dollar, and subsequently sued him to recover the balance of the claim,
on the ground of fraudulent action by the debtor in obtaining the
compromise, and that the debtor had violated his agreement not to
voluntarily pay any other creditor more than sixty per cent: Held,
that he could not recover because (1) there was no breach of good
faith on the part of the debtor, and no misrepresentation as to his
assets, and no false answer made by him to any question; (2) the pay-
ment of more than sixty per cent to another creditor having been
made when the latter had an attachment suit against the debtor,
which was about to be tried, was not a voluntary payment within the
meaning of the agreement. Cleaveland v. Richardson, 318.

5. The evidence in this case fails to establish any fraud in the making of
the notes and mortgage which are the subject of controversy, or in the
use afterwards made of the notes. Rio Grande Railroad Co. v. Vinet,
565.

1 A conveyance by a debtor, deeply indebted, and in anticipation of de-
crees and judgments which, added to existing incumbrances, will
amount to the value of the property conveyed, will lead a court of
equity to presume that the instrument was executed in fraud of the
creditors. Dent v. Ferguson, 50.

2. If a person conveys his property for the purpose of hindering, delaying
or defrauding his creditors, and for many years acquiesces and concurs
in devices, collusive suits and impositions upon the court in further-
ance of that purpose, without taking any step to annul such convey-
ance or stop such proceedings, a court of equity will not aid him or
his heirs to recover the property from the grantee or his heirs after the
fraud is accomplished. Ib.

See EVIDENCE, 1;
FRAUD, 2, 4.

GARNISHEE.

See INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

HIGHWAY.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4, 5.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See LOCAL LAW, 2, 3, 4.

INJUNCTION.

1. An appeal from a decree granting, refusing or dissolving an injunction
does not disturb its operative effect. Knox County v. Harshman, 14.

2. When an injunction has been dissolved it cannot be revived except by
a new exercise of judicial power. Ib.

3. The prosecution of an appeal cannot operate as an injunction where
none has been granted. Ib.

See JURISDICTION, A,
SUPERSEDURE.

INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

A creditor of an insolvent debtor, having full knowledge of the insolvency,
secured for himself a transfer of a large part of the notes, book ac-
counts and debts of the insolvent. Other creditors, by a proceeding
which was part of the same transaction, secured their debts by attach-
ments sufficient to absorb all the property of the debtor. A creditor
not included in the arrangement sued the debtor and, by garnishee
process, brought in the creditor who had obtained the notes, etc.;
Held, (1) that the garnishee was bound to establish, as against the
pursuing creditor, that his claim against the debtor was just, and that
he will receive from the assets no more than is reasonably necessary to
pay it; and (2) if he is found liable at all as garnishee, he is liable
to account not only for the money collected on the notes, accounts, etc.,
but also for the value of those which remain in his hands, at least to
a sufficient amount to satisfy the debt of the pursuing creditor. Klein
v. Hoffheimer, 367.

See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS;
FRAUD, 4.

INSURANCE.

In Iowa it is provided by statute that "any person who shall hereafter
solicit insurance or procure applications therefor, shall be held to be
the soliciting agent of the insurance company or association issuing a
policy on such application, or on a renewal thereof, anything in the
application or policy to the contrary notwithstanding;" Held, (1)
That a person procuring an application for life insurance in that State
became by the force of the statute the agent of the company in that
act, and could not be converted into the agent of the assured by any
provision in the application; (2) That, if he filled up the application
(which he was not bound to do) or made representations or gave ad-
vice as to the character of the answers to be given by the applicant,
his acts in these respects were the acts of the insurer; (3) That a
"provision and requirement" (printed on the back of the policy issued
on the application) that none of its terms could be modified or for-
feitures waived except by an agreement in writing signed by the
president or secretary, "whose authority for this purpose will not be
delegated" did not change the relation established by the statute of
Iowa between the solicitor and the insured. Continental Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Chamberlain, 304.

VOL. CXXXII-48

INTEREST.

See MUNICIPAL CORPORATion, 3.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

The plaintiff had a place of business, indicated by a sign over the door,
where his mail matter was received, and where he could be met by his
clients, and where the latter could deliver to him stocks to be sold by
him or under his supervision, and he was engaged there in the busi-
ness of buying and selling stocks for his customers, in which business
he regularly employed capital, by the use of which interest was earned
upon moneys advanced by him for his customers; Held, that he was
a "banker" within the meaning of that term as used in Rev. Stat.
§ 3407, and subject to taxation as such under the provisions of § 3408.
Richmond v. Blake, 592.

INVOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

See CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1, 2, 13 (4);
FRAUD, 4.

JUDGMENT.

A contingent interest in real estate or an executory devise is bound by
judicial proceedings affecting the real estate, where the court has be-
fore it all parties that can be brought before it in whom the present
estate of inheritance is vested, and the court acts upon the property,
according to the rights that appear, without fraud. Miller v. Teras
& Pacific Railway Co., 662.

See JURISDICTION, A, 1;
PRACTICE, 1;
WILL.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT.

