insurance fund, which then amounted to $40,000; Held, that this fund
was a public fund, subject to legislative control, and that W. had no
vested interest in it, which could not be taken away by the legislature
during his lifetime. Pennie v. Reis, 464.
8. No tax can be imposed by a State upon telegraphic messages sent by
a company which has accepted the provisions of Rev. Stat. §§ 5263-
5268, or upon the receipts derived therefrom, where the communica-
tion is carried, either into the State from without, or from within the
State to another State. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Alabama,
9. A statute of Alabama imposed a tax " on the gross amount of the
receipts by any and every telegraph company derived from the busi-
ness done by it in this State." The Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany reported to the board of assessors only its gross receipts received
from business wholly transacted within the State. The board required
of the company a further return of its gross receipts from messages
carried partly within and partly without the State. The company
made such further return and the tax was imposed upon its gross
receipts as shown by the two returns; Held, that the statute of Ala-
bama thus construed was a regulation of commerce, and that the tax
imposed upon the messages comprised in the second return was uncon-
stitutional. Ib.
10. The provision in the Revised Statutes of Texas that when service is
made in an action against a partnership upon one of the firm the judg-
ment may be rendered against the partnership and against the mem-
ber actually served, (§ 1224,) and the provision directing the manner
of the service of process upon a non-resident or an absent defendant
(§ 1230) are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
Sugg v. Thornton, 524.
11. Under the power of Congress, reserved in the organic acts of the Ter-
ritories, to annul the acts of their legislatures, the absence of any
action by Congress is not to be construed to be a recognition of the
power of the legislature to pass laws in conflict with the act of Con-
gress under which they were created. Clayton v. Utah Territory, 632.
See CORPORATION;
CRIMINAL LAW, 2.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1;
1. When a contract respecting property contains an agreement to be per-
formed by the owner of it when he shall "dispose of or sell it," it is
obvious that the words "dispose of" are not synonymous with the
word "sell;" and their meaning must be determined by considering
the remainder of the contract. Hill v. Sumner, 118.
2. In this case an agreement by the owner of the property which formed
the subject of the dispute that he would not dispose of or sell it, was
held to have been violated by a lease of it for a term of two years. Ib.
3. When a contract is so extortionate and unconscionable on its face as to
raise a presumption of fraud or to require but slight additional evi-
dence to justify such presumption, fraud may be set up as a defence
in an action at law with the same effect with which it could be set up
in equity as a ground for affirmative relief; and if articles delivered in
performance of such an unconscionable contract have been accepted in
ignorance, and under circumstances excusing their non-return, and
they have some value, the amount sued for will be reduced to that
value in the judgment. Hume v. United States, 406.
4. Persons dealing with public officers are bound to inquire about their
authority to bind the government, and are held to a recognition of the
fact that government agents are bound to fairness and good faith as
between themselves and their principals. Ib.
5. The plaintiff contracted in writing to sell to the government a quantity
of shucks at 60 cents a pound at a time when the market value was 13
cents a pound. He delivered them and they were consumed in the
government service. He then claimed. to be paid at the contract
price, which, being refused, he sued therefor in the Court of Claims;
Held, that he could only recover the market value of the shucks. Ib.
6. A contract between the parties as to the sale of, and payment for, a ranch
and cattle, interpreted as to the mode of payment provided for. Mc-
Gillin v. Bennett, 445.
See DAMAGES, 1, 2;
FRAUD, 1, 4;
RAILROAD.
The constitution of Colorado provided that no foreign corporation should
do business in the State without having a known place of business and
an agent upon whom process might be served. A statute of the
State made provision for the filing by such corporation with the
Secretary of State of a certificate showing its place of business and
designating such agent or agents, and also a copy of its charter of in-
corporation, or of its certificate of incorporation under a general
incorporation law; and, in case of failure to do so, that each and every
officer, agent and stockholder of the corporation should be jointly and
severally personally liable on its contracts made while in default.
Said act further provided that no corporation, foreign or domestic,
should purchase or hold real estate except as provided in the act.
The act did not indicate a mode by which a foreign corporation might
acquire real estate in Colorado. G., being the owner in fee of a tract
of realty in that State, conveyed it by deed of warranty to a corpo-
ration organized under the laws of Missouri, which had not then
attempted, and did not afterwards attempt, to comply with those
provisions of the constitution or laws of Colorado. F., the defendant
below, claimed through this corporation. Some months after his deed
to the corporation, G. executed, acknowledged and delivered a quit-
claim deed of the premises to the grantor of P., the plaintiff below;
Held, (1) That perhaps the reasonable interpretation of the statute
was that a foreign corporation should not purchase or hold real
estate in Colorado until it should acquire, in the mode prescribed by
the local law, the right to do business in that State; (2) That these
constitutional and statutory provisions were valid so far as they
did not directly affect foreign or interstate commerce; (3) That the
company violated the laws of the State when it purchased the prop-
erty without having previously designated its place of business and an
agent; (4) But that the deed was not thereby necessarily made abso-
lutely void as to all persons and for every purpose, inasmuch as the
constitution and laws of Colorado did not prohibit foreign corpora-
tions from purchasing and holding real estate within its limits;
(5) That the penalty of personal liability of officers, agents and
stockholders in case of non-compliance with the provisions of the
statute, having apparently been deemed by the state legislature suffi-
cient to effect its object, it was not for the judiciary to enlarge that
penalty, by forfeiting the estate for the benefit of parties claiming
under a subsequent deed from the same grantor; (6) That the grantee
under the subsequent quit-claim deed could occupy no better position
than the grantor, common to both parties, would have occupied if he
had himself brought the action; and that, in that case, it could not
have been maintained. Fritts v. Palmer, 282.
