provided that all marriages where either of the parties shall have a former husband or wife living at the time of such marriage shall be invalid from the beginning and absolutely void, and the issue thereof shall be illegitimate. It was held that Moore had no former wife living at the time of the New Jersey marriage, within the meaning of the statute, and that the children born in this State of the second marriage during the lifetime of the first wife were legitimate. Barnard, P. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: The rule probably now is that the divorce severs entirely the marriage relations. The divorced wife is no longer wife, either for dower or distribution in the divorced husband's real or personal property.' In the case of Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; S. C., 40 Am. Rep. 505, a judgment of divorce had been granted in this State dissolving the marriage of Elizabeth Barker and her husband on the ground of his adultery. It also adjudged that it should not be lawful for him to marry again until her death. Subsequently he married another woman at the city of New Haven, in the State of Connecticut, during the lifetime of his former wife, and after such marriage he immediately returned and lived in this State. It was held that the marriage being lawful in the State of Connecticut must be recognized as valid in the courts of this State. In the case of the People v. Faber, 92 N. Y. 146; S. C., 44 Am. Rep. 357, it appeared that the defendant was married in 1878. In 1881 a judgment was rendered dissolving the marriage on the ground of his adultery, and afterward during the life of the plaintiff in that action he married another woman in this State. It was held that such second marriage was in violation of the statute prohibiting a party convicted of adultery in a divorce action from marrying again in this State during the lifetime of the other party, and that he was guilty of the crime of bigamy. Rapallo, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, after quoting the statute constituting the crime of bigamy, says the language clearly implies that not terminates the marriage. The parties are separated and freed from the obligations of the marriage contract, but the party convicted of adultery shall not be permitted to marry again until the death of the innocent party. It is contended on the part of the appellant that the decree of divorce was not intended to cut off or deprive the innocent party of her right to share in the personal estate of her husband. That on the death of Ensign she became his widow within the meaning of the statute, so as to entitle her to a distributive share of his personal estate. The authorities upon this question are exceedingly meagre, and so far as this State is concerned the question appears to be new. Bishop, in his work on Marriage and Divorce (vol. 2), at section 705, says: 'Coming now to consider the effect of the dissolution of a valid marriage upon property rights, we must remember that the decree of divorce, so far from undoing the original marriage, expressly affirms it, and therefore does not restore the parties to their former condition, but places them in a new one. Consequently all transfers of property which were actually executed, either in law or fact, abide; for example, the personal estate of the wife, reduced to possession by the husband, remains his after the divorce the same as before. But we shall see in subsequent sections that this divorce puts an end to all rights depending upon the marriage and not actually vested, as dower in the wife, curtesy in the husband, and his right to reduce to possession her choses in action. When, after this divorce, the man dies, the woman is not his widow, and therefore no rights which the law gives to widows are hers.' In the case of Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95, it was held that a divorce dissolving the marriage contract on the ground of adultery of the husband, does not deprive the wife of her right of dower in his real estate acquired during the coverture. In the case of Kade v. Lauber, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 288, it was held that a woman divorced on the ground of the adultery of her husband is not entitled to dower in lands of which he became seised after the divorce, but other-withstanding, such a person is placed in the situawise as to lands of which the husband was seised during the coverture and before the divorce. It was also held that the decree of divorce under the statute puts an end to the marriage; that the marriage contract is dissolved from and after the decree. These decisions are placed upon the ground that the inchoate right of dower becomes a vested interest as soon as the husband is seised, and that although the divorce may dissolve and 'terminate the marriage it does not take away a vested interest in real estate previously acquired. In the case of Moore v. Hegeman, 27 Hun, 68, the wife of one Moore brought an action for divorce on the ground of his adultery, and procured a judgment granting her a divorce, and forbidding him to marry again during her life. Thereafter Moore went with a woman to the State of New Jersey and married her, returning to this State after the ceremony, and continued to reside here. The statute of