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Opinion of the Court.
pins were both provided for, which shows that, as Congress uses the phrase pins, solid-head, or other, it does not include hair-pins.
“ 20. That the phrase pins, solid-head, or other, applies only to pins with heads of some kind.
“ 3d. Generally; that the evidence does not make out a case for recovery by the plaintiffs.”
Which motion the court denied ; to which ruling defendant's counsel then and there excepted.
The court thereupon charged the jury as follows:
“Gentlemen, if you think these articles are pins, according to the common understanding of the class of pins that are known as solid-head pins, or other pins, return a verdict for the plaintiffs; if not, return a verdict for the defendant. You may take the case.”
The jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the amount having been subsequently ascertained as agreed, judgment was entered against the collector accordingly, and the cause brought here on writ of error.
Mr. Solicitor General for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Edward Hartley (with whom was Mr. Walter H. Coleman on the brief) for defendants in error.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The articles in question were ordinary headless hair-pins, made of steel wire and iron wire, and the question is whether they were dutiable as “pins, solid-head or other.”
By section 13 of the act of July 14, 1862, 12 Stat. 555, 557, c. 163, a duty of five per centum ad valorem, in addition to then existing duties, was levied on many articles, including "pins, solid-head or other,” and “manufactures, articles, vessels and wares, not otherwise provided for, of gold, silver, copper, brass, iron, steel, lead, pewter, tin, or other metal, or of which either of these metals or any other metal shall be the compo nent material of chief value."
Opinion of the Court.
By section 21 of the act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 264, c. 255, a duty of fifty per centum ad valorem was levied "on hair-pins made of iron wire.”
Under section 2504, Title XXXIII of the Revised Statutes, “Schedule M, - Sundries,” we find, “ Hair-pins, made of iron wire : fifty per centum ad valorem.” “Pins, solid-head or other: thirty-five per centum ad valorem.” 2d ed., pp. 476, 480. And in “Schedule E, - Metals," (p. 465): “All manufactures of steel, or of which steel shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for; forty-five per centum ad valorem. But all articles of steel partially manufactured, or of which steel shall be a component part, not otherwise provided for: shall pay the same rate of duty as if wholly manufactured.” And also (p. 467): “ Manufactures, articles, vessels, and wares not otherwise provided for, of
or other metal, (except
steel,) or of which either of these metals shall be the component material of chief value : thirtyfive per centum ad valorem."
In March, 1875, certain imported steel hair-pins having been held at the port of New York dutiable at fifty per cent ad valorem, because of their similarity to iron wire hair-pins, the Treasury Department decided that this was erroneous, and that they were properly chargeable with the rate of duty applicable to manufactures of steel not otherwise provided for. Synopsis T. Dec. 1875, p. 56, No. 2140.
By section 2502 of Title XXXIII of the Revised Statutes as enacted by the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 501, c. 121, “Schedule C, - Metals," a duty of thirty per centum ad valorem was levied on “Pins, solid-head or other;" and by the last paragraph in the same schedule, on “Manufactures, articles, or wares, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, any other metal, and whether partly or wholly manufactured : forty-five per centum ad valorem.”
It will be perceived that although hair-pins are not mentioned eo nomine, this last paragraph covers iron and steel hair-pins, as was ruled as to the latter by the department in 1875, in the construction and application of similar language.
Inasmuch as Congress, for the thirteen years prior to 1883, treated hair-pins for revenue purposes as a distinct article from "pins, solid-head or other,” we consider it unreasonable to conclude that the legislation of 1883 was intended to do away with a distinction manifestly regarded as inherent in the thing itself.
In short, it is doubtful if it could ever have been properly held that hair-pins were ejusdem generis with the pins referred to in the tariff acts, but if this could have been so prior to 1870, we are of opinion that at that time Congress assigned them to a class by themselves, because essentially sui generis, and, therefore, that their not being specifically enumerated in 1883 did not relegate them to the category of “pins, solid-head or other," as ingeniously argued by counsel.
From these views the conclusion follows that the court below should have instructed the jury to find for the defendant. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with a
direction to award a new trial.
