conspicuously pursuing the interests of his people, could not fail of parliamentary concurrence. Α prince of ability, he contended, might and should be the directing soul and spirit of his own administration; in short, his own minister, and not the mere head of a party: and then, and not till then, would the royal dignity be sincerely respected.

·

"He seemed to think, that a certain degree of crown influence over the houses of parliament, (not meaning a corrupt and shameful dependence) was very salutary, nay, even necessary, in our mixed government. 'For,' said he, if the members were under no crown influence, and disqualified from receiving any gratification from court, and resembled,* as they possibly might, Pym, and Haslerig, and other stubborn and sturdy members of the long parliament, the wheels of government would be totally obstructed. Such men would oppose, merely to show their power, from cuvy, jealousy, and perversity of disposition; and not gaining themselves, would hate and oppose all who did not loving the person of the prince, and conceiving they owed him little gratitude, from the mere spirit of insolence and contradiction, they would oppose and thwart him on all occasions.

"The inseparable imperfection annexed to all human governments, consisted, he said, in not being able to create a sufficient fund of virtue and principle, to carry the laws into due and effectual execution. Wisdom might plan, but virtue alone can execute. And where could sufficient virtue be found? A variety of delegated, and often discretionary, powers, must be entrusted somewhere; which, if not governed by integrity and conscience, would ne

cessarily be abused, till at last the constable would sell his for a shilling."

He had great compassion for the miseries and distresses of the Irish nation, particularly the papists ; and severely reprobated the barbarous debilitating policy of the British government, which, he said, was the most detestable mode of persecution. To a gentleman, who hinted such policy might be necessary to support the authority of the English govern. ment, he replied, by saying, "Let the authority of the government perish, rather than be maintained by iniquity. Better would it be to restrain the turbulence of the natives by the authority of the sword, and to make them amenable to law and justice by an effectual and vigorous police, than to grind them to powder by all manner of disabilities and incapacities. Better to hang or drown people at once, than, by an unrelenting persecution, to beggar and starve them."

Sir Alexander Macdonald observed, that the chancellors in England are chosen from views much inferior to the office; being chosen from temporary political views. JOHNSON. " Why, sir, in such a government as ours, no man is appointed to an office because he is the fittest for it, nor hardly in any other government; because there are so many connections and dependencies to be studied. A des spotic prince may choose a man to an office, merely because he is the fittest for it. The king of Prussia may do it."

In the Scottish schoolmaster's cause, which has been noticed at length under the head EDUCATION, in Part I, lord Mansfield said, in the house of lords, My lords, severity is not the way to govern either

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boys or men.' Nay,” ," said Johnson, "it is the way to govern them; I know not whether it be the way to mend them."

Upon the state of the nation in 1775, he thus discoursed: " Sir, the great misfortune now is, that government has too little power. All that it has to bestow, must, of necessity, be given to support itself; so that it cannot reward merit. No man, for instance, can now be made a bishop for his learning and piety; his only chance for promotion is his being connected with somebody who has parliamentary interest. Our several ministers in this reign have out-bid each other in concessions to the people. Lord Bute, though a very honourable man

a man who meant well-a man who had his blood full of prerogative-was a theoretical statesman,a book-minister-and thought this country could be governed by the influence of the crown alone. Then, sir, he gave up a great deal: he advised the king to agree that the judges should hold their places for life, instead of losing them at the accession of a new king. Lord Bute, I suppose, thought to make the king popular by this concession; but the people never minded it; and it was a most impolitic measure. There is no reason why a judge should hold his office for life, more than any other person in public trust. A judge may be partial otherwise than to the crown: we have seen judges partial to the populace. A judge may become corrupt, and yet there may not be legal evidence against him. A judge may become froward from age. A judge may grow unfit for his office in many ways: it was desirable that there should be a possibility of being delivered from him by a new king. That is now gone by an act of parliament ex

VOL. II.

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gratia of the crown. Lord Bute advised the king to give up a very large sum of money, for which nobody thanked him. It was of consequence to the king, but nothing to the public, among whom it was divided. When I say lord Bute advised, I mean, that such acts were done when he was minister, and we are to suppose that he advised them.-Lord Bute showed an undue partiality to Scotch.men. He turned out Dr. Nichols, a very eminent man, from being physician to the king, to make room for one of his countrymen, a man very low in his profession. He had ******* and ** ** to go on errands for him. He had occasion for people to go on errands for him, but he should not have had Scotchmen; and certainly, he should not have suffered them to have access to him before the first people in England." BOSWELL. "The admission of one of them before the first people in England, which has given the greatest offence, was no more than what hap pens at every minister's levee, where those who attend are admitted in the order that they have come, which is better than admitting them according to their rank; for, if that were to be the rule, a man who has waited all the morning might have the mortification to see a peer, newly come, go in before him, and keep him waiting still." JOHNSON. "True, sir; but **** should not have come to the levee, to be in the way of people of consequence. He saw lord Bute at all times; and could have said what he had to say at any time, as well as at the levee. There is now no prime minister: there is only an agent for government in the house of commons. We are governed by the cabinet: but there is no oue head there since sir Robert Walpole's time." Boswell.

"What then, sir, is the use of parliament ?" JOHNSON. Why, sir, parliament is a large council to the king; and the advantage of such a council is, having a great number of men of property concerned in the legislature, who, for their own interest, will not consent to bad laws. And you must have observed, sir, the administration is feeble and timid, and cannot act with that authority and resolution which is necessary. Were I in power, I would turn out every man who dared to oppose me. Government has the distribution of offices, that it may be enabled to maintain its authority. Lord Bute took down too fast, without building up something new." BOSWELL. "Because, sir, he found a rotten building. The political coach was drawn by a set of bad horses; it was necessary to change them." JOHNSON. "But he should have changed them one by one."

On another occasion, he said, "The mode of government by one may be ill adapted to a small society, but is best for a great nation. The characteristic of our own government at present is imbecility. The magistrates dare not call the guards for fear of being hanged; the guards will not come, for fear of being given up to the blind rage of popular juries." [Tempora mutantur.]

Talking of different governments - JOHNSON. "The more contracted power is, the more easily it is destroyed. A country governed by a despot is an inverted cone. Government there cannot be so firm, as when it rests upon a broad basis gradually contracted, as the government of Great Britain, which is founded on the parliament, then is in the privycouncil, then in the king." BOSWELL. "Power, when