Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371. Its power however to do so in case of the exercise of any trade or business which is either illegal or dangerous to human life, detrimental to health, or the occasion of great public inconvenience, is not only conferred by the provisions of the statute, but belongs to the general powers possessed by courts of equity to prevent irreparable mischief and obviate damages for which no adequate remedy exists at law. N. Y. Const., act of 1882, §§ 636, 637, 646; Story Eq. Jur., §§ 921, 924: Eden Inj., ch. 11. Whatever source of jurisdiction is appealed to, the rule governing its exercise is the same, and the court will inquire not alone as to the unlawfulness or offensiveness of the act complained of, but also as to its extent, the circumstances surrounding its exercise, and the degree of danger to be apprehended from its continuance. It was said in the case of Jordan v. Woodward, 38 Me. 424: "It is not every violation of the rights of another which may be ranked under the general head of nuisance which will authorize the interposition of this court by means of an injunction. It must be a case of strong and imperious necessity, or the right must have been previously established at law, or it must have been long enjoyed without interruption." The ground of equity jurisdiction in such cases has been said to be to "prevent irreparable mischief and also to suppress offensive and vexatious litigation." Story Eq. Jur., §§ 923, 925. He also says: "That in all cases of this sort courts of equity will grant an injunction to restrain a public nuisance only in cases where the fact is clearly made out upon determinate and satisfactory evidence. For if the evidence be conflicting and the injury to the public doubtful, that alone will constitute a ground for withholding this extraordinary interposition. Id., § 924, a. It was held in Eastman v. Company, 47 N. H. 78, that "the plaintiffs should of course show by their proof a case of strong and clear injustice, of pressing necessity and imminent danger, of great and irreparable damage, and not of that nature for which an action at law would furnish a full and adequate remedy." In the Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 M. & K. 180, it was said by Lord Chancellor Brougham that "it is always to be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of this court over nuisances by injunction at all is of recent growth, has not lately been much exercised, and has at various times found great reluctance on the part of the learned judges to use it even in cases where the act or thing complained of was admitted to be directly and immediately hurtful to the complainant." The language used in the consolidating act giving courts jurisdiction to interfere by injunction to restrain nuisances in the city of New York, has not changed the established rule as to the imminency of the danger to be apprehended or the necessity of such a remedy to avoid irreparable injury. By that act it must appear that the injunction is "needed," among other things to prevent "serious danger to human life or serious detriment to health," and unless the facts of this case bring it within the requirement, that it is imperatively necessary to prevent the consequences described, the plaintiffs have failed to show such a case as entitles them as a matter of right to the remedy demanded.

Board of Health v. Purdon. Opinion by Ruger,

C. J.

66

question for our consideration is whether the cause of action may be dealt with under the provisions of the act to prevent and punish wrongs to children (Laws 1876, ch. 122.)" We think that "business or vocation' to be within the purview of the statute, must be an employment either vicious in itself, or one which partakes of the character of an amusement, and that it has no application to productive industries, or useful or necessary business or occupation. The defendant's employment (collar) was undoubtedly of the latter character, and although in the abstract he was engaged in "business," and the machine employed in its prosecution dangerous, there is no analogy with the avocations specified in the act, and we find nothing to show that any wider sense was intended. The trial court therefore erred in submitting the case to the jury as one in which the plaintiff might recover if in their opinion the employment of the child involved such risk to her as to bring the avocation within the meaning of the term "dangerous to life and limb." Much stress is laid by the learned counsel for the appellant upon the remarks of Folger, C. J., in Cowley case, 83 N. Y. 464; S. C., 38 Am. Rep. 464, that the life of a child might be endangered or its health injured "by putting him to ride on a vicious or unmanageable horse, or by putting him to tend a dangerous piece of machinery." The remarks were pertinent to the question then in hand-a conviction under the fourth section (supra), but did not involve a consideration either of an inquiry or facts similar to those now_before us. Hickey v. Taafe. Opinion by Danforth, J. [Decided June 2, 1885.]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.*