PENNIE V. REIS.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
No. 1260. Submitted December 2, 1889. - Decided December 16, 1889.
When a pleading misstates the effect and purpose of a statute upon which
the party relies, a demurrer to it does not admit the correctness of the construction, or that the statute imposes the obligations or confers the
rights which the party alleges. The legislature of California, in 1878, enacted a statute which provided for
the payment of the police force of San Francisco at a rate“ which should not exceed $102 a month for each one,” subject to the condition that the treasurer of the city and county “should retain from the pay of each police officer the sum of two dollars per month to be paid into a fund to be known as the police life and health insurance fund." The act further provided that upon the death of any member of the police force after June 1, 1878, there should be paid by said treasurer ont of said life and health insurance fund to his legal representative the sum of $1000. On the 4th of March, 1889, this act was repealed and another statute enacted
Statement of the Case.
creating “ a police relief and pension fund," and transferring to it the police life and health insurance fund, which had been created under the other act, and making new and different provisions for the distribution of the new fund. W. was a police officer of the city and county from 1869 until his death on March 13, 1889, after the repealing act had gone into operation. His administrator sued to recover $1000 from the police life and health insurance fund, which then amounted to $40,000; Held, that this fund was a public fund, subject to legislative control, and that W. had no vested interest in it, which could not be taken away by the legislature during his lifetime.
The court, in its opinion, stated the case as follows:
This case comes from the Supreme Court of the State of California. The petitioner is the administrator of one Edward A. Ward, deceased, who was a police officer of the city and county of San Francisco from the 24th of September, 1869, until his death, which occurred on the 13th of March, 1889.
On the 1st of April, 1878, an act of the legislature of California was approved, entitled, “ An act to enable the Board of Supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco to increase the police force of said city and county, and provide for the appointment, regulation and payment thereof." Statutes of California of 1877, p. 879. The first section of this act authorized the Board of Supervisors to increase the existing force of the police, which consisted of one hundred and fifty members, not exceeding two hundred and fifty more; the whole number not to make in all more than four hundred; and provided that they should be appointed and governed in the same manner as the then existing force. The second section declared that the compensation of the two hundred and fifty, or such part thereof as the board might allow, should not exceed $102 month for each one, and that the compensation of those then in office should continue at the rate prescribed by the acts under which they were appointed until June 1, 1879, when their pay should be fixed by a board of commissioners created under the act; that the police officers then in office should be known as the “old police,” and those appointed under the act as the “new police;” and that the officers subsequently appointed to fill vacancies on the old police should receive the
Statement of the Case.
same pay as the new police, subject to the condition that the treasurer of said city and county should “retain from the
pay of each police officer the sum of two dollars per month, to be paid into a fund to be known as the “police life and health insurance fund,'” to be administered as provided in the act. The mayor, auditor and treasurer of the city and county of San Francisco were constituted a board to be known as the “police, life and health insurance board,” and required from time to time to invest, as it might deem best, the moneys of the police life and health insurance fund in various designated securities, to be held by the treasurer, subject to the order of the board. The act declared that upon the death of any member of the police force, after the first day of June, 1878, there should be paid, by the treasurer, out of the said life and health insurance fund, to his legal representative, the sum of one thousand dollars; that in case any officer should resign from bad health or bodily infirmity, there should be paid to him, from that fund, the amount of the principal which he may have contributed thereto; and that, in case such fund should not be sufficient to pay the demand upon it, such demand should be registered and paid in the order of its registry, out of the funds as received. . Ward having been a police officer whilst this act was in force, the administrator of his estate demanded of the treasurer the one thousand dollars provided by it. There was in the treasury at the time the sum of forty thousand dollars. The treasurer having refused to pay the demand, the administrator applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandate upon him to compel its payment. To the petition for that writ the treasurer demurred on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; or entitle the petitioner to the writ of mandate, or to any relief whatever; and that the act of the legislature, passed March 4, 1889, entitled "An act to create a Police Relief Health and Life Insurance and Pension Fund in the several counties, cities and counties, cities and towns of the State," was a valid and constitutional enactment. Statutes of California, 1889, p. 56. This act creates a board of trustees of the police relief and pension fund of the police department in each