See JURISDICTION A, 6;
MASTER AND SERVANT.
See MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM, 2 (3) (4) (5) (7).
COURT AND JURY.
See PRACTICE, 4.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
In regard to motions for a new trial, and bills of exceptions, the courts
of the United States are independent of any statute or practice pre-
vailing in the courts of the State in which the trial is had. Missouri
Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., 191.
See EJECTMENT;
EQUITY, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, B.
1. The false making or forging of a promissory note in a State, purport-
ing to be executed by an individual, and made payable at a national
bank, is not a fraud upon the United States, or an offence described
in Rev. Stat. § 5418. Cross v. North Carolina, 131.
2. The same act or series of acts may constitute an offence equally against
the United States and against a State, and subject the guilty party to
punishment under the laws of each government.
1. The payment of money to a customs official to avoid an onerous penalty,
though the imposition of that penalty may have been illegal, is suffi-
cient to make the payment an involuntary one. Robertson v. Frank
Brothers Co., 17.
2. The compulsory insertion by an importer of additional charges upon
the entry and invoice, which necessarily involve the payment of
increased duties, makes the payment of those duties involuntary. Ib.
3. The general rule that the valuation of merchandise made by a customs
appraiser is conclusive if no appeal be taken therefrom to merchant
appraisers, is subject to the qualification that if the appraiser proceed
upon a wrong principle, contrary to law, and this be made to appear,
his appraisement may be impeached. Ib.
4. A statute which requires the dutiable value of imported goods to be
reached by adding to the market value of the goods the cost of trans-
portation, and other defined charges, does not authorize an appraiser
to reach the amount of such cost and charges by an estimate or per-
centage; and an importer who pays duties on an importation thus
calculated may, in an action brought to recover such as were illegally
exacted, show wherein such estimate or percentage was illegal and
excessive. Ib.
5. When an article is designated in a tariff act by a specific name,
duty imposed upon it by such name, general terms in a later part of
the same act, although sufficiently broad to comprehend such article,
are not applicable to it. Robertson v. Glendenning, 158.
6. Under the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 489, embroidered linen hand-
kerchiefs are subject to a duty of thirty-five per cent ad valorem as
"handkerchiefs; and not to thirty per cent ad valorem as "em-
7. The "professional productions of a statuary or of a sculptor only," as
that phrase is used in the tariff act, (§ 2504, Rev. Stat. 2d ed. p. 478,)
embraces such works of art as are the result of the artist's own crea-
tion, or are copies of them, made under his direction and supervision,
or copies of works of other artists, made under the like direction and
supervision, as distinguished from the productions of the manufacturer
or mechanic. Merritt v. Tiffany, 167.
8. Dyes or colors called napthylamine red, orange II, orange IV, and
resorcine red J, imported in 1879, were liable to a duty of fifty cents
per pound and thirty-five per cent ad valorem under the provision of
Schedule M of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes, 2d ed. p. 479, imposing
that rate of duty on "Paints and dyes-aniline dyes and colors, by
whatever name known," although none of them were known in com-
merce before 1875, if, according to the understanding of commercial
dealers in and importers of them, they would, when imported, be
included in the class of articles known as aniline dyes, by whatever
name they had come to be known; or if, under § 2499 of the Revised
Statutes, they bore a similitude, either in material, quality, or the use
to which they might be applied, to what were known as aniline dyes
at the time the Revised Statutes were enacted, in 1874. Pickhardt v.
Merritt, 252.
9. Pieces of ivory for the keys of pianos and organs, matched to certain
octaves, sold to manufacturers, who scrape them to make them adhere
to wood, and then glue them to wood, were charged with duty as
manufactures of ivory, under Schedule M of section 2504 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1874, 2d ed. p. 474, and under Schedule N of section
2502 of the Revised Statutes, as enacted by the act of March 3, 1883,
22 Stat. 511. The importer claimed that they were liable to a less
duty, as musical instruments, under Schedule M of section 2504 of the
Revised Statutes of 1874, 2d ed. p. 478, and under Schedule N of
section 2502 of the Revised Statutes as enacted by said act of March 3,
1883, 22 Stat. 513. In a suit by him against the collector to recover
the alleged excess of duty paid, the court charged the jury that if the
articles were made on purpose to be used in pianos and organs, and
were used exclusively in them, they were dutiable as musical instru-
ments and not as manufactures of ivory; Held, that this was error;
and that the articles as imported were manufactures of ivory. Rob-
ertson v. Gerdan, 454.
10. Ordinary headless hair-pins, made of steel wire and iron wire, when
imported into the United States, are subject to a duty of 45 per cent
as "manufactures, articles or wares, not specially enumerated or pro-
vided for," "composed wholly or in part of iron, steel, copper," etc.,
and not as "pins, solid-head, or other." Robertson v. Rosenthal, 460.
11. Section 7 of the act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488, c. 121, repealing
Rev. Stat. §§ 2907, 2908, took effect immediately upon the passage of
the act. Robertson v. Bradbury, 491.
12. Contemporaneous construction by the Treasury Department of a
repealing clause in the customs-laws is entitled to weight in favor of
importers. Ib.
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