ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub
[blocks in formation]

43

CASES COMMENTED ON.
1. Penalty on liquidated damages.
Fletcher v. Dycke, 2 T. R. 32.
distinguished from Tayloe v.
Sandiford,
18
2. Commitment for contempt. Cros-
by, Lord Mayor of London, 3
Wils. 188. confirmed in Ex parte
Kearney,
3. Lien of vendor for u paid pur-
chase money, various cases on
the subject of, commented on,
distinguished, confirmed, or
overruled, in Bailey v. Green-
leaf,
51. 57
4. Local Law. Decision of this
Court in Matthews v. Zane, 5
Cranch, 92. revised and con-
firmed in S. C.
208
5. Conclusiveness of decree. Brown
v. Gilman ante, vol. IV. p. 255.
reconciled with Brown v. Jack-

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

4. Quare, Whether the lien can
be asserted against the assignees
of a bankrupt, or other credi-
tors coming in under the pur-
chaser by act of law? Id. 50
5. The dictum of Sugden, in his
Law of Vendors, 364. examined,
and questioned. Id.
50
6. It is a rule, both of law and
equity, that a party must re-
cover on the strength of his own
title, and not on the weakness of
his adversary's. Watts v. Lind-
sey's heirs,
158. 161
7. The decree must conform to the
allegations in the pleadings, as
well as the proofs in the cause.
Crocket v. Lee,
522. 525

See LOCAL LAW, 3. 28, 29, 30.
PRACTICE, 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. This Court has authority to issue
a habeas corpus, where a person
is imprisoned under the warrant
or order of any other Court of
the United States. Ex parte
Kearney,
2. But this Court has no appellate

38. 41

41

jurisdiction in criminal cases,
confided to it by the laws of the
United States, and cannot revise
the judgments of the Circuit
Courts, by writ of error, in any
case where a party has been
convicted of a public offence.
Id.
41
3. Hence the Court will not grant
a habeas corpus, where a party
has been committed for a con-
tempt adjudged by a Court of
competent jurisdiction. Id. 41
4. In such a case, this Court will
not inquire into the sufficiency
of the cause of commitment. Id.
41
5. The case of Crosby, Lord Mayor
of London, 3 Wils. 188. com-
mented on, and its authority
confirmed. Id.
6. A commitment for a contempt
by a Court of competent juris-
diction, in the exercise of its ju-
risdiction, is conclusive, and can-
not be inquired into in any other
tribunal. Id.
7. Where a party claiming title to
lands under an act of Congress,
brought a bill for a conveyance,
and stated several equitable cir-
cumstances in aid of his title,
and the State Court where the
suit was brought having dis-
missed the bill, and the cause
being brought to this Court by
appeal, under the 25th sec. of
the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20.,
upon the ground of an alleged
misconstruction of the act of
Congress under which the title
was claimed, by the State Court:
Held, that this Court could not
take into consideration any dis-
tinct equity arising out of the
contracts or transactions of the
parties, and creating a new and
independent title, but was con-
fined to an examination of the
plaintiff's title as depending upon.

41.

the construction of the act of
Congress. Matthews v. Lane,
164. 206
8. Note on the extent of the appel-
late jurisdiction of this Court in
cases arising in the State Courts
under the constitution, treaties,
and laws of the Union. Note a.
206

See JURISDICTION.

COVENANT.

1. In general, a sum of money in
gross, to be paid for the non-
performance of an agreement,
is considered as a penalty, and
not as liquidated damages. Tay-
loe v. Sandiford,
13 17
2. A fortiori, when it is expressly
reserved as a penalty. Id. 17
3. Thus, where in a building con-
tract, the following covenant was
contained: "The said houses
to be completely finished on or
before the 24th of December
next, under a penalty of 1000
dollars, in case of failure;" it
was held, that this was not in-
tended as liquidated damages for
the breach of that single cove-
nant only, but applied to all the
covenants made by the same
party in that agreement; that it
was in the nature of a penalty,
and could not be set off in an ac-
tion brought by the party to re-
cover the price of the work. Id.

[blocks in formation]

D

DEED.

6. And it must also appear that the
party found in possession enter-
ed without right; for if his entry
were congeable, or his posses-
sion lawful, his entry and pos-
session will be considered as
limited by his right.

The doctrine of estoppel, or the
principle of legal policy, which
forbids a party from denying the
title under which he has re-
ceived a conveyance, does not
apply as between vendor and
vendee, especially where the See DEED.
latter has not received posses-
sion from the former. Blight's
lessee v. Rochester, 535. 547
See EJECTMENT, EVIDENCE, FRaud.

E

EJECTMENT.

1. Possession of land by a party,
claiming it as his own in fee, is
prima facie evidence of his
ownership and seisin of the
inheritance. Ricard v. Wil-
liams,
59. 105
2. But possession alone, unexplain-
ed by collateral circumstances,
which show the quality and ex-
tent of the interest claimed, evi-
dences no more than the mere
fact of present occupation by
right. Id.

105
3. But if the party be in under ti-
tle, and by mistake of law sup-
poses himself possessed of a less
estate than really belongs to
him, the law will remit him to
his full right and title. Id. 106
4. It is a general rule that a dis-
seisor cannot qualify his own
wrong, but must be considered
as a disseisor in fee. Id.
5. But this rule is introduced only
for the benefit of the disseisee,
for the sake of electing his re-
medy.

