Brady v. N. W. Ins. Co., 11 Mich. 425.

When the Fire Association made their election in the mode indicated in their contract, the contract became precisely what they elected to make it, and the rights of the parties were thereby fixed. They cannot now recede from their election without the consent of Rosenthal, whatever may be the consequence as to expense. In Brown v. Royal Ins. Co., 1 Ell. & Ell. 853, the defendants executed a policy insuring plaintiff's premises against fire, reserving to themselves the right to reinstatement in preference to the payment of claims.' The premises were damaged by fire, and defendants elected to reinstate them, but did not do so. To an action for not paying, compensating or reinstating, defendants pleaded that they elected to reinstate, and were proceeding to do so when the commissioners of sewers, under the Metropolitan Building Act, 1885, caused the premises to be taken down, as being a structure in a dangerous condition, and that such dangerous condition was not caused by damage from the fire. On demurrer, held by Lord Campbell, C. J., Crompton, J., and Hill, J. (dissentiente, Erle, J.), that the plea was bad, inasmuch as the contract to reinstate being lawful at and ever since the time of contracting, the alleged impossibility of its performance was no defense, and defendants were bound, if they could not perform it, to pay damages for not doing This case is cited with approval in Wood on Insurance, 262, and in May on Insurance, 535; and in their discussion of the subject the same general view of the law is by both authors adopted. In some of the States a different or somewhat modified rule has been asserted, but an examination will show that the cases were controlled either by the express provisions of the company's charter or of the contract itself."

So.

In Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 37 Hun, 413, it was held the common council had no power to require street railway companies, under penalty, to provide conductors as well as drivers. The plaintiff's act of incorporation subjected it to city ordinances in the "operation" of the road, and the common council had power to "regulate and license" carriers of passengers. Barnard, J., said: "No reason can be given why a conductor is necessary to public safety or to the security of the passengers. The lines of omnibuses in all large cities have been run always without a conductor. No complaint has ever been made, and no practical injury has been suffered which a conductor would have prevented." Pratt, J., said: "It is obvious that the general jurisdiction to enact ordinances regulating the use of streets does not authorize an arbitrary and unlimited exercise of power, otherwise it might require two men to operate a wheelbarrow or a hand cart. It was therefore the duty of the trial judge to look into all the circumstances which bore upon this question. The experience of persons engaged in the business of using one-horse cars in other cities, the liability of danger from their use, the ease with which one man might manage

them, differences of construction between these and two-horse cars, which are usually operated by two men, so far as it would illustrate the point at issue, any special circumstances in the grade of the road, the width of the streets along the line, and a widespread variety of considerations suggested by the experience of practical railroad men. I entertain no doubt that among these relevant considerations was the question of expense to the company, not that mere inconvenience or diminution of profits would be sufficient to determine the point, but that these matters, along with others, might throw some light upon the question at issue. This company has a right to operate its road, and exercise its franchise without any unreasonable limitations, until the sovereign power interferes by making arbitrary requirements. Suppose it possible that it could be shown that this kind of car could be more easily operated by one man than a two-horse car could be managed by two, and with the same or even greater assurances of safety to the passengers and the public, and with less obstruction and inconvenience upon the streets, and greater convenience to the travelling public, would not this state of things help to test the reasonableness of this requirement? It is apparent from an inspection of the case as settled, that the trial judge proceeded upon the defendant's theory, and hence excluded and refused to consider this class of testimony." Dykman, J., dissented.

COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES.

EFFORT

In

FFORT.-"Effort or demonstration" is not equivalent to "intention to execute." Miles v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 156, the court said: "The law upon this subject is that to justify under threats, it must be shown that at the time of the homicide the person killed, by some act then done, manifested an intention to execute the threats.' In the qualification above cited the learned judge departs from the statute, and for some act manifesting an intention to execute the threats,' he substitutes 'made any effort or demonstration.' Now, whether he intended to qualify effort by demonstration, or demonstration by effort, we know not. Demonstration has several meanings. The first given by Mr. Webster was certainly not intended by the learned judge. The second is in harmony with the meaning given by our courts to 'manifest.' It is an expression of the feeling by outward signs; a manifestation; a show.' 'Effort' means 'an exertion of strength; strenuous endeavors; laborious attempts; struggle directed to the accomplishment of an object; exertion, as an attempt to scale a wall; an effort to excel.' (Webster's Unabridged Dictionary.) There is no work in the English language, we think, better understood by the people generally than 'effort.' And when told that an effort must have been made to execute the threats, the jury doubtless understood the court to mean an attempt. This means something more than a demonstration, or an act manifesting an in

