CHAPTER II

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AS KING-MAKER

Power without Responsibility

1756-1765

BETWEEN 1750 and 1760 the East India Company, without desiring or intending any such result, found itself in the position of the controlling power in two important regions of India, the Carnatic (which is the coast-land of the south-east) and Bengal, the fertile and populous delta of the Ganges. This unexpected result came about through the interventions. of the Company in Indian politics and war; but these interventions were in both cases forced upon the Company, not spontaneously undertaken. In the Carnatic, intervention was dictated by the necessity of self-defence against the bold schemes of the French under Dupleix, who threatened to obtain such a hold over the native powers as would enable him to make the British position untenable. In Bengal it was the result of an attack by the young Nawab Siraj-uddaula, who was alarmed by the progress of European power in the south, and determined to destroy it in Bengal before it became too dangerous. The result in each case was that the British, hitherto inclined to regard the native powers with a good deal of fear, found that with small forces, under such competent leadership as that of Clive, they could always get the better of the huge, unorganised and often disloyal armies of the Indian princes. They used their victories to place on the thrones of these provinces rulers who would be favourable to their interests, and who, in fact, were forced to recognise that their very existence was at the

mercy of the Company. Mahomed Ali in the Carnatic, from 1753, Mir Jafar in Bengal, from 1757, knew themselves to be in this position in 1760 Mir Jafar, being found unsatisfactory, had to evacuate the throne to make way for another nominee of the Company, Mir Kasim; and when in 1763 Mir Kasim showed himself too independent, he in his turn had to disappear.

It is only the action of the Company in Bengal that is illustrated in this chapter; partly because to deal adequately with the Carnatic would involve a full treatment of the struggle with the French from 1744 to 1763, for which we have not space; partly because the position of dominion achieved in Bengal was much more complete than in the Carnatic, and formed the real base for the subsequent expansion of the British power; mainly because the treaties and contemporary narratives relating to Bengal provide the clearest illustration of the way in which the trading Company gradually developed into a territorial power. The Carnatic story can perhaps best be studied in Orme's great History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan.

The Bengal story begins with the alarm caused among the English at Calcutta by the hostility of the young Nawab Siraj-uddaula, who succeeded to the rule of Bengal in April 1756. These fears are expressed in Holwell's dispatch (No. 4). Then follows Siraj-uddaula's attack upon Calcutta and the tragedy of the Black Hole, as recorded by the French Governor of Chandernagore (No. 5), who was a hostile witness, and by Holwell, who was one of the few survivors of the Black Hole (No. 6). Holwell's vivid and famous narrative of the Black Hole is omitted from considerations of space, but is easily accessible in many forms-e.g. in Mr. S. C. Hill's Bengal in 1756-7, a useful collection of documents, which contains many independent accounts of the episode. After the fall of Calcutta a force under Clive, brought from Madras, compelled Sirajuddaula to sign a treaty promising redress and giving more favourable terms to English trade (No. 7). Siraj-uddaula's failure to fulfil this treaty, and his generally hostile attitude,

led to the opening of intrigues with his dissatisfied ministers, and finally to the campaign of Plassey. These events are described in dispatches from the Secret Committee at Calcutta (No. 8) and from Clive himself (No. 9).

The victory of Plassey was followed by the enthronement of Mir Jafar, Paymaster of the defeated Nawab; who then gave effect to a treaty of permanent alliance with the Company which he had previously signed (No. 11), and distributed vast presents to its principal servants (Nos. 12, 13).

Neither the Directors in England nor their representatives in India dreamed, even after Plassey, that they had laid the foundations of a great territorial empire, nor did they feel any responsibility for the government of the huge area which had now passed under their control. Clive, indeed, with the boldness characteristic of him, realised that direct British rule must be the outcome of the new situation, and in 1759 wrote to the great Pitt urging that the Crown should assume responsibility (No. 14). But no one was yet ready for such a step. In the eyes of almost everybody, all that had happened was that a favourable Nawab had been substituted for an unfavourable one. The Directors rejoiced in the prospect of a monopoly of export trade, their servants in the chances of immense private profits, but nobody thought of interfering in, or taking responsibility for, the conduct of a government. This was still, as before, in the hands of the Nawab and his officers.

