ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

the same breath, even by the Spirit of Omnipotence. No other phial can be of so much consequence to a man as his own; and however it may be coloured by climes or circumstances, this every man ought to mind first. For it is not the quality or colouring of the vessel that signifies, but of its contents. St. Paul was proud to possess the treasure of Christ in an earthen vessel (Cor. II. iv. 7). So may any other man: if he has nothing else to be proud of, he may be proud of this; and full of his treasure he will think, if he do not say it, MY MIND IS MY FORTUNE; my present resource against want and obscurity, my future dependence for honour and felicity: it is a blessing with which Heaven has liberally visited me, and supplied the deficiency of every other advantage; an ample estate, in the improvement of which is my interest, my study, and delight. "The Lord himself is the portion of mine inheritance, and of my cup: Thou shalt maintain my lot. The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground: yea, I have a goodly heritage" (Ps. xvi. 6, 7).

There are also other significations applied to Person, besides those which have just been enumerated; as, particularly, the grammatical of persons in a sentence corresponding with the real: But this and the like are not worth insisting on, that they should detain us from matters more relevant.

2, Things, the other principal sort of modes above named will include, in a general way, every sort of subject without intellect; i. e., without the sublime faculty of speech, or some higher mode of communication; also, loosely speaking, with these advantages. And things, too, properly understood, like persons, are classible in so many ways by different criterions, that it would be endless and unavailing to attempt their enumeration. But a few abstract properties of things may be worth mentioning for a sample; as novelty, rarity, and antiquity; strangeness, probability, possibility, &c.; with their sub-modes and derivatives; prodigy, miracle, &c. ; because they too are class

ible as well as the terms before cited; making novelties, rarities, antiquities, probabilities, prodigies, miracles, &c.

Besides this simple view of the subject of modes, making only two sorts, which are Persons and Things, above mentioned, they are also liable to be reviewed, and apparently multiplied by the several combinations that were mentioned with them, making collective and complex modes of either sort; as of Persons, besides those before enumerated, corporations, communities, &c.; of Things, systems, collections, heaps, &c.; and of both, kingdoms, classes, orders, and the like. So that only from the example here given, it may appear, how the elements of the kingdom are all one with its properties so combined. While in another degree of complexity we may also perceive, how the last mentioned element, Mode, applies to other divisions of matter, as well as to the intellectual, which consists in thinking and doing, and the mixed, which consists in three sorts of properties, the material, spiritual, and intellectual above described.

4. For there are several methods by which the properties, or elements of the kingdom may be gathered, abstracted, or condensed again into Parts; but the chief and most natural are only two: and even these will not be without their difficulties in a subject at once so universal as well as simple and continuous, as the Kingdom of God in Christ. The first method is that of the subject's formation, proceeding gradually from the simplest constituents as above described; the second, that of life or existence, proceeding likewise from the same simple constituents, but in the way of succession instead of formation, in the order of time, instead of selection and constitution. Considering them both distinctly; but one here, and another hereafter:

The first mentioned method having its rise in the simplest constituents of the subject, which are accidents, as aforesaid, will furnish several distinctions, of which,

1. The first depends immediately on the union or con

traction of the three elements just mentioned in two way s both tending to the same effect; as follows, v. g.,

[blocks in formation]

the manner of which deserves to be explained; as it may in two parts, shewing, 1, how the subject or kingdom is divided into Thinking and Doing, or, Theory and Practice; next into their equivalents, the Soul and Body.

First, for example; if the subject of the Kingdom were divided or distinguished into the two constituent parts of Thinking and Doing, or Theory and Practice, it would amount to the same effect as what follows. Theory is intellect, and its fruit to the mind what the fruits of nature are to the body, its means of development, its food and support: practice is spirit, and to the inner man what the taste and digestion are to the outer, formation and enjoyment, or corruption and suffering, as it may happen. There is nothing in nature, or above, or beside, that ever was thought on, nor any thing that was ever deduced therefrom by art, but what belongs to the first, and may be a subject of the second. Even practice itself belongs to theory, and theory may be a subject of practice, as likewise practice itself; since it is the part of practice either to describe, try, consider, and believe, or confute the one; or to alter, improve, and encourage, or discourage the other. So things which are not within the controul of any artist, besides the tendency of his performance; as the immutable order of nature, for example, are still subjects for practice in some shape or other if we cannot change their nature, we may their destination; or if we cannot change their destination, we may apply its discovery to some useful part.

