Dr. MORGAN. Well, I checked very briefly with the Munitions Board in the course of writing this book and, of course, had access to their unclassified stockpile reports to the Congress, which are issued every 6 months.

Since that time, of course, as a member of the Interdepartmental Stockpile Committee I had been in daily contact with the Munitions Board throughout 1949 and 1950.

Mr. ENGLE. Evidently your thesis didn't convince them because I observed that on November 15, 1949, they sent up here an emphatic denunciation of H. R. 6082, which, as you say in your statement, was predicated upon your book. Are you familiar with that?

Dr. MORGAN. I am not familiar with that Munitions Board statement, Mr. Congressman, but if I may say so, a lot of people got copies of my study, not all of them read it, and of the number who read it, not even all of those agreed with it.

Mr. ENGLE. I am not criticizing the book; I am just saying that if you were operating down there with the Munitions Board-at least General Timberlake didn't agree with you and I assume he expresses the view of the administration.

Dr. MORGAN. He was the Director of the Staff of the Munitions Board at that time.

Mr. ENGLE. Yes; he says here in his report on the measure that the Defense Department is against this bill.

As I say, I am not criticizing the bill and very often I disagree with the powers that be down there. That is no reflection at all, either upon what you have said or on the measure.

Dr. MORGAN. I am sure that while the Munitions Board may have had some reservations as to the general thesis of the study, they cer tainly, in the time that I have been connected with them, have had no hesitation in pushing the strategic and critical materials stockpile program that they are charged with.

Mr. ENGLE. Who is this, now?

Dr. MORGAN. The Munitions Board.

SLOW-MOVING AND RESTRICTED EFFORTS TO EXPAND MINERALS PRODUCTION DUE IN PART TO LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AS TO OUTCOME OF WORLD SITUATION

Mr. ENGLE. Have you read the Johnson committee report on the Munitions Board?

Mr. MORGAN. I have seen most of their reports. Do you have refer ence to a particular one such as the one on nickel?

Mr. ENGLE. The one on nickel, the one on copper, and the one on wool. I think they have one out on rubber.

Dr. MORGAN. Yes; I have read those.

Mr. ENGLE. I recall one statement they made about their efforts with stockpiling wool. They said there had been a lot of woolgathering down there but no wool gathered.

As you know, there are other remarks equally as pertinent in connection with some of their other activities. This committee, before whom you are appearing today, for the past 5 years has belabored the Munitions Board for their inaction and everybody thought we were screaming "wolf, wolf," and then Johnson's committee took over and

in far more caustic language than we used, if possible, denounced everything they had done.

You may think that they are doing a lot but the condition of our stockpile doesn't indicate it.

Will you tell me this:

In just what spirit do you approach the problems which you face your office? Do you approach it with the sense of emergency, considering the state of emergency in which we are supposed to be placed?

Dr. MORGAN. Sir, I was in the armed services during World War II and know what combat is like and I assure you that there is no one that I have come in contact with in our organization that does not wish we had made far more progress thus far than has been made.

With the great variety of conflicting demands in this country, such as the normal needs of the civilian economy, the desire to build Armed Forces, the desire for helping our allies, the unwillingness of everyone to make the sacrifice himself-they always want the other guy to make the sacrifice-it is not too easy to reconcile all of these conflicting demands under the present emergency conditions, because we are not in a state of all-out war at the present time. It is a state of emergency. Therefore, our problem is much more difficult than it would have been or was, let us say, in 1942, when people realized that they had a shooting war right on their hands.

Mr. ENGLE. In other words, there are some people down there who believe there is an emergency but there is not a real fire burning under them yet and so you have a lot of trouble clearing the way for action;

is that it?

Dr. MORGAN. In the military service they speak of the estimate of the situation. In order to get coordinated national planning on anything, whether metals and minerals or schools or anything else, you have to have a pretty clear estimate of what the situation is that you are trying to do something about.

At the present time the situation is not too clear. If we knew for sure that we were going to have an all-out shooting war 2 weeks from now, I am sure that many things would be done differently than are being done at the present time.

If, on the other hand, we were sure that for the next 10 or 20 years we would have a continuation of the present state of international tension but we would still have reasonable access to South America and Africa and places like that, we might not do some of the things we are recommending today.

Mr. ENGLE. On what kind of assumption do you proceed?

Dr. MORGAN. We have general guidance that is passed on to us by the Office of Defense Mobilization. These assumptions and estimates of the situation are classified and I am not at liberty to say what they are in an open hearing. We have the problem, as I gave it to you: "Is it going to be a shooting war next week or are we going to have 20 years?" That is the problem. We get assumptions as to what the situation will be but I am not at liberty to say what they are.

Mr. ENGLE. It would be interesting information to know whether or not this is a phony emergency and we can dilly-dally around here or whether or not Sam Rayburn is right. If we step off the deep end into an all-out war the next week there is going to be some heads

rolling in the sawdust down in those departments because we don't have the kind of a program going that should have been put into effect. You know that, don't you?

Dr. MORGAN. Yes, sir, and we must look to the Office of Defense Mobilization which I understand is represented on the National Security Council for that type of guidance.

In the Defense Production Administration we are not primarily strategic experts on the world situation. There is the National Security Council that brings together the State Department, the Department of Defense, the NSRB, the Central Intelligence Agency, the ODM, and others. They set the general pattern and then within that pattern we attempt to take the necessary steps.

Mr. ENGLE. Haven't they told you to get going on this mining program?

Dr. MORGAN. In the information that has been made available to me, I don't recall having seen specific reference to mining. I think we are all in agreement that there are critical shortages of strategic materials, which include metals and minerals which come from mines, and obviously, we have to do something about the problem of mining. There is no doubt that there are serious shortages of strategic metals and minerals.

Mr. ENGLE. You were with NSRB?

Dr. MORGAN. I was.

Mr. ENGLE. And were transferred to your present post?

Dr. MORGAN. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. And all of your experience has been in government? Dr. MORGAN. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. You have never been in a mine in your life, have you? Dr. MORGAN. Sir, I have never worked for a mining company but I have been privileged to visit mines all over this country and in foreign countries.

Mr. ENGLE. When did you go to a foreign country?

Dr. MORGAN. During the course of World War II I served over most of the Pacific theater, including New Caledonia, the Palau Islands, the Philippines, and Japan.

Mr. ENGLE. That was in connection with the Army engineers, was it not?

Dr. MORGAN. That is correct, sir. While in New Caledonia I was able to visit the nickel and chrome mines, which at that time were being operated under contracts with the United States Government. While in the Philippines I was able to visit manganese and chrome properties.

Mr. ENGLE. Was that in connection with your duties with the Army engineers?

Dr. MORGAN. Not officially, sir. I did that on my own over there. In the Palau Islands I was able to visit phosphate mining operations which had been of importance to the Japanese.

In Japan I was able to visit copper, lead, zinc, and gold mines which were then under the control of the Army.

Mr. ENGLE. From the standpoint of practical mine operation you have had no experience whatsoever?

Dr. MORGAN. That is correct.

Mr. ENGLE. How many other people in Mr. Gibson's organization are transfers or transplants from the NSRB?

Dr. MORGAN. Mr. Gibson's own staff is very small, but within the Defense Production Administration there are several people who came from the NSRB.

Most of the people in the field of metals and minerals that he named this morning were on the staff of the NSRB for the past 2 or 3 years. Mr. BENNETT. Did I understand you to say that you are holding up your mineral production policy program until you are sure whether or not we are going to get into a shooting war?

Dr. MORGAN. No, sir, I hope I did not create that impression, sir, by what I said. What I said or what I had hoped I had said, is that there are certain actions that we are taking now with regard to metals and minerals.

If we knew that an all-out shooting war were going to start next week we would undoubtedly take additional actions.

Mr. ENGLE. It would be too late then, wouldn't it, Dr. Morgan? We would be sunk just like the Jap Navy; we would never get it going, would we?

Dr. MORGAN. Not necessarily, because that depends on the status of our stockpiles of certain materials. It varies completely from material to material.

