PER CURIAM. (a) The direction was right; there must be no rule.

Rule refused.

*DOE dem. CAWTHORN v. MEE. April 17.

[*617

The 48 G. 3, c. 149, s. 32, which requires that every surrender of copyhold, and admittance, &c., made out of court, or a memorandum thereof, shall be stamped; and sect. 33, which enacts, that in cases of surrender, &c., in court, the steward shall make, and deliver to the tenant a stamped copy of the court roll, are merely revenue regulations, and not intended to vary the rules of evidence; and, therefore, a surrender and admittance out of court, (presented and enrolled afterwards) may be proved by an examined copy of the court roll, without producing the original surrender, &c., or memorandum thereof.

AT the trial of this cause before Bosanquet, J., at the last Northampton assizes, the plaintiff, in order to prove a surrender of a copyhold tenement, made out of court, and the subsequent presentment of such surrender, according to the custom of the manor, and the admittance of the new tenant, produced copies of the entrance of these proceedings on the court rolls, examined and stamped. Miller, for the defendant, objected that such copies, assuming that they would have been evidence if the surrender had been made in court, were not so where the surrender was out of court. Bosanquet, J. received the evidence, and the plaintiff had a verdict.

Miller, by leave reserved, now moved to enter a nonsuit on account of the reception of the above evidence, to which he renewed his former objection. The original surrender at least should have been produced at the trial. In 2 Watkins on Copyholds, 4th ed. p. 38, note 1 (by the editor,) it is stated that "copies of court roll are but secondary evidence of the copyholder's title," and that "in ejectment the rolls themselves must be produced." [LITTLEDALE, J. There would be great inconvenience in requiring the production of the original rolls. PATTESON, J. Is there any authority for such a proposition? The contrary is stated in Buller's Nisi Prius, 247 a, 7th ed.] The stamp act, 48 G. 3, c. 149, (s. 32,) requires every lord of a manor taking a surrender or granting admittance, out of court, to cause the same or a memoran[*618 dum thereof to be put in writing on stamped paper, &c.; and by section 33, in cases of surrender and admittance in court, the steward is to make a copy of the court roll of such surrender and admittance, on a stamp, and deliver the same to the party entitled, under a penalty of 50l. In the latter case the act requires a stamped copy of the roll to be given, and such copy may, therefore, be evidence; but in the case of a surrender out of court, the original only need be stamped, and if the surrender could be proved without production of the origi nal, a title might be established without shewing any stamped document, and so the revenue might be defrauded. Doe, lessee of Bennington v. Hall, 16 East, 208, was cited for the defendant at the trial, but that only shews that the original entry on the court roll is evidence notwithstanding the statute.

LITTLEDALE, J. I think the statute makes no difference as to the admissi bility of this evidence. The object of the clauses which have been cited was, to establish a mode of getting at the payment of revenue in the case of transfers of copyhold, since it was not practicable to regulate the ad valorem duty on conveyance of this, in the same way as of other kinds of property; but there was no intention to vary the rules of evidence. There is no doubt that copies of the court rolls are admissible in all cases.

PARKE and PATTESON, Js. concurred.

Rule refused.

(a) Littledale, Parke, and Patteson, Js. Denman, C. J. had left the Court.

*BOLTON, Administrator of TIMOTHY BOLTON, v. DUGDALE, Executrix of ABRAM DUGDALE. April 18.

"Received and borrowed of A. B. 307., which I promise to pay with interest, at the rate of 5 per cent. I also promise to pay the demands of the sick club at II. in part of interest, and the remaining stock and interest to be paid on demand to the said A. B. my hand, &c. C. D."

This is not a promissory note.

Witness

ASSUMPSIT for money lent, &c. Pleas, the general issue, and statute of limitations. At the trial before Alderson, J., at the last assizes for the county of York, the following instrument was given in evidence to prove the loan of the money by the intestate to the testator.

"Received and borrowed of Timothy Bolton, labourer, the sum of 307., which I do hereby promise to pay with interest at the rate of 5 per cent. I also promise to pay the demands of the sick club at Haworth in the county of York, in part of interest, and the remaining stock and interest to be paid on demand to the said Timothy Bolton, his executors, administrators, or assigns. Witness my hand this 17th day of September, 1805. Abram Dugdale."

The instrument bore a 17. agreement stamp, and on the back of it was a receipt for the penalty of 5., and 17. duty. Bolton the intestate lived at Blackburn in Lancashire, and was a member of a sick club at Haworth, near which place Dugdale the testator lived. Dugdale had within six years paid money to the club on Bolton's account. For the defendant it was contended that the instrument was a promissory note, and, therefore, could not be received in evidence, the stamp having been affixed after it was made; to which point Green v. Davies, 4 B. & C. 235, was cited. The learned Judge thought the *writing was an agreement; and he directed a verdict for the plaintiff, giving leave to move to enter a nonsuit.