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-PROCEDURE-ACT 1875,CH.137HEARING ON DEMURRER.-A State court is not bound to surrender its jurisdiction, by removal under the act of 1875, until a case is made which on the face of the record shows that the petitioner is entitled to such a removal. The mere filing of a petition is not enough, unless when taken in connection with the rest of the record, it shows on its face that the petitioner has, under the statute, the right to take the suit to another tribunal. Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 14. The act of 1875, ch. 137 (18 St. 470), which governs this case, provides that the petition for removal must be filed at

or before the term at which the cause could be first tried, and before the trial. This has been construed to mean the first term at which the cause is in law triable-the first term in which the cause would stand for trial if the parties had taken the usual steps as to pleadings and other preparations. Babbitt v. Clark, 103 U. S. 606; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Speck, 113 id. 87. It has also been decided that there cannot be a removal after a hearing on a demurrer to a complaint because it does no state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Alley v. Nott, 111 U. S. 472; Scharff v. Levy, 112 U. S. 711. Gregory v. Hartley. Opinion by Waite, C. J. [Decided March 16, 1885.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INTERSTATE COMMERCECOLORADO STATUTE AND CONSTITUTION-FOREIGN CORPORATION.-The statute of Colorado, entitled "An act to provide for the formation of corporations," cannot be construed to impose upon a foreign corporation limitations of its right to make contracts in the State for carrying on commerce between the States, for that would make the act an invasion of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate commerce between *Appearing in 5 Sup. Ct. Rep.

the several States. The obvious construction of article 15 of section 10 of the Constitution of Colorado and of the statute above referred to, is that no foreign corporation shall begin doing business in the State, with the purpose of pursuing it or carrying it on, until it has filed a certificate designating the principal place where the business of the corporation shall be carried on in the State, and naming an authorized agent, residing in such principal place of business, upon whom process may be served. It cannot require such a certificate as a prerequisite to the doing of a single act of business, when there is no purpose to do any other business or have a place of business in the State. The right of the people of a State to prescribe generally by its Constitution and laws the terms upon which a foreign corporation shall be allowed to carry on its business in the State, has been settled by this court. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 id. 410. The plaintiff in error does not deny this right, but insists that upon a proper construction of section 10 of article 15 of the Constitution of Colorado, and of section 23 of the act of 1877, its contract with the defendants was valid, and that its suit should have been maintained. As the clause in the Constitution and the act of the Legislature relate to the same subject, like statutes in pari materia, they are to be construed together. Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30. The act was passed by the first Legislature that assembled after the adoption of the Constitution, and has been allowed to remain upon the statute book for the present time. It must therefore be considered as a contemporary interpretation, entitled to much weight. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Adams v. Storey, 1 Paine, 60. It must be conceded that if the contract on which the suit was brought was made in violation of a law of the State, it cannot be enforced in any court sitting in the State charged with the interpretation and enforcement of its laws. U. S. Bank v. Owens, 2 Pet. 527; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 id. 449; Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79; Brown v. Tarkington, 3 Wall. 377; Davidson v. Lanier, 4 id. 447; Hanauer v. Doane, 12 id. 342; Wheeler v. Russell, 17 Mass. 258; Law v. Hodson, 11 East, 300; Little v. Poole, 9 Barn. & C. 192; Thorne v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 80 Penn. St. 15; Allen v. Hawks, 13 Pick. 82; Roche v. Ladd, 1 Allen, 441; In re Comstock, 3 Sawy. 218. In a case involving the construction of the statute the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a foreign corporation might, without complying with the provisions of the statute, maintain an action in the courts to recover damages for trespass to its real estate. The court said: "The prohibition extends to doing business before compliance with the terms of the statute. We do not think this an abridgment of the right of a foreign corporation to sue. It extends only to the exercise of the powers by which it may be said ordinarily to transact or carry on its business. To what extent the exercise of these powers was affected we do not decide." Utley v. Clark-Gardner Lode Min. Co., 4 Col. 369. So it is clear that the statute cannot be construed to impose upon a foreign corporation limittions of its right to make contracts in the State for carrying on commerce between the States, for that would make the act an invasion of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. The prohibition against doing any business cannot therefore be literally interpreted. Reasonably construed, the Constitution and statute of Colorado forbid, not the doing of a single act of business in the State, but the carrying on of business by a foreign corporation without the filing of the certificate and the appointment of an agent, as required by the statute. The Constitution

