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Opinion of the Court.
the jury "find all issues in favor of the defendant," and the judgment repeats that “all the issues raised by the pleadings' were so found. This necessarily includes a finding that the defendant was never liable to pay the assessment. This explicit finding cannot be controlled by statements of fact in those parts of the answer which set up as independent defences matters in avoidance, or in a bill of exceptions relating to one of those defences only. Such statements, made for the purpose of presenting the issue to which they relate, are not evidence upon any other issue in the same record. As held by Chief Justice Marshall, sitting in the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, where the law authorizes a defendant to plead several pleas, he may use each plea in his defence, and the admissions unavoidably contained in one cannot be used against him in another. Whitaker v. Freeman, 1 Dev. 270, 280. See, also, Knight v. McDouall, 12 Ad. & El. 438, 442; Gould v. Oliver, 2 Man. & Gr. 208, 234; S. C. 2 Scott N. R. 241, 262.
The finding of the jury, that the defendant never subscribed for the shares or was liable to pay the assessment, constitutes of itself a conclusive determination of the case in his favor. Consequently, the ruling of the Circuit Court upon the question, stated in the bill of exceptions and principally argued at the bar, of the effect of the discharge in bankruptcy, is wholly immaterial, and cannot have prejudiced the plaintiff, for, however that question should be decided, the defendant would be entitled to judgment upon the verdict. Evans v. Pike, 118 U. S. 241; Moores v. National Bank, 104 U. S. 625; Morisey v. Bunting, 1 Dev. 3.
No. 55. Argued November 4, 1889. - Decided November 18, 1889.
When an article is designated in a tariff act by a specific name, and a duty
imposed upon it by such name, general terms in a later part of the same act, although sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are not appli
cable to it. Under the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 489, embroidered linen handker
chiefs are subject to a duty of thirty-five per cent ad valorem as “handkerchiefs;” and not to thirty per cent ad valorem as “ embroideries.”
This was an action to recover duties alleged to have been illegally exacted. Judgment for plaintiff, to which defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Stephen G. Clarke for defendant in error.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action brought to recover an alleged excess of duties exacted by the collector at the port of New York. De fendants in error had imported certain embroidered linen handkerchiefs, upon which the collector, the plaintiff in error, assessed a duty of thirty-five per cent ad valorem, under the eighth paragraph of Schedule J of $ 2502 of title 33 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by $ 6 of the act of March 3d, 1883, 22 Stat. 488, 507, which reads:
“Brown and bleached linens, ducks, canvas, paddings, cot bottoms, diapers, crash, huckabacks, handkerchiefs, lawns or other manufactures of flax, jute or hemp, or of which flax, jute or hemp shall be the component material of chief value, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty-five per centum ad valorem."
The defendants in error paid this duty under protest, claim
Opinion of the Court.
ing that the goods were only liable to thirty per cent ad valorem, under the eleventh paragraph of the same schedule, as follows:
“Flax or linen laces and insertings, embroideries, or manufactures of linen, if embroidered or tamboured in the loom or otherwise, by machinery or with the needle or other process, and not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty per centum ad valorem.”
Samples of the goods in question were produced in evidence and it appeared that the body of the cloth was linen cambric, that is, made of flax; that the articles were known in trade as, and were in fact, embroidered handkerchiefs; and that the embroidery was a substantial part of the handkerchief, and was done with cotton.
All the requirements as to protest, appeal and time of bringing suit having been complied with, the court directed a verdict for the importers for the difference claimed, upon which judgment was rendered, and the cause is brought here on writ of
The articles in controversy were embroidered linen handkerchiefs; and it is contended in support of the judgment that the provisions of the statute should be treated as if they read: "On linen handkerchiefs thirty-five per cent ad valorem, but, if embroidered, thirty per cent ad valorem.”
We cannot concur in this construction. The word “handkerchiefs” is denominative and not merely descriptive, and when an article is designated by a specific name, and a duty imposed upon it by such name, general terms in a later part of the same act, although sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are not applicable to it. Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S. 112, 113, and cases cited.
The eighth paragraph covers handkerchiefs and also “other manufactures of flax, jute or hemp, or of which flax, jute or hemp shall be the component material of chief value," and the eleventh paragraph applies to flax or linen laces, insertings, embroideries or manufactures of linen, if embroidered or tamboured, and not specially enumerated or provided for in the act.
Opinion of the Court.
Where manufactures of linen, other than those enumerated in the first provision, are embroidered or tamboured they are subjected to the rate specified in the second provision. “The test of the rate of duty is that of embroidery or not.” Arthur v. Homer, 96 U. S. 137, 140. In that case, certain linen embroidered dress-patterns had been imported into the port of New York, and were held dutiable at the rate imposed on embroidered manufactures of linen. The acts of March 2, 1861, of July 14, 1862, and of June 30, 1864, and the Revised Statutes of 1874, bearing upon the subject, were considered. By none of these acts were such dress-patterns specifically enumerated as subject to a different duty. But linen handkerchiefs were, as by the act of 1883 they are, mentioned as among the linen goods for which a certain rate was designated.
In Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U. S. 208, 211, 212, Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion of the court, makes the distinction between the use of a description applicable to many kinds of goods having different names, and the use of the specific name itself, entirely clear, and upon that distinction the disposition of the case turned.
We consider that distinction applicable here, and hold that these handkerchiefs, although embroidered, did not fall within the second provision.
The judgment must be
a new trial, and it is so ordered.
Statement of the Case.
WATSON v. CINCINNATI, INDIANAPOLIS, ST. LOUIS AND CHICAGO RAILWAY COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRIOT OF INDIANA.
No. 48. Argued October 31, 1889. - Decided November 18, 1889.
The improvement in grain-car doors, as claimed by Chauncey R. Watson
and patented to him by letters patent No. 203,226, dated April 30, 1878, may have been new and useful, but did not involve the exercise of the inventive faculty, and embraced nothing that was patentable.
IN EQUITY. The court stated the case in its opinion as follows:
This was a bill filed by appellant against the Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis and Chicago Railway Company, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, alleging an infringement of letters patent No. 203,226, granted to him for an improvement in grain-car doors, bearing date the 30th day of April, 1878.
The complainant averred, in his bill, that the patent was intended to secure and did secure to him “the sole and exclusive right to make, use and sell a car for the transportation of grain and other freight, constructed substantially like an ordinary freight car, having an outside door for closing the car, and provided with an inside flexible or yielding sliding grain door, which is adapted to be carried up on guide rods or their equivalent over head and out of the way and under the roof of the cars; that of such a car having an outside enclosing car door proper, in combination with an inside sliding flexible grain door, he was the first and original inventor," etc. These averments were denied in the answer, which also alleged that the thing pat ented in said patent, and every material or substantial part thereof, had been shown and described prior to Watson's supposed invention in various letters patent, fifteen in number, among them being a patent issued to Martin M. Crooker, May