Mr. ENGLE. You know how we stand on tungsten and manganese and chrome?

Dr. MORGAN. Yes, sir, I am familiar with those situations.

Mr. BENNETT. Will you illustrate what you mean by that prior statement?

Dr. MORGAN. To give a specific case would involve me in classified information that I can give only in executive session but will you permit a hypothetical case?

Mr. BENNETT. Take a hypothetical case.

Dr. MORGAN. Let us say that there is a material which comes only from foreign sources for which our stockpile objectives are about 80 percent complete, and let us say that our knowledge of the requirements are such that current imports are sufficient to meet current demand. If we were certain that for the next 5 years there would be no all-out war we would only cut back the civilian use of that commodity sufficiently that over the next 3 or 4 years we would complete our stockpile objective.

If, on the other hand, the war were going to start tomorrow morning, civilian use of that particular commodity in such things as automobiles or television sets or washing machines would be stopped immediately and the total imports that we could get in the next short period would be added to the national stockpile.

Mr. BENNETT. Don't you believe that it is the intent of Congress that this program was to get under way on the assumption that we might get into a shooting war at any time?

Dr. MORGAN. That may have been the intent of the Congress-I am not a lawyer--but they didn't make that clear in the wording of the Defense Production Act of 1950 under which we are operating. Mr. BENNETT. Do you think that Congress intended that you, as a policy maker, should make this determination from factors as you see them, as to when we approach this danger point, and then act accordingly?

Dr. MORGAN. No, sir. As I stressed before, we in the DPA are not posing as strategic experts. We get our guidance from the Office

of Defense Mobilization, which is represented on the National Security Council, where such over-all national strategic assumptions and estimates of the situation are arrived at.

We have general guidance from the Office of Defense Mobilization and we are operating within the framework of that guidance.

COPPER SHORTAGE

Mr. BENNETT. Are you operating on the assumption-let us take copper, for example, because as far as I am concerned, that is one of the most critical of our metals.

Are you basing your policy as to the needs of copper in the next few years on the amount of imports that we are getting from Chile or Africa or some other place, or are you basing it on the assumption that we ought to do everything possible to increase domestic production under this program?

Dr. MORGAN. Mr. Congressman, it hinges on specific execution in terms of contracts costing money of the phrase "everything possible," because, as those familiar with metals and minerals know, what is a marginal property at one price becomes a paying property at a higher price, but additional ones become marginal at each price you set, so that, for example, copper is now around 24 or 25 cents a pound, but there are copper mines that would be marginal at a dollar a pound. It is conceivable that other copper mines might be marginal at $2 a pound.

Mr. BENNETT. How far do you think that the Government ought to go in getting marginal copper mines in operation? What is your policy on that? What policy do you follow?

Dr. MORGAN. Well, to arrive at policy, we have to consider certain statistics. In the case of copper, I can't give you the specific figures because those that I use are classified and I don't have them here.

Mr. BENNETT. Is it fair to say that there is a critical shortage of copper in this country today?

Dr. MORGAN. There is no doubt that there is a shortage as shown by the fact that the National Production Authority has issued orders limiting the use of copper in the civilian economy.

Mr. BENNETT. Is it critical?

Dr. MORGAN. Well, it depends, sir; it depends on your definition of the word "critical." Let me illustrate what we do in the case of copper this way.

Mr. BENNETT. Can't you say whether in your opinion copper is critically short in this country?

Dr. MORGAN. I would say that the copper supply is fairly tight right

now.

Mr. ENGLE. Let me supplement that. The annual unsatisfied demand is about 300,000 tons a year, isn't it?

Dr. MORGAN. I don't know that anyone has a device for measuring the demand at this time. We do know that there are plenty of people who could use more copper if they could get it.

Mr. ENGLE. That is the estimate Mr. Searls gave to the Senate committee.

Dr. MORGAN. However, in World War II, as I pointed out in my study, production of copper from domestic copper mines declined after 1942 and 1943 steadily into 1944, 1945, and 1946, and in World