Brown. The point as to a joint retainer did not arise there. In Elkins v. Harding, 1 Tyrwhitt, 274, 1 Cro. & J. 345, it was held that an officer of the Court of Exchequer might sue jointly with an unprivileged person, his partner, for agency business done in that court by both: and instances of such proceedings are collected in Manning's Exchequer Practice there referred to. The point now taken by the defendant might have been raised in that case, but was not. It is not suggested here that the plaintiffs, by their practice, contemplated any fraud upon the statutes respecting attorneys. It very commonly happens that attorneys of this Court have a partner who is admitted in one of the other courts, and conducts the business there. As for the warrant to prosecute, that is always made to a single attorney. But where there are partners, if money is advanced, it comes out of a common *fund, and if labour is bestowed, the remunera*819] tion belongs to that fund. Cur. adv. vult. DENMAN, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the Court. This case was argued before us on Wednesday last. The plaintiffs were in partnership together as attorneys; one of them only was an attorney in the Palace Court, and the action was brought by both, for business done in that court. There was sufficient evidence of a contract by the defendant with both the plaintiffs that they should do the business for him. But it was contended, first, that this evidence was clearly rebutted by proof of a written retainer of one of the plaintiffs alone, who was the attorney in the Palace Court, and the order to tax, and undertaking to pay his bill, which shewed a contract with that plaintiff alone; and, secondly, that if not, the contract with the plaintiffs was not binding in point of law.

As to the first objection, when it is recollected that the retainer filed in the Court is an authority quoad the proceedings in that court only, and is analogous to the warrant of attorney filed of record in this Court; and that the undertaking which is to be enforced in the Palace Court must necessarily be to the attorney in that Court; the evidence of a joint contract with both plaintiffs is very little affected by this species of proof. And on the whole, the weight of evidence is clearly in favour of the joint employment of both plaintiffs.

The second objection is, that such a joint contract is void in law, on the ground that the attorney in the Palace Court could alone sue for business done in that court.

*820] law.

*There is no act of parliament which regulates the proceedings in this Court, (a) and therefore the case must be considered as one at common

No authorities were cited in support of the position, except that of Brandon and Brown v. Hubbard, 2 Brod. & B. 11, and a case of Heming v. Wilton in the Exchequer. The former case has no bearing upon this, and in that there was no joint employment of the plaintiffs. The latter is, as far as we can learn, not reported. It is not in any of the published reports of the Court of Exchequer; and the decision that the clerk in court in the Exchequer might sue alone for business done in that Court, though he and his partner had delivered a bill as for business done by them, may have proceeded on the ground that the joint contract with both partners was not clearly made out.

In the absence of any enactment or decision to the contrary, which we must take to be the case, the question is, whether, upon any principle of law, there is an objection to this action at the suit of both, where the contract is with both, and we think there is no objection.

Suppose neither of the plaintiffs had been attorneys of that Court, but that the defendant had employed them, and they had undertaken with him to do.the business there for him, and for reward to be paid to them; and they had then employed an attorney of the Court on their own credit, there could have been

(a) See as to this court, 2 Bac. Abr. 510, in marg. 7th ed. and the authorities there

cited.

no objection to the action by both for the reward; it would be like the case of attorneys, who, upon their own credit, *employed a proctor in the Spirit[*821 ual Courts, or, before the recent alterations, (11 G. 4, & 1 W. 4, c. 70, s. 10,) a clerk in court in the Exchequer, and who certainly might have sued their own client for their bill. If so, it can make no difference, that one of the plaintiffs is the person who himself transacts the business in the particular court, where the contract is clearly with both.

We are of opinion, therefore, that this action will lie; and the rule must be absolute to enter a verdict for the plaintiffs. Rule absolute.

DIGBY v. THOMPSON and ANOTHER.

The following words, "D. has had a tolerable run of luck. He keeps a well-spread sideboard, but I always consider myself in a family hotel when my legs are under his table, for the bill is sure to come in sooner or later, though I rarely dabble in the mysteries of ecarté or any other game. The fellow is as deep as Crockford, and as knowing as the Marquis. I do dislike this leg-al profession," will support a declaration for libel without explanatory averments; for they tend generally to disgrace the plaintiff. Quære, Whether defendant by demurring to a declaration for a libel, stated to have been published with intent to cause certain matters to be believed, admits particular words in the libel to have been published with that intent.

