Mr. LOVRE. Mr. Lawton, as I understood your testimony the underlying purpose of this reorganization plan is efficiency first and economy in government second; is that correct?

Mr. LAWTON. That is correct.

Mr. LOVRE. I realize that it is pretty hard to define a yardstick as far as efficiency is concerned. Do I understand your testimony correctly that if this reorganization plan is put into effect that it will also work for more economy?

Mr. LAWTON. I believe that many of the reorganization proposals that probably would be made would result in economy as well as increased efficiency in the operation of government. What those proposals may be, of course, depends upon the action of the President in proposing them.

Mr. LOVRE. Would it be advisable in your opinion to insert in this act a provision that there could be any consolidation or coordination. or abolition, but that it would have to have an over-all reduction of 5 or 10 percent of the administrative costs, or whatever it might be? Mr. LAWTON. I think it would be bad to try to set any yardstick or percentage on it dollarwise, because there may be cases where you can get a better operation within the same dollar framework or within the same personnel by the consolidation of functions. It may be, as I stated before, that you may be able to render better service to the people who deal with a group of agencies by a consolidation and a reducing of the points where the public needs to contact the agencies in certain areas, without necessarily saving money. It may reduce

the burden on the public or on business, without reducing the functions that the Government has to perform in that field. It simply narrows the point of contact.

Mr. LOVRE. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? Mr. Sadowski? Mr. SADOWSKI. I have no questions at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Huber?

Mr. HUBER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Blatnik?

Mr. BLATNIK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Donohue? Mr. Wagner? Mr. Coffey?

Mr. COFFEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bolton?

Mr. BOLTON. Mr. Lawton, I would like to clear up in my own mind a question with respect to the language in the act.

The purpose of the act is to consolidate and abolish agencies. Now, on page 6, it says:

No reorganization plan shall provide for, and no reorganization under this Act shall have the effect of

(1) Abolishing or transferring an executive department

Now, on page 8, you have the definition of "agency."

When used in this Act, the term "agency" means any executive departmentIs there an ambiguity there?

Mr. LAWTON. No; there is no ambiguity there. The term "agency" as used throughout there refers to the functions of an agency or the activities and so forth. This is a limitation on the definition in effect. Mr. BOLTON. What is the limitation?

Mr. LAWTON. That section 5 (1).

Mr. BOLTON. Section 5?

Mr. LAWTON. Abolishing or transferring functions of an executive department, or all the functions thereof.

You can transfer part of the functions or part of the activities of one executive department to another, but you cannot take the executive department in its entirety and abolish it or transfer it in the total of its functions.

Mr. BOLTON. Does that not apply to agencies also?

Mr. LAWTON. No; that does not. You can transfer an entire agency, or you can abolish an agency.

Mr. BOLTON. That is the point I am trying to get at.

Mr. LAWTON. That is right.

Mr. BOLTON. You can abolish or transfer an agency?
Mr. LAWTON. Except as limited by this provision.

Mr. BOLTON, Except an executive department.

Mr. LANHAM. I think Mr. Bolton is right. It seems to me that should be stricken. That is clearly a contradiction of the other provision.

Mr. LAWTON. That would necessitate writing additions to the word "agency" throughout the bill. It seems to me that the simplest way to deal with this term is to use the term "agency" throughout the bill, and then make one or two exceptions to that word at the spot where it is necessary to do it.

Mr. LANHAM. Where is that exception made? I want to see it.
Mr. LAWTON. Section 5 (1), I think it is, on page 6.

Mr. BOLTON. I notice that was in the prior act, the act of 1945.

Mr. LAWTON. The same language as the 1945 act.

Mr. BOLTON. Does that have the same explanation?

Mr. LAWTON. The only explanation is that throughout the act the term "agency" is used, and in many cases it does apply to executive departments, but in this particular instance, this is one exception in the use of the word "agency." It limits the definition of "agency" as it applies to section 5 (1).

