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humanity, we are apt to conclude, that there is no natural impediment to the same success for others, no debasing cause or principle, which might not be surmounted by God's help, no necessary continuance for any part of mankind in the wretched degradation from which some have happily escaped-we can in like manner conceive the possible existence of such degrees or altitudes, both of spirit and intellect in other states or spheres, as man will never be able to attain by any means short of a change such as would take him out of his present body or constitution.

The class, element, or, as before named, region of intellect, may be divided into five other properties or portions, making, as it were, so many districts in this empyreal region, the highest region of the Kingdom of God in Christ: which five properties, divisions or districts will be differently named, according to different considerations; as for example, if considered in the light

1, Of Divisions or Districts; 2, Of Properties.

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Which districts or sorts of properties are liable to be divided again into sections, or more particular properties, as may appear from their separate consideration; and

1, With respect to the property of Apprehension, which, if considered in a more personal light, instead of looking like a portion or district, would seem more like a whole kingdom or state, and nearly engross all the other parts which have been assigned as its correlatives; seeing the memory is nothing in fact but a protracted, nor the judgment, but a comparative,-nor the will, but a decretive, nor the imagination, but a creative apprehension : all these therefore might well be included under that one head, if required. And in that case too, a greater latitude

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would not be assumed for apprehension, than has been commonly assumed for the same property long ago, under another name, being that of Understanding. Or, it seems hard, however, to distinguish between these two notions, apprehension and understanding, in either state, i. e. in either the present or perfect, of which they are both susceptible, so as to determine what understanding may be, if not apprehending, or what the understanding, if not the apprehension. And if by understanding, may be signified the memory, judgment, &c., as well as simple apprehension, why may not apprehension likewise signify the same? Understanding, Intelligence, Perception, Conception, and the like, are but so many synonymous terms for simple apprehension: no more is Attainment in a spiritual sense; Comprehension is rather different, meaning to embrace as well as to attain or lay hold of, and being a sort of intermediate step between apprehension and memory.

But if the forenamed casts or portions of intellect are all liable to be engrossed by one denomination, we should here endeavour, notwithstanding, to keep them all distinct, considering each of the five, above mentioned, as a property of itself: of the first of which one distinction may be worth insisting on, v. g. into two sections, being those of external and internal apprehension.

Of these two sorts, the first mentioned external is implied in the action of the senses, and therefore called Sensation; the latter independent of such action in a great degree, and therefore peculiarly styled Apprehension, except by those who would rather call it Perception. The same two properties or sorts are also known abroad by other names besides external and internal; as by those of corporeal and mental sight, for example, which have been even acknowledged in Scripture, and especially in the following passages, in each of which their distinction and contrast is very perceptible, v. g., 1, the saying of Jesus, "This is the will of Him that sent me, that every one

which (1) seeth the Son, and (2) believeth on Him, may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (John vi. 40); 2, another, "Jesus saith unto him, Thomas; because thou (1) hast seen me, thou (2) hast believed: blessed are they that have not (1) seen, and yet have (2) believed" (Ib. xx. 29); as faithful Abraham, for example, of whom he tells the unbelieving Jews, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to (2) see my day: and he (2) saw it, and was glad" (Ib. viii. 56). Also (as a third example) the prophet cries out on the Jews, "O foolish people and without understanding; which (1) have eyes, and (2) see not; which (1) have ears, and (2) hear not!" (Jer. v. 21).

For what is said of apprehension by seeing may be said likewise of the same by hearing: where we find the two modes or spheres very distinct, and often separate, that is, external hearing without internal, and internal hearing without external; as in dreams and visions. But, what may seem still more remarkable, as before observed, instances will sometimes occur of the union of these two kinds, v. g. of external and internal apprehension in dreaming or visions as clearly as in waking and common conception, or even more so; as e. g., when persons have either waked justly (if it may be so said) in sleeping, or enjoyed two waking scenes at once. Of the first mentioned condition, we have a remarkable instance in the case of St. Peter, when he was liberated by an angel in his sleep, and conscious to every part of the transaction, but unconscious to himself, and "wist not that it was true, that was done by the angel, but thought he saw a vision" (Acts xii. 9), and another, in the case of St. John being in the Spirit, as he says, on the Lord's day (Rev. i. 10). And of the second condition, or as it may be said, of two waking scenes at once, St. Paul affords a remarkable instance like

VOL. I.

(1) Sight corporeal-Apprehension external.
(2) Sight mental-Apprehension internal.
* Page 79.

wise, when he was enraptured certainly; but whether "in the body or out of the body," he could not say, so equal was his conciousness of both states, combining, most likely, at the time a view of the Highest Presence, with a feeling of his own petty existence. Similar to this, was also another instance, of "Balaam the son of Beor," the man who "saw the vision of the Almighty; falling into a trance, but having his eyes open" (Num. xxiv. 16). So likewise with those who were called Prophets or Seers generally, there must have been the same sort of divided consciousness, or distinction of the mental sight; theirs being, as it were in two worlds, the near and the remote, or the present and the future at once. For of the possibility of such a divided consciousness or apprehension, there can be no doubt; neither of its going forth beyond the limits of vision to real objects, and to objects in embryo without calculation, solely in the way of intuition; nor yet of its going backward likewise, and pervading the past as well as the future, like Moses in his retrospect of the creation, and St. John in that of salvation. But such instances being miraculous, will of course be rare. Indeed sight, or perception, in the last mentioned cases must be the part of a higher property than what we call apprehension of which property it will be more pertinent to speak hereafter. Add to which, the most ordinary, as well as natural instances of this division or abstraction, as it is properly called, of the apprehension, are to be found in the first mentioned case or condition, v. g. of external without internal apprehension among persons seemingly awake. And this unfortunately is but too often the fate even of God's Word, whether heard in public, or studied in private. It must be owned, indeed, that all that passes for this word does not require the deepest apprehension of which we are capable; there are in it some things to be heard, some read, some marked, some learned, some to be inwardly digested. At the same time, equally true it is, that of what deserves to be carefully learned and deeply

digested, many excellent morsels often pass, like dishes at a great banquet, untasted and unregarded. But let us now consider these two properties, or two kinds of one,-the external and internal apprehension, briefly apart.

-1, The property of external apprehension, which is here mentioned as an intellectual constituent, resembles that of sensation before noticed, in the spiritual class, and agrees with the same likewise so far, that it may be necessary to point out their distinction, which seems to consist chiefly in this, v. g. that mere sensation does not imply any necessary connexion of itself with intellect; neither does it require altogether the modifying organs by which our external apprehension is varied, but may belong to plants as well as animals, since those have the sensation of light, heat, savour, and odour too perhaps, as well as these, if they have not the appropriate organs. Consequently that may be separated from sensation, which is the very essence of external apprehension, v. g. a notion, image, or specific impression. For example, the eye may feel, and that most painfully, the sensation of light, without any particular object or image being apprehended; the ear may be stunned by an overpowering noise, without apprehending any definite sound; the palate may be satiated, even to loathing, without the apprehension or perception of any particular flavour, whatever may be the real object or cause of such sensations. As an example of these phenomena, may be cited, the case of a man sleeping in a thunder storm, who both sees, smells, tastes, hears and feels, when the objects of these sensations are presented to him, feeling their presence, but not perceiving the objects: the glare of the lightning distresses his sight; the sulphurous vapour his olfactory nerves; the subtle acid disgusts his palate; the roar of the thunder awakes him, and his whole body thrills with the shock, if it be not paralysed. Thus the man will see, smell, taste, hear, feel, and that most intensely; but what? Why nothing: no object perceptible to his apprehension; and it may be

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