tion 3 of article 18 are those relating to police, sanitary, and other similar regulations, which operate uniformly throughout the state. The enactment of such general laws still rests in the Legislature. They provide for the peace, health, welfare, and convenience of all the people, entirely separate and distinct from and without reference to any of the state's political subdivisions. Fitzgerald v. Cleveland, 88 Ohio St. 338, 359, 103 N. E. 512, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 106.

[7] The act, as is permitted by section 1d, art. 2, of the Constitution of Ohio, was declared to be an emergency act, necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health and safety (section 79), and was not, therefore, as claimed by the plaintiff, subject to a referendum authorized either by section le, art. 2, or by the charter of the city of Dayton. The reasons given in section 79 of the act for declaring it an emergency law were held sufficient in Snyder v. Deeds, 91 Ohio St. 407, 408, 110 N. E. 1068. In view of such declaration, the ill-defined insistence that the law should have been submitted to a referendum is without merit. In adopting the initiative and referendum feature of government, the state recognized the absolute necessity of exempting therefrom laws of an emergency nature involving the general health, peace and safety. Shryock v. Zanesville, 92 Ohio St. 375, 385, 110 N. E. 937; Billings v. Railway Co., 92 Ohio St. 478, 484, 485, 111 N. E. 155.

[8] The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution does not deprive the state of the power of determining whether the officers of the conservancy district shall be appointed or be elected by the people, or the duties to be performed by them; nor does it invalidate a tax levy or an assessment lawfully made by such officers for a duly authorized improvement, or deprive the district as a political subdivision of the power to levy and collect taxes or assessments to pay the amount charged against property or political subdivisions, such as municipalities, counties, or townships, within such district. Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U. S. 522, 32 Sup. Ct. 103, 56 L. Ed. 294.

Without entering upon a further detailed consideration of the case, it may be said that every substantial objection now urged against the Conservancy Act and depending upon the federal or state Constitution or laws has been decided adversely to the plaintiff, as will appear from Miami County v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N. E. 726; Snyder v. Deeds, 91 Ohio St. 407, 110 N. E. 1068; Orr v. Allen (D. C.) 245 Fed. 486, affirmed 248 U. S. 35, 39 Sup. Ct. 23, 63 L. Ed. 109; Koehne v. City of Dayton, 97 Ohio St. 341, 119 N. E. 651, and from the unreported cases of County of Miami v. Deeds, No. 15,347, Koehne v. Miami Conservancy District, No. 15,779, Blevins v. Miami Conservancy District, No. 15,965, Hawthorne v. City of Troy, No. 16,653, and State ex rel. Silvey and Blevins v. Miami Conservancy District, No. 16,699, 130 N. E. 943, all decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Rarely has a law been found which has been assailed with such frequency or from so many angles. It has withstood every test. The Ohio courts for some time past, as evidenced by many cases, have treated its constitutionality as settled beyond controversy, some

(273 F.)

of which cases are Koehne v. City of Dayton, 97 Ohio St. 341, 119 N. E. 651; Miami Conservancy District v. Mitman, 100 Ohio St. 315, 125 N. E. 875; Miami Conservancy District v. Bowers, 100 Ohio St. 317, 125 N. E. 876; State ex rel. Silvey v. Conservancy Dist. Co., 100 Ohio St. 483, 128 .N. E. 87; State v. Valentine, 94 Ohio St. 440, 114 N. E. 947; County of Miami v. Deeds, 5 Ohio App. 408; Miami Conservancy District v. Mitman, 11 Ohio App. 106; Brady v. Miami Conservancy District, 11 Ohio App. 240; Miami Conservancy District v. Shade, 12 Ohio App. 169; Miami Conservancy District v. Bowers, 12 Ohio App. 405.

[9] The views above expressed require a denial of injunctive relief, because the bill not only fails to state a case warranting the same, but the claims of federal jurisdiction therein set forth are frivolous. It is familiar practice for the Supreme Court, for the purpose of discouraging frivolous appeals and writs of error which depend on the existence of a federal question, to dismiss the same without considering the merits of the question, if it has been so explicitly foreclosed by previous decisions as to leave no room for real controversy. Leonard v. Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co., 198 U. S. 416, 422, 25 Sup. Ct. 750, 49 L. Ed. 1108; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Brown, 187 U. S. 308, 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 123, 47 L. Ed. 190; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 338, 21 Sup. Ct. 390, 45 L. Ed. 557; Chanute City v. Trader, 132 U. S. 210, 10 Sup. Ct. 67, 33 L. Ed. 345.

[10] Owing to the existence of a serious doubt as to whether the conservancy district officers are state officers in such a sense as to justify a hearing under section 266, Judicial Code, the court as constituted under this section will not go further than to deny an injunction. If the motion to dismiss the bill is to be granted, so as to make a final order, the hearing of such motion and the making of such order will be for the judge of the district.

Petition of EASURK EMSEN CHARR.

(District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D. April 16, 1921. On Rehearing, June 6, 1921.)

No. 2453-M.

1. Aliens 61-Korean is not a "white person," within naturalization laws. Generally speaking, free white persons, within the naturalization laws, are members of the white or Caucasian race, as distinct from the black, red, yellow, and brown races, and it clearly does not include a Korean, who is admittedly of the Mongol family.

[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, White Person.]

2. Aliens 65-Purpose of 1918 amendment to Naturalization Act was to relieve service men from delays in procedure.

The primary purpose of the amendment of Act June 29, 1906, § 4, subd. 7, which dealt with procedure for naturalization, not with eligibility, by Act May 9, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4352 [7]), For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

authorizing naturalization of Filipinos and Porto Ricans who had served in United States forces, and providing that any alien serving in such forces during the present war could be naturalized without the preliminary declaration, was to reward aliens who had entered the service by admitting them to citizenship without many of the slow processes, formalities, and strictness of proof required by the existing naturalization law. 3. Aliens 65-Amendment of naturalization Act in 1918 did not authorize naturalization of Korean, who served in army.

Act May 9, 1918, amending Act June 29, 1906, § 4, subd. 7 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4352 [7]), so as to authorize naturalization of Filipinos and Porto Ricans who served in the military forces of the United States, and permitting naturalization of all aliens who had so served, without compliance with many formalities required of others, section 2 (section 4352aa) of which amending statutes repealed inconsistent acts, with the proviso that it should not repeal or enlarge Rev. St. § 2169 (Comp. St. § 4358), limiting naturalization to free white persons and persons of African descent, except as specified in subdivision 7, did not enlarge the right to naturalization, except in the cases of Filipinos and Porto Ricans, and therefore did not authorize the naturalization of a Korean, who had been honorably discharged after service in the United States army during the World War.

4. Aliens 61-Naturalization Act of 1916 did not impliedly repeal restriction of naturalization to white persons.

Rev. St. § 2169 (Comp. St. § 4358), restricting the right of naturalization to free white persons and persons of African descent, was not impliedly repealed by Act June 29, 1906, authorizing admission to citizenship of persons, not citizens, who owe allegiance to the United States, which was enacted to permit the naturalization of citizens of the Philippine Islands and of Porto Rico, who could not theretofore be naturalized, because the naturalization laws applied only to aliens and required a renunciation of former allegiance.

5. Aliens ~65-Selective Service Act not intended to include aliens not eligible to naturalization, and induction into service did not create eligibility.

The draft law did not contemplate the incorporation into the forces of the United States those not eligible to citizenship, and the fact that such may have been inducted into the service through voluntary enlistment or inadvertence of draft boards cannot affect the purpose of Congress to permit naturalization only of those previously eligible by the amendment of a naturalization act relating to those who had served in the United States forces during the World War.

On Rehearing.

6. Aliens 65-Appropriation Act of 1919 did not authorize naturalization of Korean who had served in army.

Provision of Sundry Civil Appropriation Act July 19, 1919, giving to any alien who served in the forces of the United States during the World War the benefits of Act June 29, 1906, § 4, subd. 7, as amended by Act May 9, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4352 [7]), which subdivision authorized naturalization of aliens who had served during the World War without many of the formalities required of other aliens, was not intended to and did not relax the provision of prior amendment, under which naturalization was limited to Filipinos and Porto Ricans in addition to free white persons and Africans, and therefore did not authorize the naturalization of a Korean who served in the army.

In the matter of the petition of Easurk Emsen Charr for naturalization. Petition denied.

Cameron L. Orr, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner.

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

(273 F.)