But the position in which the English agents found themselves was such as to present terrible temptations to men whose sole purpose in India was the making of profits, who were paid absurdly small salaries, and who now found that the whole trade and population of a huge province lay at their mercy. They had before 1757 been in the habit of engaging in local trade through their banyans or native agents, and there had been many complaints of their misuse of the dastaks, or free passes, which had been allowed since 1717 for goods belonging to the Company and intended for export. These dastaks had never been intended to cover local trade, but

they were now abused on a wholesale scale, not only by the servants of the Company but by native traders who paid for the right. The Nawab's officers dared not question an English dastak or a boat with an English flag. His revenues shrank; and legitimate Indian trade was ruined by unfair competition. Moreover the servants of the Company, presuming on their position, behaved like bullies wherever they went; and the Nawab's treasury was depleted by the demands for "presents" which they made. These evils, as described by Englishmen themselves, are amply illustrated in Nos. 17-24. Under such conditions, no native government could have succeeded. But Mir Jafar, the Nawab set up after Plassey, was a nerveless and incompetent person. He had not the courage to check the misbehaviour of the English servants. But in a helpless and futile way he took part in intrigues against the Company. Bengal during his reign was repeatedly attacked by the Shahzada, the exiled son of the Mogul, who found supporters among many of the zemindars; it was attacked also by the Mahrattas. Mir Jafar was unable to defend the country with his own resources; his only protection was the Company's arms. But every such intervention made the control of the Company over Bengal more unmistakable and the restraining of its servants more difficult; while the burden of maintaining these troops formed a heavy drain upon the Company's resources, and Mir Jafar (whose treasury was exhausted) could not defray these charges. Bengal had thus fallen into a state of utter anarchy and misery; the presence of the English traders, and their exactions, increased the anarchy; while their arms prevented the outbreak of a revolution or a foreign conquest, which might have restored order.

Clearly Mir Jafar's government was a failure (No. 15). But the Company and its servants did not attribute this to the system of divided authority. They blamed Mir Jafar himself; and decided that a transfer of authority to less nerveless hands was necessary. Accordingly the Nawabship was transferred -with an ease which showed how complete was the Company's

mastery-to Mir Kasim, son-in-law of Mir Jafar; with whom a new treaty was made (No. 16) providing for the cession of lands to meet the cost of the Company's armies.

Mir Kasim was a much abler and more vigorous man than his father-in-law. Backed by the honest and well-meaning Governor Vansittart, he brought about many improvements (No. 22). But efficient government involved the laying of restrictions on the activities of the Company's servants and their Indian agents; and this brought upon Mir Kasim the bitter hostility of the majority in the Council at Calcutta, who had the power to override the well-meaning Governor. In vain did Mir Kasim complain of their high-handed acts (No. 17); in vain did the Governor try to mediate (No. 18). Vansittart got no support in the attempt to deal fairly with the Nawab except from Warren Hastings, then Resident at Kasimbazar (Nos. 19, 20). In particular the servants insisted upon using the privilege of the dastak, meant only to cover goods for export, to exempt their own local traffic, carried on in competition with the Indian merchants, from the payment of all duties. The result of this must have been the ruin of all the Indian merchants. When Vansittart and Hastings arranged a compromise with the Nawab, the Council refused to accept it. Thereupon Mir Kasim, in fairness to his own subjects, abolished trade-dues altogether. The Council actually demanded that the duties should be re-established, and only Vansittart and Hastings protested, quite in vain, against this monstrous injustice (No. 21). Mir Kasim began in desperation to prepare to fight. But the struggle was precipitated by the chief among his enemies, Ellis, the Resident at Patna, who seems deliberately to have aimed at war, in order that the obstacles to the private traffic of himself and his friends might be removed (No. 22). Driven frantic, Mir Kasim murdered a number of English prisoners captured at Patna. This made it impossible even for Vansittart to support him further. Poor old Mir Jafar was once more reinstated. The Company's armies drove Mir Kasim out of Bengal; and when the Nawab of Oudh, with the Shahzada (who had now succeeded to the