LEGAL ESTATE. See EJECTMENt, 2. LIBEL. See EVIDENCE, 11. 1. The following words-"D. has had a tolerable run of luck. He keeps a well spread sideboard, but I always consider myself in a family hotel when my legs are under his table, for the bill is sure to come in sooner or later, though I rarely dabble in the mysteries of ecarte or any other game. The fellow is as deep as Crockford, and as knowing as the Marquis. I do dislike this leg-al profession"-will support a declaration for libel, without explanatory averments, for they tend generally to disgrace the plaintiff. Quære, Whether a defendant, by demurring to a declaration for a libel to have been published with the intent ascribed to it in the declaration. Digby v. Thomson, E., 3 W. 4. 821 2. In an action for a libel charging an attorney with " disgraceful conduct" in having at an election disclosed confidential communications which he had acquired professionally, the defendant pleaded in justification that the plaintiff had disclosed many details and particulars professionally and confidentially communicated to him relating to three transactions (which were specified), two of them being instances in which he had been employed by mortgagors to manage mortgages, and a third where in the course of his employment as attorney, he had become acquainted with the nature of his client's title and his right to grant leases. At the trial it appeared as to the mortgages, that the plaintiff had acted as attorney both for mortgagors and mortgagees: Held, that it was a question for the jury whether the matters disclosed by the plaintiff were such the knowledge of which was acquired professionally, and not whether they were such as he would not be compellable to disclose if called upon as a witness in a court of justice. Semble that the knowledge acquired by the plaintiff as to the right of his client to grant freehold leases, was of that privileged nature that he would not have been bound to disclose it if called on as a witness. Moore, Gent., One, &c. v. Terrell and Others, E., 3 W. 4. LICENSE. See PLEADING, 7. See VENDOR AND VENDEE, 1. 870 1. A. purchased premises which were mortgaged to B., with a proviso for reconveyance at the costs and charges of the mortgagor, on payment of principal and interest. B. sold the premises, and was to pay off the mortgage on the completion of the purchase; but A.'s attorney, who held the title deeds, would not deliver them to B. till his own bill was also paid. The bill contained some items fairly chargeable on the occasion, as costs due from the mortgagor and others, which were properly payable by the mortgagee: Held, that the attorney might enforce his lien on the deeds against B. to the whole extent of the bill; and that B. having been obliged to pay it for the purpose of releasing the deeds, could not recover back from the attorney the amount unduly charged. Ogle v. Storey, Gent., One, &c., E., 3 W. 4. 735 LOCOMOTIVE STEAM ENGINES. LONDON DOCK COMPANY. MALICE. See ACTION ON THE CASE, 2. EVIDENCE, 12. MANDAMUS. See APPEAL, 4. 1. By stat. 11 G. 4, c. lxx., the Hungerford Market Company were empowered to purchase certain premises for the purposes of the act; and by sect. 6, it was enacted as follows: That if any person interested in such premises shall, for twenty-one days next after notice given him of their being required for the purposes of the act, refuse to treat, or not agree, for the sale thereof, in every such case the Company shall cause the value of, and recompense to be made for, such premises to be inquired of by a jury; and for summoning and returning such jury, they are empowered to issue their warrant to the High Bailiff of Westminster, who is required to impannel, summon and return such jury, and is empowered to swear twelve, and to examine witnesses before them, &c.: and they shall assess the damages and recompense, &c.: Held, that the Company, having given such notice to an occupier, could not withdraw from it, though they offered to pay all reasonable costs incurred by him in consequence; but that the act obliged them, on his demand, to issue their warrant to the High Bailiff for summoning a jury. And the Court granted a mandamus to compel them so to do. The King v. The Hungerford Market Company, 3 W. 4. 327 2. It is discretionary in the Court either to determine the validity of a return to a mandamus on motion, or to order the case to be set down in the crown paper for argument. The St. Katharine Dock Company were incorporated by act of parliament, which directed that all actions against the Company should be prosecuted against the treasurer or director for the time being; but that the body or goods, lands, &c., of such treasurer or director should not, by reason of his being defendant in such action, be liable to execution. An action having been brought by T. C. against the treasurer, as such, and another by the Company, in the name of the treasurer, against T. C., all matters in difference were referred to an arbitrator, who awarded that T. C. had cause of action against the defendant, as such treasurer, for a certain sum, and directed that the treasurer should pay T. C. that sum on demand: and, as to the other suit, he awarded that the treasuer, as such, had no cause of action, and ordered him, as such treasuer, to pay T. C. the costs on demand: Held, that a mandamus would lie to the treasurer and directors, commanding them to pay the sums awarded. The King v. The St. Katharine Dock Company, M., 3 W. 4. 