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and for fees due in respect thereof, and for journeys. *Money counts, &c. [*816 Plea, non-assumpsit. The particular of demand was, " Amount of plaintiffs' bill for business done by them for defendant in the Palace Court, in a cause, Tucker, Gent., v. Stevens, 251." At the trial before Lord Tenterden, C. J., at the London sittings after Trinity term 1832,(a) it appeared that the business was done upon the defendant's retainer, in a cause in the Palace Court. The plaintiffs were partners, but Joseph Arden only was an attorney of the Palace Court, and his name only was mentioned in the defendant's written retainer. The bill was signed by both, but in the order of the Palace Court for taxation, it was mentioned as the bill delivered by Mr. Arden. The defendant had written letters to both plaintiffs jointly on the subject of the cause and its charges, while it was depending; and after it was over he proposed to them to pay them 157. in discharge of their costs, instead of 207. which they had demanded. For the defendant, it was objected that the plaintiffs, not being both attornies of the Palace Court, could not join in an action for business done there, to which point Brandon and Brown v. Hubbard, 2 B. & B. 11, was cited; and further, on the authority of Collins v. Godefroy, 1 B. & Ad. 950, that the promise to pay, under such circumstances, was not binding. Lord Tenterden was of opinion that the plaintiffs could not recover, and directed a nonsuit, giving leave to the plaintiffs to move to enter a verdict for them. A rule nisi having been obtained for this purpose,

*The Solicitor-General and Kelly in the present term shewed cause, (b) and again relied on the above-mentioned cases. The retainer was an ex[*817 press contract with Joseph Arden singly. If he had misconducted himself in the cause, Tucker could not have brought an action against both partners. The client could only contract with the partner who could legally act upon the retainer; there was no consideration for an undertaking to the partner who, by the rules of the Palace Court, could not practise there. [PARKE, J. Is there such a restriction?] There is a roll of attorneys in that court, limited to six. The rule of court was, to tax the bill "delivered by Mr. Arden." [PARKE, J. It was the bill of both.] De facto, but not de jure. Heming v. Wilton, decided about two years ago in the Court of Exchequer, is the converse of the present case. There an attorney sued for business done by him as clerk in court in the Exchequer; the defence was, that he had a partner who ought to have joined in the action; and the defendant, to establish a joint contract with the two, proved that he had given instructions to both, and that their bill was delivered in the name of both. In answer, the plaintiff proved that he alone was entitled to practise in the Court of Exchequer: and the action was held to be well brought. [PARKE, J. Suppose in the present case neither partner had been an attorney of the Palace Court, but they had contracted with the plaintiff to get his business done there. Or suppose the case of an attorney employed to get business done in a Spiritual Court; which often happens.] No doubt there would be a right to recover, but the declaration must be framed *accord[*818 ing to the circumstances. Here the claim in the declaration is for prosecuting, defending, and soliciting causes; and the particular demand is, for business done in the Palace Court. As for the promise made after the business was done, that could only be prima facie evidence of a previous contract with the two plaintiffs; and the rest of the case rebuts it.

Sir James Scarlett contrà. Brandon and Brown v. Hubbard and another, 2 B. & B. 11, bears no analogy to this case. There the business (preparing a replevin bond) was done by one plaintiff, who was replevin clerk to the sheriff: the other, who was his partner, could not legally act in it. The defendants dealt with Brandon in his capacity of replevin clerk, and not as the partner of

(a) See 1 Moody and Robinson, 191, where the case is reported as to the present and another point.

(6) Before Denman, C. J., Littledale, and Parke, Js.