[*892

CASE. The declaration stated, that the plaintiff was a person of good reputa tion, and had not ever been guilty, or, until the committing of the several griev ances by the defendants as thereinafter mentioned, been suspected to have been guilty of the misconduct thereinafter mentioned to have been imputed to him, or of any other misconduct; yet the defendants, well knowing the premises, but contriving, &c., to injure the plaintiff in his said reputation and to bring him into public scandal and disgrace, and to cause it to be suspected and be lieved that the plaintiff had been guilty of unfair play at cards, and for defrauding persons of their money by means thereof, and by bettings, and that he had played *unfairly and fraudulently at a certain game with cards called ecarté, and at certain other game swith cards, and had thereby won large sums of money from divers persons visiting the house of the plaintiff at Brighton, in the county of Sussex, and that the plaintiff invited persons to his house and entertained them there for the purpose of winning their money unfairly by gaming there; and that the plaintiff was a person of disreputable and bad character, and did in a great measure support and maintain himself by gaming and by unfair and fraudulent practices in gaming and betting, to wit, on, &c., at, &c. wrongfully, maliciously and injuriously published in a certain newspaper called the Satirist or Censor of the Times, a certain false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel of and concerning the plaintiff, containing the false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libellous matter following of and concerning the plaintiff; that is to say, "King Digby, (meaning the plaintiff,) as my friend Tom used to style him, has had a tolerable run of luck this season, (meaning thereby that the plaintiff had won divers large sums of money by gaming.) He (meaning the said plaintiff) is still here, (meaning at Brighton aforesaid,) and keeps, I assure you, friend Sat, a well spread sideboard; but, curse the fellow! I always consider myself in a family hotel when my legs are singing duets under his table; for the bill is sure to come in sooner or later, although, as you know, I rarely dabble in the mysteries of ecarté or any other game. The fellow (meaning the plaintiff) is as deep as Crockford, and as knowing as the Marquis. I do dislike this leg-al profession." Demurrer, assigning for cause that the matter alleged did not amount to any libel on the plaintiff, and also that although the plaintiff *had by an innuendo alleged that by the words of the libel, "King Digby (meaning the plaintiff), as my friend Tom used

[*823

to style him, has had a tolerable run of luck this season," the defendants meant that the plaintiff had won money by gaming, and had alleged as an inducement that the plaintiff was guilty of gaming; nevertheless it was not alleged or shewn that the libel was published of and concerning such gaming, or that such libel had any reference to the matters stated in the introductory part of the declaration, or any of them; and also for that the meaning and explanation by the plaintiff given to the words in the said libel, adds to, enlarges, and changes the sense of those words, and also for that the said meaning and explanation is not connected in any way by averment or otherwise with, or in any way applicable to the matters of inducement before stated, and also for that there is no averment that the defendant was used to employ, or did on the occasion of the publishing, employ the said words in the sense and meaning put upon them by the plaintiff in the said innuendo. No counsel appearing in support of the demurrer, the Court called upon

Wightman to support the declaration. The defendants have, by the demurrer, admitted that the words of the libel were used with the intention imputed in the declaration; the only question, therefore, is, whether the words set out will bear a sense corresponding with that intention. If the defendants had pleaded, the whole would have been a question for the jury; but after demurrer, if the words can possibly bear the sense ascribed to them, it must be taken that they were used in that sense, and the words "that the plaintiff had had a tolerable *run of luck, &c.," certainly may mean (as stated in the innuendo) that