BENEFICIAL.- In Von Brockdorf v. Malcolm, Ch. Div., 53 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 263, it was held that this word in a testamentary provision concerning property in which the testator had a "beneficial disposing power," did not mean beneficial to himself. The court said: "I start therefore with the proposition that the gentleman undoubtedly meant to exercise what power he had. It is said that the word 'beneficial' limits it, and no doubt Mr. Cozens-Hardy is quite right in saying that in the case of Ames v. Cadogan, 12 Ch. Div., Fry, J., did put a construction upon the word 'beneficial' (I do not want to shrink from a case which seems to stand in my way), which points to the word 'beneficial' meaning beneficial to the person exercising the power. I confess, with all respect to that very learned judge, that I am not disposed to think that you can altogether limit the word 'beneficial' in any case in that way. I am far from thinking or suggesting that he was not perfectly right in limiting the word 'beneficial' in that will, and if his observation had been that on that will the word 'beneficial' was to be construed as he said it was to be construed, I do not know that any person could have raised any doubt upon his dictum. The only doubt I venture to hazard on the opinion of so learned a judge is this, that the word 'beneficial' need not necessarily have that meaning. To my mind, the use of the word 'beneficial' in our language is exceedingly inaccurate, and I think it is more frequently used in the passive sense, or I should rather say it is more frequently used in the reflective sense than in the active sense.

-

We are

just as much accustomed to talk of a man exercising his power, or using his wealth, or doing any thing else in a beneficial way-meaning in a way to benefit others- as we are to talk of a man doing it in a way to benefit himself. When therefore I have the words here 'over which at the time of my decease I shall have any beneficial disposing power by this, my will,' I only say I do not think it necessary, when I come to that clause, to confine the word 'beneficial' to mean a power by which he would benefit himself."

MANUFACTURE.- Ice companies are not " manufacturers." People v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 99 N. Y. 181. The court said: "We cannot fail to see that neither it nor its operations are in any way concerned with the manufacture or sale of an artificial product. Its dealing is with 'ice,' as an existing article, not the manufacture or production of ice by combination of materials, or the application of forces, or otherwise. It collects, stores and preserves that which natural causes created, and which other

natural causes would destroy and waste. It seeks only to hold these last in check. Similar operations would equally apply to water, fruit, sand, gravel, coal and other natural productions. Water might be improved by filtration, fruit by judicious pruning of the tree or vine, or protection by glass, sand and gravel by screening, cobble-stones by selection, and coal by breaking, and each, by various processes, stored until the season of demand, when having been collected, stored, preserved and prepared for sale,' the natural articles, and no other would be put upon the market. No doubt ice may be manufactured, and frigoric effects produced by artificial means. Corporations exist for that purpose, and come literally within our manufacturing laws. Their methods in no respect resemble those of the defendant. Its tools and implements are for convenience in handling and marketing a product, and not at all for making it. Many cases are cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, but we find none so comprehensive as to include this case. They all, so far as they have any application, require the production of some article, thing or object by skill or labor out of raw material, or from matter which has already been subjected to artificial forces, or to which something has been added to change its natural condition."

