issued." The constitution of the association at the time the plaintiff joined reserved the right to amend the laws governing the endowment fund. The certificate promised to pay one-half of the amount named therein on disability, "as provided in the laws of the order." Held, That in the absence of a provision in the certificate that the payments therein specified should be subject. to such modifications as to amount, terms and conditions of payment and contingencies in which the same were payable, as the endowment laws of the order from time to time might provide, subsequent amendments, modifying the payment of benefits, would not be applicable to existing members. Haight, J., dissenting. [Judgment for plaintiff in trial court affirmed in Appellate Division, 77 N. Y. Supp. 770. Here affirmed against association.] Beach v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World (N. Y. C. A.): 69 Northeastern Reporter (January 29, 1904), 281. Constitution-Beneficiary-Dependent-Estoppel : The constitution of the order provided for a fund out of which a benefit should be paid to the family or "dependent" of the member. The member designated the plaintiff as the beneficiary of his membership certificate, stating that she was a "dependent" on him. After such designation the member survived for fifteen years, during all of which time he regularly paid his dues and assessments. Upon his death the association refused to pay the amount of the benefit certificate to plaintiff, claiming that she was not and never had been a "dependent" on the member, and, therefore, that the designation of plaintiff as beneficiary was ultra vires and void. Held, That in the absence of fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of the member, if the association did not wish to acquiesce in his opinion that the designated beneficiary was a "dependent," within the meaning of its constitution and by-laws, it should have required him to state the facts constituting her dependence, or it should have investigated the facts independently. It should not be permitted to acquiesce in this designation and receive his assessments and dues for this long period of time, and then, after his death, refuse to honor the certificate. In these circumstances the association is fairly estopped from contesting the validity of the certificate as an ultra vires contract. [Judgment for association below. Here reversed against association.1 Tramblay v. Supreme Council, Catholic Benevolent Legion (N. Y. S. C., App. Div.): 85 New York Supplement (February 1, 1904), 613. Policy-Sick Benefits Wholly Incapacitated: The policy provided for sick benefits in case the insured should be "wholly incapacitated from transacting any and every kind of work or business pertaining to his occupation, and as a result therefrom be entirely confined to the house or bed, and under the charge of some regularly qualified and registered physician." The evidence showed that after being confined to the house for five weeks, insured was, about the 13th of November, able to leave the house, when he went to the doctor's office for medicine, and also to his shop; that he was not able to work, but sat around the shop a couple of hours each day superintending his business, and for part of the time claimed, after the 25th of November, went to his shop every day, and did some work. Held, That the insured was not entitled to recover benefits after the 13th of November. [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here reversed in favor of company.] Shirts v. Phoenix Acc. and Sick Benefit Assn. (Mich. S. C.): 97 Northwestern Reporter (February 2, 1904), 966. Beneficiary-Right to Change: A beneficiary of a certificate in a fraternal relief association has no vested interest in the benefit certificate until the death of the member of the organization and termination of the life insured. Until that event the beneficiary named has no more than a mere expectancy in the mortuary benefits, and the insured is at liberty to change the beneficiary at will. Same-Resignation: T. became a member of the association in 1890, and thereafter designated his wife as beneficiary to whom the death benefit should be made payable. In 1897 T. resigned from the police force, but again became a member in 1899, and a few days thereafter resumed his membership in the association. He made no new designation of a beneficiary on the books of the association before his death, which occurred in May, 1901. He bequeathed to his wife all his estate. The wife died November 8, 1901, devising her estate to her brother and sister. Held, That T., when he became eligible by rejoining the police force, resumed his membership in the association, and the designation of his wife as beneficiary, made during his earlier membership, continued of record with the association, and, at most, its ratification by T. in some manner, formal or informal, acceptable to the associa tion, was all that was required to preserve and continue the designation of his wife as beneficiary. Same-Same-Evidence : The parties claiming under the wife were entitled to introduce evidence that T. intended his wife as beneficiary, and endeavored, in conformity to the regulations and requirements of the association, to have her designated, and also to establish, if such be the facts, that the association treated the former designation as continuous and effective under the latter membership, or waived further formal nomination of his wife as beneficiary. [Judgment against representatives of wife below. Here reversed in favor of her representatives.] St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n v. Strode et al. (St. Louis 77 Southwstern Reporter (February 3, 1904), 1091. Constitution and By-Laws-Contract: The constitution and by-laws of a mutual benefit society enter into and become a part of contracts made with its members, and such members are charged with notice thereof. Same-Same-Suicide-Certificate-Application : The certificate provided that the insured member "is entitled to all the rights and benefits of membership according to the constitution and law of the order." The member agreed in his application for membership to be "bound by the constitution, laws, rules and regulations of the order." The laws of the order provided that "self-destruction, whether sane or insane," will render the certificate null and void. Held, That the constitution and laws were a part of the contract, and the benefit certificate must. be construed in the light of the constitution and laws; that the provision against self-destruction became a condition of the certificate binding upon the member, and that having breached this condition by having committed suicide, the right of participation in the beneficiary guarantee fund of the order was lost. [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here reversed in favor of association.] United Moderns v. Colligan (Tex. C. C. A.): 77 Southwestern Reporter (February 3, 1904), 1032. Nonpayment of Dues-Expulsion-Liability of Member: A beneficiary association, whose members are subject to monthly dues, expelled a member for non-payment of such dues, and brought