After reexamining the language under discussion, I believe it would be more precise to say that the prohibition in section 5 against abolishing or transferring an executive department is a limitation on the authority to reorganize agencies provided by section 3 rather than a modification of the definition of "agency" in section 7.

Mr. BOLTON. Now I would like to clarify and pursue Mr. Hardy's question there with reference to the rights of one House or either House to reject the proposal. At the present time, in order to enact a law, you have to have both Houses' approval, is that correct? Mr. LAWTON. Yes.

Mr. BOLTON. What this does is to turn that lawmaking power over to one House and the President; is that not right?

Mr. LAWTON. It provides that if one House

Mr. BOLTON. If either House rejects it.

Mr. LAWTON. If one House refuses to reject the plan the plan becomes effective.

Mr. BOLTON. That is correct. Is that not the same as transferring the lawmaking power over to one House and the President, rather than as it is at the present time where both Houses have to enact a law? Is that not correct?

Mr. LAWTON. Both Houses and the President.

Mr. BOLTON. And the President, yes. In other words, it is taking the power away from one House, under this method.

Mr. LAWTON. Of course, this law provides that the President shall make the proposal and that it requires both Houses to reject it. Mr. BOLTON. That is right.

Mr. LAWTON. What you are saying is that in effect that says the President and one House of Congress.

Mr. BOLTON. When that becomes a law, if one House does not concur, that is what happens.

Mr. LAWTON. That is right.

Mr. McCORMACK. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BOLTON. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. Might I say that that would apply to any legislation?

Mr. BOLTON. No. At the present time you have to have both Houses to pass a law.

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes. Suppose that we passed a bill in the House and the Senate did not. The Senate has a veto on us. Nothing becomes a law unless it is by concurrent action of both branches.

Mr. BOLTON. Let me make myself clear. At the present time, in order to put an act into law, you have to have both Houses.

Mr. McCORMACK. That is correct.

Mr. BOLTON. You can make a law here by one House not concurring in a resolution.

Mr. McCORMACK. That is the regular procedure.

Mr. BOLTON. Let me make it clear. At the present time two Houses have to concur to make a law. You can make a law here by one House and the President; is that not right?

Mr. HOFFMAN. A point of order. Will the distinguished gentleman answer that, for our information at this end of the table?

Mr. McCORMACK. The procedure provided here is in accordance with the regular legislative procedure that exists constitutionally in Congress.

Mr. BOLTON. That is true, Mr. McCormack, but you have it in reverse order.

Mr. McCORMACK. What you say is true in practical effect, but it is consistent with our regular legislative process.

Mr. BOLTON. Consistent if we pass this act.

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes. If I introduce a bill or you introduce a bill and it is reported out of this committee and it passes the House, if the Senate does not act on it the Senate has a veto over it. We do the same, and we have a veto on what they do.

Mr. BOLTON. That is true, but here is a case where if we do not act it becomes a law.

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes. If they do not act it becomes a law by the necessity of action by both branches of Congress, concurrent action, which is consistent with the regular legislative process.

Mr. BOLTON. That is true in an ordinary case. If a bill is introduced and goes through the regular legislative machinery that might be true, but we are reversing the order here and we say it becomes a law if one House objects. The other way it becomes a law if two Houses concur.

Mr. McCORMACK. Well, you and I have no disagreement except that in my opinion this is consistent with the regular legislative process.

Mr. BOLTON. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. I did not mean to take up so much time. I had some other questions, but I have taken more than my share of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to ask the witness some other questions?

Mr. BOLTON. No. I can clear them up later.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Burnside? Mr. Bolling? Mr. Tauriello? Mr. TAURIELLO. Mr. Chairman, I think my question is repetitious but I would like to ask it in order to make sure I have it clear in my own mind.

The recommendations made by the Hoover Commission, insofar as the reorganization of the governmental structure is concerned, are for the purpose of consolidating the great number of bureaus and agencies that exist today?