WAGON.-A dray is a wagon. Cone v. Lewis, Texas Supreme Court, 1885. The court said: "The statute exempts from forced sale if owned by the head of a family, or family, one wagon, one carriage, or one buggy. In determining whether a dray is embraced within the meaning of the word 'wagon,' it is proper to look to the meaning of the Legislature in giving the exemption, and no such restricted meaning should be given to it as will defeat that intention. The intention of the Legislature was to protect all (heads of families) in the pursuit of their occupations, and a correct construction of the law would seem to protect the drayman and cartman in possession of their vehicles, although they do not come within the strict definition of the word 'wagon.' Rogers v. Fergerson, 32 Tex. 535; Nichols v. Claiborne, 39 id. 306; Gordon v. Shields, 7 Kans. 324; Quigley v. Gorham, 5 Cal. 418. The statute does not give the exemption of a vehicle which may be classed as a 'wagon to persons only who may be farmers, or who pursue some given occupation, but 'to every family,' and the fact that the plaintiff was pursuing the occupation of a drayman, or that he used the vehicle in any peculiar way, could not defeat the exemption. To a person pursuing the business of a drayman such an exemption would seem peculiarly appropriate, and in harmony with the spirit of the statute which exempts all implements of husbandry' and 'tools, apparatus and books belonging to any trade or profession.'”

CHILD. A "child is a boy not above fourteen, or a girl not above twelve years of age." Bell v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 53. The court said: "The proper meaning of the word 'child' has not, if our recollection serves us, ever been defined. * * *

Resort then must be had to the common meaning and acceptation of the word 'child.' Mr. Webster defines it to mean 'a young person of either sex; hence one who exhibits the character of a very young person;' and this is its common acceptation. It means a young person as contradistinguished from one of age sufficient to be supposed to have settled habits and fixed discretion. Mr. Webster defines the word boy' to mean 'a male child from birth to the age of puberty;' and 'puberty' in civil law is the age in boys of fourteen and in girls of twelve years.' Bouv. Law Dic. As the law now stands, we believe that the age of fourteen in boys and twelve years in girls limits the age of childhood."

STRONGLY CORROBORATED.—“Our statute, in using the words 'strongly corroborated,' means that the corroborating evidence must relate to a material matter, that is, must tend to show the falsity of defendant's oath, and taken all together it must be, in the opinion of both the court and the jury, strong, that is, cogent, powerful, forcible, calculated to make a deep or effectual impression upon the mind. But this character of corroborating evidence may be produced by the proof of independent facts and circumstances, which when considered separately, would not be sufficient, but when con

any

having its tickets of a certain weight or thickness, could tell the name of every voter who had supported the nominees of the party. Still, if the paper was not colored, and had no distinguishing mark placed upon it, these particular votes could not be rejected. The law does not prescribe that the tickets shall be square, or oblong, or round, or in other shape known to geometry, and those we are considering, being somewhat in the shape of a rhomboid, were not illegal. From an examination of these tickets it is evident also that the spirit and intention of the law are not violated by the use of them. They are easily folded in such a manner as to render it impossible for the closest observer to tell of what shape the paper on which they are printed is when spread out to its full size. We cannot see from an inspection of them that the secrecy of the ballot or the independence of the voter will be interfered with by allowing such tickets to be counted." But in Oglesby v. Sigman, 58 Miss. 502, it was very foolishly held that printer's rules or dashes between headings and names were "devices."

INSURABLE INTEREST IN LIFE. I.

words the corroboration may be by circumstantial evidence, consisting of proof of independent facts which together tend to establish the main fact, that is, the falsity of the oath, and which together strongly corroborate the truth of the testimony of the single witness who has testified to such falsity." Hernandez v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 134.

DEVICE.- A diamond-shaped ballot is not a "device" within a statute prohibiting" devices" on ballots. State v. Phillips, 63 Tex. 390. The court said: "By the word 'device,' as used in the statute, was doubtless meant a figure, mark or ornament of a similar character, with the pictures, signs, etc., enumerated in the same connection, and placed upon the ticket in a like manner. This is the natural and legal construction to be placed upon the word in the connection in which it is used, and we do not feel authorized to extend its meaning in restriction of the right of a voter to cast his ballot for the candidate of his choice. * * * It was doubtless the conclusion of the Legislature that if tickets were allowed to be printed upon colored paper, or if marks, pictures or stamps were placed upon them, it would be within the power of persons other than the voter to ascertain the nature of his vote when offered to the managers, and as a consequence, to exert an improper control over the voter, or punish him for the manner in which he exercised the right of suffrage. If they had supposed that the same evil result would follow from allowing tickets to be made in different shapes they doubtless would have prescribed the form of the paper on which they should be written or printed. It might happen that a political party, by