New Jersey tion of having a husband or wife living for the purposes of the act. In the case of the Final Accounting in the Estate of Samuel Webb, 1 Tuck. 372,it was held that where Webb was divorced from his wife by the Supreme Court of this State and forbidden to remarry during her lifetime, but went to reside in New Jersey and remarried there, and afterward returned to this State and died, leaving a widow and children of the second marriage, the second marriage was valid, and the widow and children of that marriage were entitled to his personal property to be set apart under our statutes; that the interest which the first wife had in her husband's property had been liquidated in the shape of alimony paid to her under the judgment of the Supreme Court during the lifetime of Webb. In the case of Chenowith v. Chenowith, 14 Ind. 2, it was held that if a married woman obtains a divorce and alimony she has no interest as survivor in the estate of her husband. Hanna, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 'Her marital interest as survivor depended upon her being his wife at the time of his death.' In the case of Dobson v. Butler, 17 Mo. 87, it was held that a woman who had been divorced from her husband is not, at his death, entitled, under the statute, to administration upon his estate. Ryland, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: "That it is the opinion of the court that it is manifest that the provisions of the statute were for | the benefit of the widow and family, and the widow therein named must have been, at the time of the death, the wife of the husband; that the relation of husband and wife must have existed between them up to the death; that a wife when divorced from her husband is not, and cannot be the widow contemplated in the statute of administration.' So much for the authorities bearing upon the question. From them it appears that the wife, notwithstanding the divorce, is entitled to the inchoate dower interest of which she became vested during coverture. The prohibitory clause of the statute preventing remarriage of the other party still continues the marriage to the extent that the person may be convicted of bigamy in case of remarriage in this State. But as to everything else, the tendency of the authorities is to the effect that the decree of divorce entirely dissolves and terminates the marriage relation, and that this terminates also the property rights of one in the estate of the other. * in the case of Graff v. Kinney, 1 How. Pr. (N. S.) 59, in which the opposite result was reached. And again, in the case of Noel v. Kinney, 31 Alb. L. J. 328, in which the decision in the case of Graff v. Kinney was criticised and disagreed with, and the decision in the former case concurred in. So far as we have been able to discover, the precise question has not been passed upon in the General Term or the Court of Appeals. In the case of Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 199, 204; S. C., 27 Am. Rep. 38, Allen, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 'The disabilities of a married woman are general, and exist at common law; the capabilities are created by statute, and are few in number and exceptional. It is for him who asserts the validity of a contract of a feme covert by evidence to bring it within the exceptions.' In the case of Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152, 160; S. C., 44 Am. Rep. 361, Earl, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says: 'The common-law incidents of marriage are swept away only by express enactments. The ability of the wife to make contracts is limited. Her general engagements are absolutely void, and she can bind herself by contract only as she is expressly authorized to do so by statute. A husband still has his common-law right of tenancy by the curtesy,' * * * and that the common-law disability of husband and wife, growing out of their unity of person to convey to each other, still existed. It is believed also that the common-law rule as to the liability of the husband for the torts and crimes of his wife are still substantially in force.' In this case it was held that under a conveyance to a husband and wife jointly, they take not as tenants in common or joint tenants, but as tenants by the entirety, and upon the death of either the sur * * If the appellant's view is correct, a man and wife at the age of twenty-two may be divorced; within five years thereafter both parties may be lawfully married to other persons, with the leave and approbation of the court; fifty years thereafter the husband may die; can it be that under such circumstances the law would recognize him as hav-vivor takes the whole estate. In the case of Coleing two widows, each entitled to a distributive share in his personal estate? We think not. Such does not appear to us to be the policy of the law. It is argued that the innocent party in a divorce action ought not to be made to suffer for the misconduct of the other. Very true, and the courts and the Legislature have been careful to protect all of the vested rights of such party, but the wife has no vested interest in the personal estate of her husband. She is only given a distributive share on the death of her husband, and her becoming his widow. But in lieu of this the courts are permitted by the statute, upon granting the decree of divorce, to make a suitable allowance for her support, having regard to the circumstances of the parties.' In Kaufman v. Schroeffel, p. 140, it was held that husband and wife may not enter into partnership with one another. The court, by Haight, J., said: "This question has recently received consideration in the case of Fairlee v. Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr. 292, in which it was held that such copartnership is not authorized by the statute, and that the common-law disability of husband and wife to so contract together still exists. It was again considered man v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17; S. C., 45 Am. Rep. 162, it was held that the statute authorizing a married woman to carry on a trade or business, and to perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account, did not absolve her from the duty to render to her husband such services in his household as are commonly expected of a married woman in her station in life. In the case of Johnson v. Rogers, 35 Hun, 267, this court has held that a deed made by a husband to his wife directly, for a mere nominal consideration, passes no legal title. At common law, by reason of the unity of husband and wife, they cannot contract together a business copartnership. This disability still continues unless it has been changed by the statute. The question therefore becomes one of construction of the statutes. And in such construction we must not forget the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed." (As we have several times recently pointed out, this holding is flatly in opposition to the Code, which abolishes the old common-law rule of construction on this point.) We omit the discussion on this point. The court conclude: "If we are correct in this reading of the section, it follows that a married woman cannot enter into a copartnership with her husband and carry on a trade or business. Again, it is argued that it has been held that a married woman may engage in a copartnership business with a person other than her husband, and that this construction of the section would be in conflict with such decisions. This, we do not think, would necessarily follow. The married woman was disqualified from engaging in business by reason of the existence of her husband. By her marriage her person was united with that of her husband, and they thereafter were regarded in law as one person. She could not contract separate and distinct from him. As soon as the husband died her disability was removed. In using the words 'sole and separate' in the statute under consideration, the Legislature doubtless had in mind the husband, and these words were doubtless intended to refer to him and to him only. The Legislature, by chapter 381 of the Laws of 1884, has now removed the disability of a married woman to contract, and she may now contract to the same extent and with like effect and in the same form as if unmarried; but it is expressly enacted that this act shall not affect or apply to any contract that shall be made between husband and wife, thus recognizing and continuing the construction that we have given." large, but they were quick and sure, for the certificate of taxation instantly opened as by magic the trustee's pocket. The presiding genii of the place were the registrars, six in number, whose duties were divided between Basinghall street and the liquidation office in Portugal street, near Lincoln's Inn. Mild inoffensiveness was the common characteristic of them all. Hazlitt, Brougham, Pepys, were respectable names, and seemed to give a certain literary flavor to their possessors, but a couple of hardheaded, suspicious, old attorneys would have been far better fitted to get through the work, and to choke off the rogues and blacklegs who infested every nook and corner of the building, than these quiet, elderly gentlemen who were evidently and consciously out of their proper sphere. So little influence did the registrars exert, and so little individuality was there about them that at the present moment we have not a recollection of their personal appearance even, except as to Hazlitt, whose ruddy face and military white moustache always suggested the idea of an old East Indian officer, presiding over a court-martial. Yet it is not too much to say that had the registrars, aided by the chief judge in bankruptcy, been equal to the not very difficult task of working out an admirably drawn act of Parliament (for the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 was, in our opinion, a model of skillful THE OLD LONDON BANKRUPTCY COURT. draughtmanship) a really efficient insolvency sys IN N a narrow, tortuous street, in the heart of the city of London, a stone's throw from Guildhall, stands, or rather stood at the time whereof we write some twelve years ago- - a large and massively built stone edifice, whose lofty, well-proportioned chambers and commodious staircases seemed to brood in silent dinginess over the ghost of a prosperous and jovial past. Once these chambers had been clothed with rich hangings and deeppiled carpets; these staircases had been trodden by merchant princes; the whole place had been redolent of solid wealth and substantial commerce, and the very name of Basinghall