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in section 42, to confine the duty of 2d. to ports lying eastward of Hull. The Aire and Calder Navigation Company, in resisting payment of these dues, are in effect setting up a claim to use the plaintiff's docks without making any compensation.

DENMAN C. J. I am of opinion that Goole comes within the description of a port on the east coast of England to the northward of Yarmouth and southward of Holy Island; and that vessels loading there, and coming into the harbour, basin, or docks of Kingston-upon-Hull, are liable to the duty of 2d. per ton. As *189] to the vessels not loaded at Goole, I have considerable *doubt: nor am I satisfied with the dilemma suggested, that they must either pay 2d., as proceeding from a port north of Yarmouth and south of Holy Island, or 6d., as proceeding from a "port or place not before described." It appears to me, that there are no words in the act to make them liable to either duty. If, before Goole was made a port, there was nothing to render them chargeable with the duty of 2d., I think their merely passing through the entrance basin there, after loading at another place, cannot have that effect now. It is said, that if the duty of 2d. does not attach, that of 6d. must. But that would be so startling an anomaly, that I cannot bring myself to believe that it was intended. Some qualification must be imposed on the word "place," in the clause exacting this duty; giving it a signification anlogous to that of "port," in the proper sense of the word, or considering it to mean a "place" on the coast. It is sufficient at all events, to rely on the general proposition, that a tax must be imposed in distinct and unequivocal words. Here the vessels not loaded at Goole do not proceed from a port within the meaning of the clause giving a duty of 2d.; and the other clause is not distinct enough to enable us to say that the vessels come within that.

PARKE, J. The questions in this case relate to two classes of vessels: the first, those which take in goods at Goole, and proceed from thence to Hull, and use the harbour or docks there; the second, those which begin or end the voyage at Leeds, merely passing through the entrance basin at Goole, in their way to Hull. Unquestionably, no duty can be claimed on any of these, but such as is distinctly given by the forty-second section* of the statute.

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I think it

190*] is clear, that the vessels carrying goods to and from Goole are liable to the duty of 2d. but I differ from my Lord Chief Justice on the other point; for I cannot distinguish between the two classes of vessels, and it seems to me that the Dock Company are entitled to the duties on both. As to the first class, construing the first and second rating clauses of section 42, together, it is clear that the duty of 2d. is imposed on every vessel trading between Hull and any port on the east side of England, north of Yarmouth and south of Holy Island: for the words in the second clause are, any port, &c. on the east side of England, except as above. There is an uncertainty in the words "port or place," in the third clause and, before Goole was made a port, I think they would not have included it; nor would they now include Selby or Leeds; for "place" must be something ejusdem generis with "port." But since Goole has been made a port, the case, as to that falls precisely within the first clause. Undoubtedly the enactment applies to newly made ports as well as to others; and the application is reasonable, because those who use the docks ought to pay for doing so. As to the second class, if vessels sailing from the port of Goole are liable to duty, I think it attaches also, though they take their cargo at a place more inland. It is the same as where a vessel takes in goods at Norwich to go from Lowestoff. not see why they should not be liable, at whichever place the goods are loaded. One reason for such a construction is, that under this act, a greater tonnage is imposed in proportion as the ports are more distant, because vessels do not arrive so often at Hull from those ports: coming frequently from Goole, they yield a *191] sufficient compensation though the duty is *less. Then it does not seem reasonable that the duty levied on vessels from Goole should not equally be paid by those coming, in the first instance, from Leeds, a more distant place;

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and from which the trips are of course less frequent. On the first class therefore, I think the duty is clearly given by the express words of the act with respect to the second, I am less confident, because I have the misfortune to differ from the rest of the Court.

