The Judge charged the jury, that the platt and certificate made by Pollock, if he marked no more of the corners and lines of Sumner's tract, but the southern boundary, and south-east and south-west corner would show, by calculation, where the northern boundary of his tract should be.

Nothing can be more apparent than the correctness of this charge. The law directs, that " every tract surveyed for officers or soldiers, shall be run out at the four cardinal points of the compass, either in a square or in an oblong." Consequently, when one line of a survey is given, the remaining three lines are found by a calculation which cannot vary. General Sumner's entry was for 12,000 acres of land. A line from west to east, constituting the southern boundary, was run, and measured 1,292 poles. Corner trees at each extremity were marked. From the end of this first line the survey calls for a line due north 1,486 poles. Had this line been actually run and marked, the tract would have been bounded by the lines actually run, and the corner trees actually marked. But, the line not having been run, the tract was bounded by the course and distance called for. Had there been no survey, had Sumner's entry been for 12,000 acres of land, to begin where the survey began, and to run east 1,292 poles, and from the ends of that line north for quantity, it must have been bounded in the same manner, because, a rectangular oblong figure, to contain 12,000 acres, one of which is 1,272 poles, must have for its other sides, lines of 1,486 poles. Of course the Judge was correct in saying, that if the southern

boundary was given, the northern boundary was to be found by computation.

Was he equally correct in adding, that Gee's land might be located on the north of Sumner's northern line when thus found?

We think he was.

Gee's entry called to lie, "adjoining the northern boundary of B. General Sumner, running west along his line for complement."

Sumner's northern line was, consequently, Gee's southern line.

If, then, Sumner's grant had been issued according to Pollock's survey, no interference between him and Gee could have taken place. But a platt and certificate of survey was afterwards made out by Malloy, who was also a deputy surveyor, which extended the lines constituting the eastern and western boundary of Sumner's land, to 1,737 poles; and upon this platt and certificate his patent was issued. We must, therefore, inquire whether Pollock's survey was legally made; and, if it was, whether it could be afterwards changed, so as to affect a person making an entry in the intermediate time between his first and second survey.

The laws of North Carolina make it the duty of surveyors to survey entries in the order in which they are made, and do not require the presence or direction of the owners of the land. Pollock was a deputy surveyor authorized to make this survey. Consequently, it was regularly made, and had all the consequences of a legal survey.

Admitting the alteration made by Malloy, to be

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perfectly justifiable, Gee's entry was prior to that alteration; and the question is, whether such alteration can affect an appropriation previously made?

Upon the principles of reason and common justice, we could feel no difficulty on this point. But we are relieved from considering it by the decisions which have already taken place in Tennessee. In Blakemore v. Chambles, (1 Tenn. Rep. 3.) it was expressly determined, that the validity of surveys "has no dependence on the will or direction of claimants," and that though the mistakes of surveyors may be corrected, "they cannot be so corrected as to injure a subsequent adjoining enterer."

Gee's entry, then, made after Pollock's survey, will, if a valid entry, hold the lands against any subsequent survey made for Sumner. But as Sumner's is the eldest grant, the validity of Gee's entry must be examined.

It calls to adjoin Sumner's northern boundary, and to run west along his line for complement.

The laws of North Carolina direct, that an entry shall express "the nearest water courses, and remarkable places, and such water courses, lakes, and ponds as may be therein, the natural boundaries and lines of any other person or persons, if any, which divide it from other lands."

This law cannot be construed, and never has been construed, to require that water courses, or remarkable places which are remote, should be expressed in the entry. It requires the expression of those only which are contiguous, and which may assist in show

ing the land intended to be acquired. If there be no considerable water courses, lakes, or ponds within it, the entry cannot express them. The reference to the adjoining land, when we take into view that the law directs entries to be surveyed according to their dates, would always be sufficient to make the entry special, if the line called for could be found. In Smith and others v. Craig's Lessee,(2 Tenn. Rep. 296.) the Court said, "Previously to the year 1786, a vague entry was well understood to be one that contained no such specialty as that a majority of those acquainted in its neighbourhood, at its date, could by reasonable industry, find it; a special entry was considered the reverse. How natural is it, then, for us to suppose, that the legislature designed, in the use of this expression, in the act of 1786, to convey such ideas as had by usage and common consent been appropriated to it."

The books are full of cases containing similar expressions. It is impossible to look at all into the subject, without being satisfied that in the State of Tennessee, such an entry as that of Gee would be deemed special, if Sumner's northern boundary could be found.

There could be no difficulty in finding it, since his land had been surveyed when this entry was made. But the great objection on which the plaintiffs most rely, is, that to constitute a special entry in the state of Tennessee, the objects called for must be notorious as well as certain. The entry must be such as to give general information of the precise land it appropriates. Notoriety, as well as identity, are es

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sential, it is said, to specialty, and a call for Sumner's line is not good, unless Sumner's survey was noto

rious.

If this proposition be correct, if notoriety as well as identity be essential to the validity of an entry in Tennessee as it is in Kentucky, then Gee's entry cannot be sustained. But the law of Tennessee is, in this respect, entirely different from that of Kentucky. The act of Virginia, which is the land law of Kentucky, requires, that entries shall be so special and certain that any subsequent locater may know how to appropriate the adjacent residuum. The land law of North Carolina, which is the law of Tennessee, contains no such provision. The lawyers of Kentucky have made some attempts to transplant into Tennessee the principles which had grown up in Kentucky; but their attempts were unsuccessful. The books are full of cases in which it is expressly decided that notoriety is not essential to the validity of an entry. In the case of Philip's Lessee v. Robertson, (2 Tenn. Rep. 399.) the whole subject is reviewed. Judge Overton takes a very comprehensive view of the doctrines growing out of the land laws of North Carolina, and shows conclusively that they do not require, and had never been understood in Tennessee to require notoriety, as essential to the validity of an entry. His opinion in this case has, we are informed, been confirmed by the other judges of their Supreme Court.

If notoriety be not necessary to Gee's entry, it is special according to the laws of Tennessee, and ought to hold the land it covers against any subsequent sur