:

Brown. The point as to a joint retainer did not arise there. In Elkins v. Harding, 1 Tyrwhitt, 274, 1 Cro. & J. 345, it was held that an officer of the Court of Exchequer might sue jointly with an unprivileged person, his partner, for agency business done in that court by both and instances of such proceedings are collected in Manning's Exchequer Practice there referred to. The point now taken by the defendant might have been raised in that case, but was not. It is not suggested here that the plaintiffs, by their practice, contemplated any fraud upon the statutes respecting attorneys. It very commonly happens that attorneys of this Court have a partner who is admitted in one of the other courts, and conducts the business there. As for the warrant to prosecute, that is always made to a single attorney. But where there are partners, if money is advanced, *819] it comes out of a common *fund, and if labour is bestowed, the remuneration belongs to that fund. Cur, adv. vult. DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court. This case was argued before us on Wednesday last. The plaintiffs were in partnership together as attorneys; one of them only was an attorney in the Palace Court, and the action was brought by both, for business done in that court. There was sufficient evidence of a contract by the defendant with both the plaintiffs that they should do the business for him. But it was contended, first, that this evidence was clearly rebutted by proof of a written retainer of one of the plaintiffs alone, who was the attorney in the Palace Court, and the order to tax, and undertaking to pay his bill, which shewed a contract with that plaintiff alone; and, secondly, that if not, the contract with the plaintiffs was not binding in point of law.

As to the first objection, when it is recollected that the retainer filed in the Court is an authority quoad the proceedings in that court only, and is analogous to the warrant of attorney filed of record in this Court; and that the undertaking which is to be enforced in the Palace Court must necessarily be to the attorney in that Court; the evidence of a joint contract with both plaintiffs is very little affected by this species of proof. And on the whole, the weight of evidence is clearly in favour of the joint employment of both plaintiffs.

The second objection is, that such a joint contract is void in law, on the ground that the attorney in the Palace Court could alone sue for business done in that court.

*820] law.

*There is no act of parliament which regulates the proceedings in this Court, (a) and therefore the case must be considered as one at common

No authorities were cited in support of the position, except that of Brandon and Brown v. Hubbard, 2 Brod. & B. 11, and a case of Heming v. Wilton in the Exchequer. The former case has no bearing upon this, and in that there was no joint employment of the plaintiffs. The latter is, as far as we can learn, not reported. It is not in any of the published reports of the Court of Exchequer; and the decision that the clerk in court in the Exchequer might sue alone for business done in that Court, though he and his partner had delivered a bill as for business done by them, may have proceeded on the ground that the joint contract with both partners was not clearly made out.

In the absence of any enactment or decision to the contrary, which we must take to be the case, the question is, whether, upon any principle of law, there is an objection to this action at the suit of both, where the contract is with both, and we think there is no objection.

Suppose neither of the plaintiffs had been attorneys of that Court, but that the defendant had employed them, and they had undertaken with him to do.the business there for him, and for reward to be paid to them; and they had then employed an attorney of the Court on their own credit, there could have been

(a) See as to this court, 2 Bac. Abr. 510, in marg. 7th ed. and the authorities there

cited.

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no objection to the action by both for the reward; it would be like the case of attorneys, who, upon their own credit, *employed a proctor in the Spiritual Courts, or, before the recent alterations, (11 G. 4, & 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 10,) a clerk in court in the Exchequer, and who certainly might have sued their own client for their bill. If so, it can make no difference, that one of the plaintiffs is the person who himself transacts the business in the particular court, where the contract is clearly with both.

We are of opinion, therefore, that this action will lie; and the rule must be absolute to enter a verdict for the plaintiffs.

Rule absolute.

DIGBY v. THOMPSON and ANOTHER.

The following words, "D. has had a tolerable run of luck. He keeps a well-spread sideboard, but I always consider myself in a family hotel when my legs are under his table, for the bill is sure to come in sooner or later, though I rarely dabble in the mysteries of ecarté or any other game. The fellow is as deep as Crockford, and as knowing as the Marquis. I do dislike this leg-al profession," will support a declaration for libel without explanatory averments; for they tend generally to disgrace the plaintiff. Quære, Whether defendant by demurring to a declaration for a libel, stated to have been published with intent to cause certain matters to be believed, admits particular words in the libel to have been published with that intent.

