1822. Evans V. Eaton. always be reasonable. But it may be said that the statute positively enjoins it. If so, we must submit. When the legislature has clearly expressed its will, the Court have no duty but to obey. This brings us to the question, what has the legislature enjoined on this subject? 3. All that can be supposed to relate to it is contained in the 2d and 3d sections. The second speaks of improvements; the third of specifications. It points out the object of the specification, and directs what shall be done for its attainment. The object is to put the public in complete possession of the invention, whether an improvement or an original discovery; so that interference with it may be avoided while the patent continues, and its benefits may be fully enjoyed by the public, after the patent expires. To this end it enjoins that the applicant for a patent "shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same; in such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known; and to enable any person skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same." This is the directory part. The thing is to be described "so as to distinguish it from all other things before known." How distinguish it? By describing all the things before known, and pointing out in terms in what it differs from them all? Certainly not; but by giving a description of it so complete and accurate, as “to enable any person skilled in the art, &c. to make, compound, and use the same." Is the discrimination contended for, but not mentioned in the statute, necessary for this purpose? By no means. Any person skilled in the art or science, in order to make, compound, and use the new invention, has but to look to the description of the invention itself. He need not know how nearly it resembles, or how widely it differs, from any other thing before known. With these he has no concern. And if, on the other hand, he wishes to use nothing before used and known, and to avoid interfering with the patented invention, or improvement, he has only to compare the thing which he so wishes to make or use, with the description of the patented invention, or improvement contained in the specification; and he will immediately see wherein they differ, and be enabled to avoid the latter, while he uses the former. This section (the 3d) further directs, with a view to the same objects, that the applicant, the inventor, "in case of any machine," shall "fully fully explain the principle, and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by which it may be distinguished from other inventions." Here, as in the rest of the section, nothing is said about improvements, as distinguished from original discoveries. They are all treated equally as "inventions," and are placed precisely on the same ground. They are all to be so described, as that they may be distinguished in their principles, and modus operandi, as well as in their construction and composition, from other inventions: and this is to be effected by means, not of a formal discrimination, in terms, between them, and any 1822. Evans V. Eaton. 1822. Evans V. Eaton. other thing or things of the same general nature; but of a full and accurate verbal description, aided by drawings, models, and specimens; where the matter is of such a nature as to admit their use. In all this, nothing is said or hinted about "improvements," as contra-distinguished from "original discoveries." All are treated alike as "inventions," and the same means of enabling all concerned, to distinguish them from things before used, or known, are provided in relation to both. In fact, what is an "improvement," but a new invention? Every thing that is made better is improved; and every thing that makes another thing better, or does it in a better way, is an improvement. If it be new, it is an invention so far as it goes. The greater the improvement, the greater is the invention and any improvement differs from any other, or from an original discovery, if there be any such thing, not in nature but in degree. They may be greater inventions or less; more or less ingenious; or more or less useful; but as far as they are, so they are all inventions, and are treated precisely alike by this portion of the patent law; which, I again repeat, makes no mention, and gives no hint of a discrimination, in the specification of an improvement, between the improvement, or the thing as improved, and the original thing on which the improvement is made. Treating them all alike as "inventions," it requires, with respect to all, that they shall be so described as clearly to distinguish them, that is, as to enable all concerned to distinguish them from all other things of the same na ture, before in use or known. To construe the sta tute, so as to make it require a description not only of the new invention, but of all things of the same general nature before known, and a discrimination in terms between them, would be as unreasonable in the case of an improvement, as of an original discovery, and would be perfectly unreasonable in either. It would make the statute do that which its terms do not indicate, and which the law can never be presumed to intend. It would make it require what it is not only impossible in a great variety of cases to do, but what, if done, would in every case be wholly useless and vain. This it cannot be so construed as to require: for neminem ad vana aut ad impossibilia lex cogit. The counsel then adverted to the 2d section, where it was supposed, he said, that something might be found to support this doctrine of discrimination. That section spoke particularly of improvements, as to which the third was wholly silent. It said nothing whatever of the specification, its objects or motive. It made two provisions, both useful as declarations of the law, to put persons on their guard and prevent mistakes, but both undoubtedly law, without any such declaration. The first was, that the discoverer and patentee of an improvement in any thing before patented, should not be entitled to make, use, or vend the original; nor the inventor and patentee of the original to make, use, or vend the improvement. Here again they were both considered as inventors, and both put on the same footing. It was declared, for general information, and to prevent 1822. Evans V. Eaton. 1822 Evans V. Eaton. doubts and mistakes, that one should not be entitled to the invention of the other: but nothing was said about the manner of distinguishing these inventions one from the other. That was left to the third section; where it was done without the least mention or hint of the formal discrimination, in terms, contended for in the judgment below. It was manifest that this discrimination could derive no countenance from this branch of the second section. It obvious could derive none from the other branch, which merely, for giving information to the public, and preventing mistakes, declared "that simply changing the form or proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery." This merely amounts to saying, what would clearly have been the construction of law without any such declaration, that to constitute a patentable discovery, either original or by improvement, there must be a new principle or modus operandi, and not merely a change of form or proportion. If the change of form or proportion should be such as to produce a new principle or modus operandi, then it would be a discovery or invention, whether it amounts to an original or an improvement only and here again improvements were treated as inventions, equally with original discoveries; the distinction between them being not in nature, but merely in degree. But the point under consideration has been expressly settled, by the former decision in this case : the same objection, for want of this discrimination, was made in the court below, on the first trial; and the same doctrine on the subject expressly laid down |