had the same golden flavor which still belongs to Lombard street or Capel Court. Now all was changed. The resort of merchants had become the habitation of the London Bankruptcy Court. Commerce had abandoned the spot to the mercy of the lawyers, and dusty and interminable records filled the vaults once sacred to bullion and merchandise. Yet it was still a busy place. All day long counsel and attorneys, clerks and insolvents hurried through the corridors, filing petitions and accounts, moving for injunctions and orders, searching records, paying fees. Little by little, by motions, by affidavits, by searches, by attendances, the lawyers' bills amounted up, and even the final taxation added something to the pile. Here was the paradise of red tape, the native home of six-and-eight pences. Litigation and conveyancing hid their heads in shame before the colossal profits of a bankruptcy practice. Not only were the gains tem might have been established that would have given general satisfaction. The fault of the system lay in the costs, which were far too liberal, and yet it was in this very matter of costs that the least supervision was exercised. Next to the registrars, in his own estimation, came the officer for administering oaths. His only function was to sit in an easy-chair all day and swear affidavits. By a careful cultivation of natural ferocity he had reduced his work to its smallest possible compass, and woe betide the wight who came to him with an affidavit interlined or erased. His signature, he held, was all he was bound to give, and why should he be expected to waste his valuable time initialling alterations? Once however we saw him moved, and will record the occasion, to his credit. A timid, country lad approached the dread chair in all the security of ignorance, and rendered an affidavit more like a newspaper map than a legal document. Something in the paper caught the old man's eye, and he paused to read the contents. The affidavit was an identification by a son of the body of his father, a bankrupt and a suicide. Old S. blew his nose very hard, swore, and initialled the affidavit in silence, and bidding the lad wait, went behind a screen, from which he emerged in a few moments with something in an envelope. This he handed to the boy, telling him not to open it till he got home, and then turning to ourselves, who were next in turn, vented his superfluous feeling by some very uncomplimentary remarks about our papers, in which he professed to detect something wrong. For the only time in our experience we did not feel like kicking him. Oc Oscar Lapham and Simon S. Lapham, for plaintiff. Edwin Metcalf, Nicholas Van Slyck and Stephen O. Edwards, for defendant. TILLINGHAST, J. This is a petition for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the evidence and the weight thereof, and that the damages found by the jury are excessive. The main facts in the case are not in dispute, and are substantially as follows, viz. The plaintiff, who resides at Pawtucket, was a passenger on defendant's road from Providence to Pawtucket on the night of January 2, 1883, leaving Providence in the 6:10 P. M. train, which was due at Pawtucket at 6:22 P. M. The train, which consisted of There were many other officials and departments scattered throughout the building, in varying degrees of inefficiency. Perhaps the official auditor should be exempted from the general condemnation, for as far as he could, he did check the trustees' accounts, and sometimes managed to make life a burden to them. The worst den was the record office, a horrible little room in the cellarage, reeking with gas and mustiness, and it was here that some of the grossest frauds were committed. casionally whole files (as the records were usually five cars, ran on the west track going out, and as it apcalled) were stolen; more frequently a single important sheet, a resolution of creditors, or an order of the court, was surreptitiously removed. The technicalities of bankruptcy procedure, and the illegitimate profits so easily made by an unscrupulous man attracted to the court some of the very worst class of practitioners, men quite capable of picking pockets. Our first introduction to bankruptcy practice made us acquainted with one of these fellows, a man who had sacrificed a flourishing practice to drink, and ultimately, a few years afterward, ended in the penitentiary. Our principal had to unravel the thread of a very old and complicated insolvency, and bring it to an issue. This man held all the clues in his hands, and it was our business for several days to accompany him to the different offices simply to pay the necessary fees on the papers, for he could not be trusted with a shilling. When the business was finished he received a liberal fee, and in less than a fort NEGLIGENCE-INFERENCE EITHER WAY-QUES RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT, JULY 25, 1885. DE *To appear in 15 Rhode Island Reports. proached the Dexter street crossing, which is about six hundred feet south of the Pawtucket station, which is on the west side of the track, it was signalled to stop by a crossing tender of the road, and did stop. When it came to a standstill the engine and one car had passed over said Dexter street crossing, the remainder of the train being over and