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CASE. The declaration stated, that the plaintiff was a person of good reputa tion, and had not ever been guilty, or, until the committing of the several griev ances by the defendants as thereinafter mentioned, been suspected to have been guilty of the misconduct thereinafter mentioned to have been imputed to him, or of any other misconduct; yet the defendants, well knowing the premises, but contriving, &c., to injure the plaintiff in his said reputation and to bring him into public scandal and disgrace, and to cause it to be suspected and believed that the plaintiff had been guilty of unfair play at cards, and for defrauding persons of their money by means thereof, and by bettings, and that he had played *unfairly and fraudulently at a certain game with cards called ecarté, and at certain other game swith cards, and had thereby won large sums of money from divers persons visiting the house of the plaintiff at Brighton, in the county of Sussex, and that the plaintiff invited persons to his house and entertained them there for the purpose of winning their money unfairly by gaming there; and that the plaintiff was a person of disreputable and bad cha racter, and did in a great measure support and maintain himself by gaming and by unfair and fraudulent practices in gaming and betting, to wit, on, &c., at, &c. wrongfully, maliciously and injuriously published in a certain newspaper called the Satirist or Censor of the Times, a certain false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel of and concerning the plaintiff, containing the false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libellous matter following of and concerning the plaintiff; that is to say, "King Digby, (meaning the plaintiff,) as my friend Tom used to style him, has had a tolerable run of luck this season, (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had won divers large sums of money by gaming) He (meaning the said plaintiff) is still here, (meaning at Brighton aforesaid,) and keeps, I assure you, friend Sat, a well spread sideboard; but, curse the fellow! I always consider myself in a family hotel when my legs are singing duets under his table; for the bill is sure to come in sooner or later, although, as you know, I rarely dabble in the mysteries of ecarté or any other game. The fellow (meaning the plaintiff) is as deep as Crockford, and as knowing as the Marquis. I do dislike this leg-al profession." Demurrer, assigning for cause that the matter alleged did not amount to any libel on the plaintiff, and also that although the plaintiff *had by an innuendo alleged that by the words of the libel, "King Digby (meaning the plaintiff), as my friend Tom used

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to style him, has had a tolerable run of luck this season," the defendants meant that the plaintiff had won money by gaming, and had alleged as an inducement that the plaintiff was guilty of gaming; nevertheless it was not alleged or shewn that the libel was published of and concerning such gaming, or that such libel had any reference to the matters stated in the introductory part of the declaration, or any of them; and also for that the meaning and explanation by the plaintiff given to the words in the said libel, adds to, enlarges, and changes the sense of those words, and also for that the said meaning and explanation is not connected in any way by averment or otherwise with, or in any way applicable to the matters of inducement before stated, and also for that there is no averment that the defendant was used to employ, or did on the occasion of the publishing, employ the said words in the sense and meaning put upon them by the plaintiff in the said innuendo. No counsel appearing in support of the demurrer, the Court called upon

*824]

may

Wightman to support the declaration. The defendants have, by the demurrer, admitted that the words of the libel were used with the intention imputed in the declaration; the only question, therefore, is, whether the words set out will bear a sense corresponding with that intention. If the defendants had pleaded, the whole would have been a question for the jury; but after demurrer, if the words can possibly bear the sense ascribed to them, it must be taken that they were used in that sense, and the words "that the plaintiff had had a tolerable *run of luck, &c.," certainly may mean (as stated in the innuendo) that he had won large sums of money by gaming. Besides, this declaration be supported, because the matter charged as libellous, independently of any innuendo, has a tendency to disgrace the plaintiff, and the Court will understand the words used without any explanatory averment, if the sense is sufficiently obvious as it is here. In Peare v. Jones, Roll. Abr. Action on the case, 55, pl. 16, the plaintiff declared that he was an utter barrister of the Middle Temple, and a practiser of the common law for several years, and that the defendant, of purpose to defame him, maliciously said of him to J. S., his fatherin-law, Did Mr. Peare, (the plaintiff), marry your daughter? to which J. S. said, Yes; to which the defendant replied, He is a dunce and will get nothing by the law; to which J. S. answered, Other men have a better opinion of him; to which the defendant replied, He was never accounted otherwise in the House. It was held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that the action lay upon this declaration; for a man may be heavy, and not so pregnant as others are, and yet a good lawyer. But here it appeared on the whole matter that it was spoken maliciously, and he said, he would not get anything by the law, which disgraced him in his profession. The Court there took notice of the meaning of the word dunce, according to the common understanding, (Cro. Car. 382, S. C.) And in Goddart v. Haselfoot, Roll. Abr. 54, pl. 12, it is held, if a man says of a doctor of physic, "he is an empiric, and a mountebank," an action lies, without any averment of the signification of the words; for these are terms of disgrace well *825] known, and in disgrace of his *profession. In Peare's case, Roll. Abr. 55, pl. 15, (see Vin. Abr. Action for Word, S. a 10, 11, 12, 16, 17,) it is said to have been held that, if a man says of a councillor of law in the North, "Thou art a daffadowndilly," an action lies, with an averment that the words signify he is an ambodexter. The word "ambodexter," there, might have been said to require an explanatory averment, almost as much as the word it was intended to explain. Here the imputation that the plaintiff invited persons to his house, and entertained them there with a view of winning their money by gaming, has a tendency to disgrace the plaintiff, and no explanation was necessary.

