Minnesota, former Congressman Carroll Reece, of Tennessee, and the late Carl Mapes, of Michigan. Now, on October 4, 1945, that was after Mr. Truman became President-the House passed the Truman reorganization bill, which was a stronger bill than the 1939 act, given to Mr. Roosevelt by a nonpartisan vote of 304 to 56. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lanham, do you have any questions? Mr. LANHAM. I would like for Mr. Ellis to again explain the difference in the cases that went up and the present bill. Mr. ELLIS. The difference was that under the 1932 law as amended then in 1933, which was the law under which that plan came out, any plan-an executive order in those days-any plan became law in 60 days after it came up to Congress unless a new law provided for a different effective date, or unless a new act of Congress provided that. In the present bill all that is required is a concurrent resolution of the two Houses to change the situation, to cancel out the plan entirely, if that is what is wanted. It has been suggested to me that I should have clarified one further point. This bill, of course, does not call for any complete abrogation of the congressional function. The theory is that in passing this bill Congress is effecting the legislative function as the law requires it. That is, Congress is deciding what the policy shall be and is laying down the standards and the guides which shall be the framework of the executive action under the law. It is under that theory that the Supreme Court, since the earliest days, has sustained the theory of delegation of legislative power. If you keep it within those limits; if you, as the legislature, will show what policy you want followed, what limitations you want, what objectives, then you are effecting a valid delegation of legislative power within many Supreme Court cases which could be cited. One, if you recall, was the brig Aurora. Then there were Field v. Clark, Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S., Buttfield v. Stranahan, and dozens of other cases. There is ample precedent for delegation of legislative authority, if you do it by the means such as this bill provides of showing the policy you want followed, the limitations to be complied with, and so on. In other words, this bill by the enactment is the legislative action which the Constitution requires. Mr. LANHAM. That is all. Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Warren, I have been greatly impressed today with the sincerity and the earnestness of your presentation with regard to this legislation. I followed it through carefully and I believe it is your earnest feeling that, if this legislation is enacted, there will be greater efficiency in the departments of our Government, and also there should be a tremendous amount of economy. Mr. WARREN. I certainly do think that, Mr. Riehlman. I would like to say this-and I weigh my words when I say it-if this fails, then we might as well close up the shop for good regarding hopes of ever reducing the size of this Government or eliminating waste and extravagance and useless functions. I say that very sincerely. I think this is just about the last chance. It is almost the last chance I will have coming up here on it. Mr. RIEHLMAN. That is one thing that I am definitely interested in, and I am very pleased to hear your statement in that respect. Mr. HARVEY. Like Mr. Riehlman, I have been very much impressed, not only with your explanation of your stand upon this, but also I have been impressed with your background that has contributed toward this statement. I note in your discussion you have mentioned the fact that the great difficulties in the past have been the exemptions that were made to the reorganization; that is, exemption of certain agencies, and so forth. Did you encounter a great deal of pressure when you were serving in the Congress in that respect? Mr. WARREN. You know, Mr. Congressman, I try to be a realist and, as I say, I was the author of the 1939 act and was also the floor manager of it. We had quite a debate there. Some of those exemptions were put over on us because we could not help ourselves, and a few were put in the bill in the start because we realized that, if we did not, they were going to get in anyway. The last authority given to President Truman in 1945 was a much better bill than that given to President Roosevelt in 1939. I have not been asked this, but somebody will say, "Well, what was accomplished under all of this?" I could name some very fine things that were accomplished. I testified one time that the only way you are going to attack this prob-lem is to go after it with a meat ax; let the chips fall where they may. There have been some good things accomplished. I think that I would have gone after some little heavier things. I have not lost hope. I have strong hopes that something can and will be accomplished through this effort. Mr. RIEHLMAN. You are recommending, then, that no exemptions. from the Executive be made in this bill? Mr. WARREN. Yes. I will go along with that. Of course, that does not mean that the President can send down here plans abolishing this, that, and so forth. Of course not. It is not fair or reasonable to think that he would. Certainly, no