1. A bill in equity prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant from
trespassing on the land of the plaintiff and taking mineral and ore
therefrom, and that he account to the plaintiff for the value of the
ore already taken therefrom. After a hearing on pleadings and
proofs, the Circuit Court made a decree granting a perpetual injunc-
tion, and ordering an account before a master; Held, that the decree
was not final or appealable. Keystone Manganese and Iron Co. v.
Martin, 91.

2. The granting or refusal, absolute or conditional, of a rehearing in
equity, rests in the discretion of the court, and is not a subject of
appeal. Roemer v. Bernheim, 103.

3. This court has jurisdiction to review, on writ of error, a decision of the
highest court of a State, in which it is decided that a provision in a
tax act of the State that it shall not apply to railroad corporations
exempted from taxation by their charters is not applicable to a par-

ticular corporation, party to the suit, although its charter contains a
provision respecting exemption from taxation. Yazoo & Mississippi
Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 174.

4. A complaint in a suit in a District Court in Idaho Territory prayed for
an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the
possession of a mining claim which the plaintiff had, by a written
agreement, licensed the defendant to work, for a compensation, the
agreement also containing a provision for the conveyance of the
claim to the defendant, on certain terms. The complaint also prayed
for an accounting concerning all ore taken from the mine by the
defendant, and the payment to the plaintiff of the amount due to the
plaintiff under the agreement. The defendant filed a cross complaint
praying for a specific performance by the plaintiff of the contract to
convey. The District Court, by one judgment, granted to the plaintiff
the injunction asked, and ordered an accounting before a referee, and
dismissed the cross complaint. On appeal by the defendant the judg
ment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory, and the de-
fendant appealed to this court; Held, (1) The judgment was not final
or appealable; (2) It made no difference that the judgment dismissed
the cross complaint; (3) The right of the defendant to appeal from
the judgment, so far as the cross complaint is concerned will be pre-
served; and time will run against him, as to all parts of the present
judgment of the District Court only from the time of the entry of a
final judgment after a hearing under the accounting.
Winters v.
Ethell, 207.

5. The rulings upon a motion for a new trial are not open to consideration
in this court. Dahl v. Raunheim, 260.

6. The objection that a corporation cannot sue in a territorial court, on the
ground that it does not appear that the corporation has complied with
the conditions imposed by a statute of the Territory upon its transact-
ing business there, cannot be urged for the first time in this court.
Dahl v. Montana Copper Co., 264.

7. On appeal from the decree of a territorial court in a proceeding in the
nature of a suit in equity, this court cannot consider the weight or
sufficiency of evidence, but only whether the facts found by the court
below support the decree, and whether there is any error in rulings.
duly excepted to, on the admission or rejection of evidence. Idaho
and Oregon Land Improvement Co. v. Bradbury, 509.

8. Where the Supreme Court of a State decides a Federal question, in
rendering a judgment, and also decides against the plaintiff in error
on an independent ground not involving a Federal question, and
broad enough to maintain the judgment, the writ of error will be dis-
missed, without considering the Federal question. Hale v. Akers, 554.
9. This court has jurisdiction to hear and determine, irrespective of the
amount involved, an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Utah, in which the power of the governor of the Ter-

ritory, under the organic act, to appoint a person to be the auditor of
public accounts is drawn in question. Clayton v. Utah, 632.

See APPEAL, 1, 2;

EQUITY, 1;

EVIDENCE, 6;

EXCEPTION;

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM;
PRACTICE, 5;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. An action on a marshal's bond, to recover damages for the wrongful
taking of goods under an attachment issued out of a Circuit Court of
the United States, is a case arising under the laws of the United
States, and is within the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United
States without averment of citizenship of the parties. Feibelman v.
Packard, 109 U. S. 421, affirmed and applied. Bachrack v. Norton, 337.
2. Property of a debtor, brought within the custody of the Circuit Court
of the United States by seizure under process issued upon its judg
ment, remains in its custody to be applied in satisfaction of its judg-
ment, notwithstanding the subsequent death of the debtor before the
sale under execution. Rio Grande Railroad Co. v. Gomila, 478.
3. The jurisdiction of a court of the United States, once obtained over
property by its being brought within its custody, continues until the
purpose of the seizure is accomplished, and cannot be impaired or
affected by any legislation of the State, or by any proceedings subse-
quently commenced in a state court. Ib.

4. Probate laws of a State which, upon the death of a party to a suit in
a Federal Court, withdraw his estate from the operation of the exe-
cution laws of the State, and place it in the hands of his executor or
administrator for the benefit of his creditors and distributees, do not
apply when, previous to the death of the debtor, his property has been
seized upon execution, and thus specifically appropriated to the satis-
faction of a judgment in that court. Ib.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES;

CRIMINAL LAW, 2;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

C. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.

A State is not deprived of jurisdiction over a person who criminally forges
a bill of exchange or promissory note with intent to defraud, in viola-
tion of its statutes, or of its power to punish the offender committing
such offence, by the fact that he follows this crime up by committing
against the United States the further crime of making false entries
concerning such bill or note on the books of a national bank, with in-
tent to deceive the agent of the United States designated to examine
the affairs of the bank, and in violation of the statute of the United
States in that behalf. Cross v. North Carolina, 131.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 2;

JURISDICTION, B, 4.