360 3. On motion for a mandumus to the master and wardens of an incorporated company of the city of London, to call a meeting of the company on the next annual day of election, for the purpose of electing a master and wardens according to the charters, it being suggested, as the ground of motion, that the said officers were at present improperly elected by a part only of the company, instead of the whole body; the Court refused the writ. On motion afterwards for a quo warranto against the master elected in the manner complained of, it appeared that the practice, as far as it could be traced, from the year 1488, had been for the master, wardens, and a body called the court of assistants (which had varied in number from twenty-four to forty), to elect the master; and that he had asually been elected out of the court of assistants, and not out of the general body. The assistants, besides belonging to that court, had the same qualifications for being elected as the other members of the company. In some instances, but it was not stated how many or at what period, persons had been elected who were not of the court. The company had existed from time immemorial; by a charter of Rich. 2, they were empowered to elect a master de seipsis when and as they should please; and by a charter of 18 Hen. 7, (1502) all their liberties, franchises and customs, were confirmed: Held, that if one entire by-law were to be presumed, for the master, wardens, &c., to elect, and to elect out of a restricted body, the latter part of such by-law would be bad, and vitiate the whole, but that no ground was laid for presuming such by-law, inasmuch as the elections from the particular body might have been made in every instance by choice, and not under any rule; and further, it appeared that there were exceptions, although these were not specifically stated; and that even the practice of electing by a limited body was not necessarily to be presumed part of a by-law, as it might have been a custom, incorporated by reference in the charter of Hen. 7. Quære, Whether a quo warranto information lies at the instance of a private relator, against a person claiming to hold an office in one of the incorporated companies of the city of London? The King v. Attwood, 3 W. 4. 481 4. The Court of Directors of the East India Company sent to the Board of Control, for their approval, a draft of a dispatch headed "Political Department," which that board altered and returned to them, to be transmitted to India, pursuant to the 33 G. 2, c. 32, s. 12. The directors objected to the alterations, but not the jurisdiction of the commissioners to make them; and the alterations being insisted on by the board, the directors afterwards rescinded the resolution on which the despatch was founded, and lef. it to the commissioners to originate the dispatch pursuant to the sect. 15 of the statate. On motion for a mandamus to the directors to transmit the altered dispatch: Held, first, that the conduct of the directors was equivalent to a refusal to transmit the dispatch; secondly, that the directors could not in this case annul the resolution on which the dispatch had been founded; thirdly, that the despatch having been originated by the directors, and altered by the board of control, and ordered by them to be transmitted, and proceedings being so far regular, it was no answer to an application for a mandamus, that the board might by another proceeding, as by originating a dispatch, attain the same end: fourthly, that the directors having admited the jurisdiction of the board with respect to the dispatch, and only contested the alterations, were estopped from afterwards contending that the dispatch was not one over which the board had authority. H., 3 W. 4. 530 5. To ground a proceeding at petty sessions under 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 31, s. 8, for compensation in respect of felonious injury by rioters, the party or his servant must go before a justice within seven days after the offence committed, and submit to examination, &c., according to section 3 of the act, as well as where an action is to be brought. And the Court will not grant a mandamus to summon such petty session, where it does not appear by affidavit that these steps have been taken, though the party swear that he has duly served the notice required by section 8. King v. Bateman and Another, H. 3 W. 4. The 552 6. The act 11 G. 4, c. lxx. (passed May 1830), incorporating the Hungerford Market Company, empowers them to purchase certain estates; and section 17, enacts, that every lessee or tenant for years or at will of any messuages, &c. to be purchased under the act, shall deliver up possession to the company at three months' notice, they making compensation to every such tenant, &c. who shall be required to quit before the expiration of his term such compensation, in case of dispute, to be assessed by a jury. Section 19, provides, that all tenants for years, from year to year, or at will, occupiers of any messuages, &c. comprised in the