one thinks that he is going to send down a plan abolishing the Veterans' Administration. That is absolutely ridiculous. No one thinks that he is going to send down a plan abolishing the Marine Corps. You have to put confidence and trust in someone. I just know, if you put exemptions in, someone will say, "Well, you have exempted that fellow; why not exempt us?" That makes it much harder. Mr. HARVEY. People have not changed very much from 1939 to 1945 to 1949. I am wondering, looking at it from your position now, if there is any greater hope or expectancy of putting through a bill without exemptions than there was in 1939 and in 1945. Mr. WARREN. You gentlemen sitting around this table must answer that. The CHAIRMAN. It is your opinion, Mr. Warren, that, should we pass this bill and should the President send down some plan that would unfairly affect some existing bureau or department, that department would immediately take notice, public attention would be called to it, the Members of Congress would be notified of it, and there would be an opportunity certainly within 60 days for them to> take action on it if such a step should not be done. Mr. WARREN. I think, if the President should send down some unconscionable plan dealing with something the Congress felt very deeply on, this committee of its own volition would immediately initiate a concurrent resolution to defeat that plan. Mr. KARSTEN. Mr. Warren, I thoroughly enjoyed your discussion and I think it is one of the finest contributions we have had in this committee for a long time. I have only one question, and that is: Do you know of any opposition to this plan? I know in past years, when we have considered reorganization plans, we have heard from this individual, that individual, a half dozen departments; but on this we have not. I just wonder if you have heard of any opposition to it. Mr. WARREN. Out in the Government? Mr. KARSTEN. In the Government or from the public? Mr. WARREN. No; I have not. Mr. KARSTEN. It is quite different, I know, from the other bills that we have considered here. On one occasion, I remember receiving 10,000 telegrams. I think that was on the 1939 bill. Mr. WARREN. The 1938 bill. Mr. KARSTEN. I received telegrams from all over the country. Mr. KARSTEN. If there is any opposition, it certainly has not as yet made itself known. Mr. BONNER. Mr. Warren, are there any provisions of H. R. 1569 as drawn that you disagree with, or suggest might be changed? Mr. WARREN. You see, I did not know that I was to appear before this committee until 1 o'clock yesterday, and we had to do a lot of rushing about this. Mr. Ellis only this morning called my attention to section 3, paragraph 5, and I think that Mr. Hoffman might be interested in this. Suppose I get Mr. Ellis to tell you what he told me this morning. Mr. ELLIS. This is on page 3 of the bill and 4 of the committee print. A new item in reorganization which did not appear in the act the last time is this: the authorization of any officer to delegate any of his functions. Now, we have not, of course, had the opportunity to have a showing as to just what is in mind by that provision, or why it is necessary; but, taking it on its face, we would have to suggest that it might be a little broader than Congress would want to sustain. For one thing, to give you an example, this bill itself, if enacted, authorizes the President to make certain findings and to come out with a reorganization plan. Now, to put, as we say, an "imaginary horrible" that we talked about awhile ago, it is quite conceivable the very first plan of the President would be the delegation of this very authority to, say, the Assistant to the Attorney General, or somebody. That could be reorganization plan No. 1; and, if that plan should become effective after 60 days, the authority to reorganize which is being given by this bill would thereafter rest in the Assistant to the Attorney General. It might be that you would feel that is a little bit too broad. One possible exception to the suggestion would be this: that you might want to put in "delegate any of his non-rule-making functions." The greatest authority that any Executive has, I suppose, is this delegated legislative authority. The statutes are full of them. For example, I understand that the Department of Agriculture has at least 29 different laws that it administers and under which it issues rules and regulations, themselves having the force and effect of law, and it does so by the delegated authority from Congress. We mentioned awhile ago the authority under rate cases in the former Shipping Board now in the Maritime Commission. There is similar authority in the Interstate Commerce Commission. In other words, the authority of the head of an agency to issue a rule or regulation, itself having the force and effect of law, to me is such an important and fundamental authority that the Congress would not even want to have a reorganization plan providing for the delegation of that authority. Mr. WARREN. I am going to recommend, gentlemen, that you make that amendment. I think that language is a little too broad. Mr. HOFFMAN. I had an amendment drawn to that, Mr. Warren; and, if I may ask Mr. Ellis a question, all these cases that you have