Opinion of the Court. tified that, according to the course of business in the customhouse, under the law, the entered value is the value declared upon the entry under oath, and that the practice is, that the collector shall not levy duty on less than the entered value, though the amount in the invoice is less. Another clerk testified to the same effect. Thereupon, the evidence being closed, the counsel for the government moved that the jury be directed to find for the defendant upon the following grounds: 1, that the evidence does not show the duty exacted on any amount in excess of the invoice value; 2, nor in excess of the entered value; 3, nor does it make out a case of recovery for the plaintiff. The court having denied this motion, the counsel then made a request to charge fourteen separate propositions, the substance of which was that under section 2900 of the Revised Statutes, which declares that "the duty shall not, however, be assessed upon an amount less than the invoice or entered value," the collector was bound to assess the duty on the amount stated in the entry and in the invoice certified by the consul, and could not take notice of the uncertified invoice; and that if the plaintiff desired to have the invoice corrected, his remedy was to demand an appraisement under section 2926 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that merchandise, of which incomplete entry has been made, or an entry without specification of particulars, either for want of the original invoice or for any other cause, or which has received damage during the voyage, shall be conveyed to a warehouse and there remain until the particulars, cost or value, as the case may require, shall have been ascertained, either by the exhibition of the original invoice, or by appraisement, at the option of the owner, importer or consignee, and until the duties shall have been paid or secured to be paid. The court declined to adopt the propositions of the counsel, but charged the jury that as the invoice certified by the consul purported to show the value of the goods "free on board at Antwerp," if the jury were satisfied by the evidence that this meant that the value so expressed included charges, the charges of transportation and placing on board ship, charges from VOL. CXXXII-32 Opinion of the Court. the markets of the country to the ship then it was not an invoice of the "dutiable value," but was an incomplete invoice; that if this was its character, the importer or consignee had a right to claim that it was incomplete, and to ask that the goods be appraised, or that he might amend his invoice. The charge then proceeded as follows: "You have heard Mr. Patterson testify as to what occurred when he presented this invoice to the entry clerk. Now, if he was given to understand when he presented that invoice there and stated that he wanted to get the charges out in some way, and presented this additional paper-you heard his testimony about what he did-if he was given to understand that he must enter those goods at the value expressed: that is, the value including the charges, the value expressed in the invoices, and in no other way, and that they could not get along in any other way than that, then he was not bound to ask for an appraisement. If they gave him to understand that that was the only thing he could do, if they met him right there when he wanted to put in this additional invoice, and said the only thing you can do is to enter these goods at this value, and the importer was compelled to do it in order to proceed at all, and he yielded to that, then he was not bound to say anything about an appraisement. But if they did not do that, if they merely refused that and gave him a chance to ask for an appraisal if he wanted to, and he did not ask for it, he mistook his remedy, and the plaintiff cannot recover, and it was his fault that he did not enter them right. But if they cut him right off on that subject and said he must enter at this larger value, then it was their fault, and the plaintiff can recover if duties on charges were collected." The court further charged, that if the examiner, who appraised the goods, appraised their value in the principal markets of the country whence they came, in the shape they were, (that is, in cakes,) at 34 marks 50 pfennigs, that was their dutiable value and the collector exacted a duty in excess for charges, whether he called them charges or not, and the plaintiff should recover what he paid for this duty on charges, because the law of 1883 took out charges as a part of the dutiable value; but Opinion of the Court. that, if this was not the value that the appraiser took, when he says he did appraise the goods, and the jury cannot tell what it was, then they cannot tell what duty was paid on charges, and the plaintiff has not made out his case. As to the deficiency in weight, the counsel for the government contended, and asked the court to charge, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover anything in respect to the difference between the weights stated in the invoices and entries and the weights stated in the official weigher's returns. The court declined so to charge, and instructed the jury that if the deficiency arose from the loss of goods on the passage, a proportionate reduction should be made; but not if it arose from mere shrinkage, and if all the goods that were sent arrived. The counsel for the government excepted to each part of the charge as given, and to each refusal to charge as requested. We do not think that the