various statutory enactments in the several States are only declaratory of what had long been a settled doctrine of the jurisprudence of this country. This was held in Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9, 17, and Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 23 id. 516-526. In the last case the court thus stated the conclusion to which an investigation of the subject had led it: "My conclusion therefore is that the statute of 14 George III, avoiding wager policies upon lives, was simply declaratory of the common law, and that all such policies would be void, independently of that act." There seems to have been some uncertainty as to whether this rule obtained prior to the above act of Parliament; but it is impossible to believe that the English judiciary would ever have incorporated into the jurisprudence of that country any other principle. The anomaly would have been unexampled had the court sustained a life insurance upon a life in which the party procuring the insurance had no interest, and at the same time had held void a similar insurance on property. As the court said in Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., supra: “But policies without interest upon lives are more pernicious and dangerous than any other class of wager policies; because temptations to tamper with life are more mischievous than incitements to mere pecuniary frauds." But such a policy was held valid in Dalby v. India and London Life As. Co., 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 312. The considerations of public policy which form the basis of this doctrine have been nowhere better stated than in Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 249. The court said: "It is a general rule of law that no one can procure valid insurance on a life unless he has an interest in that life. I may insure my own life, for I have an interest in it. But an entire stranger to me, one who has no interest in my life, as a creditor or otherwise, cannot take out a valid policy on it. Should he procure such policy the law would condemn it as a mere wager, a bet on my life, a gambling contract; and there could be no recovery thereon. This rule prevails, not in the interest of insurance com

panies or out of regard for them. The rule has its foundation in good morals and sound public policy. It has been well said of such wager policies that 'if valid they would not only afford facilities for a demoralizing system of gaming, but furnish strong temptations to the party interested to bring about if possible the event insured against.' The annals of crime furnish more than one instance where murder has been perpetrated by the holders of such policies, that they might reap the fruits of speculative insurance upon the life of their victim. If an entire stranger to me were permitted to take out insurance on my life, his sole interest, you must perceive, would be in my speedy death. The law therefore wisely takes from him the temptation to bring about the event by forbidding such contract. The evils of gambling in such policies are also apparent and great, and therefore the law will not sauction insurance obtained for the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a life in which the assured has no interest." The most succinct and at the same time most accurate definition of a wager policy is the one to be found in Ruse v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., supra, at page 523: "A policy obtained by a party who has no interest in the subject of insurance is a mere wager policy." The word "obtained" is italicised because, as will be shown subsequently, an insurance on life in favor of one who has no interest in the life insured, is not necessarily void as a wager policy, provided the insurance is not obtained by the party claiming the money, but voluntarily procured by the person whose life is insured, and made payable to such party.

Starting then with the admitted principle that a policy of insurance in favor of a person who has no insurable interest in the life insured is generally void, the question naturally arises as to what constitutes an insurable interest within the meaning of this rule. The United States Supreme Court have stated the general rule with admirable precision and clearness in Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775: "It is not easy to define with precision what will in all cases constitute an insurable interest so as to take the contract out of the class of wager policies. It may be stated generally however to be such an interest, arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation; for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent; a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful as operating more efficaciously to protect the life of the insured than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the insured; otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire for the event. They are therefore, independently of any statute on the subject, condemned as being against public policy." It will be seen from the concluding sentence of this extract from the opinion that the national Supreme Court considered it as settled law that such contracts were void at common law. It cannot be said that in the present state of the law on the subject every statement of an insurable interest contained in or the general rule laid down in the foregoing opinion has the support of adjudications. But the principle which it is

there stated should govern in the determination of the question of an insurable interest is so just and so consistent with the reasons on which wager policies are declared to be void, that it must ultimately be adopted by every American court. The substance of the opinion may be summed up in the following questions: Has the person for whom the insurance is obtained any pecuniary interest in the life insured? Is he so connected by consanguinity or affinity with the person whose life is insured that it is highly improbable that he would gamble on the uncertainty of such life, and that it is highly improbable that any pecuniary consideration would prompt or tempt him to destroy such life or desire its termination? If either of the foregoing questions can be answered in the affirmative the policy is valid. Perhaps the views of the writer are hardly sustained by the opinion last cited; but they seem to rest on the fundamental principles which underlie all the authorities.

