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to answer.4hp flWStion;'f ^anjd; trjfciattitude was app¥bv$dj by Gpfikity ]qa$iisj? himself, the President of the court. The latter's reputation for impartiality, therefore, has suffered somewhat. During the week the reported "confession " of Dreyfus the day after his degradation in January, 1895, came up again, and was thus explained by the prisoner:
I said to Captain Lebrun-Renault: "I arrv innocent. I will declare it in the face of the whole people. That is the cry of my conscience. You know that cry. I repeated it all through the torture of my degradation." Du Paty de Clam asked me if I had not given documents of no importance in orl^r to obtain others in exchange. I replied that not only was I absolutely innocent, but that I desired the whole matter should be cleared up. Then I added that I hoped that within two or three years my innocence would be established. I tola Du Paty de Clam that I wanted full light on the matter, that an iniquity had been done and that it was impossible for the Government to fail to use its influence to discover the whole truth. "The Government," I said, "has means, either through the military attaches or through diplomatic channels, to reach the truth." And I also said, " It is awful that a soldier should be convicted of such a frightful crime. Consequently, it seems to me, I who asked only for truth and light, that the Government should use all the means at its disposal to secure that light." Du Paty de Clam replied: "There are interests at stake higher than yours."
Towards the end of the The "Uper^"* week M. Bertillon, the expert in chirography, and a famous specialist in measurements of the human body, began his ingenious testimony. He tried to prove (1) that the bordereau was a doctored document; (2) that it could have been manufactured only by the prisoner; (3) that it had been written in a free hand by means of a key-word placed beneath tracing-paper in such a way as to be quite visible. The basic objection to M. Bertillon's testimony is that its premises were all wrong. The testimony of another handwriting expert, M. Gobert, contradicted the above. He asserted that the handwriting of the bordereau was natural and fluent, but that it was almost illegible, whereas Dreyfus, even when writing rapidly, always wrote legibly. M. Gobert suggested that the judges compare the bordereau with a letter admitted to be in Esterhazy's handwriting, and with documents written by the prisoner. He
thus showed that the bordereau was in Esterhazy's handwriting, and not in the handwriting of Dreyfus. He pointed out the identity of letters therein with letters admittedly written by Esterhazy, proving that while the resemblance was not apparent in Dreyfus's handwriting, in Esterhazy's there were marked peculiarities in punctuation and in the manner of beginning fresh lines, also noticeable in the bordereau, but not found in the prisoner's chirography. M. Charavay, an expert who in 1894 had testified that Dreyfus was the author of the bordereau, confessed to a change of opinion. The reasons for this change were the publication of Esterhazy's letters, the discovery of the Henry forger}', the inquiry of the Court of Cassation, and Esterhazy's confession. "It is a great relief to my conscience," M. Charavay added, " to be able to say before you, and before him who is the victim of my mistake, that the bordereau is not the work of Dreyfus, but of Esterhazy."
Perhaps the most inter
esting testimony of the entire trial was that given by Captain Freystaetter on Saturday of last week; at all events, his evidence is equaled in importance only by Colonel Picquart's. Captain Freystaetter has as brilliant a military record as has any French officer. He was a member of the 1894 court martial. Two years ago his conscience compelled him to disclose the fact that Dreyfus had been condemned not only by secret but also by illegal evidence. The witness declared that the proofs of the condemnation were to be found in the bordereau and in four secret pieces sent to the court by General Mercier. Colonel Maurel, the President of the 1894 court martial, had previously admitted to the present court martial that he had read one, but only one, of the secret documents sent by General Mercier to the 1894 prosecution, and withheld from the defense. Maitre Labori, therefore, called upon Colonel Jouaust to have Colonel Maurel confront Captain Freystaetter. On this Colonel Maurel repeated, with evident embarrassment, that he had only looked at one document, but, he added, "I did not say that only one piece was read. I admit, after what Captain
Freystaetter says, that other documents may hare been produced." Freystaetter replied: "Not only did I see them, but I assert that Colonel Maurel had them in his hands. And. what is more, I assert that he made a commentary on each document as h passed through his hands." Maurel halt.ngS- replied that he did not remember, and refused to say more. Freystaetter added that he had written Maurel a letter recalling the scene at the secret sessions of the court martial of 1S94. and announcing his intention of telling the truth, as he was now doing. Maurel acknowledged this with a nod. but suit refused to say anything more. The admission of prevarication on the part of the President of the court martial of 1894 made the Freystaetter testimony of extremest pertinence, a pertinence increased when the witness confronted General Mercier. The former had said that a despatch from a foreign attache*, reporting the arrest of Dreyfus, had been communicated to the judges of the 1894 court martial, and that this despatch was a forger)-. It was an erroneous translation of the Panizzardi despatch, and those who communicated it knew it to be erroneous, for at that date they possessed a correct translation. As no contradiction had been offered to Freystaetter's statement, and as Mercier had previously testified to having given an order that the telegram should not be communicated, and, further, that his order had been carried out, Maitre Labori asked the President of the court to demand an explanation from Mercier. The latter denied Freystaetter's declaration that the Panizzardi despatch was in the dossier, shouting, " It's a lie," possibly forgetting that Freystaetter's evidence had been admitted by Colonel Maurel. To this Freystaetter replied: "I swear that what I have said is true. And I remember not merely the despatch, but I have a vivid recollection of the fact that the first words were, 'Dreyfus is arrested. Emissary warned.'"
