difement of an inveterate rival, without paying a conftant, though fruitlefs attention to the means of preventing it. Hence the two ruin ous wars, during the reign of Frederick, ftyled the great, that deprived Auftria of fuch extenfive territories. The court of Vienna had ample cause to rue its endeavours to reduce a power fo ftrongly fupported by others, and efpecially by the houfe of Bourbon, the fworn foe, during a long period, to the poffef fors of the Imperial crown, whofe defpotic aims, at the liberties of Germany, had more than once been fruftrated by its interpofition. Though the French monarchy was no more, its politics ftill fubfifted refpecting the houfes of Auftria and Brandenburgh. Of course, the court of Berlin, confcious of the utility to be derived from fo powerful an ally, foon retracted its shortlived enmity to France, when it found that, whether a kingdom or a commonwealth, its aid might fafely be relied upon in any future contest with the court of Vienna. To thefe motives may be afcribed the paffive acquiefcence of the Pruffian council, in the enterprizes of the French in Germany. As Pruffia expected, and was promifed a fare in the spoils of Auftria, it connived at all the proceedings of thefe dangerous invaders, fecure of a like connivance on their part. The neceffity of coinciding with many of the views of this ambitious court, induced the directory to give an indirect affent to the ufurpations it had refolved on. While the French armies were employed in the feizure of fo many towns and territories, the Pruffian miniftry revived claims upon the Imperial tity of Nuremberg, that had lain dormant upwards of two hundred years. They were of a most serious nature, and directed to no lefs than the fovereignty of that large and flourishing city; the fuburbs of which the king of Pruffia challenged as his property, and took forcible poffeffion of them, in contempt of the reclamation of the fenate and regency. So manifeft a violation of the na tive and long acknowledged right of no inconfiderable ftate in Germany, countenanced in fo glaring and unqueftionable a manner by the French generals, was viewed, by the difcerning part of the Germans, as the remuneration tacitly allowed to Pruffia by France, for affenting to its invafion of the empire, and fhowed, at the fame time, how readily the rulers of the republic would facrifice the liberties and independence of others to their own ambitious purfuits. The diflatisfaction univerfally produced, by this conduct of the French, did them effential differvice throughout all Germany, and indeed through all Europe. It now became certain, by the evidence of facts, that their pretences, to affume the protection of ftates and nations. againft tyranny, were a mere impofition upon the credulity of mankind. The connection of Pruffia with the republic, expofed it to the fufpicion of abetting the project of diffolving all the political ties that held together the Germanic body, and under the protection of which the immunities and liberties of the lefler princes and ftates were re, fpected by the more powerful. A furmife had prevailed for many years, that the houfe of Branden burgh had conceived the idea of placing itfelf at the head of the [K2] empire, empire, fupported by the proteftant intereft, which flood on a parity of ftrength and importance with that of the Roman catholic; it alfo counted among its friends and wellwithers, thofe powers abroad, with which Auftria was liable to be at variance. But the fupport of the moft potent of thefe powers had vanifhed from its ideas, fince the matrimonial alliance that took place between the houfes of Bourbon and Auftria, in the perfon of the late unhappy queen of France. It had revived however on the treaty that fevered Pruffia from the coalition, and it was fecretly held out, by France, as the most efficacious temptation to a court, the afpiring views of which required no lefs motives at this period to fecure its alliance. Could the conftitution of Germany have undergone fuch a change, as to place the Imperial diademn on the head of a proteftant prince, and could the houfe of Brandenburgh have fecured its fucceffion to this dignity, it was generally imagined that Pruffia would have interested itfelf in the defence of the empire; but the little expectation it entertained, of being able to compafs fuch a point, rendered it, in the general opinion, indifferent to the prefervation of the Germanic conftitution. Provided the difmemberment of this great body fhould be accompanied with thefe advantages, which the politics of Pruffia kept in view, it was the public perfuafion that no oppofition would arife from the court of Berlin, to an alteration, from which it would derive fuch material benefit. The fmaller ftates firft, and then the greater in lower Germany, feemed likely to be fwallowed up peace-meal in a rifing Pruffian empire: if this empire itself should not be divided, by that partitioning policy, which has fupplanted the law of nations, among the Ruffians, Swedes, and Auftrians. A conviction of the rapacious views of Pruffia had greatly alienated the attachment of the Germans to that power. The willingness of the French, to permit the encroachments it had in contemplation, fubjected them no lefs to a diminution of that partiality