*620]

Knowles now moved accordingly. No specific form of words is necessary to constitute a promissory note. Here, if the document had ended with the first sentence, it would have nearly resembled that which was held to be a promissory note in Green v. Davies, 4 B. & C. 235. Then was its character altered by the subsequent promise to pay the demands of the sick club in part of interest? The mention of the club was only a description of the mode in which those payments were to be made; as if at the foot of a common promissory note there had been a memorandum that the interest was to be paid into a particular bank. [PARKE, J. Could Dugdale have been obliged to pay the interest in any other way than to the sick club? And it was uncertain what their demands would be.] He was liable to pay Bolton on demand, and it is not clear that that demand might not have been made before any thing was due to the club. The payments to be required by the club could not exceed five per cent. on the principal.

DENMAN, C. J. To a certain extent this instrument resembled a promissory note; but it was, in fact, an agreement engrafted on a note. The objection cannot prevail.

LITTLEDALE, J., concurred.

PARKE, J. The amount of the sick club charges was uncertain; so, there*621] fore, was the sum to be paid to *Dugdale; the instrument, as far as regarded this contingent demand, could not be a promissory note; and the

transaction was entire.

PATTESON, J. The instrument engages for the payment of remaining stock and interest" at a time not fixed. It is something like the undertaking in Leeds v. Lancashire, 2 Camp. 205, which was held not to be a promissory note. Rule refused.

VOL. XXIV.-18

MARY ANN WILLIAMS v. WILLIAM CARWARDINE. April 18.

A. by public advertisement stated, that whoever would give information which should lead to the discovery of the murder of B. should, on conviction, receive a reward of 201. Held, that C., who gave such information, was entitled to recover the 201., though she was led to inform, not by the proffered reward, but by other motives.

[*622

ASSUMPSIT to recover 207., which the defendant promised to pay to any person who should give such information as might lead to a discovery of the murder of Walter Carwardine. Plea, general issue. At the trial before Parke, J., at the last Spring assizes for the county of Hereford, the following appeared to be the facts of the case :-One Walter Carwardine the brother of the defendant, was seen on the evening of the 24th of March, 1831, at a public house at Hereford, and was not heard of again till his body was found on the 12th of April in the river Wye, about two miles from the city. An inquest was held on the body on the 13th of April and the following days till the 19th; and it appearing that the plaintiff was at a house with the deceased on the night he was supposed to have been murdered, she was examined before the magistrates, but did not then give any information which led to the apprehension of the real offender. On the 25th of April the defendant caused a hand-bill to be published, stating that whoever would give such information as should lead to a discovery of the murder of Walter Carwardine should, on conviction, receive a reward of 207.; and any person concerned therein, or privy thereto, (except the party who actually committed the offence) should be entitled to such reward, and every exertion used to procure a pardon; and it then added, that information was to be given, and application for the above reward was to be made to Mr. William Carwardine, Holmer, near Hereford. Two persons were tried for the murder at the Summer assizes, 1831, but acquitted. Soon after this the plaintiff was severely beaten and bruised by one Williams; and on the 23d of August, 1831, believing she had not long to live, and to ease her conscience, she made a voluntary statement, containing information which led to the subsequent conviction of Williams. Upon this evidence it was contended, that as the plaintiff was not induced by the reward promised by the defendant, to give evidence, the law would not imply a contract by the defendant to pay her the 207. The learned Judge was of opinion, that the plaintiff, having given the information which led to the conviction of the murderer, had performed the condition on which the 201. was to become payable, and was therefore entitled to recover it; and he directed the jury to find a ver dict for the plaintiff, but desired them to find specially whether she was induced to give the information by the offer of the promised reward. The jury found that she was not induced by the offer of the reward, but by other

motives.

*Curwood now moved for a new trial. There was no promise to pay [*623 the plaintiff the sum of 201. That promise could only be enforced in favour of persons who should have been induced to make disclosures by the promise of reward. Here the jury have found that the plaintiff was induced by other motives to give the information. They have, therefore, negatived any contract on the part of the defendant with the plaintiff.

DENMAN, C. J. The plaintiff, by having given information which led to the conviction of the murderer of Walter Carwardine, has brought herself within the terms of the advertisement, and therefore is entitled to recover.

LITTLEDALE, J. The advertisement amounts to a general promise, to give a sum of money to any person who shall give information which might lead to the discovery of the offender. The plaintiff gave that information.

PARKE, J. There was a contract with any person who performed the condition mentioned in the advertisement.

PATTESON, J. I am of the same opinion. We cannot go into the plaintiff's

motives.

Rule refused.

*624]

*HINE v. ALLELY and Another. April 18.

In assumpsit on a bill of exchange drawn upon "P. P., No. 6, Budge Row," and accepted by him, an averment that the bill, when due, was presented and shewn to P. P. for payment, is supported by proof that the holder went to 6 Budge Row to present it, but found the house shut up, and no one there. And notice may be given to the drawers on the day of such dishonour, as in the case of an actual refusal to pay.