act, who shall sustain "any loss, damage, or injury in respect of any interest whatsoever for goodwill, improvements, tenant's fixtures, or otherwise, which they now enjoy, by reason of the passing of this act," shall receive compensation from the company, by such means as are provided in respect of the tenants of certain hereditaments mentioned in a schedule to the act; namely, by assessments, as before stated. A lessee, whose term expired on the day the company came into possession (June 24th, 1830), obtained leave to hold on till the premises were wanted, and did so for a year and three quarters, at the end of which time he quitted, having received half a year's notice. His under-tenant, who came in at Christmas 1828, and had held from year to year, and who knew of the above proceedings, and also received notice to quit, was held entitled to compensation for good-will (to be assessed by a jury) under sect. 19. The King v. The Hungerford Market Company, E. 3 W. 4. 592 7. Under sections 17, and 19, of the Hungerford Market Act (see the preceding case) compensation was claimed by a party, who in 1823 became the assignee of a lease for fourteen years, granted in 1818, of premises on the estate purchased by the company. The lease contained covenants to yield up the premises, with all fixtures and improvements, at the end of the term, and not to underlet or assign without leave; but this latter clause had not been introduced in contemplation of any advantage to be taken of it by the landlord with reference to the prezent act. The company suffered the lease to expire, and then turned out the tenant: Held, that he was entitled to have compensation assessed for the loss, if any, sustained by him in respect of good-will, or the chance of a beneficial renewal of his lease; but not for fixtures set up or purchased, or for improvements made by him, inasmuch as he had no legal interest in them. Held, nevertheless, that these might be considered by the jury in estimating the chance of a beneficial renewal. The King v. The Hungerford Market Company (Ex parte Gosling), E. 3 W. 4. MANGANESE. See POOR-RATE, 2. MARKET. 596 Quære, if the grantee of a newly created market can, by virtue of such grant merely, maintain an action for disturbance of franchise against a person selling marketable articles in his own shop, within the franchise, but not within the limits of the market place on the market day. But a claim by immemorial custom to exclude others from selling such commodities on the market day, except in the market place, is valid in law. And where a market for meat, &c. was proved to have been in existence in the reign of James the First, proof that the grantees of the market had for the last hundred years appointed market-lookers, that no butchers' shops had existed out of the market place until 1810, and that the shops then set up were objected to by the grantees, was held to be sufficient evidence of such immemorial right. The Mayor of Macclesfield v. Pedley, H. 3 W. 4. MARRIAGE. 397 To render a marriage invalid, the 4 G. 4, c. 76, s. 22, which enacts, "that if any persons shall knowingly and wilfully intermarry without due publication of banns, the marriages of such persons shall be null and void," it must be contracted by both parties with a knowledge that no due publication has taken place. And therefore where the intended husband procured the banns to be published in a Christian and surname which the woman had never borne, but she did not known that fact until after the solemnization of the marriage: it was held that the marriage was valid. The King v. The Inhabit 640 ants of Wroxton, E. 3 W. 4. MARSHAL OF THE KING'S BENCH. See ATTORNEY, 1. MASTER AND SERVANT. See EVIDENCE, 12. MINES. See POOR RATE, 2. MISJOINDER OF ACTION. MISJOINDER OF COUNTS. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED. MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE. MUTUAL CREDIT. See ATTORNEY, 2. NOTICE TO OVERSEERS. See SETTLEMENT BY APPRENTICESHIP, 1. NOTICE TO QUIT. See MANDAMUS, 5, 6. NOTICE TO REPAIR. NOTICE TO PURCHASE PREMISES. NOTICE OF WRIT OF ERROR. NOTTINGHAM CASTLE. NUISANCE. See HIGHWAY, 1. By an act reciting that a railway between cer tain points would be of great public utility, and would materially assist the agricultural interest and the general traffic of the country, power was given to a company to make such railway according to a plan deposited with the clerk of the peace, from which they were not to deviate more than 100 yards. By a subsequent act the company or persons authorized by them were empowered to use locomotive engines upon the railway. The railway was made parallel and adjacent to an ancient highway, and in some places came within five yards of it. It did not appear whether or not the line could have been made, in those instances, to pass at a greater distance. The locomotive engines on the railway frightened the horses of persons us ing the highway as a carriage road. On in dictment against the company for a nuisance, Held, that this interference with the rights of the public must be taken to have been contemplated and sanctioned by the legisla ture, since the words of the statute anthorizing the use of the engines were unqualified; and the public benefit derived