Third Term for President of the United States: Hearings Before a Subcommittee ...on S.J. Res. 15... and S.J. Res. 289...Sept. 4 to Oct. 30, 1940
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accept administration adopted amendment American argument become believe candidate chairman Chief citizens Cleveland committee Congress consider Constitution continue Convention course danger democracy Democratic effect election eligible established example Executive exist experience expressed fact favor fear Federal feel force give going hands hold House idea important indispensable ineligible influence institutions interest issue Jefferson leader letter liberty limitation majority matter means mind never nomination opinion party period person political position possible practice precedent present President Presidential principle proposed question reason record reelection Representatives Republic Republican resolution Roosevelt second term Senator BURKE Senator WILEY serve single statement tenure thing third term thought tion tradition true United vote Washington witness
324 페이지 - It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism.
200 페이지 - It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another. There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably...
199 페이지 - All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party, often a small but artful...
200 페이지 - However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.
327 페이지 - The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
198 페이지 - The period for a new election of a citizen, to administer the executive Government of the United States, being not far distant, and the time actually arrived, when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person, who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise...
199 페이지 - ... They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force ; to put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community ; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels, and modified by...
229 페이지 - All the powers of government — legislative, executive and judiciary —result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.
227 페이지 - I am apprehensive, therefore, — perhaps too apprehensive, — that the government of these states, may in future times end in a monarchy. But this catastrophe, I think, may be long delayed, if in our proposed, system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult, by making our posts of honor places of profit.