immediately to the south thereof. A freight train on the east track was about to pass the Pawtucket station going south, and the sigual to the passenger train to stop was given to prevent the latter from reaching the station at the time when said freight train was passing the same, and to avoid the consequent liability to accident on the part of the passengers. No notice was given in the smoking car that the train had not arrived at the station. Directly upon the stopping of the train the plaintiff, who occupied a seat near to the forward door of this car, which was next the engine, went to the front platform, and having alighted, attempted to cross the east track of said road, going in the direction of his home. In the act of crossing he was struck by the engine of said freight train, knocked down, his right leg so badly injured that it had to be amputated just below the knee, and other injuries inflicted. The cars were well quite a number of whom were for Pawtucket; and filled with passengers at the time of the accident, when the train stopped, as aforesaid, many of them, supposing that they had arrived at the station, arose from their seats, and started to leave the cars. The plaintiff testified upon this point as follows: "There are two tracks laid side by side. George Brown was with me. * * * Finally the train stopped, and I thought we had got to the depot. Judging by the time I thought it was just about time to get to the Pawtucket depot. I never thought any thing about Dexter street, for I had never stopped there before. I thought I was at the depot, and felt perfectly safe in getting out. That is the side I always got off at. * I got out the same as I always had at the depot. It was dark, and I could not see what there was in front of me. It is just the common distance between the two tracks." * * * * * It was and long had been the custom for passengers to board and leave trains at the Pawtucket station, on either side thereof, without caution or restriction from the officers or servants of the road; and passengers alighting from a train at said station on the east side of a train going north would necessarily descend upon the ground, there being no platform between the tracks, and would cross the east track, which is the one used by inward, Providence-bound trains. There were platforms on each side of the double track at the station, the one on the east side however being very short and used mainly in the handling of baggage, but it frequently happened that they were not of sufficient length to accommodate the entire trains stopping there; in which cases passengers in the extreme front and rear cars descending upon either side thereof would frequently alight upon the ground. The train in which plaintiff was a passenger was on time, and it had never before stopped, so far as the employees of the defendant knew, at said Dexter street crossing. One of the printed rules of the road provided that " When a passenger and freight train approach a station at the same time the freight train must always be stopped before reaching it, and wait for the passenger train, and no switching will be done until it has passed." Said rules took effect January 1, 1879. But since then the road has been provided with electric signals; and to meet this new condition of things the superintendent has from time to time supplemented and varied these rules and regulations by personal instructions given to the employees of the company. At the time of the accident both trains and the crossings were in charge of the usual number of careful, competent and experienced officials, and the gates at said Dexter street crossing were closed and furnished with the lights ordinarily used at such places. The conductor of the passenger train had no warning of the intended stop or the cause thereof. He proceeded promptly to ascertain the cause, and having done so, caused his train to move forward slowly to the station. The stop at said crossing was but momentary. The engine on the freight train carried a head-light which lighted the track in front for a considerable distance. There was a curve in the road however at and near to said Dexter street crossing, which prevented said head-light to some extent from lighting the track where the accident occurred. Said freight train was running at the rate of about fifteen miles per hour; and both the engineer and fireman thereon saw the plaintiff on the track before he was struck, but it was impossible then to stop the train or lessen its speed before it struck him. The plaintiff was well acquainted with the surroundings at said crossing and at the station, having been ou the police force of the town for several years, and had frequently been a passenger on defendant's road between Providence and Pawtucket. There is some conflict of testimony as to whether it was cloudy and foggy at the time of the accident; but it was dark and there was no moon. The witness, Sewell Read, testified upon this point as follows: "It was a very dark night; that is, it was misty. It is just as dark when you get opposite the depot as it is there, place of the accident. * * * Going on the opposite side, from the depot, you are going into total darkness. There is a light on Exchange street, clear at the corner of the bridge, but you could not tell by