107

lb.

ESTOPPEL.

EVIDENCE.

16.

1. Presumptions of a grant, ari-
sing from the lapse of time, are
applied to corporeal, as well as
incorporeal hereditaments. Ri-
card v. Williams, 59. 109
2. They may be encountered and
rebutted by contrary presump-
tions, and can never arise where
all the circumstances are per-
fectly consistent with the non-
existence of a grant. Id. 109
3. A fortiori, they cannot arise
where the claim is of such a na-
ture as is at variance with the
supposition of a grant. Id. 110
4. In general, the presumption of
a grant is limited to periods ana-
logous to those of the statute of
limitations, in cases where the
statute does not apply. Id. 110
5. Where the statute applies, the
presumption is not generally re-
sorted to: but if the circum-
stances of the case are very co-
gent, and require it, a grant may
be presumed within a period
short of the statute. Id. 110
6. Under the laws of Massachusetts

and Connecticut, the power of
an administrator to sell the real
estate of bis intestate, under an
order of the Court of Probates,
must be exercised within a rea-
sonable time after the death of
the intestate. Id.
115

7. The case of such a power to sell
is not within the purview of the
statute of limitations of Connec-
ticut, which limits all rights of
entry and action to fifteen years
after the title accrues; but the
reasonable time, within which
the power must be exercised, is
to be fixed by analogy to that
statute. Id.
8. One heir, notwithstanding his
entry as heir, may afterwards,
by disseisin of his co-heirs, ac-
quire an exclusive possession,
upon which the statute will run
both against his co-heirs and
against creditors. Id. 120
9. An heir may claim an estate by

117

title distinct or paramount to that
of his ancestor; and if his pos-
session is exclusive under such
claim, against all other persons,
until the statute period has run,
he is entitled to the protection of
the bar. Id.

121

10. A person having an interest only
in the question, and not in the
event of the suit, is a competent
witness. Evans v. Eaton, 356.
421

11. In general, the liability of a wit-

ness to a like action, or his
standing in the same predica-
ment with the party sued, if the
verdict cannot be given in evi-
dence for or against him, is an
interest in the question, and
does not exclude him. Id. 424
12. Where a deposition has once
been read in evidence without
opposition, it cannot be after-
wards objected to as being ir-
regularly taken. Evans v. Het-
tich,
13. It is no objection to the compe-
tency or credibility of a witness,
that he is subject to fits of de-
rangement, if he is sane at the
time of giving his testimony.

Id.

453

470

14. The doctrine that if witnesses
concur in proof of a material
fact, they ought to be believed
in respect to that fact, whatever
may be the other contradictions
in their testimony, ought to be
received under many qualifica-
tions and with great caution.
The Santissima Trinidad, 338
15. Application of the maxim, falsus
in uno, falsus in omnibus. Id.

339
16. The decisions of the board of
Commissioners under the acts of
Congress providing for the in-
demnification of claimants to
public lands in the Mississippi
Territory, (commonly called
the Yazoo lands,) are conclu-
sive between the parties in all
cases within the jurisdiction of
the Commissioners. Brown v.
Jackson,
218. 237
17. This determination reconciled
with that of the Court in Brown
v. Gilman, ante, vol. IV. p. 255.
.p..
Id.
240
18. The practice of the State Courts

cannot sanction the admission of
depositions in the Courts of the
United States, which are not
taken according to the laws of
the United States, and the rules
of their Courts. Evans v. Ea-
ton,
426

F
FRAUD.

1. A debtor has a right to prefer
one creditor to another in pay-
ment, and his private motives
for giving the preference can-
not affect the exercise of the
right, if the preferred creditor
has done nothing improper to
procure it. Marbury v. Brooks,
565

2. But any unlawful consideration,
moving from the preferred

[blocks in formation]
[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

te

[ocr errors]

that

ation. Id.

577

2. But p' it be invalidated by the
ed F
the trustee, to whom
'wh
conveyance is made, being
father in-law of the debtor,
received the conveyance with a
view of concealing the felony,
and preventing a prosecution of
his son-in-law, provided it was
not executed wth the concur-
rence of the cestui que trusts,
and a knowledge on their part
of the motives which influenced
the trustee, or was not after-
wards assented to by them un-
der some engagement to sup-
press the prosecution. Id. 579

I
INSURANCE.

1. Under a policy containing the
following clause: "And lastly,

.3.

Co.

[ocr errors]

en
insu-
by a regu-
unsoundness at

ent period of the
scharged the under-
Dorr v. The Pacific
581

An exemplification of a condem-
nation of the vessel in a foreign
Court of Vice Admiralty, reci-
ting the certificate of surveyors,
that the vessel was unworthy of
being repaired, and unsafe and
unfit ever to go to sea again, and
produced in evidence by the in-
sured to prove the loss, is "a
regular survey," in the lan-
guage of the above clause. Id.
581

3. But the survey must correspond
with the contract, and if the
vessel be declared unseaworthy
for any additional cause, besides
being "unsound or rotten," it
is not conclusive evidence of un-
seaworthiness Id.
581

J

JUDGMENT.

See EVIDENCE, 16. 17.
PRIZE, 11, 12. 17.

JURISDICTION. ·

A writ of errror lies from this
Court, upon a judgment of the
Circuit Courts awarding a pe-
remptory mandamus. The Co

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »