this chapter shall prohibit any person from mortgaging his homestead, the spouse, if any, joining therein. Sec. 3. Sections 1, 3, 6 and 7 of the Exmption law of Oklahoma as amended in 1905 are accepted and extended over the entire state. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS— HOW CREATED. By Hon. John Roaten, City Attorney, of Edmond, Oklahoma. By municipal corporations we mean to embrace cities, towns and villages which have been incorporated, and which possess all the powers, duties and liabilities incident to such a status. We do not mean to include counties, townships, school or road districts, or similar subdivisions of the state, created by the state of its own sovereign will. These subdivisions may, quite properly be called public qaasi-corporations, and possess only a portion of the powers, duties and liabilities incident to municipal corporations proper. Municipal corporations are organized, or at least assented to, by the inhabitants included within their corporate limits; while public quasicorporations are established by the state without reference to the wishes of the people residing therein. Hence, a great difference obtains between these two classes of what are generally designated as municipal corporations. Board, etc., Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; Dunnon vs. Grandy, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 345. Bouvier defines a municipal corporation to be a public corporation created by the government for political purposes and having subordinate and local powers of legislation. The supreme court of Tennessee has declared a municipal corporation to be a body corporate and politic established by law to share in the civil gov ernment of the country, but chiefly to regulate the local or internal affairs of the city, town or district incorporated. East Tennessee University vs. Knoxville, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 166. Our own supreme court has said that, "municipal corporations are but subdivisions of the state or territory created for the convenience and better government of its affairs by local officers. City of Guthrie vs. Territory, 1 Okla. 188. If, then, municipal corporations are "created by the government," "established by law" and "created for convenience and better government," we are led to inquire into the paramount authority which create them, and breathes into them the breath of life, with a view of determining the manner or means of such creation. When The settled rule is that corporations must derive their origin and authority from specific legislative enactment. However, there are a few instances where municipal corporations exist by prescription. Massachusetts has a number of decisions to this effect. the charter in question has been lost or destroyed, or for other reasons cannot be found, it may be shown by general reputation, and by general knowledge and assent of the legislature, without objection for a long period of time and with public acquiescence, that such towns are entitled to continue the exercise of the corporate powers allowed by law by prescriptive right. Dillingham vs. Snow, 5 Mass. 546; Bassett vs. Porter, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 487; also Robie vs. Trustees, etc., 35 Barb. (N. Y. ) 319. It is a question of fact and not a question of law. Piedgeon vs. McCarthy, 82 Ind. 321 There are two general sources whence corporate authority is derived-the federal and the state governments. In the constitution of the United States there is no express authority delegated by the states to the federal governement to create corporations. Then the only power the federal government has to create private or municipal corporations is by the implied authority necessary to carry out some particular power delegated in the constitution to that government McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. Thru this implied power of the federal government, Congress may provide for the creation and organization of public corporations in the district of Columbia and the territories. Congress may delegate this power to the territorial legislatures. The territorial legislature then may create corporations by general laws, altho such a legislature is not sovereign. Vincennes University vs. Indiana, 14 Howard 268; Riddick vs. Amelin, 1 Mo. 5. The sovereign power of the different states to create municipal corporations is traceable back to Great Britain, The history of the early English towns and cities in their struggle for self government is varied and interesting. They were weak at first, and had to demand, beg or buy greater privileges from king and priest. In their early history they were especial objects of royal displeasure. As this country was settled principally by people from England, it was quite natural that our municipal corporations should be established in accordance with those left behind in the mother country, so modified, however, to meet the requirements of the conditions of the newly settled country. When the colonies severed their relations with Great Britain and established an independent government, and when the states became sovereign, they succeeded to all the powers and prerogatives possessed by the English crown. Until a comparatively short time ago the crown claimed and exercised the authority of granting or withholding charters when asked for by the people. Consequently the sovereign states have full power to grant charters to all public and private corporations; subject of course, to limitations placed by the people in the several state constitutions; and subject also, to the powers that were granted to the federal government by the states as expressed or implied in the Constitution of the United States. People v. City of Riverside, 70 Cal. 461; New Boston v. Dunbarton, 12 N. H. 409. As the cities and towns grew to be larger and more important, it became essential to their welfare that they find some method of acquiring authority for the purpose of conducting their own affairs. The states being sovereign they quite naturally applied to the legislature for special charters, by virtue of which they assumed corporate existence. These special charters proved to be very unsatisfactory. Yet, for a large part of our national existence, this was the only method of incorporating municipalities. It was argued, and very properly so, that special charters were in their very nature special legislation, giving to some cities powers and privileges not granted to others. This proved quite unsatisfactory to those against which discriminations were made. The dis-satisfaction arising from the special charter system was the principal cause of the establishment of general laws, could accomplish its own incorporation whenever it desired. These uniform laws prevented disparities in privileges granted different municipalities. All must incorporate under the same laws, and all are equal before those laws. This system has given such universal satisfaction that almost all of the states have now prohibited incorporation by special chapters. Most states have provided general laws for the incorporation and government of municipalities. It is probably only a question of time when all the states will abolish the special charter, and when all cities and towns will be incorporated under general laws. This is the most satisfactory plan that the wisdom and ingenuity of man has yet devised. It might be added that the charter of a municipal corporation is not a contract, as is the charter of a private corporation. The charter of a municipal corporation is revocable and may be changed by the power that created it, since it is only a political subdivision of the state. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat, 518; Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Penn, 169. CURRENT OKLAHOMA DECISIONS. R. D. HOWE, Plaintiff in Error VS. THE CITY OF HOBART, Defendant in Error. No. 1732 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Filed Feb., 13th, 1907.) Error from District Court of Kiowa County F. E. Gillette, Trial Judge. Affirmed. 1. This court cannot consider assignments of error attacking the action of a referee before whom a case was tried in the district court. Such action when complained of must be attacked in the district court. and the action of the district court thereon may be assigeed as error in this court. 2. The evidence taken before a referee in a cause where the referee is directed to try the cause, make findings of fact and conclusions of law and report the same to the court, can only be preserved and made available for review in the district or supreme court by incorporating the same into a bill of exceptions and having the referee to allow and sign the same. 3. The rulings, findings and report of a referee can only be made the subject of review in this court when first presented to the district court by a motion for a new |