ASSUMPSIT by indorsee against drawers of a bill of exchange, dated 15th May, 1830, payable to themselves, at three months, directed to "Mr. Peter Perry, No. 6, Budge Row, Watling Street," and accepted by him. Averment, that on the 18th of August, 1830, the said bill was presented and shewn to the said Peter Perry for payment; and he then and there had notice of the indorsement, &c., and was requested to pay, but would not, of which the defendants had notice. Plea, the general issue. At the trial before Parke, J. at the sittings in Middlesex, after last Hilary term, it appeared that on the day the bill became due, it was taken to No. 6 Budge Row, to be presented on behalf of the plaintiff, but the house was shut up, and no further presentment could be made. On the same day the bill was shewn to the defendants, and notice given them of the dishonour. No other noticed appeared to have been given within proper time. It was objected, upon this evidence, that the averment in the declaration, that the bill was presented and shewn to Perry, was not made out, though if the declaration had said "duly presented" only, the proof might have been sufficient. Parke, J. thought there was a presentment, and that the rest of the averment might be rejected as surplusage. It was further objected that the only notice proved was given to the drawers on the day the bill became due: whereas the whole of that day ought to have been allowed them for payment. Parke, J. overruled this objection also, and a verdict was found for the plaintiff, but leave given to enter a nonsuit.

*625] *Erle now moved accordingly, and re-stated the objections. [PARKE, J. As to the first, Hardy v. Woodrooffe, 2 Stark. 319, is in point.] At all events the notice on the 18th was premature. Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp. 193, may be cited in answer, but there Lord Ellenborough said, "I think the note was dishonoured as soon as the maker had refused payment on the day when it became due." Here the holder only concluded that the bill would not be paid, from finding no one at the house. There had been no refusal.

PER CURIAM.(a) It is the same, if the house is shut up and no one there. Both cases are in point. Rule refused.

The APOTHECARIES' Company v. ALLEN. April 18.

A person who advises patients, and compounds and sells the medicines recommended by himself, but does not and cannot make up physici ans' prescriptions, is liable to the penalties of 55 G. 3, c. 194, s. 20, for practising as an apothecary without a certificate.

DEBT for penalties under 55 G. 3, c. 194, s. 20, for acting and practising as an apothecary in England, to wit, at Grantham, by then and there, as such apothecary, attending and advising, and furnishing and supplying medicines to and for the use of R. R., without having obtained a certificate pursuant to the act;

(a) Denman, C. J., Littledale, Parke, and Patteson, Js.

it being also averred, that defendant was not practising as an apothecary on or before the 1st of August, 1815. Plea, the general issue. At the trial before Denman, C. J., at the Lincoln Spring assizes 1833, it appeared that the defendant had not been in regular practice as an apothecary on or before the 1st of August, 1815, and had not a certificate; *that he kept no shop, [*626 but lived in lodgings; that he did not make up physicians' prescriptions, and was not able to do so, but that he advised patients, and made up and sold to them the medicines which he himself ordered. Denman, C. J. was of opinion, that a person compounding medicines, and selling them under these circumstances, did act as an apothecary in the ordinary sense of the term; and that it made no difference if he prescribed, as well as prepared, the medicine. The jury, under his direction, found a verdict for the plaintiff.

Balguy now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.

It is not

a practising within the act, where the party merely prepares and dispenses medicines recommended by himself, and does not make up physicians' prescriptions. In The Apothecaries' Company v. Warburton, 3 B. & A. 40, it was held, that a person could not come within the protection of the act, as having practised before the 1st of August, 1815, if he was then incapable of preparing medicines from a prescription. If a person so disqualified could not practise for the purpose of acquiring the privileges of the act, neither ought he to be considered as practising so as to incur its penalties. It was not the design of the legislature to guard against such cases as this; they might be left to the common sense of mankind. In section 5, the duty of an apothecary is stated to be "to prepare with exactness, and to dispense, such medicines as may be directed for the sick by any physician lawfully licensed," &c. And the penalty imposed by that clause is for not observing the directions to be given by such prescription. [PARKE, J. *According to your argument, any person, however igno[*627 rant, might safely dispense any quantity of medicine.] Provided he did not practise as an apothecary within the terms of the act. In the extreme case suggested, if people are willing to trust such a person, they are not within the protection which the legislature intended to give.

DENMAN, C. J. It is true that the Court held in The Apothecaries' Company v. Warburton, 3 B. & A. 40, that a man who before August 1815 had administered medicines without being able to make up a physician's prescription, had not practised so as to be within the protection of 55 G. 3, c. 194, s. 20; but it does not follow that a person so disqualified is free from the penalty there imposed.

LITTLEDALE, J. I do not know what is acting or practising as an apothecary within the clause in question, if this is not.

PARKE, J. The preamble to section 5, does not profess to recite all the duties of an apothecary, but only those referred to by the penal enactments which follow. It is not to be inferred from the decision in The Apothecaries' Company v. Warburton, 3 B. & A. 40, that if a person compounds medicine without being able to make up a physician's prescription, he is not liable to penalties for practising as an apothecary.

PATTESON, J. concurred.

Rule refused.

*The KING v. The Inhabitants of HENDON.

April 19.

[*628

A parish may be indicted for non-repair of a bridge, without stating any other ground of liability than immemorial usage.

INDICTMENT stated that there is a certain common public bridge called Decoy Bridge, situate in the parish of Hendon, in the county of Middlesex, in the king's common highway there, for all his Majesty's subjects to go, return, &c.