*824] he had won large sums of money by gaming. Besides, this declaration may be supported, because the matter charged as libellous, independently of any innuendo, has a tendency to disgrace the plaintiff, and the Court will understand the words used without any explanatory averment, if the sense is sufficiently obvious as it is here. In Peare v. Jones, Roll. Abr. Action on the case, 55, pl. 16, the plaintiff declared that he was an utter barrister of the Middle Temple, and a practiser of the common law for several years, and that the defendant, of purpose to defame him, maliciously said of him to J. S., his fatherin-law, Did Mr. Peare, (the plaintiff), marry your daughter? to which J. S. said, Yes; to which the defendant replied, He is a dunce and will get nothing by the law; to which J. S. answered, Other men have a better opinion of him; to which the defendant replied, He was never accounted otherwise in the House. It was held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that the action lay upon this declaration ; for a man may be heavy, and not so pregnant as others are, and yet a good lawyer. But here it appeared on the whole matter that it was spoken maliciously, and he said, he would not get anything by the law, which disgraced him in his profession. The Court there took notice of the meaning of the word dunce, according to the common understanding, (Cro. Car. 382, S. C.) And in Goddart v. Haselfoot, Roll. Abr. 54, pl. 12, it is held, if a man says of a doctor of physic, "he is an empiric, and a mountebank," an action lies, without any averment of the signification of the words; for these are terms of disgrace well known, and in disgrace of his *profession. In Peare's case, Roll. Abr. 55,

*825] pl. 15, (see Vin. Abr. Action for Word, S. a 10, 11, 12, 16, 17,) it is said

to have been held that, if a man says of a councillor of law in the North, "Thou art a daffadowndilly," an action lies, with an averment that the words signify he is an ambodexter. The word "ambodexter," there, might have been said to require an explanatory averment, almost as much as the word it was intended to explain. Here the imputation that the plaintiff invited persons to his house, and entertained them there with a view of winning their money by gaming, has a tendency to disgrace the plaintiff, and no explanation was necessary.

DENMAN, C. J. I am very unwilling to decide this case on the ground that the defendant has, by demurring, admitted, on the record, that the libellous matter was published with the intent charged in the declaration; and that, if the words can, by possibility, bear the sense alleged, the Court are bound to hold that they were so used. But I think the declaration sufficient, on the

more general ground that the matter charged as libellous imports something disgraceful to the plaintiff. The charge is, that the plaintiff invited persons to his house, and entertained them, and made them pay for such entertainment; and that, connected with the other words, may, I think, support the allegation, that the libel accused the plaintiff of making them pay by winning their money in gaming. I give this opinion, however, with reluctance, as I had rather the words had been distinctly explained by innuendoes, than that a jury, if the case had been tried, should have had to speculate on their meaning.

*LITTLEDALE, J. I think the declaration may be supported, because the libel imputes what is disgraceful to the plaintiff. I am not prepared

to

[*826

say that we can import into this record the admission relied upon by Mr. Wightman, to give the words complained of the sense ascribed to them in the declaration.

PARKE, J. Rejecting all the innuendoes, I think the matter charged in the declaration is clearly actionable. No man of common sense could read it without seeing that it imputed fraudulent and dishonest conduct to the plaintiff. Without, therefore, adverting to the point made in argument, that the words here must be taken to have been used with the intent imputed in the declaration, I think the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.

Judgment for the plaintiff.

BIRD, Clerk, v. JOSEPH RELPH, and JANE, his Wife, Executrix of SMITH, Clerk.

Neglect to cultivate the glebe land in a husbandlike manner, is not a dilapidation for which an incumbent can recover.

CASE for dilapidations. The first and second counts stated the parsonage house, &c. to be out of repair. The third count stated, that by the law and custom of England, the vicars of this kingdom for the time being ought not to manage, use, or cultivate the lands of and belonging to their respective vicarages, nor ought they to suffer or permit the same to be managed, used, or cultivated otherwise than in a good and husbandlike manner, and according to the custom of the country where the said lands are situate, and such vicars ought to leave the said lands managed, *used, and cultivated in a good and [*827 husbandlike manner, and according to the custom of the country where the said lands are situate, to their successors; and that if such vicars do leave such lands to their successors impoverished, damaged, or lessened in value by reason of having been managed, used, and cultivated in a bad and unhusbandlike manner, and not according to the custom of the country where the said lands are situate, then the executors or administrators of the goods and chattels of such vicars, after their deaths, having sufficient of the goods and chattels of such vicars, are bound and ought to satisfy so much as shall be necessary to be expended or paid for repairing the damage done to the said lands by reason of their being so impoverished, damaged, or lessened in value by such improper management, usage, and cultivation. It then stated that W. Smith deceased in his lifetime was vicar of Ainstable, in the county of Cumberland, and was seised, in right of the vicarage, of certain lands in that county, and died; that the plaintiff after his death, to wit, on, &c. was presented, admitted, instituted, and inducted into the said vicarage, and thereby became vicar of the parish church of Ainstable, and the next successor of the said W. Smith; that at the time of his death the lands were and still are greatly damaged and lessened in value by reason of the same having been used, managed, and cultivated during the lifetime of the said W. Smith, and whilst he was such vicar, in a bad and

unhusbandlike manner, and contrary to the custom of the country where they were situate, and having been wrongfully left so impoverished, damaged, and lessened in value by the said W. Smith, at the time of his death, &c. At the trial before Gurney, B., at the Carlisle Spring assizes, *1833, it ap*828] peared that the lands belonging to the vicarage consisted of ancient glebe land, and of lands allotted in lieu of tithes, under an inclosure act passed in 1820. The learned Judge refused to receive evidence that the allotments under the inclosure act had been impoverished by bad husbandry, but gave leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict, if the Court thought the evidence admissible, for such an amount as should be certified by an arbitrator.

Coltman now moved accordingly. The action for dilapidations is founded. on the common law, by which the incumbent of a living is required to leave the premises belonging to it in the same state he ought to keep them in, so that his successor may have the same beneficial enjoyment of them which he had. It is true that such actions are usually brought in respect of the buildings not being in that state of repair which the incumbent ought to have kept them in, and there is no express authority for saying, that such an action is maintainable against the executors of a deceased incumbent for not cultivating the lands in a husbandlike manner. But the principle on which the action is founded, viz., that the incumbent for the time being should have the beneficial use of the property belonging to the living, extends to the glebe lands as well. as to the buildings; for, it is quite clear, that the successor will not have that beneficial enjoyment of the glebe lands which he ought to have, if his predecessor has not cultivated them in a husbandlike manner. In Liford's case, 11 Co. *829] 49, a., it is said, "If a parson of a church, and one A., are *tenants in common of a wood, and A. endeavours to commit waste, the parson, for the preservation of the timber trees, shall have a prohibition against him that he shall not commit waste; and the reason thereof, as the Chief Justice said, was, that if the parson of a church will waste the inheritance of his church to his private use in felling trees, the patron may have a prohibition against him; for the parson is seised as in the right of his church, and his glebe is the dower of his church, for of it he was endowed." And in Wise v. Metcalf, 10 B. & C. 299, where the question was, by what rule the dilapidations as to the rectory-house, buildings, and chancel were to be estimated, three rules were proposed for the consideration of the Court, the second rule being, that they were to be left as an outgoing lay tenant ought to leave his buildings, where he is under covenant to leave them in good and sufficient repair, order, and condition. Bayley, J., said, that although the Court were not prepared to say that any of those rules was precisely correct, the second approached most nearly to that which they considered as the proper one. In 2 Gibson's Codex, 752, in a note upon the 13 Eliz. c. 10, s. 1, it is said, "Although, in this preamble, nothing is referred to as dilapidation, but decayed or ruined buildings, yet it is certain that, under that name, are comprehended hedges, fences, &c., in the like condition; and it hath been particularly adjudged concerning wood and timber, that the felling of them by any incumbent, (otherwise than for repairs or for fuel) is dilapidation, from which he may be restrained by prohibition during his incumbency; and for which he or his executors are liable to be prosecuted, after he ceases to be incumbent."

*830]

DENMAN, C. J. This is an entirely new application. To render the executors of an incumbent liable to an action for dilapidations, there ought to be something of demolition. There is no ground for saying that executors are liable to such an action for mismanagement of the glebe land.

LITTLEDALE, J., concurred.

PARKE, J. An action lies by a landlord against a tenant for the mismanagement of his farm, on the implied contract between landlord and tenant that the latter shall cultivate the land in a husbandlike manner. Here no such contract can be implied between the parson and his successor; and there is no authority for saying that such an action is maintainable.