requires the foreign corporation to have one or more known places of business in the State before doing any business therein. This implies a purpose at least to do more than one act of business; for a corporation that has done but a single act of business, and pur. poses to do no more, cannot have one or more known places of business in the State. To have known places of business it must be carrying on or intending to carry on business. The obvious construction therefore of the Constitution and the statute is that no foreign corporation shall begin any business in the State, with the purpose of pursuing or carrying it on, until it has filed a certificate designating the principal place where the business of the corporation is to be carried on in the State, and naming an authorized agent, residing at snch principal place of business, on whom process may be served. To require such a certificate as a prerequisite to the doing of a single act of business, when there was no purpose to do any other business or have a place of business in the State, would be unreasonable and incongruous. The case of Potter v. Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill, 490, tends to support this conclusion. The charter of the bank provided that its operations of discount and deposit should be carried on in the village of Ithaca, and not elsewhere. The cashier discounted a note in the city of New York for the purpose of securing a demand due the bank, and the fact that the note was discounted in New York city was set us a defense to a suit on the note. In giving judgment for the bank, Nelson, C. J., said the statute "obviously relates to the regular and customary business operations of the bank, and does not apply to a single transaction like the one in question." A similar ruling was made in Suydam v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 6 Hill, 217. See also Graham v. Hendricks, 22 La. Ann. 523. Cooper Manuf'g Co. v. Ferguson. Opinion by Woods, J. [Decided March 16, 1885.]

PRACTICE-AMENDMENT OF EQUITY PLEADING-VENDOR'S LIEN FOR PURCHASE-MONEY-LIMITATION.-No rule can be laid down in reference to amendments of equity pleadings that will govern all cases. They must depend upon the special circumstances of each case, and in passing upon applications to amend the ends of justice must not be sacrificed to mere form, or by too rigid an adherence to technical rules of practice. The rule is thus stated in Lyon v. Tallmadge, 1 Johns. Ch. 188: "If the bill be found defective in its prayer for relief, or in proper parties, or in the omission or statement of fact or circumstance connected with the substance of the case, but not forming the substance itself, the amendment is usually granted. But the substance of the bill must contain ground for relief. There must be equity in the case, when fully stated and correctly applied to the proper parties, sufficient to warrant a decree." See also 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. (5th ed.) 384. In a suit brought by the heirs and administrator of a vendor of land by title bond the bill alleged that the bond had been obtained by fraud, and also that the land had not been fully paid for according to the contract of sale. Its prayer was, among other things, that the bond be cancelled; that an account be taken of the rents and profits which the purchaser had enjoyed, and of the amount paid on his purchase; that the title of the complainants be quieted; and that they have such other relief as equity might require. At the final hearing the complainants were permitted to amend the prayer of the bill so as to ask, in the alternative, for a decree for the balance of the purchasemoney, and a lien on the land to secure the payment thereof. Held, that no error was committed in allowing the amendment. It did not make a new case, but only enabled the court to adapt its relief to that made

