it cannot be exercised without a bona fide change of domicil, and can never be asserted as a cover for fraud, or to justify a crime against the country, or any violation of its laws. Id. 348 8. An augmentation of force or il- legal outfit within the neutral territory only affects captures made during the cruize for which such augmentation or outfit was made. Id. 348 9. Captures by public ships, as well as by privateers, if made in violation of our neutrality, are subject to restitution. Id.
350 10. Case of the Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116. distinguished from this case. Id. 11. Quære, How far a condemnation as prize in the Court of the cap- tor's country will oust the ju- risdiction of a neutral tribunal, proceeding in rem against the captured property for a viola- tion of the neutral jurisdiction? ld. 12, Such a condemnation will not oust the jurisdiction of the neu- tral tribunal, which has custody of the res capta, before its con- demnation in the Court of the captor. Id. 355 13. Prizes made by armed vessels which have violated the statutes for preserving the neutrality of the United States, will be re- stored if brought into our ports. The Gran Paru, 471, 486 14. But this Court has never deci- ded that the offence adheres to the vessel under whatever change of circumstances that may take place, nor that it cap- not be deposited at the termina- tion of the cruize, in preparing
for which it was committed; but if this termination be merely colourable, and the vessel was originally equipped with the in- tention of being employed on the cruize, during which the capture was made, the delictum is not purged. Id. 487 A question of fact respecting the proprietary interest in prize goods, captured by an armed vessel fitted out in violation of the statutes of neutrality of the United States. Restitution to the original Spanish owners de- creed. Id. 490 16. This Court will restore to the former owners property captu- red in violation of the neutrali- ty of the United States, where it is claimed by the original wrong-doer, though it may have come back to his possession after a regular condemnation as prize. The Arrogante Barcelones, 496.
Quære, How far a condemnation would protect the title of a third person, being a bona fide pur- chaser, without notice, in such a case? Id. 519
In cases where a condemnation is relied on, the libel as well as the sentence must be produced. The Nereyda, Note a, 519 19. In such cases, the claimant must show by competent evidence that he was a bona fide pur- chaser for a valuable considera- tion. Id. 519 20. A question of fact upon the bona fides of an alleged sale of Portu- guese ships, and their cargoes, which had been captured in violation of our neutrality. Res- titution to the original owners fecreed. The Monte Allegre,
2. Commitment for contempt. Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, 3 Wils. 188. confirmed in Ex parte Kearney,
43 3. Lien of vendor for u paid purchase money, various cases on the subject of, commented on, distinguished, confirmed, overruled, in Bailey v. Greenleaf, 51. 57 4. Local Law Decision of this Court in Matthews v. Zane, 5 Cranch, 92. revised and confirmed in S. C.
208 5. Conclusiveness of decree. Brown v. Gilman ante, vol. IV. p. 255. reconciled with Brown v. Jack
commented on and confirmed in Macker's heirs v. Thomas, 531
1. The vendor of real property, who has not taken a separate security for the purchase money, has a lien for it, on the land, as against the vendee and his heirs. Bailey v. Greenleaf, 46, 50 2. This lien is defeated by an alienation to a bona fide purchaser without notice. Id. 50 3. Nor can it be asserted against creditors holding under a bona fide conveyance from the vendee. Id.
4. Quare, Whether the lien can be asserted against the assignees of a bankrupt, or other creditors coming in under the purchaser by act of law? Id. 50 5. The dictum of Sugden, in his Law of Vendors, 364. examined, and questioned. Id. 6. It is a rule, both of law and equity, that a party must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of his adversary's. Watts v. Lindsey's heirs, 158. 161 7. The decree must conform to the allegations in the pleadings, as well as the proofs in the cause. Crocket v. Lee, 522. 525
See LOCAL LAW, 3. 28, 29, 30. PRACTICE, 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. This Court has authority to issue a habeas corpus, where a person is imprisoned under the warrant or order of any other Court of the United States. Kearney, 2. But this Court has no appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, confided to it by the laws of the United States, and cannot revise the judgments of the Circuit Courts, by writ of error, in any case where a party has been convicted of a public offence.
