gia back! And here let me say, that I do not doubt that there is a large and powerful Union sentiment still surviving in all the States which have seceded, South Carolina alone, perhaps, excepted; and that if the people of those States can be assured that they shall have the power to protect themselves, by their own action, within the Union, they will gladly return to it, very greatly preferring protection within to security outside of it. Just now, indeed, the fear of danger, and your persistent and obstinate refusal to enable them to guard against it, have delivered the people of those States over into the hands, and under the control, of the real secessionists and disunionists among them; but give them security, and the means of enforcing it; above all, dry up this pestilent fountain of slavery agitation, as a, political element, in both sections, and, my word for it, the ties of a common ancestry, a common kindred, and common language; the bonds of a common interest, common danger, and common safety; the recollections of the past, and of associations not yet dissolved, and the bright hopes of a future to all of us, more glorious and resplendent than any other country ever saw; ay, sir, and. visions, too, of that old flag of the Union, and of the music of the Union, and precious memories of the statesmen and heroes of the dark days of the Revolution, will fill their souls yet again with desires and yearnings intense for the glories, the honors, and the material benefits, too, of that Union which their fathers and our fathers made; and they will return to it, not as the prodigal, but with songs and rejoicing, as the Hebrews returned from the captivity to the ancient city of their kings.

1

Proceeding, sir, upon the principles which I have already considered, and applying them to the causes which, step by step, have led to our present troubles, I have ventured, with great deference, to submit the propositions, which are upon the table of the House. While not inconsistent with any of the other pending plans of adjustment, they are, in my judgment, and again I speak it with becoming deference, fully adequate to secure that protection from aggression, without which there can be no confidence, and, therefore, no peace and no restoration for the Union.

There are two maxims, sir, applicable to all constitutional reform, both of which it has been my purpose to follow. In the first place, not to amend more, or further, than is necessary for the mischief to be remedied, and next, to follow strictly the principles of the Constitution which is to be amended; and corollary to these, I might add, that in framing amendments, the words and phrases of the Constitution ought, so far as practicable, to be adopted.

I propose then, sir, to do as all others in the Senate and the House have done, so far-to recognize the existence of sections as a fixed

fact, which, lamentable as it is, can no longer be denied or suppressed; but, for the reasons I have already stated, I propose to establish four instead of two grand sections of the Union, all of them well known, or easily designated by marked, natural, or geographical lines and boundaries. I propose four sections instead of two; because, if two only are recognized, the natural and inevitable division will be into slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections; and it is this very division, either by constitutional enactment, or by common consent, as hitherto, which, in my deliberate judgment and deepest conviction, it concerns the peace and stability of the Union, should be forever hereafter ignored. Till then, there cannot be, and will not be, perfect union and peace between these United States; because, in the first place, the nature of the question is such that it stirs up, necessarily, as forty years of strife conclusively proves, the strongest and the bitterest passions and antagonism possible among men; and, in the next place, because the non-slaveholding section has now, and will have to the end, a steadily increasing majority, and enormously disproportioned weight and influence in the government; thus combining that which never can be very long resisted in any government—the temptation and the power to aggress.

Sir, it was not the mere geographical line which so startled Mr. Jefferson, in 1820; but the coincidence of that line with the marked principle, moral and political, of slavery. And now, sir, to remove this very mischief, which he predicted, and which has already happened, it is essential that this coincidence.should be obliterated; and the repeated failure, for years past, of all other compromises, based upon a recognition of this coincidence, has proved, beyond doubt, that it cannot be obliterated, unless it be by other and conflicting lines of principle and interests. I propose, therefore, to multiply the sections, and thus efface the slave-labor and free-labor division, and, at the same time, and in this manner, to diminish the relative power of each section. And to prevent combinations among these different sections, I propose, also, to allow a vote in the Senate by sections, upon demand of one third of the Senators of any section, and to require the concurrence of a majority of the Senators of each section in the passage of any measure, in which, by the Constitution, it is necessary that the House, and therefore, also, the President, should concur. All this, sir, is perfectly consistent with the principles of the Constitution, as shown in the division of the legislative department into the two Houses of Congress; the veto power; the two-thirds vote of both Houses necessary to pass a bill over the veto; the provisions in regard to the ratification of treaties, and amendments to the Constitution; but especially in the equal representation and suffrage of each State in the Senate, whereby

the vote of Delaware, with a hundred thousand inhabitants, vetoes the vote of New York, with her population of nearly four millions. If the protection of the smaller States against the possible aggressions of the larger States, required, in the judgment of the framers of the Constitution, this peculiar, and, apparently, inequitable provision, why shall not the protection, by a similar power of veto, of the smaller and weaker sections against the aggressions of the larger and stronger seotions, not be now allowed, when time and experience have proved the necessity of just such a check upon the majority? Does any one doubt that, if the men who made the Constitution had foreseen that the real danger to the system lay, not in aggression by the large upon the small States, but in geographical combinations of the strong sections against the weak, they would have guarded jealously against that mischief, just as they did against the danger, to which they mistakenly believed the government to be exposed? And if this protection, sir, be now demanded by the minority as the price of the Union, so just and reasonable a provision ought not, for a moment, to be denied. Far better this than secession and disruption. This would, indeed, enable the minority to fight for their rights in the Union, instead of breaking it to pieces to secure them outside of it.

Certainly, sir, it is in the nature of a veto power to each section in the Senate; but necessity requires it, secession demands it, just as twice, in the history of the Roman Commonwealth, secession demanded, and received the power of the tribunitian veto, as the price of a restoration of the Republic. The secession to the Sacred Mount secured, just as a second secession, half a century later, restored the veto of tribunes of the people, and reinvigorated and preserved the Roman constitution for three hundred years. Vetoes, checks, balances, concurrent majorities-these, sir, are the true conservators of free gov

ernment.

But it is not in legislation alone that the danger, or the temptation to aggress, is to be found. Of the tremendous power and influence of the Executive I have already spoken. And, indeed, the present revolutionary movements are the result of the apprehension of executive usurpation and encroachments, to the injury of the rights of the South. But for secession, because of this apprehended danger, the legislative department would have remained, for the present at least, in other and safer hands. Hence the necessity for equal protection and guarantee against sectional combinations and majorities, to secure the election of the President, and to control him when, elected. I propose, therefore, that a concurrent majority of the electors, or States, or Senators, as the case may require, of each section, shall be necessary to the choice of President and Vice-President; and lest, by reason of this increased

complexity, there may be a failure of choice oftener than heretofore, 1 propose also a special election in such case, and an extension of the term, in all cases, to six years. This is the outline of the plan; the details may be learned in full from the joint resolution itself; and I will not detain the House by any further explanation now.

Sir, the natural and inevitable result of these amendments will be to preclude the possibility of sectional parties and combinations to obtain possession of either the legislative or the executive power and patronage of the Federal Government; and, if not to suppress totally, at least very greatly to diminish the evil results of national caucuses, conventions, and other similar party appliances. It will no longer be possible to elect a President by the votes of a mere dominant and majority section. Sectional issues must cease, as the basis, at least, of large party organizations. Ambition, or lust for power and place, must look no longer to its own section, but to the whole country; and he who would be President, or in any way the foremost among his countrymen, must consult, henceforth, the combined good, and the good-will, too, of all the sections, and in this way, consistently with the Constitution, can the “general welfare" be best attained. Thus, indeed, will the result be, instead of a narrow, illiberal, and sectional policy, an enlarged patriotism and extended public spirit.

If it be urged that the plan is too complex, and, therefore, impracticable, I answer that was the objection, in the beginning, to the whole Federal system, and to almost every part of it. It is the argument of the French Republicans against the division of the legislative department into two Chambers; and it was the argument especially urged at first against the entire plan or idea of the electoral colleges for the choice of a President. But, if complex, I answer again, it will prevent more evil than good. If it suspend some legislation for a time, I answer the world is governed too much. If it cause delay, sometimes, in both legislation and the choice of President, I answer yet again, better, far better this, than disunion and the ten thousand complexities, peaceful and belligerent, which must attend it. Better, infinitely better this, in the Union, than separate confederacies outside of it, with either perpetual war or entangling and complicated alliances, offensive and defensive, from henceforth forever. To the South I say: If you are afraid of free State aggressions by Congress or the Executive, here is abundant protection for even the most timid. To the Republican party of the North and West I say: If you really tremble, as, for years past you would have had us believe, over that terrible, but somewhat mythical monster-the SLAVE POWER-here, too, is the utmost security for you against the possibility of its aggressions. And, from first to last, allow me to say that, being wholly negative in its provisions, this plan

It is can only prevent evil, and not work any positive evil itself. a shield for defence, not a sword for aggression. In one word, let me add, that the whole purpose and idea of this plan of adjustment, which I propose, is to give to the several sections inside of the Union that power of self-protection which they are resolved, or will some day or other be resolved, to secure for themselves outside of the Union.

I propose further, sir, that neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, shall have power to interfere with the equal right of migration, from all sections, into the Territories of the United States; and that neither shall have power to destroy or impair any rights, of either person or property, in these Territories; and, finally, that new States, either when annexed, or when formed out of any of the Territories, with the consent of Congress, shall be admitted into the Union with any constitution, republican in form, which the people of such States may ordain.

And now, gentlemen of the South, why cannot you accept it? The Federal Government has never yet, in any way, aggressed upon your rights. Hitherto, indeed, it has been in your own, or at least in friendly hands. You only fear, being in the minority, that it will ag gress, because it has now fallen under the control of those who, you believe, have the temptation, the will, and the power to aggress. But this plan of adjustment proposes to take away the power; and of what avail will the temptation, or the will then be, without the power to execute? Both must soon perish.

And why cannot you of the Republican party accept it? There is not a word about slavery in it, from beginning to end—I mean in the amendments. It is silent upon the question. South of 36° 30′, and east of the Rio Grande, there is scarce any territory which is not now within the limits of some existing State; and west of that river and of the Rocky Mountains, as well as north of 36° 30', and east of those mountains, though any new State should establish slavery, still her vote would be counted in the Senate and in the electoral colleges, with the non-slaveholding section, to which she would belong; just as if, within the limits of the South, any State should abolish slavery, or any new State, not tolerating slavery, should be admitted, the vote of such State would also be cast with the section of the South. However slavery might be extended, as a mere form of civilization or of labor, there could be no extension of it as a mere aggressive political element in the government. If the South only demand that the Federal Government shall not be used aggressively to prohibit the extension of slavery; if she does not desire to use it herself, upon the other hand, positively to extend the institution, then she may well be satisfied; and if you of the Republican party do not really mean to aggress