by the bill and sustained by the proof. The bill, with the prayer thus amended, was in the form in which it might have have been originally prepared consistently with the rules of equity practice. The circumstances of the present case are entirely different from those in Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130. The amendment here did not introduce new allegations, nor make additional parties, nor incumber the record, nor increase the expenses of the litigation, nor complicate the suit, nor make new issues of fact. It simply enables the court, upon the case made by the original bill, to give the relief which the case justified. Neale v. Neale, 9 Wall. 8; Tremolo Patent case, 23 id. 518; Burgess v. Graffam, 10 Fed. Rep. 219; Battle v. Mutual Ins. Co., 10 Blatchf. 417; Ogden v. Thornton, 30 N. J. Eq. 573; McConnell v. McConnell, 11 Vt. 291. The deed to Hardin, and the deed of the latter to his wife, having been properly cancelled, the legal title remained in the heirs of the vendor. They were not bound to surreuder that title except upon the performance of the conditions upon which their ancestor agreed to convey, viz., the payment of the purchase-money. According to the local law, they occupied the position of mortgagees; for "the legal effect of a title bond is like a deed executed by the vendor and a mortgage back by the vendee." Holman v. Patterson's Heirs, 29 Ark. 363; Martin v. O'Bannon, 35 Ark. 68. The heirs of W. held the title in trust for the purchaser, while Hardin was a trustee for the payment of the purchase-money. Shall v. Biscoe, 18 Ark. 157; Moore v. Anders, 14 id. 629; Holman v. Patterson's Heirs, 29 id. 363; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 50; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 225; Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 126; 1 Story Eq. Jur., 1217 et seq.; 2 Sugd. Vend. 375, ch. 19, note d. But it is contended that the debt for unpaid purchase-money, as well as the lien claimed therefor, are equally barred by the statute of limitations of Arkansas. An action to recover the debt may be barred by limitation, yet the right to enforce the lien for the purchase-money may still exist. Lewis v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 127; Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark. 593; Coldcleugh v. Johnson, 34 Ark. 318. Harden v. Boyd. Opinion by Harlan, J. [Decided March 16, 1885.]

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UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT ABSTRACT.*

VERDICT-POWER OF COURT TO CORRECT MISTAKE IN. Where a jury in an action for services returned a verdict for plaintiff for $3,500, and two days after, while counsel for both parties were present, the court directed the jury to be recalled, and they all, on being asked if that was their verdict, answered that it was - that their verdict was for $3,500 with interest-held, that the court had power to cause the mistake to be corrected, and that the plaintiff should have judgment for $3,500 and interest. People v. Gasherie, 9 Johns. 71; Wood v. Robbins, 11 Mass. 504; Burdett v. Estey, 19 Blatchf. 1; S. C., 3 Fed. Rep. 566. The power of the court to cause the verdict to be corrected would seem to be ample, according to the law of the State of New York, and the practice of its courts, and by its highest court. In Dalrymple v. Williams, 63 N. Y. 361, the jury returned a verdict against two, when the verdict agreed upon was against one, and in favor of the other, and the verdict was recorded and the jury separated; afterward, on the same day, on the affidavit of all the jurors, the verdict was corrected and the judgment entered upon it. This course was approved. In Cogan v. Ebden, 1 Burr, 383, where the issue was as to two rights of way under which the defendant justified, the jury found for the defendant as to one and for the *Appearing in 23 Federal Reporter.

plaintiff as to the other, but returned a verdict for the defendant as to both, and separated. This verdict was corrected on the affidavit of the jurors. In this case there is no suspicion of any unfair conduct on the part of the jurors, or any one. It was an honest mistake which, if not corrected, would prevent the finding of the jury as it actually was from being carried out. The correction is not an impeachment of the verdict by the jury in any sense. It upholds the real verdict and prevents miscarriage in its delivery into court. Cir. Ct. E. Dist. N. Y. Burlingame v. Central R. of Minn. Opinion by Wheeler, J.

[Decided Dec. 24, 1885.]

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-OPTIONS-NOTICE-REASONABLE TIME.-Where a demand note, given as security for a continuing option transaction, but valid on its face, was bought in the regular course of business and for full value, twenty-three days after date, by one who knew the payees of the note dealt in options, and suspected, but did not know, that it had been taken in some option deal, held (1), that the note had been negotiated within a reasonable time; (2) that the purchaser was a bona fide holder without notice. Cir. Ct. E. D. Mo. Mitchell v. Catchings. Opinion by Brewer, J.