this action against such member to recover the dues unpaid. Held, That by expulsion of the member the society elected to stand upon a forfeiture of its contract with him, and an action to recover the unpaid dues for which the forfeiture and expulsion were declared can not be maintained. [Judgment for association below. Here reversed against assccia- L' Union St. Jean Baptiste De Pawtucket v. Ostiguy (R. I. 56 Atlantic Reporter (February 4, 1904), 681. Articles of Incorporation-By-Laws-Application for Membership: The articles of incorporation required that a person desiring to become a member must make application for membership, and the by-laws required the application to be signed personally by the applicant. The insured and his brother were partners in business. The brother was solicited to become a member of the association, and was asked to induce the insured to also become a member. The brother urged insured to take membership, and he authorized his brother to make the necessary application. which he did, signing the insured's name thereto. The insured subsequently, under the requirements of the association, submitted to a medical examination. Held, That the association is as fully bound by the certificate issued in response to the application as though the application had been filled out and signed directly by the insured. Same-Same-Same-Waiver of Signature: The organizer of the association had power to waive any requirements of the contract that the application must be signed by the applicant, and the issuance of the certificate on this application with the knowledge that it was signed for the applicant by his brother, would clearly be a waiver of any objections on that ground. Same-Amount Insured-Policy: * The articles of incorporation provided that the beneficiary of a deceased member should be entitled "to a sum of money equal to what would be realized from an assessment upon all members, * * but in no case shall the sum exceed the amount stated in the certificate of membership of the deceased member." The sum stated in the policy was $2,000, with a further stipulation that "the amount due under this contract to be provided for by assessments on the membership, levied pro rata according to age, as provided for in the articles of incorporation, unless otherwise supplied." Held, That these provisions of the articles and the contract make it clear that the beneficiary of the certificate was entitled, not simply to the proceeds of an assessment, but to the sum named in the policy, unless an assessment on the membership of the association as it existed at the time of the death of the member would not yield that amount. Same--Same-Same-Remedy of Plaintiff: Under such a contract the beneficiary is entitled to a money judgment, and not merely to a mandatory order to make and pay over the proceeds of an assessment. Same-Same-Same-Burden of Proof: The burden of proof is on the association to show that an asssessment on its membership at the time of the death of the member would not have yielded the full amount named in the certificate. [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here affirmed against association.] Thornburg v. Farmers' Life Ass'n. (Ia. S. C.): 98 Northwestern Reporter (February 16, 1904), 105. By-Laws-Loss of Hand: A by-law of the association provided that "if a member lose a hand by accident he shall recover one-fourth of the amount of his certificate of membership in cash." The evidence shows that the members hand was mashed so as to require the amputation of the second and third fingers at the knuckle joint, and the index finger at the second joint. The plaintiff testified that the hand was useless to him; that the leaders of the remaining finger and thumb were so weak that he could not use the hand for the purpose of lifting any but the very lightest article. Held, That the by-law does not mean that there should be total destruction of the hand, anatomically speaking, but that the loss of the use of it for the purposes of which a hand is adapted would be the loss of it within the meaning of the by-law, and that whether the member had lost his hand within the meaning of the by-law was properly submitted to the jury. Same-Same-Change in By-Laws-Validity: After plaintiff became a member of the association the bylaws were amended to read that the loss of a hand must be by amputation or severance at or above the wrist. In his applica tion for membership and insurance, plaintiff agreed to conform in all respects to the constitution, laws, rules and usages of the order then in force or which might be thereafter adopted. Held, That the agreement in the application means that the member will comply with such by-laws, rules and regulations as relate to his duties as a member of the association, but do not mean that the association may interefere with the essential provisions of the contract of insurance. The association is powerless by by-laws or otherwise to change or modify the essentials of the contract of insurance without the express consent of the member. [Judgment for plaintiff below. Here affirmed against association.] Sisson v. Supreme Court of Honor (St. Louis C. A.): 78 Southwestern Reporter (February 17, 1904), 297. Foreign Association—Statute-Attorney's Fees: Art. 3096, Rev. St. Texas 1895, exempts mutual relief associations which have no capital stock and whose relief funds are created and sustained by assessments from the operation of the general insurance laws of the State. Under Art. 3071, life insurance companies failing to pay a loss within the time specified are liable for 12 per cent. damages and reasonable attorney's fees. Held, That a foreign fraternal beneficiary association which has subordinate lodges and which issued beneficiary certificates payable from funds created from assessments on its members is not liable to the penalty and attorney's fees, except in case of failure to make an annual statement to the insurance department. Same-Same-Same-Burden of Proof: The burden of proof is on a beneficiary suing on a certificate issued by a foreign fraternal beneficiary association to show that it is subject to the provisions of the Texas statutes concerning a 12 per cent. damages and reasonable attorney's fees. [Judgment for plaintiff in trial court for damages and attor- Supreme Council A. L. H. v. Story et al. (Tex. S. C.): Change in By-Laws-Notice to Member-Authority: Under Sec. 679, Ky. St. 1903, where any reference to the application or by-laws is made in any policy of insurance, such by-laws or application shall not be admissible in evidence unless a copy thereof be attached to the policy. Before the enactment of this section a certificate was issued which contained no reference to suicide by the member. After such enactment a by-law was passed providing that in case a member died by his own hand the association should be liable only for a proportionate amount of the policy. The insured member's attention was not called to this change in the by-laws, nor was a copy thereof attached to his certificate. The plaintiffs admitted that the member committed suicide. Held, That the by-law of the company regarding |