TAUNTON, J. Of the first two vessels mentioned in the case, one took in the whole, the other part of her cargo at Goole. I think that on those the duty attaches, for the reasons already given. They come within the forty-second-section, but that I think is owing merely to the accident of Goole having been made a port, otherwise they would be in the same situation as vessels trading from Leeds. The other two vessels, I think were not liable. The one having taken her cargo at Leeds, passed into the harbour of Hull and unloaded there; she had, in the course of her voyage, gone through the entrance basin of the Goole docks, but had not taken any goods, nor is it said that she made any stay there. The other loaded at Hull, and went to Leeds, also passing through the entrance basin of the docks at Goole, but she, too, does not appear even to have made a rest there. Then the question is, whether a ship so taking or discharg ing her cargo at Leeds, can be considered as coming to or going between the port of Kingston-upon-Hull, and a port to the northward of Yarmouth and southward of Holy Island, it being agreed that Goole is such a port? I think not, because the port so described ought to be a terminus to the Voyage: and a mere passage through the entrance basin of a dock is not a coming to such port, *or going between it and Hull, within the meaning of the first clause. [*192 Nor is the voyage to Leeds a trading between Hull and any "other port or place," within the meaning of the third clause; for "place" must be something ejusdem generis with "port;" that is, lying on the coast, and not situated internally as Leeds is. I am therefore of opinion, that the duty attaches on the first two classes of vessels, but not on the last.

PATTESON, J. Where a duty is claimed, those who seek to enforce it must shew some clear words by which the legislature has imposed it. With respect to the last two cases, I find no words in the 42nd section of this act, applying to the inland navigation between Hull and places up the river. I think it was clearly not intended to lay the duty on vessels going to and from such places, before Goole was a made a port; and I cannot see why it should be demandable now because Goole is port, and a vessel merely passes through the mouth of that port. If the vessel came from Goole, or took in her cargo or part of it there, there are distinct words in the first clause applicable to that case, for Goole is a port, and is to the northward of Yarmouth, and southward of Holy Island. The argument for the plaintiffs went the length of contending that the words of that clause might include a port on the west side of England, as Liverpool; but that is going too far: the words can only apply to a port which has its sea-mouth (if I may so express it) on the east coast.

Judgment for the plaintiffs as to the first two vessels; for the defendants as to the last two.

*FRIEDLANDER v. The LONDON Assurance Company.

Nov. 14. [*193

If a witness on a trial gives evidence against the interest of the party calling him, such party may bring other witnesses, not to discredit him generally, but to contradict him on the fact to which he has deposed, if it be material to the issue; not if it be merely collateral.

In an action upon a policy of insurance against fire, one issue was, whether or not goods of the plaintiff had been destroyed by fire as alleged in the declaration. A witness was called for the plaintiff, to prove that part of the goods were supplied to the plaintiff by him before the fire; but on being shewn an invoice and letter relating to such goods, he stated that they were written by him, but that he never delivered such goods to the plaintiff; and he deposed that the letter (supposed to have been sent from Edinburgh)

was written by him in London, at the desire of the plaintiff; that the invoice was drawn up by him (the witness) after the fire, in the presence of the plaintiff's son and shopman; and that the son and shopman persuaded him to state that the goods had been sent according to the invoice and letter:

Held, that the son and shopman, who had already been examined for the plaintiff, might have been called back to contradict all these statements.

COVENANT on a policy of insurance against fire. The declaration, after setting out the policy, stated that the plaintiff was interested in the goods thereby insured, to the amount mentioned therein, and that after the policy was effected, and while he was so interested, the said goods were destroyed by fire, &c. The defendants pleaded, among other things, that the plaintiff was not interested in the said goods to the said or any amount, and that the said goods were not destroyed by fire; and on these averments the parties went to issue. At the trial before Lord Tenterden, C. J., at the London sittings after Hilary term 1832, the plaintiff called witnesses to shew that goods of considerable value had been sent in to him, on the premises in question, by various persons, before the fire happened. Among others one Lewin Samuel Friedlander was examined, for the purpose of proving that he (L. S. Friedlander) had sold and delivered certain goods to the plaintiff before the fire, and had, on that occasion, sent him an invoice and letter from Edinburgh, relating to such goods. The witness, on his examination in chief, when the invoice and letter were shewn to him, admitted that he wrote the invoice, but denied that he had ever sent the goods, and said 194*] that the invoice was made out by him after the fire, in the presence of the plaintiff's son, and Nathan his shopman; that the letter was, in fact, written in London, at the plaintiff's house and by his desire; and that the plaintiff's son and shopman had persuaded him to say that he had sent the goods. It was then proposed, on the part of the plaintiff, to call the son and the shopman (both of whom had been examined before) to prove that the invoice was not made, nor the letter written, under the circumstances alleged, and that they had not acted in the manner stated by the witness. Lord Tenterden rejected the evidence, being of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to offer it, in contradiction to his own witness; and the jury found a verdict for the defendants. A rule having been afterwards obtained for a new trial.