DENMAN, C. J. I am very unwilling to decide this case on the ground that the defendant has, by demurring, admitted, on the record, that the libellous matter was published with the intent charged in the declaration; and that, if the words can, by possibility, bear the sense alleged, the Court are bound to hold that they were so used. But I think the declaration sufficient, on the

more general ground that the matter charged as libellous imports something disgraceful to the plaintiff. The charge is, that the plaintiff invited persons to his house, and entertained them, and made them pay for such entertainment; and that, connected with the other words, may, I think, support the allegation, that the libel accused the plaintiff of making them pay by winning their money. in gaming. I give this opinion, however, with reluctance, as I had rather the words had been distinctly explained by innuendoes, than that a jury, if the case had been tried, should have had to speculate on their meaning.

*LITTLEDALE, J. I think the declaration may be supported, because the libel imputes what is disgraceful to the plaintiff. I am not prepared [*826 to say that we can import into this record the admission relied upon by Mr. Wightman, to give the words complained of the sense ascribed to them in the declaration.

PARKE, J. Rejecting all the innuendoes, I think the matter charged in the declaration is clearly actionable. No man of common sense could read it without seeing that it imputed fraudulent and dishonest conduct to the plaintiff. Without, therefore, adverting to the point made in argument, that the words here must be taken to have been used with the intent imputed in the declaration, I think the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

BIRD, Clerk, v. JOSEPH RELPH, and JANE, his Wife, Executrix of SMITH, Clerk.

Neglect to cultivate the glebe land in a husbandlike manner, is not a dilapidation for which an incumbent can recover.

CASE for dilapidations. The first and second counts stated the parsonage house, &c. to be out of repair. The third count stated, that by the law and custom of England, the vicars of this kingdom for the time being ought not to manage, use, or cultivate the lands of and belonging to their respective vicarages, nor ought they to suffer or permit the same to be managed, used, or culti vated otherwise than in a good and husbandlike manner, and according to the custom of the country where the said lands are situate, and such vicars ought to leave the said lands managed, *used, and cultivated in a good and [*827 husbandlike manner, and according to the custom of the country where the said lands are situate, to their successors; and that if such vicars do leave such lands to their successors impoverished, damaged, or lessened in value by reason of having been managed, used, and cultivated in a bad and unhusbandlike manner, and not according to the custom of the country where the said lands are situate, then the executors or administrators of the goods and chattels of such vicars, after their deaths, having sufficient of the goods and chattels of such vicars, are bound and ought to satisfy so much as shall be necessary to be expended or paid for repairing the damage done to the said lands by reason of their being so impoverished, damaged, or lessened in value by such improper management, usage, and cultivation. It then stated that W. Smith deceased in his lifetime was vicar of Ainstable, in the county of Cumberland, and was seised, in right of the vicarage, of certain lands in that county, and died; that the plaintiff after his death, to wit, on, &c. was presented, admitted, instituted, and inducted into the said vicarage, and thereby became vicar of the parish church of Ainstable, and the next successor of the said W. Smith; that at the time of his death the lands were and still are greatly damaged and lessened in value by reason of the same having been used, managed, and cultivated during the lifetime of the said W. Smith, and whilst he was such vicar, in a bad and

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