with which they had hitherto been favoured by the people of Germany. These had hoped, that the dread of this victorious nation would have fo far operated in favour of the common claffes every where, as to have in duced the divers princes, engaged in the coalition, to have abated of the rigorous exactions from their refpective fubjects, and procured to thefe a milder treatment than if their arms had been fuccessful. But when they began to feel the weight of the contributions demanded by the French in the countries of which they had taken poffeffion, and found that the authority they exercifed was no lefs grievous and fevere, than that of their former rulers, their good wifes to the French diminished, and they began to miftruft thofe promises of equity and moderation, to thofe who fubmitted to them, which had induced fuch numbers to give them a friendly reception, and to welcome them as their deliverers from oppreffion. The mafs of the people in the numerous diftricts, where contributions were required by the French, had expected that no more would have been exacted from these than their juft proportion; but, contrary contrary to their hopes, and in contradiction to thofe principles of equality on, which the French laid fo much ftrefs, thefe, with a degree of carelefinefs and improvidence, that belied the ideas, which had been fo univerfally formed of their fagacity, left the repartition of the fums to be raised, to the management of thofe very perfons who had been objects of public difcontent and complaint, for the injuftice and partiality of which they had been the inftruments, under their refpective governments. These being, for the fake of expedition, entrufted with those levies, made no alteration in the manner, and adhered to established precedents. Thus the privileged claffes ftill enjoyed their former exemptions, and the inferior part of the community was loaded, as antecedently, with almoft the whole burden of the taxes, impofed for the raising of the contributions. This was the most injudicious of all the meafures adopted by the French in the management of their new acquifitions, and it operated more fatally to their intereft than was perceptible to the generality, It excited the most violent refent ment in the multitude, which had been taught to believe, that where, ever the French became mafters, all oppreffions would be at an end, and no man would be treated worfe than his neighbour. To be deceived in fo barbarous and oppreffive a manner: to behold their tyrannical rulers authorized to lord it over them as ufual, and to find that the prefence of the French, from which to much had been expected, produced no mitigation of their flavery. To be rendered, in fhort, no lefs miferable by the fucceffes of the French, than they could have been, had their boafted republic been deftroyed, and the completeft defpotifm eftablished on its ruins, filled them with the keeneft indignation at a people whom they now branded as deceivers and impoftors, and wholly unworthy of the good for tune that had attended them. Had the French republic been true to the principles profeffed in their declarations and manifeftoes to all nations, they would have been wholly irrefiftible. All thrones raifed on defpotic power would have fallen; and, as was faid of Alexander * the Great, the earth would have stood filent before them. It is to their weakness and vices, the inconfiftency of their conduct in Italy, Germany, and wherever they went, with their profeflions, the prevalence of their paffions over their principles, that moft of the European potentates owe their crowns at the prefent moment. One of the causes of the readiness with which the French allowed the petty fovereigns of Germany, to collect in their own manner the contributions impofed upon them, was, to conciliate their good will, and convince them that no interference was aimed at in their domeftic affairs, by leaving to them the arrangement, of which their fovereignty and independence remained unviolated. Had the French purfued another fyftem, and proclaimed an entire emancipation of their fubjects from all farther allegi ance to their native princes, it was far from clear that fuch a measure would have produced any other confe quence than throwing the countries, * First Book of the Maccabees, Ch. 1. thus thus revolutionifed, into confufion, and embroiling the French with feveral princes, the amity of whom they were defirous to obtain, and were at that time earnestly seeking. But a measure of this kind muft at once have rendered these princes irreconcilably averfe to any connections with a ftate evidently bent on the deftruction of every fpecies of fovereignty, but that of the people at large; and determined to abolith every where the rights of princes and reigning families, and every trace of hereditary government. The real truth was, that the fituation of France, at this period, was extremely critical. The pecuniary wants of the republic were fuch, that it could not provide the fupplies required by the commanders of their numerous armies abroad, which, though victorious, were frequently reduced to the most deplorable need of the commoneft necef faries. It was therefore indifpenfibly requifite to procure them at any rate, and with the most effectual expedition, for men who nei