but they are affected by analogy." Where a party has an equitable lien, if he be guilty of such negligence as would bar him at law, he shall be barred in equity. In relation to the whole class of incorporeal hereditaments, whether the cases arise in equity, or at law, the bar is furnished, not by the terms of the statute of limitations, but by its analogy." So is the law, also, with regard to an equity of redemption. There is no right to enter. It is but a mere equitable interest in the land; it is not, therefore, within the terms of the statute; but yet it is barred by the lapse of time prescribed by the statute for other cases. Rent, also, a highly favoured lien, will be presumed to be discharged by the lapse of the statute period." In short, it will be difficult to find a case in which a lien upon land, which may be asserted and enforced at any time, has been established, after the expiration of the time allowed to make title to the land itself. In most of these cases, the ends of justice, and the policy of the law, are attained by presuming a grant. This presumption is made from principles of public policy, and the necessity of the case. It is for the furtherance of justice, and for the sake of peace: it is founded in this, that whatever has long existed, and has been acquiesced in by a 1 Scho. & Lefr. 413. b 2 Saund. 175. note a. 1 Bos. & Pull. 401. 3 East, 294. 4 Day's Rep. 244. c 1 Powell Mort, 408. d Bailey v. Jackson, 16 Johns. Rep. 210. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. those who had an interest to disturb it, had, probably a lawful beginning. It is not to be supposed that a man would suffer another to obstruct the enjoyment of his right without complaint, and an effort to obtain redress. The presumption is not to be made out, by weighing minutely the evidence of particular facts and probabilities. This would be proof, not presumption. Legal presumption is resorted to where there is no particular proof, and because there can be no particular proof; the question, in such cases, is not to be decided by personal belief or disbelief. The grant presumed is taken to exist as a fact, in contemplation of law." Whatever is possible may be presumed, in order to establish long continued possessions. Royal charters, acts of parliament, grants from the state, common recoveries, and private conveyances of all descriptions. Some of the questions now presented here were fully discussed in the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in a case in which the same parties were plaintiffs, as in this, and which respected the same title and I refer particularly to the judgment pronounced in that case by the chief justice. The ground is, that by a neglect to assert the claim, and enforce the lien for a length of time equal to that prescribed by the statute to bar a title to the land itself, the creditor shall be presumed to have waived a 2 Bos. & Pull. 206. 12 Ves. 261. b 12 Ves. 374. 2 Hen. & Munf. 370. 2 T. R. 159. or surrendered the lien; that this presumption stands on principles of public policy, and furnishes a complete bar to the demandants' recovery. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Feb. 28th. Court. The principal questions which have arisen, and have been argued here, upon the instructions given by the Circuit Court, and to which alone the Court deem it necessary to direct their attention, are, First, whether upon the facts stated, a legal presumption exists, that William Dudley died seised of an estate of inheritance in the demanded premises; and, if so, Secondly, whether an exclusive possession of the demanded premises, by Joseph Dudley and his grantees, after the death of William, under an adversary claim, for thirty years, is a bar to the entry and title of the demandants under the administration sale. how evidence It is to be considered, that no paper title, of any Possession, sort, is shown in William Dudley, or his son Joseph. of ownership. Their title, whatever it may be, rests upon possession; and the nature and extent of that possession must be judged of by the acts and circumstances which accompany it, and qualify, explain, or control it. Undoubtedly, if a person be found in possession of land, claiming it as his own, in fee, it is prima facie evidence of his ownership, and seisin of the inheritance. But, it is not the possession alone, but the possession accompanied with the claim of the fee, that gives this effect, by construction of law, to the acts of the party. Possession, per se, eviden 1822. Ricard V. Williams. ces no more than the mere fact of present occupation, by right; for the law will not presume a wrong; and that possession is just as consistent with a present interest, under a lease for years or for life, as in fee. From the very nature of the case, therefore, it must depend upon the collateral circumstances, what is the quality and extent of the interest claimed by the party; and to that extent, and that only, will the presumption of law go in his favour. And the declarations of the party, while in possession, equally with his acts, must be good evidence for this purpose. If he claims only an estate for life, and that is consistent with his possession, the law will not, upon the mere fact of possession, adjudge him to be in under a higher right, or a larger estate. If, indeed, the party be in under title, and by mistake of law, he supposes himself possessed of a less estate in the land than really belongs to him, the law will adjudge him in possession of, and remit him to, his full right and title. For a mistake of law shall not, in such case, prejudice the right of the party, and his possession, therefore, must be held co-extensive with his right. This is the doctrine in Littleton, (s. 695.) cited at the bar; and better authority could not be given, if, indeed, so obvious a principle of justice required any authority to support it. But there the party establishes a title in point of law greater than his claim; whereas, in the case now supposed, the party establishes nothing independent of his possession, and that qualified by his own acts and declarations. This is the distinction between the cases, and accounts at once for the different principles of law applicable to them. It has also been argued at the bar, that a person who commits a disseisin cannot qualify his own wrong, but must be considered as a disseisor in fee. This is generally true; but it is a rule introduced for the benefit of the disseisee, for the sake of electing his remedy. For if a man enter into possession, under a supposition of a lawful limited right, as under a lease, which turns out to be void, or as a special occupant, where he is not entitled so to claim, if he be a disseisor at all, it is only at the election of the disseisee." There is nothing in the law which prevents the disseisee from considering such a person as a mere trespasser, at his election; or which makes such an entry, under mistake for a limited estate, a disseisin in fee absolutely, and, at all events, so that a descent cast would toll the entry of the disseisee. But, were it otherwise, in order to apply the doctrine at all, it must appear, that the party found in possession entered without right, and was, in fact, a disseisor; for if his entry were congeable, or his possession lawful, his entry and possession will be considered as limited by his right. For the law will never construe a possession tortious unless from necessity. On the other hand, it will consider every possession lawful, the commencement and continuance of which, is not proved to be wrongful. And this upon the plain principle, that every man shall be presumed to act in obedience to his duty, a Com. Dig. Seisin. F. 2. & F. 3. 1 Roll. Abrid. 662. l. 45. Id. 661. l. 45. |