The next inquiry is what has been settled on the subject of insurable interest by judicial decisions.

That a wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband has been decided by every court before which the question has come. Baker v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. 283; McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383; Gambs v. Covenant Life Ins. Co., 50 id. 44; Equitable Life Ins. Soc. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338; Holabird v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 2 Dill. C. C. 166; St. John v. American Life Ins. Co.,2 Duer,419; Brummer v. Cohn,86 N. Y. 14; Lord v. Dale, 12 Mass. 115; Loomis v. Eagle Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 396; Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457; Warnock v. Davis, 104 id. 775; Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N. Y. 73; Thompson v. A. T. Life & Sav. Ins. Co., 46 id. 674; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen (Mass. Sup. Ct.), 30 Alb. L. J. 363.

A husband has no insurable interest in his wife's life. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419. But an insurable interest in the life of his wife was held to exist in Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, supra. In this last case the court held that the policy being valid in its inception, the subsequent divorce of the parties would not vitiate it. To same effect, Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 601, and Bliss Life Ins., § 30. See also McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383.

In Chisholm v. National Capitol Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213, the court went far beyond all precedents and sustained a policy of insurance on the life of a man in favor of his betrothed. This decision however is unquestionably correct on principle.

The English law would seem to be opposed to a policy issued on the life of a child in favor of the father. Halford v. Kymer, 10 B. & C. 724. But the rule is just the reverse in this country. All the cases sustain the insurability of the interest which the father has in the life of his child. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S.457; Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kane,81 Penn. St. 154; Williams v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 31 Iowa, 541; Mitchell v. Union Life Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104; Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 396; Hoyt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775; Grattan v. National Life Ins. Co., 15 Hun, 74; May Ins., §§ 102-111; Bliss Life Ins., §§ 20-31. In Grattan v. National Life Ins. Co. the law of insurable interest is so clear that a brief quotation from the opinion will be of value: "It seems to be well-settled law that a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child. The insured need not necessarily have any pecuniary interest in the life of the cestui que vie. The contract of life insurance is not one merely of indemnity for a pecuniary loss, as in marine and fire policies; it is sufficient to show that the policy is not invalid as a wager policy. If it appear that the relation, whether of consanguinity or affinity, was such between the person whose life was insured aud the beneficiary named in the policy as warrants the

conclusion that the beneficiary had an interest, whether pecuniary or arising from dependence or natural affection, in the life of the person insured, such interest will uphold the policy.'

A mother has been held to have an insurable interest in the life of a child. Reif v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 17 Ins. Chron. 13.

In Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35, the court decided that a child has not as such an insurable interest in the life of a parent; that to recover on the policy he must show dependence on the parent, or that some substantial advantage is likely to be derived by the child from the continuance of the parent's life. This case is unsound in principle; and it moreover establishes an inconvenient and uncertain rule. Opposed to it are the dicta of Shaw, C. J., in Loomis v. Eagle Life Ins. Co., supra, and of the United States Supreme Court in Warnock v. Davis, supra, and the case of Reserve Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Kane, 15 Alb. L. J. 3; S. C., 81 Penn. St. 154.

A brother has no insurable interest in the life of his brother. Lewis v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 39 Conn. 100. Neither has an uncle in the life of his nephew. Singleton v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 66 Mo. 63. Nor nephew in life of uncle. Mowry v. Home Life Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346. But a sister has been held to have an insurable interest in the life of her brother, on whom she is dependent; Lord v. Dale, 12 Mass. 115; and a married sister in life of brother, on whom she is dependent. Frances v. Etna Life Ins. Co., 2 Ins. L. J. 657. The right to recover on the policy in the first case was based, not on the mere relation existing between the parties, but on the fact that the sister had a pecuniary interest in her brother's life because of her dependence on him. It is not necessary that there should have been a valid marriage between the person whose life is insured and the beneficiary. It is sufficient if the parties are living together as husband and wife. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Paterson, 41 Ga. 338; Estate of Mueller, 31 Alb. L. J. 283. In each of these cases it appeared that the husband whose life was insured in favor of the woman with whom he was living as his wife had another wife living at the time the policy was issued; and yet both policies were sustained. In the last case the court said: "Judged by the reason of the principle, there can be no doubt that Maria Mueller had an insurable interest in the life of John Mueller, when the policy was taken out for her benefit. She had married him in good faith; had borne him children; had kept his house; had aided him in business and helped him accumulate his estate; and he had treated her as his wife; had supported her as such; she had passed in society as such, and was dependent on him for support.' Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Puterson, supra. She had therefore, as in fact occupying the relation of wife, a deep interest in the preservation of his life. But she had also an interest as the mother of his children. He was under a natural obligation to maintain them until they could maintain themselves."

A creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. Rawls v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282; Brockway v. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 249; Dalby v. India & London Life Ins. Co., 15 C. B. 365; Olmsted v. Keyes, 85 N. Y. 599; Ferguson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 32 Hun, 306; Goodwin v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 497.

In Rawls v. American Mutual Life Ins. Co. the court decided that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the life of one Fish, although the interest which plaintiff had in the life of Fish as creditor was his interest in a debt due to a firm of which he, the plaintiff, was a member from a partnership of which Fish was a member.

While it is true that a creditor has an insurable in

terest in the life of his debtor, that interest is not unlimited. The creditor cannot arbitrarily insure the life of his debtor in any amount irrespective of the amount of the debt. It has been expressly held that he cannot take out a policy largely in excess of his claim. Fox v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Big. L. & A. Ins. Cas. 458; Morrell v. Trenton Mutual Life Ins. & Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 282.

That he may insure his debtor's life in an amount exceeding his claim is settled by authority and clear upon principle. If he were limited to the actual sum due, he could never obtain indemnity, for the premiums paid would steadily reduce the net amount to be received under the policy and the interest accruing would increase at the same time the amount of his claim. The following case sustains this doctrine. Goodwin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 480. In this case the amount of the debt was $1,200, and the court sustained a policy of $5,000. The authority however is somewhat weakened by the fact that the insured was the sister of the person whose life was insured. The court seems to have based its conclusion, in part at least, on the ground of the relation existing between the parties. "Another answer to this point' (that the policy was void as a wager policy) "is that the insured was a brother and near relative of the plaintiff, allied by the strongest ties of kindred, and that she had a pecuniary interest in his life as creditor. There is sufficient in the evidence to show that he owed her the sum of $1,200, which was outstanding against him and unpaid. Occupying the position referred to she is brought directly within the exception of the statute which prohibits wager policies. The plaintiff had clearly an insurable interest in the life of the insured, and the policy was not within the prohibition of the statute. Nor under the circumstances is there any ground for holding that the recovery should be limited to the amount loaned by the plaintiff to the insured."

It is not necessary that the creditor should have held a claim which he could have enforced by legal proceedings.

In Rivers v. Gregg, 5 Rich. Eq. 274, the insurance was on the life of an infant debtor. No action could have been maintained on the debt as the claim was not for necessaries; and yet the policy was sustained on the ground that the creditor had an insurable interest in the infant debtor's life. That it is not necessary that the amount of the policy should correspond with the amount of the creditor's claim is exemplified in a class of cases that were decided shortly after the breaking out of the gold fever. Parties in the east advanced sums of money to persons who were anxious to go out to the gold mines but had no capital to procure outfit and pay expenses. Those who advanced the money had an interest in the profits of the business. In every case an insurance on the life of the person to whom the money was advanced and in favor of the party making the advancement was sustained, although the amount of the policy largely exceeded the sum advanced. Miller v. Eagle Life Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith, 268; Hoyt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Morrell v. Trenton Life Ins. Co., 10 Cush. 282; Bevin v. Conn. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244; Trenton Mut. Life and Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zabr. 576.

In Bevin v. Conn. Life Ins. Co., the amount loaned was $300, and the court sustained a policy of $1,000.

In Hoyt v. New York Life Ins. Co., the policy was $1,000, and the sum advanced about $200. The policy was held valid. It is true that in each one of these cases the insured had an interest in the life of the debtor exceeding the amount of the debt, as he was to share in the profits, but that interest was not capable of being accurately or even approximately estimated;