cited about delegation of authority-every single one of them-hold in making such delegation of authority the Congress must prescribe the general principles to be followed. Mr. ELLIS. That is the general theory. Mr. HOFFMAN. And what this subsection of section 3 does is to put a delegation of authority upon a delegation of authority. For example, the Congress delegates its authority to the agency, and the head of the agency can delegate that authority to somebody else, and you can go right on down until you strike some fellow way down in a township who is making rules which have the effect of law. Mr. ELLIS. That is a good question, because, in the delegation problem, you constantly have the question as to whether you can redelegate. Some folks and some courts have said that the authority to delegate carries with it impliedly the authority to redelegate; and the result, as you aptly put it, is that the authority which Congress puts trustingly in the secretary of this or that is redelegated, and we find the authority exercised by some functionary away from congressional control and not with trustworthiness. Mr. HOFFMAN. And he may or may not possess any qualifications. Mr. ELLIS. That is a very real problem. Mr. WARREN. I think that that particular section should be carefully considered by the committee. The CHAIRMAN. Your objection to this section is based upon the belief that it would give the President himself authority to delegate his own powers to do this job to some other people? Mr. ELLIS. I put that as an outlandish example. There is not the faintest possibility, in fact, that President Truman would do so; but any power you have granted heretofore to any public officer-the President or a secretary-could be delegated as a result of authority to delegate in a reorganization plan. The CHAIRMAN. If he should abuse good judgment or should scandalize us by some great delegation of authority to some officer, why would not the same condition obtain there as would apply to any other act under this reorganization plan? Why would not this committee or the public be aroused over such a delegation of authority in a reorganization plan? Mr. ELLIS. The only thing that I can suggest immediately is that sort of thing is usually buried in page 25, section so-and-so; and, while it is in itself important, it is overshadowed by the good things that appear in the plan. You have to vote it up or down; no amendments. The CHAIRMAN. If you were to submit to this Congress a reorganization plan, I am quite sure you would avoid any act which would tend to destroy the plan in toto. I do not see why we should become unduly alarmed over this delegation of power in these words. Either we have to trust him to do a job; we have to depend upon him to do it within his power, or I think we ought to stop before we start. It is a job that has to be done. He can do it better than anyone else. The people of the United States have selected him and believe in him. The Congress must trust the President as being a man interested in the country and its welfare and the Government and its welfare. I do not see why we should be any more alarmed over this than over any other provision in the bill. Mr. HOFFMAN. The answer is the people never gave the President or the Congress authority to ignore any provision of the Constitution, and here is a real delegation of power. Anyone in a ward in Chicago could exercise the same power as the Secretary of the Army or of National Defense. The CHAIRMAN. Many of us differ with you as to what is constitutional and what is not. Mr. HOFFMAN. Even Mr. Warren calls attention to this thing which is obvious to everyone. The CHAIRMAN. He is just alarmed. I do not think that he should be any more alarmed over that than any other provision in the bill. Mr. BONNER. I want to ask you if there are any other features, or parts of this bill, that you may have some strong opinions on. I regard very highly, Mr. Chairman, the experience of the Comptroller. The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. Mr. BONNER. And I regard very highly his opinion. Naturally, I do. The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. Mr. BONNER. I have a personal reason for that, so I am going to take this opportunity to ask if there are other features of this bill that should be called to the attention of the committee, for the reason that the Comptroller General is on our side of this matter. He represents the Congress, and he is with us in my opinion as council and adviser council. Mr. WARREN. The only thing that I can think of is this: this makes the provisions of the bill permanent legislation. Mr. BONNER. I was going to get to that. Mr. WARREN. I always advocated that it should apply only to the President in office; through his term. That is a matter of policy for the Congress to decide, whether it should be 4 years or whether it should be permanent. I have nothing to do with that. Mr. BONNER. Do you have any opinion as to setting up an entirely new executive department under this reorganization act? Mr. WARREN. That is new. Heretofore, more or less from necessity, we provided that only the Congress by direct legislation or legislative action should have the right to set up another department. |