1822. nish owners were entered, pro forma, in the District and Circuit Courts, and the cause was brought by Arrogante appeal to this Court. The Barcelones. Feb. 22d. Mr. Winder, for the appellant and claimant, argued, (1.) that it was the settled rule of this Court not to interfere in a doubtful case of this description, and that the evidence in the present case was too dubious to justify the Court in depriving the captors of the possession which they had acquired in war. (2.) That even supposing he was mistaken on this point, this was a capture by a lawfully commissioned cruizer of Buenos Ayres, the title under which had been confirmed by a regular condemnation in the Prize Court of Venezuela, an ally of Buenos Ayres in the war againt Spain. It may be stated as an universal proposition, which has never yet been doubted or denied, that a sentence of condemnation by a competent Court is conclusive, as to the proprietary interest in the res capta, and upon the mere question of prize or no prize: whatever doubts may have been suggested as to the collateral effect of such sentences. And a condemnation in the Court of an ally or co-belligerent is equally competent for this purpose with that of the captor's country itself. This Court, as a neutral tribunal, is a The Amistad de Rues, 5 Wheat. Rep. 385. b Wheat. on Capt. 261. 2 East's Rep. 473. 2 Bro. Civ. and Adm. Law, 257. 281. "What has been said does not extend to ships carried into the ports of an ally in the war, and there condemned, or while the ship is there, condemned in the captor's country; and, therefore, in the present war a sentence of 1822. The Barcelones. therefore precluded from all inquiry into the previous circumstances under which the capture was made, and whether the capturing vessel had been Arrogante armed and equipped in violation of our neutrality. There must be some limit to such inquiries, and there is none so fit as a regular sentence of condemnation, which, by the universal law and usage And of nations, quiets the title acquired in war. even if a decree of restitution in the present case would not directly impugn the sentence, it would so far affect the general doctrine of conclusiveness as to disturb the safety of neutral purchasers. Mr. D. Hoffman, contra, insisted, (1.) that there was no sufficient legal evidence of the existence of the condemnation set up in this case. We have a mere dry sentence of the Court of Juan Griego, contained in a few lines, stating that the property is Spanish, and condemned as legal prize. The character of the capturing vessel, by whom commanded, commissioned, or owned and equipped, the authority of the Court to adjudicate on the subject, the nature of the connexion (if any) between Venezuela and Buenos Ayres, or any power by whom the commission may have been granted, do not appear: every ground is withheld which could enlighten this Court, now virtually called upon condemnation at Bayonne, of a ship taken by the French and carried into St. Sebastian, (22) and lying there at the time of the sentence, has been held valid; and this decision agrees with Bynkershoek's opinion, Qu. Jur. Pub. cap. 4. (22) 2 Robinson, p. 209, case of the Christopher. 1822. to enforce this decree. In a case like the present, the Court will require the most satisfactory informaArrogante tion that can be furnished. Where a case is free The Barcelones. from suspicion and difficulty of any kind, and when the sentence itself, however concise, necessarily involves the point in discussion before another tribunal, it might be sufficient to produce the sentence as evidence of the condemnation relied on; but the Court is pressed, on this occasion, with many necessary inquiries which do not usually occur. If the condemnation is to operate as a conclusive bar against the exercise of the restoring power of this Court, so essential to the maintenance of the laws, treaties, neutrality, and morals of the country, it has a right to be informed whether their violation was ever the subject of inquiry before the Court which pronounced the condemnation: it has a right to ascertain whether there was a commission, and by whom the commission was granted; for if granted by an individual, or a people neither recognized as a sovereign state, nor as engaged in a civil war, the condemnation would, on these grounds alone, be wholly inoperative. In such a case the Court will require the entire prize proceedings to be exhibited; but if not, then at least the libel, in addition to the sentence. Here is neither the libel nor an abstract of proof, and the sentence itself is uncommonly bald. The rule on this subject formerly was, that the entire proceedings should be set forth: now, however, if the libel and sentence are satisfactory, the Court dispenses with any thing further." The libel, it would a Mar. Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 207. 220. 1822. The Barcelones. appear, is essential: In Fernandis v. Da Casta, Lord Mansfield dispensed with the libel, only because the plaintiff had, by an unequivocal act of his Arrogante own, made it unnecessary to be exhibited. So, also, in the case of Beake v. Tyrrel, the necessity of furnishing the Court with the material grounds of the prize proceedings, is strongly urged by Lord Chief Justice HOLT. If we advert to the general principles of the common law on this subject, we shall find it an established principle, that wherever a record is relied all that concerns the matter in question must be produced. The authorities cited are pointed to this effect." No case can well be imagined in which the necessity of showing the grounds and extent of the proceeding more strongly applies than in the present for it does not appear that Almeida had any commission; and if this be the fact, no condemnation would avail, were it ever so well authenticated." on, 2. But were the condemnation satisfactorily proved, it is contended that it was pronounced by a Court wholly incompetent to adjudicate on the case; that the whole proceeding was coram non judice; and that it appertains to all Courts to inquire into the jurisdiction of another Court, whose judgments or decrees are relied on. It is presumed that under the jus gentium an operative sentence of condemnation must be pronounced: either, first, by a Court of the a Park on Ins. 177. 178. b Comber. 120. IBELO c 3 Inst. 173. Trial per Pais. 166. 2 Bac. Abr. Evid. F. p. 611. 613. d 2 Bro. Civ. Law, 55. 1822. The Barcelones. captor, sitting in the country of the captor; or, secondly, by a Court of the captor, held in the country of an Arrogante ally or co-belligerent of the captor; but that the Courts of the ally or co-belligerent are wholly incompetent to hold plea of captures made by any one but themselves. The question is entirely new; and it is believed to be so only because it was never before attempted by the Courts of an ally to pass sentence on captures made by their associates in war. That allies and co-belligerents can co-operate judicially as well as in a belligerent manner, is a position not to be found in the works or opinions of any writer. Condemnations in the port of an ally or co-belligerent are frequent; but no case can be produced of a condemnation in the Court of an ally. No elementary writer mentions this exercise of judicial power of an ally. Dr. Brown has been evidently misapprehended by the appellant's counsel. That sensible, though hasty, and sometimes inaccurate writer, has not expressed himself, in the passages cited, as clearly as he might have done; but still he does not speak of the Courts of an ally condemning property taken by a companion in arms. He speaks of ships carried into the ports of an ally, and there condemned; but he does not state by whom condemned. It is, therefore, but justice to him to infer that he meant a Court of the captors established in the territory of the ally in the war; and that this, and nothing else, is his meaning, is obvious from the authorities which he cites. All the cases in support of the condemnation now in judgment, will be found, on examination, to be de a 2 Bro. Civ. Law, 215. 257. 281. |