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expreffing his regret at the precipitation with which his mafter had concluded the treaty of peace with France; the terms of which, he faid, would have been much lefs fevere, had he waited for the more favourable opportunities that followed it. For having uttered words of that import, he was ordered to quit the territory of the republic. The Tufcan envoy was difmifled in the fame manner, on account of the particular zeal he had teftified in behalf of Lewis XVI.'s daughter, when he was permitted to leave France.

The court of Rome, when compelled by the victories of Buonaparte to folicit a fufpenfion of arms, had fent commiflioners to Paris, to negociate a peace: but, in hope that the numerous reinforcements, which were coming from Germany to the Imperial army, would enable it to recover its loffes, and expel the French from Italy, they ftudioufly protracted the negociation, on pretence that they were not furnifhed with fufficient powers to conclude a definitive treaty. It was not till the fuccefies of the French had put an end to thefe hopes, that they appeared defirous, as well as empowered, to come to a conclufion. But the directory, for anfwer, fignified their immediate difiniffion.

Notwithstanding the refolute and decifive conduct adopted by the directory, they found it neceflary to abate of their peremptorinefs with the Dutch; who, though ftrongly determined to remain united in intereft with France, were not the lefs refolved to retain their national independence. The party that favoured and had called in the French, had done it folely with the view of fecuring their afliftance for the fup

preffion of the ftadtholdership, in which they had been formally promifed the concurrence of the French republic. They were, for this motive, fo zealous for the fuccefs of its arms, that, during the campaign of 1794, they had projected an infurrection in the principal towns of the Seven United Provinces, while the republican armies fhould advance, with all fpeed, to their fupport. Having communicated their defigns to the French government, they doubted not of its readiness to second them, and prepared accordingly to execute the plans which they had formed in virtue of that expectation. But the uninterrupted career of victory, that had given fo decided a fuperiority to the French over all their enemies, had alfo elated them in fuch a manner, that, looking upon the co-operation of their party, in Holland, as no longer of that importance which it had hitherto appeared to be, they now received its applications with coldnefs, which plainly indicated that they confidered the Dutch as a people that muft fubmit to their own terms, and whom they now propofed to treat rather as being fubdued by the arms of the French, than as confederated in the fame caufe.

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Such were the difpofitions of the French towards the Dutch, when they enterred the United Provinces. The arbitrary manner, in which they impofed a multiplicity of heavy contributions upon the Dutch, was highly exafperating to the nation : but they were too prudent to exafperate men, who were determined to act as conquerors, and whom it was impoffible to refift. They fubmitted, therefore, with that phlegm atic patience, which characterizes

them in difficulties, and ufually enables them to furmount the greatest, by giving way to the ftorm while it lafts, and referving themfelves for thofe aufpicious opportunities of re. trieving their affairs, that fo feldom fail the vigilant and undefponding.

In the mean time; the republican party, in Holland, refolved to conduct itfelf with fo much temper to the adherents of that party, which it had oppofed with fo much firmness and perfeverance, that they fhould have no cause to complain of its having made an improper ufe of the power it had newly acquired. The effects of this moderation were highly beneficial to both parties. It foftened the grief of thofe who had been deprived of the government of their country, and induced them to be lefs hoftile to thofe who had taken their places: and it procured for thefe a readinefs in the generality of people to confider them as actuated by patriotic motives, and in no wile by private animofity towards their antagonists.

This conduct was the more remarkable, that the inhabitants of the provinces, though a large majority, was defirous of a change of government, differed materially in their opinions concerning that which was to fucceed it. The party favouring the ftadtholder was the least confiderable. It confifted of the titled, or noble families, ftill remaining in the United Provinces, and chiefly depended upon the inferior claffes, and the great number of foreigners, for the moft part Germans, in the Dutch fervice. The mercantile and middle claffes, and generally the people of opulence and property, were inclined to a republican fyftem: but herein they differed among themfelves as to the plan to be adopted. VOL. XXXVIII.

Several preferred the antecedent one, that had fubfifted from the demife of William III. king of Great Britain and ftadtholder, with such alteration as might fecure it effectually from a re-establishment of that. office, and render it more democratical: others recommended an immediate adoption of the precedents, which the French had fixed on as the most popular. Thefe different parties contended with great warmth for the fuperior excellence of their various plans. But the neceffity of fettling fome form of government, brought them, at laft, after long and violent difpute, to the determination of calling a national convention. The provinces of Zealand and Frizeland, the two most confiderable in the Dutch republic, next to that of Holland, made a long and obftinate oppofition to this propofal. But they were, at length, prevailed upon to concur with the others on its expediency.