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ACCIDENT

[Decided April 18, 1885.] INSURANCE "SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH."-In an action on an accident policy where it is shown that the deceased sustained an acci

dental injury to an internal organ, and that necessarily produced inflammation, and that produced a disordered condition of the injured part, whereby other organs of the body could not perform their natural and usual functions, and in consequence the injured person died, the original injury will be considered as the proximate and sole cause of death; but if an independent disease or disorder, not necessarily produced by the injury, supervened upon the injury, or if the alleged injury merely brought into activity a then existing but dormant disorder or disease, and death resulted wholly or in part from such disease, the injury cannot be considered the sole and proximate cause of death. Whitehouse v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 7 Ins. Law J. 23; Southard v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 34 Conn. 574; N. A. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Penn. St. 43; McCarthy v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 8 Ins. Law J. 208. Cir. Ct. E. D. Wis. Barry v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n. Opinion by Dyer, J. [Decided March, 1885.]

INSURANCE-LIFE-KNIGHTS OF HONOR-CHANGING BENEFICIARY.-A party to whom a benefit certificate has been issued by the order of the Knights of Honor may revoke the appointment of the beneficiary named therein, and appoint a new beneficiary, to whom the benefit will be payable on his death "in good standing." The defendant's charter was so construed in the fol

lowing named cases, in which certificates of membership was involved, in terms substantially the same as the one now before the court: Highland v. Highland, 109 Ill. 366; Tennessee Lodge v. Ladd, 5 Lea, 716; Supreme Lodge v. Martin, 12 Ins. Law J. 628. For cases in which the unlimited right to change the beneficiary has been conceded to the members of other mutual benefit societies, see Durian v. Central Verein, 7 Daly, 168; Swift v. Conductors' Ass'n, 96 Ill. 309; Splawn v. Chew, 60 Tex. 532; Hellenberg v. I. O. B. B., 94 N. Y. 580; Relief Ass'n v. McAuley, 2 Mack. 70. It is urged that the courts of Kentucky, in which State the defendant was incorporated, have a different view of the question. It appears however that there is no real conflict of authority. The Kentucky cases in which it has been held that the member's power of appointment is limited to his family, or to

an instrument of commerce, and not upon the commodities themselves. Western Union Tel. Co. V. Mayer, 28 Ohio St. 531. So a tax upon the capital of a merchant engaged in importing into this State merchandize from other States and from foreign coun tries, and selling the same by wholesale and retail, is not a regulation of commerce. Raguet v. Wade, 4 Ohio, 107. And the exclusive right granted to a patentee of a medicine to manufacture and use the same is not infringed by a State law prescribing certain qualifications for a practicing physician, which prevents the patentee from using the same in his practice as a physician. Jordan v. Overseers, 4 Ohio, 294. And a tax on steamboats engaged in interstate commerce is valid. Perry v. Torrence, 8 id. 521. It is settled that a State in the exercise of its power of taxation cannot impose burdens upon the products of other States imported into the State for sale more onerous than is imposed upon the same kind of articles produced within the State, nor discriminate against citizens engaged in selling them. Wilten v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 id. 434; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 id. 123. These cases relate to the taxing power of the State, and not to its police power. McGuire v. State. Opinion by Johnson, C. J.

DEED-RESERVING MINERALS-RIGHTS OF GRANTEE -SUPPORT OF SOIL.-It seems to be well settled, that when one owning the whole fee, grants the minerals, reserving the surface to himself, his grantee will be entitled only to so much of the minerals as he can get without injury to the superincumbent soil, unless the language of the instrument clearly imports that it was the intention of the grantor to part with the right of of subjacent support. Humphries v. Brogden, 1 E. L. & Eq. 241; Davis v. Treharne, 6 App. Cas. 460; S. C., 34 Moak's Eng. 528; Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Penn. St. 81; Jones v. Wagner, 66 id. 429; Harris v. Ryding, Mees. & W. 60; Zinc Co. v. Franklinite Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 322, 342; Smart v. Morton, 5 Ell. & Bl. 30. The owner has a natural right to the use of his land, in the situation in which it was placed by nature, and if the surface of the land and the minerals beneath belong to different owners, the owner of the surface is entitled to have it supported by the underlying mineral strata, and an action may be maintained against the owner of the minerals, for the damages sustained by the subsidence. Each owner must so use his own, as not to injure the property of the other. The subjacent support should be such as will preserve the integrity of the surface; but if the mineral strata are not essential to prevent the subsidence of the upper soil-if the soil above is such as not to require their support, the underlying minerals may be entirely removed by their owner, without liability to an action for so doing. Burgner v. Humphrey. Opinion by Dickman, J. [See 15 Am. Rep. 464, 470.—ED.]