from the railway (whether it would have excused the alleged nuisance at common law or not), shewed at least that nothing was unreasonable in a clause of an act of parliament giving S. and E. were partners in alum works, for an indefinite period. E. was a dormant partner. In January 1829, it was agreed that the settlement of the partnership accounts, and all questions concerning the respective liabilities and the mode of winding up the affairs, and the manner and time of dissolving the partnership should be referred to an arbitrator; and it was afterwards agreed that S. and E. should respectively bid for the plant, utensils, and fixtures, and the referee was to declare the highest bidder to be the purchaser. In April 1829, S. having been declared the highest bidder, became the purchaser, and the works were entirely given up to him: Held, that the partnership was then determined, although the referee had made no order as to the dissolution; and that S. had no authority, after that time to bind E. by a promissory note. Heath v. Sansom, M. 3. W. 4. PARTNERSHIP. 172 See BANKRUPT, 8. EVIDENCE, 13. PARTNER. PARTY GRIEVED. See APPEAL, 4. PAWNBROKER. The pawnbrokers' act 40 G. 3, c. 99, s. 24, enables justices, in case it shall be proved before them that any goods pawned have been sold contrary to the act, or have been embezzled or lost, or are become or have been rendered of less value than at the time of pawning, through the default, neglect or wilful misbehaviour of the person with whom the same were pawned, to award satisfaction to the owner as there specified: Held, that justices have no power in the above cases to commit in default of such satisfaction being made. Quære, Whether a pawnbroker is answerable for pledges destroyed by accidental fire, as goods "lost" within the above clause. Semble, that the words "through the default," &c. apply to all the cases previously mentioned, and not only to that of the goods pawned having become of less value. Exparte Cording, 3 W. 4. 198 PAYMENT. See BANKRUPT, 8. PAYMENT OF MONEY INTO COURT. See ASSUMPSIT, 1. EVIDENCE, 10. PENAL ACTION. See APOTHECARY, 1, 2. One calendar month before the commencement of an action for penalties against a clergyman for non-residence, a notice in writing of the intended writ and cause of action was delivered to the bishop's deputy registrar at his own house, and carried by him the next morning to the registry office, and there left: Held, that that was not sufficient to satisfy the 57 G. 3, c. 99, s. 40, which requires such notice to be delivered to the bishop of the diocese, by leaving the same at the registry of his diocese. Vaux v. Vollans, Clerk, H. 3 W. 4. 525 PENSION. A pension during his Majesty's pleasure, granted by order in council on petition, for past services as advocate of the admiralty, and charged on the navy estimates, may be appropriated, under the insolvent act 7 G. 4, c. 57, s. 29, with the consent of the lords of the admiralty, for payment of creditors. Quare, Whether this Court could have granted a prohibition to the insolvent debtor's court, against proceeding upon an order for such appropriation, if it had not been warranted by the statute? Ex parte Battine, E. 3 W. 4. 690 PETTY SESSIONS. See MANDAMUS, 5. PINDER. See SETTLEMENT BY SERVING AN OFFICE, 1. PLEADING. See ACTION ON THE CASE, 2. BILL OF Ex CHANGE, 3. EVIDENCE, 8. 1. In trespass against surveyors of the highways for pulling down a watchhouse, the act 13 G. 3, c. 78, s. 82, does not enable them, under a plea not guilty, to justify the removing it as being a nuisance on the highway. The Company of Proprietors of the Witham Navigation v. Padley and Others, M. 3 W. 4. 69 2. The plaintiff having declared in covenant for rent at 267. a year, the defendants pleaded that they were only chargeable as executor; that the term came to them as such; that the premises were of less yearly value than the said rent of 267., viz. of no value; and that they had fully administered, &c. Replication, that the premises were of the yearly value of 261.; issue thereon. At the trial the yearly value was found by the jury to b 201.: Held, that the replication was, in substance, that the premises were of some value; that the issue was merely informal and cured by verdict; and that the plaintiff might recover the arrears of rent at the rate fixed by the jury. Rubery v. Stevens, M. 3 W. 4. 241 3. Declaration contained six counts in case, the seventh charged that the defendants took and distrained the goods of the plaintiff for rent, of more than sufficient value to satisfy the rent and costs, and then voluntarily abandoned the same, and afterwards wrongfully, injuriously, and rexatiously again took and distrained the same goods for the same rent, and refused to return the same, and converted them to their own use: Held, on motion in arrest of judgment for misjoinder of case and trespass, that although this second taking of goods was a trespass, yet the plaintiff might bring case for the conversion, and that the count was an informal one in case, and sufficient after verdict. Smith v. Goodwin and Richards, H. 3 W. 4. 