The year 1795 was confumed in altercations of this nature. But as foon as the national convention met, which was on the first of March, 1796, all parties agreed on a refolution to declare war against Great Britain, which they confidered as having chiefly occafioned the many calamities that had befallen the United Provinces for a course of years. Through its influence over the ftadtholder, the ftrength of the ftate had been perfidiously withheld from acting in defence of the trade and fhipping of the republic, and its interefts wholly facrificed to thofe of England. During the whole duration of the American war, this had been done in despite and contempt of continual remonftrances and folicitations from the most refpectable citizens in the common[N]

wealth.

wealth. It was through the interference of England, leagued with Pruffia, that the stadtholder, who had been expelled from the United Provinces, was reftored in defiance of the manifeft will of the Dutch. Thus a governor was impofed upon them, whom they could compare to no other than a lord-lieutenant of Ireland, or a ftadtholder of fome Pruffian diftrict. He was the mere agent of thofe two powers, by whofe impulfe he was guided, and by whofe power he was upheld in his authority, which he exercised entirely according to their directions. Through their fatal influence, Holland had been precipitated into the prefent conteft with France, against the well-known wifhes of all the provinces, and upon pretexts quite foreign to their intereft. While this influence lafted, Holland could be viewed in no other light than as a dependence of England and Pruffia. It was, therefore, incumbent on the national convention, to put an end to this flavish and ruinous connection with thofe two powers, but efpecially with England; which had, on the pretence of efpoufing the caufe of the ftadtholder, torn from the republic almost the whole of its poffeffions in the Indies and in America. What was still more infulting, the English miniftry treated him avowedly as the fovereign of the Seven Provinces, though they must know that he was conftitutionally no more than the captaingeneral of their armies, and the admiral-in-chief of their fleets. What was this but tyranny and ufurpation in the extreme? The pretenfions of Pruffia were at end, by the treaty it had concluded with France: but thofe of England were in full vigour, and it eagerly feized every

opportunity of doing all the damage in its power to the people of the United Provinces; who had, therefore, the clearest right to consider it as their most inveterate enemy. On these confiderations, which were obvious to all impartial minds, the national convention ought to call forth the whole ftrength of the nation, and ufe every effort to recover what England had fo unjustly taken from it, rather by furprize than real prowefs.

Such was the language of the republican party, in Holland, which, confiding in its ftrength, and on the fupport of the French, was determined to improve to the utmost the opportunity that now offered, of extinguishing, radically, all the hopes and pretenfions of the Orange family. In this determination, this party met with every encouragement from the directory, which anxioufly ftimulated it to form a conftitution explicitly exclusive of a stadtholder.

The Dutch convention itself was fufficiently averfe to the re-establifhment of this office, which, new-modelled as it had been, by England and Pruffia, was become, in fact, a fovereignity. But however unanimous on this point, they varied on several others. The former independence of the Seven Provinces on each other, and their feparate and unconnected authority over their refpective territories and people, had fo long fubfifted without impairing the general union, that it appeared to many unneceflary, if not dangerous, to make any alteration in this matter, as it would affect the mode of levying taxes, and burthen one province with the expences of another. To this it was replied, that a firm and indiffoluble

union, which was the object principally required, could not be effected, while fuch a feparation of interefts was fuffered to exift. It would open a door to perpetual variances, which might eventually endanger the very existence of the government they were about to establish, by breaking the principal bond of unity on which it was to be founded. After a multiplicity of debates upon this fubject, the importance of a folid union of all the provinces, into one common ftate, appeared fo indifpenfible, that it was unanimoufly agreed to, on the first day of December, 1796. To remove the objection that had principally flood in the way of this decifion, a commiffion of the most refpectable members of the convention was appointed to examine and ftate the former debts of the respective provinces, and to confider of the most equitable and fatisfactory manner of liquidating them, by providing for their extinction, and preferving, at the fame time, uninjured, the rights and interefts of all the parties concerned in this liquidation.