that, I should think." The jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages at $6,000. The defendant contends, first, that upon this state of facts there is no evidence of negligence on its part; and second, that there is evidence of gross carelessness on the part of the plaintiff. In regard to the degree of care which the law imposes upon common carriers of passengers, it is settled by a long and uninterrupted line of adjudications that they are bound to exercise the utmost care and skill which prudent men would use under similar circumstances; and that they are liable for injuries resulting from even the slightest negligence on the part of themselves or their servants. Weed v. Panama R. Co., 5 Duer, 193; Maverick v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 378; Caldwell v. Murphy, 1 Duer, 233; Edwards v. Lord, 49 Me. 279; Sales v. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa, 547; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Simmons v. New Bedford Steamboat Co., 97 Mass. 361; McElroy v. Nashua & Lowell R. Corp., 4 Cush. 400; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1, and cases there cited; Stokes v. Salton. stall, 13 Pet. 181, 191; Bowen v. New York Cent. R. Co., 18 N. Y. 408; Thayer v. St. Louis, Alton, etc., R. Co., 22 Ind. 26; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. George, 19 Ill. 510; Virginia Cent. R. Co. v. Sanger, 15 Gratt. 230; N. & C. R. Co. v. Messino, 1 Sneed, 220. It is also equally well settled that the question as to whether or not the defendant in a given case is chargeable with negligence is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the jury, under proper instructions from the court as to what constitutes negligence. And the same is true in regard to contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. And although there are cases in which, the facts being undisputed, and being decisive of the case, it becomes the duty of the court to decide, as matter of law, upon the question of negligence, yet it is only in those cases where the question of fact is entirely free from doubt, and where only one conclusion can be fairly arrived at therefrom, that the court has the right to thus apply the law without the action of the jury. In the language of the court in Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N. Y. 622, cited on defendant's brief, When, from the circumstances shown, inferences are to be drawn which are not certain and incontrovertible, and may be differently made by different minds, it is for the jury to make them; that is to say, when the process is to be had at a trial of ascertaining whether one fact had being from the existence of another fact, it is for the jury to go through with that process." Or as is tersely said by Cooley, C. J., in Detroit & Milwaukee R. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 122, also cited by defendant: "When the question arises upon a state of facts on which reasonable men may fairly arrive at different conclusions, the fact of negligence cannot be determined until one or other of these conclusions has been drawn by the jury. The inferences to be drawn from the evidence must either be certain and incontrovertible or they cannot be decided upon by the court. Negligence cannot be conclusively established by a state of facts upon which fair-minded men may well differ. See also Bernhardt v. Rensselaer & Saratoga R. Co., 32 Barb. 165; Shear. & Redf. Neg., § 11, and notes; Keller v. New York Cent. R. Co., 2. Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 480; Ireland v. Oswego, etc., Plank Road Co., 13 N. Y. 526, 533; Wells Questions of Law and Fact, 265, and authorities cited. The case at bar, in our judgment, is not one in which the court sitting with a jury could pass upon the question of negligence as matter of law. For while the main facts therein are not in dispute, yet the inferences and deductions to be drawn therefrom are not so manifest and apparent as to warrant the court in declaring them. They were therefore properly left to the jury, and, we are bound to presume, under as favorable a construction of the law as the defendant was entitled to. For represented as it was at the jury trial by able and diligent counsel, it made no objection that the law applicable to the facts in proof was not fully and clearly stated. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the only question now is whether that finding was clearly, palpably and decidedly against the evidence and the weight thereof, or in other words, whether the evidence very strongly preponderates against the verdict. Johnson v. Blanchard, 5 R. I. 24, 25. If so the court should set it aside; but if not so, it should not be disturbed. Upon a careful study of all the evidence and the law applicable thereto, we are unable to say that there is a very strong preponderance of evidence against the verdict. There were many facts and circumstances connected with the case which it was the peculiar province of the jury to weigh and consider, and from which it was their prerogative to draw such inferences as in their good judgment they might legitimately and fairly draw. For instance, we think that the question as to whether the defendant was guilty of negligence in stopping the train so near to the station in the night |