Sir James Scarlett, Campbell, and Kelly, now shewed cause. The evidence was rightly rejected. The witness was called to prove that certain goods were sold and delivered to the plaintiff before the fire. To that extent, if his evidence was adverse, the plaintiff was at liberty to put in other testimony. But the questions which were put to him respecting an invoice and letter were clearly collateral to the matter in issue; to contradict the witness on those points could only have the effect of proving that he was unworthy of credit; and it is an established rule, that a party cannot take this course against his own witness. Ewer v. Ambrose, 3 B. & C. 746, Bradley v. Ricardo, 8 Bingh. 57, shew that a witness may be contradicted as to material facts by the party calling him, but not generally discredited. The evidence here offered could have no other tendency.

*Holt and Follett contrà. It is true that evidence cannot be given to

*195] discredit a witness generally, by the party calling him. But if he has given evidence on a particular point contrary to expectation, and operating as a surprise on that party, other witnesses may be called to give different testimony as to the individual transaction, if it be, as in this case, not merely collateral, but important to the issue. [PARKE, J. The witness may be contradicted as to matters that are not purely collateral: the question is, whether that was the object here. To contradict the witness on a collateral fact would be only to discredit him in the same manner as if you proved that he had been guilty of a felony.] It is settled law, that although a party cannot bring evidence to discredit his own witness, he may to contradict him, if the fact be material to the issue. Here it was so. The plaintiff claimed damages for goods which he

[*196

alleged to have been on his premises, and to have been destroyed by fire. The defendant denies that they were there at the time of the fire: the plaintiff asserts the contrary, and that they were, bonâ fide, purchased at a time previous to that event. The plaintiff might clearly have called another witness to prove that fact before he called L. S. Friedlander. But Friedlander is first called for this purpose, and a letter and invoice are put into his hands, which tend materially to shew that the goods were, bona fide, purchased. He denies that the drawing up of these was a genuine transaction. Then may not the plaintiff set up another witness named in his brief, and who might have been called before, to shew the real character of this letter and invoice? It may be said that the question as to the invoice is collateral only,* because no act appears done by the plaintiff himself with respect to it. But the essential point was to shew that the document was fabricated; no matter by whom. Friedlander asserted that it was fabricated by the plaintiff's son: it was material to establish on the other hand, that the invoice was not fabricated with his concurrence, because, if it was his fraud or Nathan's, proof of that fact was as conclusive against the plaintiff as if it had been his own. The point of contradiction was one on which the whole issue turned; and the evidence given was not to affect a prior witness, but to prove a substantial and leading fact in the cause. If the son or shopman might have been examined as to this fact before Friedlander, why not after? It cannot be maintained, that because a witness has, by his statement out of court, deceived the .party preposing to call him, he shall be enabled to preclude that party from giving the other evidence with which he was prepared, to the same facts. It was once supposed that a party could only give this contradiction where the witness was forced upon him by law, as the subscribing witness to a deed or will. But the more comprehensive rule is now clearly established. Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Camb. 556, Ewer v. Ambrose, 3 B. & Č. 746, Bradley v. Ricardo, 8 Bingh. 57. In Richardson v. Allan, 2 Stark. N. P. C. 334, a witness called by the plaintiff to prove an indorsement denied the genuineness of the hand-writing, and Lord Ellenborough, though he thought the plaintiff could not prove the contrary by other witnesses, allowed the indorser to be called, because his testimony went to charge himself. But it is clear now, that if the indorser in *such a case had been first called and denied the writing to be his, the plaintiff might still have brought forward his other witnesses to prove the contrary.

