ASSUMPSIT. (Consideration-Discharge of joint debtors.) Where a plaintiff discharges one of two joint debtors, the other also has a right to be discharged; and therefore, a promise by a third person to pay the debt, in order to obtain the discharge of the defendant in custody, is void for want of consideration. Herring v. Dorell, 8 C. & P. 604.

BILLS AND NOTES. (Notice of dishonor.) The following is a good notice of dishonor: "I beg to inform you that A. B.'s acceptance for 2007., drawn and indorsed by you, due July 31, has been presented for payment and returned, and now remains unpaid." (2 M. & W. 799: 2 P. & D. 278.) Cook v. French, 3 P. & D. 596.

2. (When suable on, in debt.) Debt may be brought by the payee against the maker of a note, or by the drawer of a bill payable to himself against the acceptor, although the instrument expresses no consideration, either by the words "value received" or otherwise. (1 B. & C. 674 ; 2 D. P. C. 635; 3 D. P. C. 243; Hatch v. Trayes, and Watson v. Kightley, 3 P.

3 Price, 253.)

& D. 409. COMPUTATION OF TIME. Where it appeared on the face of a conviction for an offence against the excise laws, that the plaintiff had been summoned on the 20th September to appear before the defendant on the 30th September following, and not appearing on that day, the defendant proceeded to hear evidence, and convicted him in a penalty of 51.; the court held the conviction to be null and void, and the defendant liable in trespass for issuing a distress warrant, as the excise act (4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 51, s. 19) requires that "ten days' notice at least" shall be given to the party to appear, and the rule is inflexible to construe such limitation of time as ten clear days. Mitchell v. Forster, 4 P. & D. 150.

COVENANT. (Joint or several.) By articles of agreement, reciting that the defendant had contracted with J., as the agent of the plaintiff and the other owners of the property, for the purchase of the lands therein mentioned, the defendant covenanted with the plaintiff, and the several other parties beneficially

interested, to perform such contract by paying the purchase money on a certain day, &c.: Held, that this covenant was several, and that the plaintiff might sue alone for the non-payment of his share of the purchase-money without joining the other parties beneficially interested. Poole v. Hill, 6 M. & W. 835.

DEED. (Reservation of right of way, construction of.) A deed reserved to the defendant a right of way over a yard "to the stable and loft over the same, and the space or opening under the loft, and now used as a wood-house," and also the use of the yard "in common with the plaintiff and his tenants for the time being, it being the intent that the whole of the yard should lie open and undivided as the same then was, without any other building to be erected thereon, and that the yard should be used in common by the occupiers of the plaintiff's and defendant's messuages, in the same manner as the tenants thereof had been accustomed to use the same."

The defendants converted the loft and the space there used, which had been used as a wood-house, into a cottage.

Held, 1. That the deed did not justify the defendant in using the yard after the cottage was built, for that such user was not the accustomed user which had been reserved.

2. That the reservation of the 66 way to the space or opening under the loft, and now used as a wood-house," was to be taken as identifying the locality, and confining the way to a piece of open ground generally, and not specifically to a wood-house; but that the conversion of the open space to a cottage was an alteration of substance, and that the defendant had no right of way to the cottage. Allan v. Gomme, 3 P. & D. 581. EVIDENCE. (Admission of copy of instrument under judge's order.) Although a judge's order has been made on the plaintiff to admit a copy of a letter from himself to the defendant, and the plaintiff has also had notice to produce the original, the copy cannot be read, unless evidence is given of the existence of the original.

Whether the notice to admit contains a saving of all just ex

ceptions or not, the opposite party is entitled to rely on any valid objection to the documents mentioned in the notice. Sharpe v. Lambe, 3 P. & D. 454.

2. (Admissibility of parol evidence.) A witness called to prove the terms of a verbal agreement, stated that he was in company with the plaintiff and defendant when it was entered into, and referred to an entry which he made a few hours afterwards to refresh his memory. This entry was made by him from a paper written in pencil by the plaintiff, during the interview between the parties, and read by him to the defendant, as embodying the terms of their agreement. The defendant assented to it, but he neither signed nor was asked to sign it, nor was it shown to him: Held, that it was not necessary to produce this paper as constituting the real agreement. Truwhitt v. Lambert, 3 P. & D. 676. 3. (Of handwriting.) In an action against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, the only proof of his handwriting was that of a banker's clerk, who stated that two years ago he saw a person calling himself by the defendant's name sign a book; that he had never seen him since, but he thought the handwriting was the same; and that he had since seen checks similarly signed pass through the bank: Held, that this was evidence to go to the jury. Warren v. Anderson, 8 Scott, 384. 4. (Admission of defendant.) A parol admission by a party to a suit is always receivable in evidence against him, although it relate to the contents of a deed or other written instrument; and even though its contents be directly in issue in the cause. (1 Ry. & M. 187: 5 C. & P. 542.) Slatterie v. Pooley, 6 M. & W. 664; Newhall v. Holt, id. 662.

