REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, JANUARY TERM, 1879. TERRITORY v. CHARLES SELDEN. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS MUST ACCOMPANY THE TRANSCRIPT in all cases of ap peal. APPEAL from the district court of the first judicial district, county of Pima. The opinion states the case. L. C. Hughes, for the respondent. S. Ainsa, for the appellant. By Court, FRENCH, C. J.: There is no bill of exceptions and no statement whatever in this transcript; nor is there any assignment or claim of error in the case in this court. An examination of the record discloses no error. The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed. REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, JANUARY TERM, 1880. D. K. HOUGHTALING, RESPONDENT, v. N. ELLIS ET AL., APPELLANTS. REFORMATION OF CONTRACT ON WHICH SUIT IS BROUGHT may be properly asked for in the answer thereto, if the suit is an original proceeding in equity. TWO SYSTEMS OF LAW AND EQUITY CAN NOT be Blended in the same action or proceeding in the federal constitutional courts. The equity jurisdiction of those courts is derived solely from the constitution of the United States and the acts of congress, and is the same in every state. COURTS OF TERRITORIES ARE NOT UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, but United States territorial courts, acting under the statutes of their respective territories. EQUITABLE DEFENSE TO ACTION AT LAW CAN BE AUTHORIZED by territorial statutes, and has been so authorized by the statutes of the territory of Arizona. APPEAL from the district court of the third judicial district, county of Yavapai. The action was an action at law brought by the plaintiff against the defendants, on a written contract for the payment of money. The defendants, in their answer, set up new matter of an equitable nature as a defense to said action. Plaintiff demurred to the answer, on the ground that the facts therein set up constituted a bill in equity seeking affirmative relief, and could not be pleaded by way of defense to this action. The court below sustained the demurrer and gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendants appealed to this court. Clark Churchill, for the appellants. Rush and Wells, for the respondents. In the argument of this case it was assumed that the question was raised in this record whether in this territory an equitable defense can be interposed to a complaint setting forth an action at law, and especially whether the defendant pleading such equitable defense can properly ask that the contract on which the legal action is founded be reformed in such action. There is no doubt that a reformation of the contract on which the action is brought may be properly asked for in the answer in such action, if the action be an original proceeding in equity. This may be done even in an action for the specific performance of such contract. The matter entitling a party to amendment • of his contract may be set up by way of defense to a proceeding for a specific performance of it. Woodworth v. Cook, 2 Blatchf. 151. As to the federal constitutional courts, the rule and practice is well established that the two systems of law and equity can not be blended in the same action or proceeding. The equity jurisdiction of the purely federal courts is derived solely from the constitution and acts of congress. The equitable jurisdiction of these courts is the same in every state, and the rule of decision is precisely the same in all. Their rule of practice is not regulated or even modified by the state practice. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 347; United States v. Howland & Allen, 4 Wheat. 108; S. C., 4 Curt. 360. A great many cases to the same effect are found in the United States supreme court decisions, and none contra. The supreme court goes further still; in the case of Jones et al. v. Howard, 20 How. 22, the court say: "It must be remembered that this is a suit at law to recover the possession of the land in dispute; and that although it may be the course of practice in, the courts of the state of Texas in a suit of this description to blend in the proceeding the principles of law and equity, in the federal courts sitting in the state the two systems must be kept distinct and separate. This principle is fundamental in these courts, and can not be departed from. The court, therefore, in a suit at law, should exclude the hearing and determination of all questions that belong appropriately and exclusively to the jurisdiction of a court of equity. In a case calling for the interposition of this court, and turning upon equitable considerations, relief should be sought by bill in equity." The doctrine is here clearly announced that if a party seek equitable remedy or relief, he must do it by original bill, and not in answer to an action. at law. In the United States federal courts, state statutes and practice have no application. This doctrine and practice, so uniformly announced and maintained in all the United States federal courts, has no doubt tinged the decisions of the territorial courts in some instances. But the courts of the territories are not United States constitutional courts, but United States territorial courts acting under the statutes of their respective territories; and the question in the case at bar is whether an equitable defense to an action at law can be authorized by territorial statutes, and if so, whether it has been so authorized by territorial enactments in Arizona. I am of the opinion that both these questions may be answered in the affirmative. Two cases in the supreme court of Montana are cited by the respondent. But these cases do not reach the case at bar. In the summing up of the doctrine of these two cases, in the latter case, in divisions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, on page 540, the concluding number 5 reads as follows: "That suits in equity, where equitable relief is prayed, or where an equitable defense is set up to a claim at law, must be tried as in a court of chancery, and the decree emanate from the judge sitting as a chancellor." This is precisely what is prayed for by the defendants in this case. A. T. REPS. I-25 |