Id. 3. Hence the Court will not grant a habeas corpus, where a party has been committed for a contempt adjudged by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Id. 41 4. In such a case, this Court will not inquire into the sufficiency of the cause of commitment. Id. 41 5. The case of Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, 3 Wils. 188. commented on, and its authority confirmed. Id. 6. A commitment for a contempt by a Court of competent jurisdiction, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, is conclusive, and canany other not be inquired into in tribunal. Id. 7. Where a party claiming title to lands under an act of Congress, brought a bill for a conveyance, and stated several equitable circumstances in aid of his title, and the State Court where the suit was brought having dismissed the bill, and the cause being brought to this Court by appeal, under the 25th sec. of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20., upon the ground of an alleged misconstruction of the act of Congress under which the title was claimed, by the State Court: Held, that this Court could not take into consideration any distinct equity arising out of the contracts or transactions of the parties, and creating a new and independent title, but was confined to an examination of the plaintiff's title as depending upon
the construction of the act of Congress. Matthews v. Lane, 164. 206 8. Note on the extent of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in cases arising in the State Courts under the constitution, treaties, and laws of the Union. Note a. 206
1. In general, a sum of money in gross, to be paid for the non- performance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty, and not as liquidated damages. Tay- loe v. Sandiford, 2. A fortiori, when it is expressly reserved as a penalty. Id. 17 3. Thus, where in a building con- tract, the following covenant was contained: "The said houses to be completely finished on or before the 24th of December next, under a penalty of 1000 dollars, in case of failure ;" it was held, that this was not in- tended as liquidated damages for the breach of that single cove- nant only, but applied to all the covenants made by the same party in that agreement; that it was in the nature of a penalty, and could not be set off in an ac- tion brought by the party to re- 17 cover the price of the work. Id.
4. An agreement to perform cer- tain work within a limited time, under a certain penalty, is not to be construed as liquidating the damages which the party is 17 to pay for the breach of his co- Id. venant. 5. The case of Fletcher v Dycke, 2 Term Rep. 32. commented on, and distinguished from the pre- sent. Id.
6. And it must also appear that the party found in possession enter- ed without right; for if his entry were congeable, or his posses- sion lawful, his entry and pos- session will be considered as limited by his right.
The doctrine of estoppel, or the principle of legal policy, which forbids a party from denying the title under which he has re- ceived a conveyance, does not apply as between vendor and vendee, especially where the See DEED. latter has not received posses- sion from the former.
See EJECTMENT, EVIDENCE, FRAUD.
1. Possession of land by a party, claiming it as his own in fee, is prima facie evidence of his ownership and seisin of the inheritance. Ricard v. Wil- liams, 59. 105 2. But possession alone, unexplain-
ed by collateral circumstances, which show the quality and ex- tent of the interest claimed, evi- dences no more than the mere fact of present occupation by right. Id. 105 3. But if the party be in under ti- tle, and by mistake of law sup- poses himself possessed of a less estate than really belongs to him, the law will remit him to his full right and title. Id. 106 4. It is a general rule that a dis- seisor cannot qualify his own wrong, but must be considered as a disseisor in fee. Id. 107 5. But this rule is introduced only for the benefit of the disseisee, for the sake of electing his re- medy.
1. Presumptions of a grant, ari- sing from the lapse of time, are applied to corporeal, as well as incorporeal hereditaments. Ri- card v. Williams, 59. 109 2. They may be encountered and rebutted by contrary presump- tions, and can never arise where all the circumstances are per- fectly consistent with the non- existence of a grant. Id. 109 3. A fortiori, they cannot arise where the claim is of such a na- ture as is at variance with the supposition of a grant. Id. 110 4. In general, the presumption of
a grant is limited to periods ana- logous to those of the statute of limitations, in cases where the statute does not apply. Id. 110 5. Where the statute applies, the presumption is not generally re- sorted to : but if the circum- stances of the case are very co- gent, and require it, a grant may be presumed within a period short of the statute. Id. 110 6. Under the laws of Massachusetts and Connecticut, the power of an administrator to sell the real estate of bis intestate, under an order of the Court of Probates, must be exercised within a rea- sonable time after the death of the intestate.
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