The Court Regarding the probable verdict on Dreyfus, an impression has gained ground that the judges are prejudiced against him. This would not be unnatural—indeed, the testimony of General Roget, for instance, made a visibly
profound effect on them. The vehemence of Roget's deposition, however, can be explained by his undoubted realization that he and his brother generals are quite as much on trial as is Dreyfus. The testimony of the Generals must needs be received by the members of the court with due deference. All of those members are graduates of the Military Polytechnic School, and from their early youth their respect for military convention and traditional discipline is nothing less than religious. The Generals occupy a higher military rank than the judges, and overawe them. Hence the judges are constantly subject to an illegitimate army pressure. There are seven members in the court. According to law a court martial has a Colonel as its President when the prisoner is a Captain, and two members are of the same rank as the accused. It is not necessary that the verdict be unanimous. Hardly any legal evidence against Dreyfus has been adduced bearing upon the real question before the court; indeed. Lord Russell, Chief Justice of England, is quoted as saying that there has been no testimony in support of the charge against Dreyfus that would warrant an English magistrate in holding him for a regular trial. The one specific question is: Did Dreyfus communicate to a foreign government the facts mentioned in the bordereau / The Court of Cassation, the Supreme Court of France, has already established the fact that the conviction of Dreyfus in 1894 was illegal. It has directed the present court martial to obtain evidence bearing on the question before it. but for three weeks the court martial has heard evidence bearing upon the entire subject. Perhaps this implied disdain of the Court of Cassation results partly from the repeated demand of the Dreyfusards to probe the justice of their cause to the bottom, but more likely it is due to the vanity and obstinacy, if not terror, of the guilty creatures of the General Staff. The reiteration of hearsay or presumption from them is not evidence, and the only evidence, except that mentioned in our first paragraph, worth considering has been that contained in the received renderings of the Schneider and Panizzardi despatches. Both of these renderings are now shown to be forgeries. Indeed, the Schneider despatch was the eleventh forged document which the prosecution has produced as evidence.
Last week a Blue Book relating to the proposed Transvaal reforms was published by the British Government. It opens with a despatch from Sir Alfred Milner suggesting arbitration of the varying interpretations of the Anglo-Dutch Conventions of 1881 and 1884. Sir Alfred, though reiterating his favorable opinion as to limited arbitration in certain circumstances after the Outlanders' grievances had been redressed, declares that the scheme of reform put forth by the Transvaal Government is absolutely unacceptable. On July 1 Mr. Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, cabled that the Government would not accept the Transvaal proposal, but toward the end of the month proposed an inquiry into the new Transvaal reformed franchise law. In this proposal he declared that under no circumstances would the British Government admit the intervention of a foreign power regarding the interpretation of the Conventions. He added that, if the Transvaal would agree to the exclusion of the foreign element, he was willing to consider how and by what methods such a question of interpretation could be decided by some judicial authority, the independence and partiality of which would be beyond suspicion. On the last day of July Mr. Chamberlain invited President Kruger to appoint delegates to inquire into the franchise law, adding that, if an inquiry took place, the British delegates would be in structed to press for an early report. Sir Alfred Milner also informed President Kruger that, while the inquiry must be confined to the political representation of the Outlanders, he, as British Commissioner, was prepared to discuss, not only the franchise, but also other matters. In support of Mr. Chamberlain's policy, as disclosed by the Blue Book, the London papers are practically unanimous. The "Standard" voices the general opinion:
Nobody in England wants war, and the Government is doing all it can to avoid a rupture. Still less do we want the Transvaal itselfr Apart from its gold reefs its territory is almost worthless. Its mines will probably be exhausted in half a century. We do not desire the Boers as fellow-subjects. We do
not want another Ireland. It is merely common political justice that the Government is determined to obtain.
On Saturday of last week Mr. Chamberlain, addressing an audience at Highbury, said:
The knot must be loosened or we will have to find other ways of untying it. If we are forced to that, then we will not hold ourselves limited by what we have already offered, but, having taken the matter in hand, we will not let go until we have secured the conditions which establish our paramount power in South Africa and secure to our fellow-subjects the equal rights and privileges promised by President Kruger.