ther would, nor indeed could, wait for them, and who thought themselves entitled to a comfortable'maintenance, and fome remuneration for the fervices they were continually performing for their country. The German people, in confequence of the depredations exercifed upon them by the French armies, became their most inveterate foes, and loft no opportunity of doing them every fpecies of detriment. They joined in crowds the Imperial armies; they formed themfelves into bodies under chiefs of their own chufing, and fell upon the French wherever they could do it with advantage. They proved, in fhort, the moft ufeful auxiliaries to the Auftrian troops, through their local knowledge of the countries where the war was waged, and through the refentment that animated them against the French, for the loffes they had fuitained in the predatory incurfions of the republican foldiery, and the avidity of booty for which these were peculiarly noted. Such were the caufes of the rapid decline of that partial difpofition towards the French, expreffed by the commonalty in fo many countries in Germany, at their first entrance. As they viewed them in the light of friends and brethren, coming to their relief, they were the more exafperated, when they found them to be enemies and plunderers. In the mean time, the army, commanded by Jourdan, having overrun Franconia, was advancing towards Ratisbon, levying contributions from all the diftricts in its way. The diet of the empire, fitting in that city, was ftruck with confternation, at the rapidity of its approach, notwithstanding that the Imperial army difputed every step with the utmost resolution. The army, under general Moreau, was, at the fame time, marching from Swabia, of which he had completed the reduction, by taking Ulm and Donawerth, places of great importance on the Danube. He was now mafter of both fides of that river, and propofed to pafs the Lech, dividing Swabia from Bavaria, in order to penetrate into this circle. The Auftrians, apprifed of his intention, collected a ftrong force to oppofe him; but he forced his paflage over,on the twentyfourth of Auguft, near the city of Augurg, and compelled the Auf trians to retire into the country behind them. Thefe operations of the army, under Moreau, were defigned to fecond thofe of that under Jourdan, who was fuccessfully proceeding in every enterprize he formed, and driving before him the Imperialifts, under Wartenfleben, a brave and experienced officer, but at this period continually unfortunate. After a feries of ill fuccefs, he fuftained a heavy defeat, on the fixth of Auguft, at Hochftadt, in the neighbourhood of Bamberg, where his own fkill, and the valour of his troops, were obliged to yield to the fuperior exertions of the French. He now retired to a strong pofition between Sultzbach and Amberg, two towns on the confines of the north of Bavaria, but here he was again attacked by general Jourdan, on the fixteenth of Auguft, and his troops diven from the advantageous poft they occupied bere and at Neumark, a town in the vicinity. Thefe repeated difafters, in Germany, rendered more grievous by the intelligence daily arriving of the victorious progrefs of the French in Italy, caufed an alarm at Vienna, almoft equal to that which had been experienced in the commencement of the reign of the late emprefs, Mary Theresa, when he was compelled to quit her capital, to avoid the danger of falling into the hands of her numerous enemies. The emperor Francis feemed on the eve of being in the like manner forced to abandon Vienna. His hereditary dominions, Bohemia particularly, were menaced with a Speedy invafion by the French, unlefs an immediate ftop were put to their career. In this perilous emergency he made a folemn appeal to his fubjects in Bohemia, who lay neareft the. danger, exhorting them by every motive of loyalty to their fovereign, and regard to the fafety of their poffeffions and religion, to arm inftantly in the defence of both. To this purpose he enjoined the establifhment of a national militia, to which he held out every encouragement and remuneration enjoyed by the regular troops. By the plan propofed, the twentieth part of all the able-bodied men in that kingdom were to be drafted for the protection of its frontiers, from the expected irruption of the French. The like appeal was made to the people of Hungary, and of all his other dominions. They were carefully reminded, on this occafion, of the immenfe exactions of the French, not only in money, but in every article of neceffity, or of ufe, and with what fevere punctuality the payment of them was required. It was chiefly the dread of thefe heavy demands that influenced the determination of the Germans to contribute all in their power to prevent the farther progrefs of the French. Their levies of money, and their other requifitions excited univerfal alarm. The duke of Wirtemburg had been affeffed four millions; the circle of Swabia, twelve millions, befides to furnish eight thousand horses, five thousand oxen, one hundred and fifty thoufand quintals of corn, one hundred thoufand facks of oats, a proportionable quantity of hay, and one hundred thoufand pair of fhoes. Eight millions were demanded from the circle of Franconia, with a very large fupply of herfes. Great fums [K 4] were |