Opinion of the Court.

The second section of its charter empowered the corporation to build and construct, and thereafter use, operate, own, and enjoy a railroad or railroads into, along, and across that part of the State lying between the Mississippi River and the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad, "one of said lines, or a branch therefrom, to reach the Mississippi River at or near a point opposite Arkansas City if practicable, so as to connect such point on the east bank of the Mississippi River with some point or points on the line of the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad;" and by section seven it was empowered to "build, construct, maintain, and operate of itself, or with others, in or out of this State, a ferry across, or a tunnel under, or a bridge over, the Mississippi River, at any point within this State where its railroads, branches, laterals or spurs may reach said river;" and to acquire lands, etc., for landings, wharves, inclines, etc., and to establish said landings, wharves, inclines, etc., as might be necessary or convenient in transporting freights, passengers, etc., upon and across said Mississippi River. In our opinion it cannot be doubted that a principal object of the grant to the company was the building of a line across the State from the Chicago Railroad to the Mississippi River, and that the point of contact was to be opposite Arkansas City, if that were practicable. Five years was contemplated as sufficient to complete the road to the river, so that the twenty years' exemption should commence.

By the thirteenth section it was provided that the legislature might declare the charter forfeited, if twenty miles were not constructed and in operation within three years from the passage of the act. This indicates that the legislature did not assume that the line might probably be extended to the river in less than five years, and were not thereby induced to insert the twenty years as a limitation on the twenty-five. No reason is perceived for limiting the exemption to begin with the completion of the railroad to the Mississippi River, if it were intended that the exemption should be for more than twenty years at all events, commencing with the approval of the

act.

The question when the property may be taxed is answered

Opinion of the Court.

by ascertaining when the period of the specified exemption begins, for until then the general law provided that while the road could not be taxed during the process of construction, such parts as were finished and in operation could be, though they might be for a time exempt under the charter after the line was completed to the Mississippi River. When the Mississippi River was reached then the period of exemption would begin; but how long it would continue would depend upon the length of time to elapse before the end of twenty-five years from the approval of the charter. And this disposes of the argument that it is immaterial whether the period of exemption is twenty or twenty-five years, because it is agreed that the property could not be taxed until the period of exemption, whatever that is, shall have expired, for that ignores the real inquiry, which is as to when the exemption

commences.

Again, the preamble to the act is referred to by counsel, as sustaining their construction, because it is therein declared that the work is one of "great public importance," and "to be encouraged by legislative sanction and liberality," and that "the physical difficulties of constructing and maintaining railroads to, across, along or within either the Mississippi, Sunflower, Deer Creek or Yazoo bottoms or basins, or the other alluvial lands herein referred to, are such that no private company has so far been able to establish a railroad and branches developing said basins and alluvial lands, and connecting them with the railroad system of the country." But as the preamble is no part of the act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous, the necessity of resorting to it to assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the legislature is in itself fatal to the claim set up. Indeed, what is therein stated appears to us to be quite as referable to the remarkably extensive powers granted as to the assignment of reasons for exemption from taxation.

It is true that it is stated in section eight, that, in order to encourage the investment of capital in the enterprise, and “to make certain in advance of such investment, and as inducement

Opinion of the Court.

and consideration therefor, the taxes and burdens which this State will and will not impose thereon," the exemption is thereby declared. Yet if, notwithstanding that statement, the matter were left uncertain, that would not allow the court to make it certain by construction, and to remove ambiguity upon the presumption of a legislative intent contrary to the fixed presumption where the rights of the public are involved. In short, there can be no uncertainty in the result when the language used is construed, as it must be, in accordance with thoroughly settled principles. After stating the exemption in controversy, section eight concludes as follows: "And when the period of exemption herein prescribed shall have expired, the property of said railroad may be taxed at the same rate as other property in this State. All of said taxes to which the property of said company may be subject in this State, whether for county or State, shall be collected by the treasurer of this State and paid into the state treasury, to be dealt with as the legislature may direct; but said company shall be exempt from taxation by cities and towns."

Since upon the expiration of the period of exemption, it would have followed that the property of the company would be subject to taxation at the same rate as other property, it may be that the object of the final clause was to create a scheme of taxation peculiar to the road. Upon the comprehensiveness and validity of such scheme we do not undertake to pass. It was not to take effect until the exemption expired, and the terms in which it was couched do not render the commencement of the exemption other than the Supreme Court held it to be.

The case is clearly controlled by our decision in Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railway Company v. Dennis, supra, and the judgment must therefore be

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

YAZOO AND MISSISSIPPI VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY v. BOARD OF LEVEE COMMISSIONERS OF THE YAZOO MISSISSIPPI DELTA.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI.

No. 1087. Submitted October 28, 1889. Decided November 18, 1889.

Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, ante, 174, affirmed and applied.

IN EQUITY. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. James Fentress, Mr. W. P. Harris and Mr. J. B. Harris for appellant.

Mr. Marcellus Green and Mr. S. S. Calhoon for appellees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the

court.

This is an appeal, by plaintiff in the suit, from the decree of the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, dismissing its bill of complaint filed in that court against the appellees, the Board of Levee Commissioners, and certain sheriffs and tax-collectors, to enjoin the collection of taxes levied under an act of the legislature, creating such Board of Commissioners, for the purpose of providing for the payment of the principal and interest of bonds authorized to be issued by the board, the proceeds of which were to be applied to the construction and repair of levees on the Mississippi River.

The bill set up the same exemption relied on in Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company v. Thomas, ante, 174, and it was insisted that the taxes sought to be collected were unauthorized and illegal by reason of such exemption; and that the law imposing the taxes impaired the obligation of the alleged contract of exemption and thus violated the Constitution of the United States; the litigation,

Opinion of the Court.

therefore, making a controversy arising under that Constitution. Without considering whether any other ground for affirming the decree exists, it is sufficient to say that this case is disposed of by the decision which has just been announced in that referred to.

Decree affirmed.

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 66. Submitted November 5, 1889. Decided November 25, 1889.

In regard to motions for a new trial, and bills of exceptions, the courts of the United States are independent of any statute or practice prevailing in the courts of the State in which the trial is had.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. John F. Dillon for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Alexander Martin and Mr. Robert H. Kern for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

In this action, tried by the Circuit Court without a jury, there is no case stated by the parties, or finding of facts by the court. The bill of exceptions, after setting forth all the evidence introduced at the trial, states that "there were no declarations of law asked for, or given by the court;" and the single exception taken is to the overruling of a motion for a new trial, which is a matter of discretion, and not a subject of exception, according to the practice of the courts of the United States. In regard to motions for a new trial, and bills of exceptions, those courts are independent of any statute or practice prevailing in the courts of the State in which the