In all these transactions, the members of the Dutch convention were remarkably cautious in permitting no visible interference in their deliberations on the part of the French government. Its fecret influence was well known; but the prefervation of every form and external indication of freedom, was judged indifpenfible, in order to maintain the apparent dignity of the state, and, what was of more confequence in the eye of the difcerning, to prevent the French themselves, at any future period, from pleading a right of interfering, from any acknowledged precedent. The directory was alfo very careful in abfraining from all

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open and oftefible exercise of authority over this meeting. This would have invalidated their proceedings, and infringed the liberty which France boafted, of having reftored to the Dutch, in too glaring a manner, not to have excited their murmurs and resentment. these reafons the directory affected every fentiment of refpect for this national convention of the United Provinces, and treated it with every outward mark of their confidering it as the representative of an inde pendent nation.

But the regard fhewn, by France, to the republic of Holland, was measured folely by the confideration of its weight in the political fcale, which, however depreffed by circumftances, might ftill recover the level of its former importance. The directory did not extend the fame deference to thofe whom it deemed more fubjected to its power. This was remarkably evinced in its conduct towards Geneva. This little republic had invariably remained attached to the interefts of the revolution in France, ever fince its first breaking out; and had gone hand in hand with it through all its variations. Relying on thefe proofs of its fidelity, it now requested the directory to confirm its independence, by making it a claufe in the treaties between France and other powers. But this requeft did not coincide with the views of the directory, which had, it feems, in contemplation the annexation of Geneva to the dominion of France. In purfuance of this project, an intimation was given to the Genevans, that their intereft would be better confulted, and their freedom fecured, by becoming a part of the French republic. This intimation was highly difguft[N2]

ing

ing to the Genevans; and the means taken to bring them to compliance, were ftill more offenfive. Disturbances and bloodfhed were indirectly either promoted or countenanced, by fome dark intrigues, with a view to make them fenfible that the only remedy, for thofe domeftic confufions, was to throw themselves into the arms of the French. But this attempt was not fuccefsful; nor even approved by numbers of the French themfelves. They condemned it as manifefting an ambition incompatible with thofe principles of moderation, on which true republicans ought to value themselves, and which the French held forth to Europe as the maxims by which they had refolved to conduct themfelves. Were Europe once convinced that the ancient fyllem of conqueft and encroachment on the territories of its neighbours, which had rendered France fo odious under the monarchy, were to be continued under the republic, the neceflity of felf-defence would gradually unite every country against it: in which cafe, notwithstanding the brilliant career of its armis hitherto, patience and perfeverance, on the part of the numerous enemies that fo unjuftifiable a conduct would create, must in the end prevail, and both the glory and character of integrity, at which the French ought equally to aim in their political proceedings, would be forfeited.

In addition to thefe motives, for abfiaining from a forced incorporation of Geneva with France, it was urged that the inhabitants of that city and its territory, though forming but a small state, were fo jealous of their independency, that they would never confent to refign it. The

very circumfcription of that ftate, made every member of it the more fenfible of his personal weight in its affairs, and of the freedom which he enjoyed. To deprive him of the fatisfaction, arifing from fuch a fituation, would be a wanton exertion of the fuperior firength of the rupublic, which would redound much more to its difgrace than benefit. Stung with rage at a treatment which they did not deferve, the citizens of Geneva would defert it, and carry to other countries that industry to which alone it owed its flourishing fituation during fo many years. The mere poffeffion of the place itfelf would prove a poor recompenfe for the expulfion of its inhabitants, which, however indirectly effected, would not be the lefs real. In the mean while, they would exhibit, in the various places of their voluntary banishment, living proofs of the ambition and tyranny of France. The neareft of its neighbours would fee their own destiny in that of thofe unhappy fugitives, and learn from thence the obligation they were under, of embracing one of thele two alternatives; either of fubmitting to the like treatment, or of preparing manfully to refift it. Of thole who would be conftrained to adopt this refolution, the firft would be the Swifs, a people noted for ages on account of their love of liberty, and of their aftonifhing atchievements in its defence. Such a people, if united, France would find a formidable enemy: nor was it indeed to be fuppofed, they would tamely behold the annexation of Geneva to France, by compulfory means, nor even by the voluntary conceffion of its inhabitants. They were bound, in the former of thete cafes, to aflift them, and in the latter

they

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