413 4. Declarations ("in a plea of trespass on the case") stated that the defendant, intending to injure plaintiff in his good name, and to cause his dwelling-house to be searched for stolen goods, and to procure him to be imprisoned, went before a justice, and falsely and maliciously, and without probable cause, charged that certain specified goods of defendant had been feloniously stolen, and that he suspected that the said goods were concealed in the plaintiff's dwelling-house; and upon such charge the defendant procured the justice to grant a warrant, authorizing a constable to enter the plaintiff's house to search for the said goods; and the defendant, with divers other persons, caused and procured the dwelling-house of the plaintiff to be searched and rummaged for the said goods, and the door of such house and a pantry to be broken to pieces, and the plaintiff and his family to be disturbed in possession, and his goods to be carried away. The general conclusion was, that by means of the premises the plaintiff was injured in his good name and trade, put to expense, and hindered in his business. A count in trover was added: Held, on general demurrer, by Taunton and Patteson, Js., Littledale, J. dissentiente, that the acts of violence alleged to have been committed in the house, appeared sufficiently by the declaration to have been acts done in pursuance of the warrant; and in consequence of the charge made by the defendant, and that they were stated as mere matter of aggravation, and consequently that the whole count containing this statement was in case. Hensworth v. Fowkes, H. 3 W. 4. 449 5 Declaration stated, that in consideration that the plaintiff would sell goods to the defendant for 6007., to be paid for by approved bills, falling due before the 15th of February 1832, the defendant undertook to pay plaintiff said sum, by approved bills falling due before the said, &c. At the trial the plaintiff proved a written contract, corresponding with that set out in the declaration, except that the payment was to be in approved bills, falling due by the 15th of February: Held, that although the declaration did not profess to set forth any contract in writing, this variance was amendable by the Judge at Nisi Prius, under the statute 9 G. 4, c. 15, s. 1. Lamey v. Bishop, H. 3 W. 4. 479 6. Declaration by husband and wife, stated that the wife lived separate from the husband, and kept a boarding-house, and enjoyed good credit, and was supplied necessaries upon credit by tradesmen, both for her own support and for carrying on her said business; that the defendant spoke certain words of her, and of and concerning her manner of carrying on her business, imputing to her insolvency, adultery, and prostitution: by reason whereof divers persons left off boarding with her, and tradesmen ceased to supply her on credit, whereby she was injured in her said business and impoverished, &c.: Held, that the wife ought not to have been joined in this action, the words being only actionable in respect of damage to the business, and that damage being solely the husband's. Whether or not he could have maintained an action under the circumstances, quære. Saville and Joyce his Wife v. Sweeney, H. 3 W. 4. 514 7. Trespass for breaking and entering the lands of the plaintiff, and sinking pits. Plea, that before the plaintiff had any thing in the said lands, one U. was seized in fee of one undivided third part therein, and, by indenture, granted to B. license to dig, mine, &c. throughout his one third part, with liberty to erect engines, &c. for the term of twentyone years; that before the expiration of the term the grantee died, and his executrix became legally entitled to the enjoyment of the license, and because she could not enjoy it so fully as it was lawful for her to do without committing the supposed trespass, the defendant, as her servant, entered upon the said lands, and upon the plaintiff's possession, and committed the same. Replication, that the supposed license was granted, subject to a condition "that if the grantee, his executors, &c. should neglect to work the mines for a certain time, or should fail in the performance of all or any of the covenants, then and from thenceforth the indenture, and the liberties and licenses thereby granted, should cease, determine, and be utterly void and of no effect." Averment that the grantee, for a space of time exceed ing that specified, neglected to work the premises contrary to the condition, and the license thereby became utterly void: Held, on general demurrer, to the replication, that the word void, in the proviso, meant voidable at the election of the grantor. and thererore that it was necessary for the plaintiff to allege that the grantor, or some person claiming under him (which it was not shewn that the plaintiff did,) had, by some act, evinced his intention to avoid the license. Roberts v. Davey, E. 3 W. 4. 664 7. Declaration by husband and wife stated, that, by agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, reciting that one J. L. had been arrested at the suit of the plaintiffs; that the defendant had become bail to the sheriff; that the bail had been forfeited; and that J. L. had given a cognovit for the debt and costs; it was understood and agreed be tween the plaintiffs and defendant, and the defendant undertook and promised, in consideration that the plaintiffs would not enter |