1822. The Barcelones. guage of this Court, when about to restore the prize, if a condemnation were presented with a view of Arrogante closing all inquiry as to the violation of our territory? We apprehend it would be to this effect. In regard to France, your enemy, the capture is rightful; your condemnation pronounces it such; but in the present inquiry a third party is interested. Your possession of this vessel was gained by an abuse of our asylum, and an infraction of our territorial jurisdiction: as we have now the possession of the corpus, we restore it to those from whom yon have, as to this country, illegally taken it. If such would be the language of this Court, in the case of a gross violation of our territory, I apprehend the same reply will be given to Almeida, who has not only violated all the laws enacted for the preservation of our neutrality, but has, also, grossly abused the asylum accorded to the privateers of the South American provinces. If these vessels, in the use of that asylum, completely equip themselves with our arms, ammunition, and men, and all is to be rendered valid, or at least inscrutable, by a formal condemnation, all legislation on the subject of neutrality is but public and solemn mockery. If this condemnation be a conclusive bar against all inquiry as to the violation of our laws, the competency of the power granting the commission, the competency of the person receiving the commission, &c. it is manifest that Venezuela, Buenos Ayres, or any of these new formed sovereignties, may compel us, through the instrumentality of a condemnation, to accord to them the rights of sovereignty to every ex tent. In such case, captures made under the commission of Aury, or Artigas, would be equally operative with those granted by powers acknowledged to be independent, or engaged in a civil war, and the doctrine of Rose v. Himely, and the distinction taken in Palmer's case, and that of the Estrella, would be of no avail. Nay, even in the case of seizures clearly piratical, the 6th and 14th articles of our treaty with Spain would be effectually annulled. Again; all inquiry into the fact of the violation of our laws, and its civil as well as penal consequences, belongs exclusively to the tribunals of this country. The Courts of other nations have no right to pronounce a binding judgment as to the validity or invalidity of any act against our civil, political, or criminal laws: the right to vindicate our own laws is essential and inherent: it is a sovereign right, which we have not parted with to the tribunals of other nations. If the decrees or judgments of those tribunals come in collision with our laws, the Courts of this country must pursue their even way, and enforce those laws, without any reference either to the laws or judgments of a foreign state. Passive obedience to the decisions of foreign tribunals has been sufficiently inculcated; but no attempt has ever been made of so exceptionable a character as this: to require this Court not only to yield to the demands of foreign violators of our laws and sovereignty, but also to the insolent requisitions of our own criminal citizens." a 2 Azuni, 252. 1 H. Bl. 123. 2 H. Bl. 410. 1821. The Arrogante Barcelones. 1822 The Barcelones. To give force to this condemnation, is, in fact, to call on this Court to enforce the decree of a foreign Arrogante Court. A Court, thus called on, always claims the privilege of examining into the jurisdiction of the Court pronouncing the decree, the regularity of its judicial proceedings, and the intended extent of its operation. It cannot be denied, that if a privateer, or even a public vessel of war, of a foreign power, be fitted out in our ports, her commission can protect neither her nor her prizes from the sanctions of our law. Why then should a condemnation, which is but the exercise of another species of sovereign power, place the property in a state of absolute immunity? The position taken on the other side, that decrees of a Court of competent jurisdiction are always binding, and exclude all inquiry, is far from sound. The general doctrine is well known, but its extent and its exceptions are equally well known. Secondly: But this Court may decree restitution, without in any degree impugning the doctrine of the conclusiveness of admiralty sentences. If the postulate be allowed, that the restoring power of this Court rest exclusively on the ground of violated neutrality, then the prize Court had no right to, and never did, in fact, institute any inquiry relative to the illegality of the equipment, in reference to our laws; that is an inquiry competent for this Court solely. There is another inquiry, competent solely for the Courts of the captors, viz. the fact of the capture, and its conformity to prize regulations and the jus belli. These are distinct rights, in the exercise of 1822. The Barcelones. which neither tribunal is called on to pronounce on any matter not essential to be proved in order to justify a decision. The taking was rightful, in regard to the Arrogante belligerents, though our laws were violated, and its restitution by this tribunal will be equally so, though the seizure be valid qua prize. In this point of view, there is no collision between the two tribunals; the decree of each stands, valeat quantum valere potest. No judgment or decree establishes any thing beyond what was necessarily proved in order to arrive at the decision. The sentence, at most, proves nothing but its own correctness in regard to the mere question of prize. All the cases, where condemnations are relied on, have a qualification to this extent. The sentence in this case pronounces that the property was Spanish, and is condemned as good prize. It does not state, either affirmatively or negatively, one word about the equipment of the privateer; and it cannot, therefore, be even prima facie evidence that the privateer had proceeded legally in regard to the whole world. Where a vessel is captured by a belligerent, for unneutral conduct, a condemnation would be conclusive; she was condemned on this sole ground, and she could not be restored by the Courts of the neutral nation, without falsifying the very fact on which the capture and condemnation proceeded. But here the possession will be restored to the Spanish owners, not qua prize, but simply on the ground that the use of our neutral means in making the a Maley v. Shattuck, 3 Cranch 458. 488. 126. 142. 1 Campb. N. P. Cas. 419. 2 Bro. Civ. and Adm. Law. 121. The Mary, 9 Cranch, 1822. The Arrogante Barcelones. capture, was a matter in which the prize Court of Juan Griego had no concern. As a capture in violation of neutral territory is still valid, in regard to the contending parties, the capture, in a belligerent Court, would be omni exceptione major. Spain, in the present case, would in vain have set up the violation of our laws as a defence, and the United States had no persona standi in judicio. A suggestion of violated neutrality, on behalf of this country, would not have been regarded. Adverting, for a moment, to the grounds on which the doctrine of conclusiveness is said to rest, we shall find that none of them would be impeached by the the restoration of this property. They are said to be three comity, notice to all the world, and the coequality of nations. As to the doctrine of comity, it is founded on the supposition of the utmost good faith, and there must be a perfect reciprocity in order to support it. Is it not too much to require of any nation, on the ground of comity, to permit foreign powers to confederate with the worst class of our people, in insulting and trampling on our solemn treaties, neutral obligations, and explicit laws of public policy? But it is supposed to be a second ground of this doctrine of conclusiveness, that the whole world have notice, and are parties to the proceedings in a prize Court, they being in rem. This, if true in fact, only applies to those who have a title or interest in the res ipsa, and not to those who have such a collateral, incidental, or potential right as that of the United |