[*197 PARKE, J. There is no dispute in this case as to the law; the application of it only is in question. It is clear that a party may contradict his own witness if he speaks to a material fact in the case, against the interest of those who called him. On a collateral fact he cannot be contradicted, not only because such evidence goes to the credit of the witness, but because a multiplicity of issues ought not to be introduced. Now here the conduct of the plaintiff himself in directing the letter to be written was clearly a material fact, on which the witness might be contradicted. On the point as to the invoice, I thought at first that the acts of the plaintiff's son and shopman were not so pertinent to the case as to admit the contradictory testimony. But I am now of opinion that those acts were not collateral, because it was material to the issue to shew that the invoice existed before the time of the fire, and was a genuine document. The evidence, therefore, ought to have been received.

TAUNTON, J., concurred.

PATTESON, J. The whole question is, for what purpose it was proposed to call back the witnesses, who had already been examined. The law is clear, but there is a good deal of difficulty in the application. I had a doubt at first, whether the plaintiff's son and shopman could be called to contradict a witness who stated that the invoice had been fabricated by him in their presence, and that they had persuaded him to say that the *goods were sent conformably to the letter and invoice. It struck me that this would have been [*198 offering contradiction on a collateral point. But I am satisfied that the evidence

on these facts was admissible, on the ground that they were not collateral, but material to the issue; and the genuineness of the letter was clearly a material question in the case. The rule will therefore be absolute.

DENMAN, C. J., having been counsel in the cause, gave no judgment.

Rule absolute.

Ex parte CORDING. Nov. 15.

The pawnbroker's act, 40 G. 3, c. 99, s. 24, enables justices in case it shall be proved before them that any goods pawned have been sold contrary to the act, or have been embezzled or lost, or are become or have been rendered of less value than at the time of pawning, through the default, neglect, or wilful misbehaviour of the person with whom the same were pawned, to award satisfaction to the owner, as there specified: Held, that justices have no power, in the above cases, to commit in default of such satisfaction being made.

Quare, Whether a pawnbroker is answerable for pledges destroyed by accidental fire, as goods "lost" within the above clause.

Semble, that the words "through the default," &c., apply to all the cases previously mentioned, and not only to that of the goods pawned having become of less value.

IN obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, the governor of the House of Correction in Cold Bath Fields brought the above party before the Court, and returned, as the cause of his being taken and detained, the following warrant of

commitment:

"To all constables and other peace officers of the county of Middlesex, and to the governor of the House of Correction at Cold Bath Fields in the said county.

"Whereas, on the 2d day of October, 1832, George Courtney, of, &c., gen*199] tleman, informed me, William Ballantine, Esq., one of his Majesty's justices of the peace for the said county of Middlesex, that on the 11th day of January in the year aforesaid he pawned one gun, of which he was the real owner, for securing the sum of 218. lent thereon by John Masheder Cording, of the parish of St. George in the said county, pawnbroker, and the profit thereof; and that the said G. Courtney had, within the space of one year after the pledging of the said gun, to wit, on the 28th day of September in the year aforesaid, duly tendered unto the said J. M. C. the said sum of 218., the principal money borrowed upon the said gun, and the profit due to the said J. M. C., according to the table of rates established by the act of parliament in such case made and provided, and thereupon demanded and required the said J. M. C. to deliver back the said gun to the said G. Courtney; but that the said J. M. C. did, on the said 28th day of September in the year aforesaid, at, &c., unlawfully, and without shewing reasonable cause for so doing, neglect and refuse to deliver back the said gun to the said G. Courtney; and whereas the said J. M. C. appeared before me, the said justice, on the 2d day of October in the year aforesaid, at the Thames Police Office, in the parish, &c.: and I, the said justice, proceeded to examine on oath, in the presence and hearing of the said J. M. C., the said G. Courtney, and also one Charles Young, a credible witness, touching the premises, and he produced before me the note or memorandum which had been given by the said J. M. C. upon the pledging of the said gun, according to the direction of the act of parliament in such case, &c., and proved a tender of the principal money due, and all profit thereon, to have been made as aforesaid to the said J. M. C., within the said space of one year after the *200] pledging of the said gun, whereupon the said J. M. C. stated that the said gun had been destroyed by fire on his premises: and whereas, upon due consideration had thereof, it appeared to me, the said justice, that the said gun had been lost by the said J. M. C., and I did thereupon, by a certain order

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