Mr. LAWTON. Providing a better organization of government to carry out the functions that are in existence. It may propose consolidations. What they may propose I do not know.

Mr. TAURIELLO. These consolidations will bring forth a more efficient Government?

Mr. LAWTON. They have generally talked of reducing the number of Government agencies now in operation to a much smaller number. Mr. TAURIELLO. The other point I would like to get clear is this: Does the Congress have to accept this in toto or may it accept it in part?

Mr. LAWTON. Any reorganization plan submitted must be accepted or rejected in toto.

Mr. TAURIELLO. In other words, we cannot take a part of this and say, "We will adopt this into law"?

Mr. LAWTON. Not under this procedure. Of course, anyone could introduce a bill immediately to do it, but it would not be done under this reorganization procedure that has been in effect under the 1939. and 1945 acts.

Mr. TAURIELLO. It would either be in toto or not at al?

Mr. LAWTON. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. Are you referring to this bill now? We do not have to. accept this bill.

Mr. LAWTON. No; the plans under the bill.

Mr. TAURIELLO. The recommendations under the bill.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, is it not true that the acceptance or rejection of this bill in toto is the same as it would be if a bill would come to the floor of the House under closed rules such as the tax bills. always have, to prevent a whittling away of highly complicated and technical provisions in the bill by first one log-rolling group and then another? If there is something objectionable in the plan to the majority of the Congress they could immediately disapprove of the plan and introduce legislation paralleling the plan but eliminating. that particular objectionable feature, is that not correct, Mr. Lawton? Mr. LAWTON. That is correct.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. As to the constitutionality of the one-House proposition, I know the constitutionality was not brought up on it, but it is true that the Auchincloss home-rule bill for the District was upheld

on the same basis of the one-House concurrence by the Attorney General, and John W. Davis and other lawyers approved the constitutionality of that method of procedure.

Mr. LAWTON. I am not familiar with that.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. The same method of procedure as here indicated, was upheld.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Did any court approve of it?
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Any court?

Mr. HOFFMAN. Any court.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I do not know as it was tested.

Mr. HOFFMAN. You do not know of any court that ever approved it? Mr. HOLIFIELD. I do not know. I do not think it was ever challenged.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions that any member of the committee would like to ask of Mr. Lawton?

Does any question suggest itself to your minds?

Mr. Lawton has some colleagues here, Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Levi, the experts who have been present and listened to the discussion. Í will ask Mr. Atkinson if he has any paricular point he would like to raise.

Mr. ATKINSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask Mr. Levi the same question.

Mr. LEVI. No.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, did you say the attorneys are here? I would like to ask a question of the attorney or the present witness, and that is this: Would there be any objection to the suggestion which I think Mr. Lanham had in mind, of requiring the President to submit any reorganization plan so many days prior to the adjournment of the Congress?

We all know that we are very busy the last few days of the session. If the President comes down say 70 days before the adjournment with a plan, it would be difficult to give very much consideration to a plan in the remaining time. Should not there be something along the line that it should be submitted within say 60 or 70 or 90 days of the convening of the Congress?

Mr. BOLTON. May I intepose a suggestion there? I think the bill itself provides that the Congress has to be in session for 60 days.

Mr. HOFFMAN. That is true, but what I am getting at is to have the bill submitted along toward the beginning of the session, so that it would be certain that Congress would have ample time to give it consideration, and that the measure would not be crowded out by the congestion of bills at the very end of the session.

Is there any objection to having it submitted comparatively early in the session?

Mr. LAWTON. I think that the objection would lie on that only on the ground that the President should have time to consider these things. For example, the Hoover commission reports are going to be made over a period of about 2 months. Now, when Congress will adjourn is something that is not predictable at this time.

Mr. HOFFMAN. The time of adjournment is fixed by the Reorganization Act.

Mr. LAWTON. That could be amended.