Applying these observations to thinking and doing, the two principal parts, as they may be called, of the Kingdom of God in Christ, we shall perceive where they belong to theory, and in what respects they are rather objects of

practice. Thinking is theory: it is the part of the internal sphere, and the immediate cause of doing: it is the LIFE OF THE SPIRITUAL BODY; which a man passes in himself remote from observation, secretly and securely with respect to other men, but openly and accountably with respect to God, who is as much within a man's thoughts as they are within the man. Doing is practice, the part of the external sphere, and an effect of thinking: it is the LIFE OF THE NATURAL BODY; which is protracted in the world, as the other is out of it; and of course not always so secretly, nor independently, but that the world may observe and animadvert upon the same, though it take its rise from within; or, as our Lord expresses it, "out of the abundance of the heart" (Mat. xii. 34). For out of the heart (says he)" proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies" (Ib.xv.19); which are proper objects for human animadversion. And in fact doing, whether good or evil in a moral acceptation, must be regarded as the consummation of thinking; thinking, as inward doing, so close is their affinity. Yet thinking and doing will not be the same part; as appears from this, v. g., that there may be thinking without doing, and doing also without thinking, taking both in a literal sense: though too frequently, even in the most thoughtless actions, as we kindly call them, in adulteries, fornications, and the like, there is the process of thinking going before doing, however vicious or absurd such thinking may be found.

Besides these two sorts of materials, v. g., thinking and doing--that the interior, and this the exterior of the Kingdom; that the soul, and this the body; that the internal, and this the external life-we find likewise a third sort not so decided, being of an intermediate nature; more inward than doing, more outward than thinking, and generally a way or medium from one to the other; which is saying. The same distinction of the Kingdom or its like, v. g., into thinking, saying, and doing, seems also not uncommon but from the aforesaid participation of this middle sort in the other two, it is often found inconve

nient to distinguish it as a constituent, and far preferable in a general way, to acknowledge only two sorts of materials in the Kingdom, or two parts of life in this respect, being the first and last mentioned, Thinking and Doing.

It should here also be farther observed, though rather in advance, compared with what follows; that, as there is generally no doing without thinking-or if otherwise indeed, there can be no thinking either without some tinge or character, which the heart derives from principle and imparts to practice, or else to inaction whether right or wrong. So that a man's actions will generally bespeak not only his inward sentiments, but also the extrinsic principle from which they proceed, as well as the heart or government in which they are digested and matured. And in this manner every tree is known by his own fruit” (Luke vi. 44): as the divine Teacher infers, and as we also shall have further occasion to observe.

66

Thinking, which cannot in any sense be deemed a moderate part, will appear less so than usual in that which it is here, and perhaps not unreasonably assumed to be. For usually thinking will imply only one half of the spiritual or inward life; the other, which is the more ostensible, consisting in volition, &c.; whereas, according to the sense that is here preferred, thinking will also imply volition with every other property or particular, however situated or combined; being the office of both mind and soul, or of the assemblage of constituents called the inner man. By which extension of its meaning, if the term is rendered more complex, the subject in return will be rendered more intelligible, and its discussion more exact. While, on the other hand, doing, which is the part of the external sphere, or of the visible and executive department of the human republic, or Kingdom incarnate; the life of the natural body and the proper effect of thinking, figures with equal importance in the definition that has been given; according to which it will consist of as many parts as there are in the power that directs it. The doing of the hand, of the eye, the feet, &c., are all parts

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »