equality, nor the report as it stood, that the report was as susceptible of melioration as the motion: that a reform would be nugatory and nominal only, if we should make another Congress of the proposed Senate that if the adherence to an equality of votes was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on the other side; and that we were in fact cut asunder already, and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it: that he was, however, filled with astonishment, that, if we were convinced that every man in America was secured in all his rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good to the phantom of state sovereignty: that his feelings were more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his country than he could express that he conceived this to be the last opportunity of providing for its liberty and happiness: that he could not, therefore, but repeat his amazement, that, when a just government, founded on a fair representation of the people of America, was within our reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment to the ideal freedom and importance of states: that should this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was prepared for every event, rather than sit down under a government founded on a vicious principle of representation, and which must be as short-lived as it would be unjust. He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expedient as had been hinted by Mr. Wilson; but he never could listen to an equality of votes, as proposed in the motion.

Mr. DAYTON. When assertion is given for proof, and terror substituted for argument, he presumed they would have no effect, however eloquently spoken. It should have been shown that the evils we have experienced have proceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the seeds of dissolution for the state governments are not sown in the general government. He considered the system on the table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was persuaded that it never would be received by the people.

Mr. MARTIN would never confederate, if it could not be done on just principles.

Mr. MADISON would acquiesce in the concession hinted by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence should be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the states. The Senate, therefore, is only another edition of Congress. He knew the faults of that body, and had used a bold language against it. Still he would preserve the state rights as carefully as the trial by jury.

Mr. BEDFORD contended, that there was no middle way between a perfect consolidation and a mere confederacy of the states. The first is out of the question; and in the latter they must continue, if not perfectly, yet equally, sovereign. If political societies possess ambition, avarice, and all the other passions which render them formidable to each other, ought we not to view them in this light here?

the same motives operate in America as elsewhere? If any gentleman doubts it, let him look at the votes. Have they not been

dictated by interest, by ambition? Are not the large states evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the small? They think, no doubt, that they have right on their side, but interest had blinded their eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small state at present, she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. South Carolina is actuated both by present interest and future prospects. She hopes, too, to see the other states cut down to her own dimensions. North Carolina has the same motives of present and future interest. Virginia follows. Maryland is not on that side of the question. Pennsylvania has a direct and future interest. Massachusetts has a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it be expected that the small states will act from pure disinterestedness? Look at Great Britain. Is the representation there less unequal? But we shall be told, again, that that is the rotten part of the constitution. Have not the boroughs, however, held fast their constitutional rights? And are we to act with greater purity than the rest of mankind? An exact proportion in the representation is not preserved in any one of the states. Will it be said that an inequality of power will not result from an inequality of votes? Give the opportunity, and ambition will not fail to abuse it. The whole history of mankind proves it. The three large states have a common interest to bind them together in commerce. But whether a combination, as we supposed, or a competition, as others supposed, shall take place among them, in either case the small states must be ruined. We must, like Solon, make such a government as the people will approve. Will the smaller states ever agree to the proposed degradation of them? It is not true that the people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present Congress. The language of the people has been, that Congress ought to have the power of collecting an impost, and of coercing the states where it may be necessary. On the first point they have been explicit, and, in a manner, unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree to this, and similar measures, if they ever mean to discharge their engagements? The little states are willing to observe their engagements, but will meet the large ones on no ground but that of the Confederation. We have been told, with a dictatorial air, that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good government. It will be the last, indeed, if the propositions reported from the committee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehensions. The large states dare not dissolve the Confederation. If they do, the small ones will find some foreign ally, of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand, and do them justice. He did not mean, by this, to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which ought to be avoided by enlarging the federal powers, not annihilating the federal system. This is what the people expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient government; and why not make such a one as they de sire? 157

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Under a national government, he should

participate in the national security, as remarked by Mr. King; but that was all. What he wanted was domestic happiness. The national government could not descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the state governments. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new-born infant on its mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satisfactory, he had nothing to add that could be so.

Mr. KING was for preserving the states in a subordinate degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the purposes stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He did not think a full answer had been given to those who apprehended a dangerous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be devised, as he conceived, that would give them all the security the nature of things would admit of. In the establishment of societies, the constitution was, to the legislature, what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by express provisions in the state constitutions, why may not a like security be provided for the rights of states in the national Constitution? The articles of union between England and Scotland furnish an example of such a provision, in favor of sundry rights of Scotland. When that union was in agitation, the same language of apprehension which has been heard from the smaller states was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. The articles, however, have not been violated, and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity and happiness. He was aware that this will be called a mere paper security. He thought it a sufficient answer to say, that, if fundamental articles of compact are no sufficient defence against physical power, neither will there be any safety against it, if there be no compact. He could not sit down without taking some notice of the language of the honorable gentleman from Delaware, (Mr. Bedford.) It was not he that had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he who, with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. This, too, was the language of the honorable member himself. He was grieved that such a thought had entered his heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had dropped from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse it to himself on the score of passion. For himself, whatever might be his distress, he would never court relief from a foreign power.

Adjourned.

MONDAY, July 2.

In Convention. On the question for allowing each state one vote in the second branch, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, it was lost, by an equal division of votes,

Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, (Mr. Jenifer not being

present, Mr. Martin alone voted,) ay, 5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, 5; Georgia, divided, (Mr. Baldwin, ay, Mr. Houston, no.)

Mr. PINCKNEY thought an equality of votes in the second branch inadmissible. At the same time, candor obliged him to admit, that the large states would feel a partiality for their own citizens, and give them a preference in appointments: that they might also find some common points in their commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a real distinction between the northern and southern interests. North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, in their rice and indigo, had a peculiar interest, which might be sacrificed. How, then, shall the larger states be prevented from administering the general government as they please, without being themselves unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some, but not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Congress have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the federal system. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it but the appointment of this Convention; and he could not express his alarms for the consequence of such an event. He read his motion to form the states into classes, with an apportionment of senators among them. (See Article 4 of his plan ante, p. 129.)

Gen. PINCKNEY was willing the motion might be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Dr. Franklin, (q. v. June 30, p. 266.) Some compromise seemed to be necessary, the states being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in the second branch. He proposed that a committee consisting of a member from each state should be appointed to devise and report some compromise.

Mr. L. MARTIN had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications whatever could reconcile the smaller states to the least diminution of their equal sovereignty.

Mr. SHERMAN. We are now at a full stop; and nobody, he supposed, meant that we should break up without doing something. A committee he thought most likely to hit on some expedient.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS* thought a committee advisable, as the Convention had been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the second branch tended, he was sure, to defeat the object of it. What is this object? To check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses, of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the state legislatures, precipitation in Congress, changeableness—in every department, excesses against personal liberty, private property, and personal safety. What qualities are necessary to constitute a check in this case? Abilities and virtue are equally necessary in both branches. Something more, then, is now wanted. In the first place,

He had just returned from New York, having left the Convention a few days after it commenced business.

the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch. One interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices, as they exist, must be turned against each other. In the second place, it must have great personal property; it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it through pride. Pride is, indeed, the great principle that actuates both the poor and the rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter abuses, authority. In the third place, it should be independent. In religion, the creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in political affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body should be as independent, and as firm, as the democratic. If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived by America have not restrained the senatorial branches of the legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the second branch is to be dependent, we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so; he hoped so. The rich will strive to establish their dominion, and enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security against them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces will then control each other. Let the rich mix with the poor, and, in a commercial country, they will establish an oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men; and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus combining, and setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be combined against it. There will be a mutual check and mutual security. In the fourth place, an independence for life involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures, nobody will trust us; and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of men? Ask any man if he confides in Congress if he confides in the state of Pennsylvania - if he will lend his money, or enter into contract? He will tell you, no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If Great Britain were to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed. He disliked the exclusion of the second branch from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the military officers, during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended from the executive, what a left-handed way is this of obviating it! If the son, the brother, or the friend, can be appointed, the danger may be even increased, as the disqualified father, &c., can then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides, shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens, not be permitted to hold offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also against paying the senators. They will pay themselves, if they can. If they cannot, they will be rich, and can do without it. Of such the