M. R. Bevington, of St. Louis, Mo., and C. A. Ramsey, of Kansas. City, Mo., for the United States.

VAN VALKENBURGH, District Judge. The petitioner is a native of Korea, owing allegiance to and a subject of the Mikado of Japan, a resident of Parkville, Mo., as a student of Park College. He was drafted into the United States army, serving therein from April 15, 1918, to December 28, 1918, receiving an honorable discharge from such service. His service was at military training camps within the United States. His educational qualifications, character, and record of military service are good. His naturalization is not opposed on personal grounds, but upon the contention that all members of his race are barred from naturalization under the provisions of section 2169 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (Comp. St. § 4358). He seeks to be naturalized under the provisions of subdivision 7 of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended by the Act of May 9, 1918 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 4352[7]), and by the subsequent Act of July 19, 1919 (41 Stat. 222). Section 2169, imposing limitations upon eligibility for naturalization, reads as follows:

"The provisions of this title [of naturalization] shall apply to aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent."

The applicant is admittedly neither of African nativity nor of African descent. The question at issue is whether he is a white person within the meaning of this section, and, if not, whether he is still entitled to citizenship because of the alleged exceptions made by the acts of Congress to which reference has been made.

[1] The meaning of section 2169 has become so far clarified by late judicial decisions that we are confronted by no embarrassment in determining the question of color in so far as that controls. In ex parte Dow (D. C.) 211 Fed. 486, and In re Dow (D. C.) 213 Fed. 355, it was held that the words do not mean a person white in color, nor do they designate racial distinction, meaning Caucasian or Indo-European, but are to be construed rather as a geographical term, referring to the peoples who were commonly known in the United States as those inhabiting Europe, and whose descendants, at the time of the passage of the act of 1790 (1 Stat. 103), formed the inhabitants of the United States, excluding Africans. In those cases, a Syrian from the Lebanon district-that is to say, from that part of the Mediterranean coast in Asia occupied in ancient times by the Phoenicians—was denied admission to citizenship upon the ground that he was not a free white person within the meaning of section 2169. The holding in those cases was rejected by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the same entitled case. 226 Fed. 145, 140 C. C. A. 549. In accordance with numerous holdings the term includes, as commonly understood, all European races and those Caucasians belonging to the races around the Mediterranean Sea, whether they are considered as fair whites or dark whites, and though certain of the eastern and southern European races. are technically classified as of Mongolian or Tartar origin. Generally

273 F.-14

speaking, "free white persons" includes members of the white or Caucasian race as distinct from the black, red, yellow, and brown races. Whether or not historically the term "Caucasian" is accurate as a designation of the white race, it is a term which appeals to common understanding and to that of the lawmakers with practical definiteness, and the term "white person" may now be said to have a well understood meaning. In the case at bar we are not troubled by close refinements of definition, either as to race, color, or geographical location. The petitioner is a Korean, admittedly of the Mongol family. Whatever their precise shade of color may be defined to be, they are confessedly not white persons, either in fact or in accordance with common understanding, and they are about as far removed from Europe and the Mediterranean Sea as could well be imagined. If, then, the applicant is eligible to be admitted to citizenship in this country, it must be because of the provisions of the amendatory acts to which reference has been made. So much of subdivision 7 of section 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended by the Act of May 9, 1918, as is material to this discussion, reads as follows:

"Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States and who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the United States Navy or Marine Corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service of not less than three years, may be honorably discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge with recommendation for reenlistment; or any alien, or any Porto Rican not a citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years and upward, who has enlisted or entered or may hereafter enlist in or enter the armies of the United States, either the regular or the volunteer forces, or the national army may, on presentation of the required declaration of intention petition for naturalization without proof of the required five years' residence within the United States; Any alien serv

ing in the military or naval service of the United States during the time this country is engaged in the present war may file his petition for naturalization without making the preliminary declaration of intention and without proof of the required five years' residence within the United States; * * * and any alien, or any person owing permanent allegiance to the United States embraced within this subdivision, may file his petition for naturalization in the most convenient court without proof of residence within its jurisdiction, provided he appears with his two witnesses before the appropriate representative of the Bureau of Naturalization and passes the preliminary examination hereby required before filing his petition for naturalization in the office of the clerk of the court."

Section 2 of the Act of May 9, 1918 (section 4352aa) provides that: "All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this act are hereby repealed; but nothing in this act shall repeal or in any way enlarge section twenty-one hundred and sixty-nine of the Revised Statutes, except as specified in the seventh subdivision of this act and under the limitation therein defined. That as to all aliens who, prior to January first, nineteen hundred, served in the armies of the United States and were honorably discharged therefrom, section twenty-one hundred and sixtysix of the Revised Statutes of the United States shall be and remain in full force and effect, anything in this act to the contrary notwithstanding."

*

[2] The purpose of this act is well understood. It was to reward those aliens who had entered the military or naval service of the United States, as therein described, by admitting them to citizenship without