_.. _ The German Emperor and
The Prussian ,r. , ~ . . .
Cabinet Crisis King of Prussia has declined to receive the resignation of the Prussian Cabinet, which was due to the Prussian Landtag's adverse vote to the Government on the two Canal bills, which had been introduced into that body as coming from the Emperor himself. A change of Cabinet, however, would hardly mark the importance of that adverse vote much more clearly; no Prussian needs such an event to emphasize the fact that, for the first time since the Franco-German war, the Agrarian Conservatives, generally fervent supporters of the monarchy, have openly defied a mandate of their sovereign. For the moment the Socialists have joined hands with the Agrarians " in upholding the principles of constitutional right." It is not impossible that the Emperor may dissolve the Diet, but he must know that such an event might bring about the encountering by his Government of a considerably increased opposition, the Agrarians, or Junkers, hitherto having been invariably on his side. Germans who are not Prussians are taking a special interest in the matter because of the fact that the Prussian Prime Minister, Prince von Hohenlohe, is also the Imperial German Chancellor. It is rumored that Prince von Hohenlohe wishes to resign both offices if his resignation of one be accepted. His services to Germany during the term of his Chancellorship, since 1894, have been not inconsiderable, and there is a natural dread among Germans at making further changes in the personnel of the Government during the reign of the present Emperor. Nevertheless, his subjects have been getting accustomed to many and rapid changes— a contrast to the order of things during preceding reigns.
The Situation in the Philippines
An obviously necessary preliminary to a decision as to what should be our future course in the Philippines is a full understanding of the actual situation there. A very clear statement on this point has just been made by the special correspondent of "Harper's Weekly," Mr. John F. Bass. Mr. Bass has military as well as newspaper experience, and favors the energetic pushing of the military campaign to an end. Of General Otis, Mr. Bass writes that he is "the impersonation of industry," that he directs the minutest details, approves the smallest bills, forms personally the plans for everything done. This indefatigable industry, however, the correspondent implies, is a source of weakness, for General Otis works in an office, has never been out on the lines, has never seen a fight or a skirmish, and other officers assert that it is impossible for the general-in-chief under these conditions to make intelligent plans. Mr. Bass then states the limits of our military lines. Although he writes in June, and the subsequent advances to Angeles on the north and to Imus on the south have increased the extent of our lines, the difference is not a very' material one. He points out that on last Decoration Day the insurgents were still within three miles of the city on the south, and that the graves of American soldiers buried near Camp Dewey could not be decorated because the ground was held by the insurgents; that we control only a small part of Laguna de Bay, and that "out of one hundred and twenty-three miles of railroad from Manila to Dagupan, we hold only thirty-nine miles, or less than one-third" (to this must now be added a few miles reaching to Angeles); that the land along the railroad and at its east held by the insurgents is very fertile, and furnishes supplies to their army in abundance; that no effort has been made to land troops at Dagupan to attack the insurgents along the railroad upon two sides, as Mr. Bass thinks could be done. He states positively and without qualification that "the whole population of the
islands sympathizes with the insurgents; only those natives whose immediate selfinterest requires ic are friendly to us. The insurgent army is in no way ready to give in, and its policy of retreating is the one best adapted to the accomplishment of its ends." Mr. Bass makes many criticisms on the equipment of the army, and states that there were five thousand men in the general hospital when he writes—sixteen per cent, of the whole army—a large part of whom are broken down by over-exertion made necessary by bad planning. He asserts that the real figures as to the numbers of men in hospital have been suppressed. He holds, in common with the opinions expressed by General King and other experienced officers, that one hundred thousand men are needed to carry out a systematic plan for occupying the territory. This correspondent is most strongly impressed with the belief that the plans and methods adopted for crushing the enemy have varied frequently, and urges the adoption of a definite and continuous plan. He says unreservedly that "the American outlook is blacker now [June 12] than it has been since the beginning of the war." We give these criticisms, not as final or as being necessarily correct in every particular, but as embodying the observations of one of the best correspondents on the spot, and as a contribution toward the complete understanding of the situation, which, as we have said, is the prime requisite to the forming of an intelligent policy for the future.
. ... «i An equally grave view is
Another View , . ,
taken in a letter from the Manila correspondent of the New York "Tribune "—a letter which has been forwarded through San Francisco by mail, evidently to avoid the censor's supervision. As the New York "Tribune" certainly cannot be suspected of antiexpansion tendencies, the letter has the more weight. This correspondent, writing under date of July 22, says:
In Manila talk of the ending of the war deals no longer with weeks, but with months and even years. Among the mass of people here, military men and foreign residents, there is only one opinion. The whole effort of the insurgents for three months was to hold off the Americans until their ally, the rains, came. In this they have been as successful as they