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ABSTRACT.*

ATTACHMENT-PENSION MONEY.- Pension money, after it is received by the pensioner, is not exempt from attachment. If the money goes into attachable real estate, such estate may be taken for the pensioner's debts. Knapp v. Beattice, 70 Me. 410. There would surely be some grounds for saying that there might be an unfairness in extending the protection to the limit contended for. If the money be exempted against any debts, it would be against all attachments and all debts. And the pensioner may have obtained credit from the very fact of the possession of property To appear in 77 Maine Reports.

acquired in this way. There are decisions favoring our view of the question. The Iowa court has twice affirmed the same view. Triplett v. Graham, 58 Iowa, 136. In Webb v. Holt, 57 id. 712, it was said that "the exemption applies only to money due the pensioner, while in course of transmission to him, and that there is no exemption after it comes into his possession." In Jardain v. Fairton Sav. Fund Assn., 44 N. J. L. 376, the same conclusion was reached, where it is said by the court: The fund is not placed in the hands of a pensioner as a trust, but it is to inure wholly to his benefit. When it comes to him in hand or personal control, it is his money as effectually and for all purposes as the proceeds of his work or labor would be, and whether he expends it in new contracts, or it be taken to pay the consideration due from him for those of the past, it equally inures to his benefit." In Spelman v. Aldrich, 126 Mass. 113, it was held that "even if, by the laws of the United States, the pension was exempt from attachment while it remained in the form of a pension check, the exemption ceased after the money was drawn upon the check." Cranz v. White, 27 Kans. 319; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 408 and note, is to the same effect. In Hayward v. Clark, 50 Vt. 612, a case not directly calling for a decision of the question, a different view is intimated. Friend v. Garcelon. Opinion by Peters, C. J. [See 35 Hun, 647.] [Decided Jan. 5, 1885.]

66

WILL-LEGATEE RELEASING ALL INTEREST.- The appellant wishing to receive his share of his father's estate in anticipation of his death, made a settlement with his father, by which, with the advancements previously made to him, he received $15,000, and gave him an instrument which provides as follows: 'Whereas said Francis Low, in said will gave, devised and bequeathed to me certain property, now therefore in consideration of $15,000 paid to me and for me by said Francis Low during his life-time, the receipt whereof I hereby acknowledge (and which said sum is my full share, and more, of my father's estate), do for myself, my heirs, executors and administrators hereby remise, release and discharge my said father, his executor or administrators, or legal representatives from paying the legacy named in said will to me..... and I release all my right, claim and title as heir to any and all estate and property which my said father may die seized or possessed of, and I will make no claim for any portion of the same." It is claimed that the meaning of the words "legacy named in said will" is fully answered by applying them to the general legacy of $4,000; that the word "legacy" is in the singular, and does not embrace both the general legacy and that under the residuary clause. It is a general rule for the interpretation of contracts as well as statutes, that the singular may be read as plural and the plural as singular, when the context requires it. Here the purpose of the testator appears to have been to anticipate his death by paying to his son his full share of his estate that would go to him under his will (and by the settlement of his estate in probate it appears much more than his share), in extinguishment and satisfaction of the provisions which he had made for him therein, and this purpose was fully participated in by the son; among other things, he agreed in his release, under seal, to make no claim to any portion of the estate of which his father might die seised and possessed. Considering this clause in connection with the preceding, we think the words "the legacy named in said will" should be held to include all the provisions of the will in favor of the appellant, and that they were fully adeemed and satisfied. Allen v. Allen, 13 S. C. 512. While the instrument in evidence cannot be treated as a technical release of the appellant's interest in his father's estate