court below committed any error in its instructions or in its refusals. First. In regard to the construction and effect of the consular invoice which expressed the value of the goods "free on board," it was perfectly proper and right to instruct the jury that if they were satisfied from the evidence that this form of valuation was understood to include charges of transportation from the place of production to the place of shipment, and other charges of shipment and transshipment, then the levy of duties on such valuation, since the passage of the act of 1883, was contrary to law, and that the plaintiff could recover back the duties levied on the amount of such charges, provided he took the proper course to avail himself of the error. is so evident that it needs no discussion to make it plainer. This Secondly. As to the course which the plaintiff did pursue, we see no error in the position taken by the court, that although the statute prescribed a particular method to be followed under section 2926 of the Revised Statutes, in case of an incomplete entry of goods, or an entry without the specification of particulars, (namely, to convey the goods to a warehouse, there to remain until the particulars, cost or value should be ascertained either by the exhibition of the original Opinion of the Court. invoice, or by appraisement,) yet if, when the importer or consignee pointed out the imperfection, and desired to correct it, or have it corrected, he was met by a declaration of the officers that he must enter the goods at the value expressed in the invoice and in no other way, and was given to understand that that was the only thing he could do, and he was compelled to do that in order to proceed at all, then he was not bound to ask for an appraisement under the statute. The case was prejudged against him. The theory of the customhouse officers evidently was, that the valuation of the goods in the entry and invoice was binding on the importer, although in that valuation he had inadvertently included charges for transportation, and other charges, exempted from duty by the act of 1883; and that it was his own fault for having so included such charges, and that he was estopped from disputing the valuation thus made and sworn to, even though qualified by the words "free on board," which could have no effect to alter the valuation. It is not stated in these words, but that was the tendency of the evidence; and we think that the jury were properly instructed on the subject. Thirdly. As to the deficiency in the weight of the goods, as the value was measured by the weight, both in the invoice and by the appraiser, namely -so much per 1000 kilograms, we think the court was right in telling the jury that any deficiency arising from loss of goods, and not from mere shrinkage, was a proper subject of recovery. If goods are damaged or affected intrinsically, that is a matter for examination and appraisement under section 2927, Revised Statutes, but if any portion of them has never come to hand but has been actually lost, the case would seem to come within the spirit of section 2921, which says that "if, on the opening of any package, a deficiency of any article shall be found on examination by the appraisers, the same shall be certified to the collector in the invoice, and an allowance for the same be made in estimating the duties." The appraiser's certificate in the present case related merely to pro rata value, and not to quantity, that was ascertained and certified by the weigher. If only half of the cargo was found on board the Statement of the Case. ship, it could hardly be contended that the importer would be bound by his entry and invoice to pay duty on the entire cargo shipped at Antwerp. As to the point that the payment of the duties was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff, it is obvious to remark, that the case as already considered involved this very question. The verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, under the instructions given, was virtually a finding of the fact that the plaintiff was compelled to pay the illegal duties in order to get possession of his goods. The counsel for the government says that he ought to have asked for a reappraisal. The question whether he was bound to take that course or not was involved in the inquiry submitted to the jury under the second head of instructions. We see no error in the record and the judgment is Affirmed. MULLER v. NORTON. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE No. 91. Argued November 8, 11, 1889.- Decided December 9, 1889. Cunningham v. Norton, 125 U. S. 77, affirmed to the point that the act of the legislature of Texas of March 24, 1879, in regard to assignments by insolvent debtors for the benefit of their creditors was intended to favor such assignments; and that a provision in such an assignment, void in itself, did not necessarily vitiate the assignment, or prevent its execution for the benefit of creditors. 66 A provision in an assignment for the benefit of creditors that the assignee shall at once take possession of all the assigned property " and convert the same into cash" as soon as and upon the best terms possible, can hardly be construed into a discretionary authority to sell on credit. In Texas an assignment for the benefit of creditors, under the statute, may be made to more than one assignee. THIS was an action of trespass brought in the court below by Frederick Muller and Adolph Jacobs, assignees of the firm of Louis Goldsal & Company, of Denison, Texas, against |