5. (Secondary evidence.) A witness, called to prove a parol demise from the plaintiff to the defendant, stated that, at the time of making it, the plaintiff looked at written minutes, from which he appeared to read the terms, to which the defendant assented: Held, that, in the absence of any further proof respecting the nature of the minutes, parol evidence of the terms of the demise was admissible: Truwhitt v. Lambert, 10 Ad. & E. 470. 6. (Same.) Where a deed is in the hands of an attorney, who

holds it not merely as an attorney, but as a security for money owing to him from his client, and the attorney, being called on by a subpoena duces tecum, refuses to produce the deed on the ground of his own lien, the party calling for the production of the deed is entitled to give secondary evidence of its contents.

There are no degrees of secondary evidence; but where a party is entitled to give secondary evidence at all, he may give any species of secondary evidence within his power. (2 Atk. 71; 6 C. & P. 206.) EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. (Dying declarations.) Two days before the death of the deceased, the surgeon told her she was in a very precarious state; on the day before her death, when she had become much worse, she said to the surgeon that she found herself growing worse, and that she had been in hopes she should have got better, but as she was getting worse, she thought it her duty to mention what had taken place. Immediately after this she made a statement: Held, that this statement was not receivable in evidence as a declaration in articulo mortis, for that it did not sufficiently appear that, at the time of making it, the deceased was without hope of recovery. Reg. v. Megson, 9 C. & P. 418. FIXTURES. (Removal of, by tenant after his term.) The right of a tenant to remove tenant's fixtures continues only during his original term, and during such further period of possession by him as he holds the premises under a right still to consider himself as tenant.

Where, therefore, the term, pursuant to a proviso in the lease, was forfeited by the bankruptcy of the lessee, and the lessor entered upon the assignees, in order to enforce the forfeiture, and three weeks afterwards the assignees of the lessee, still continuing in possession, removed and sold a fixture put up by the lessee for the purposes of trade; and the jury found that it was not removed within a reasonable time after the entry of the lessor: Held, that they had no right so to remove it, and that the lessor might recover it in trover.

And semble such would have been the case even without such

finding of the jury. (2 East, 81; 1 C. M. & R. 275; 2 M. & W. 458.) Weeton v. Woodcock, 7 M. & W. 14. GUARANTEE. The case of Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & E.

309, 2 P. & D. 477 (23 L. M. 162,) was affirmed on error in the exchequer chamber. Brooks v. Haigh, 10 Ad. & E. 323. 2. (When continuing.) "In consideration of your supplying my nephew V. with china and earthenware, I guarantee the payment of any bills you may draw on him on account thereof, to the amount of £200 Held, a continuing guarantee, and that the defendant was liable upon it, although, after it was given, goods to a greater amount than £200 had been supplied to and paid for by V. (12 East, 227; 2 Campb. 412; 3 Camp. 220; 2 C. & J. 13; 6 Bing. 244; 9 Bing. 618; 1 C. & M. 68. Mayer v. Isaac, 6 M. & W. 605. HUSBAND AND WIFE. (Right of husband to restrain liberty of wife.) Where a wife absents herself from her husband, not on account of any misconduct on his part, and he afterwards, by stratagem, obtains possession of her person, and she declares her intention of leaving him again whenever she can, he has a right to restrain her of her liberty until she is willing to return to a performance of conjugal duties. In re Cochrane, 8 D. P. C. 630.

2. Goods bought by a married woman out of the proceeds of property vested in trustees for her sole and separate use, may be taken in execution on a judgment against her husband. (Vin. Abr., Baron & Feme, F. 2.) Carne v. Brice, 8 D. P. C. 884. INDICTMENT. (Statement of property in goods.) Where a party has been convicted of felony and is in prison under his sentence, and his wife continues in the possession of his house and goods, an indictment for breaking into the house and stealing the goods, laying the property in the goods in the queen, may be sustained as to the larceny; but a count for breaking the house and stealing the goods, laying them to be the house and goods of the wife, cannot be supported. Reg. v. Whitehead, 9 C. & P. 429.

LIBEL. (Province of judge and jury in action for.) It is com