have been entitled, the grant of his father notwithstanding: and consistent with the possession taken at William's death, by his son Joseph, under whom we claim. This presumption would support and confirm a title, under a possession of fifty-three years. Any other would shake and unsettle titles which have, for half a century, been considered as good and valid. If this grant be presumed from Thomas to William, then, according to the law of Connecticut referred to, Joseph, being the issue of William, the first donee, was the tenant in fee of the premises; and the plaintiff in error, being his grantee, is also the tenant in fee of them. It was stated by the learned judge, in his charge to the jury, that as William had been so long in possession, the jury might presume a grant to him from his co-heir, in order to support that possession. But the nature of William's possession, the claim under which he must be presumed to have taken that possession, must be judged of according to the state of things at the time when he took the possession. He must be presumed to have continued in possession by the same right under which he originally claimed to enter into it, until it be shown that he acquired another right. Now, when William entered, upon the death of his father, in 1769, I have already shown, that he entered under some claim of right, distinct and different from that of heir at law. He cannot be presumed to have entered as grantee of his co-heirs at law, because such grant could not be made; he was not only an infant himself, but his brothers and 1822. Ricard V, Williams. 1822. Ricard V. Williams. sisters were all infants still younger than he was. As then when he entered, claiming the whole of this property as his own, William could have had no grant from his co-heirs; and as his possession must be presumed to have continued under the same claim of title under which he originally entered, it seems to be a presumption against all law, that he ever had a grant from his co-heirs. It is a well established rule that the declarations of a person in possession of land as to his title are evidence against him and all persons claiming under him. In this case, we have the declarations of William Dudley, under whom the demandants claim, made while in possession of the land, that he held it for life only, and that after his death it would descend to his eldest son. If, then, declarations are evidence against all claiming under William, they, of course, are evidence against the demandants, and show that William never had any thing but an estate for life in the premises in question which expired with him; and there was no interest left which the administrator could sell after his death. In this view of the case, it is immaterial how long William's possession continued. It was a possession under a claim of an estate for life, and the possession was commensurate with the claim. As I have already shown that the plaintiff's title rests wholly on William's possession, and as William never pretended to any possession but for life, there can be now no title in the demandant. Presumptions are often made to support old claims of title accompanied by a long possession; but it is new doctrine that a possession under a claim of an estate for life gives a fee. It appears by the record, that immediately after the death of William Dudley, in 1786, Joseph, his eldest son, entered into possession of the premises by his guardian, and, afterwards, by himself, taking the whole rents and profits, and claiming the lands as his own, and continued in the exclusive possession thereof, holding all others out, until he sold the land in 1811 and 1812, when his grantees entered as owners, and continued to hold until this action in 1819. If, then, a possession of seventeen years in William gave him a title which is a sufficient ground of recovery for the demandant, why is it that a possession of thirty-three years in Joseph, and those claiming under him, does not give a good title to the defendants? The reason assigned by the demandants why this possession should not avail the defendants is, that William died in possession, and the possession of Joseph was but the continuance of William's possession, a part of the same title, and that title is subject to be sold for the payment of William's debts. But if the possession taken by Joseph was a possession taken under a claim adverse to the claim of a fee in William, then it would seem to follow as an inevitable consequence, that the possession of Joseph, and those claiming under him, would give them a good title. William died intestate, and left seven children. Joseph, the eldest, then being an infant, all these children, by the law of Connecticut, were his 1822. Ricard V. Williams. 1822. Ricard Williams. heirs at law. Joseph, however, entered into the exclusive possession of the whole of the premises, "keeping all others out." He did not, then, enter as heir at law, but he entered denying the rights of the heirs at law he entered, therefore, under a claim of title adverse to them, and, of course, adverse to the claim of a fee now set up in William, his father. There can, in this case, be no presumption of a grant from his co-heirs when he entered, because they were infants of very tender years when he entered. But not only can no grant be presumed from them to Joseph, but the record contains upon its face evidence that no such grant was ever made by them. The plaintiffs proved, that in 1811, two of the brothers claimed to be entitled to a portion of the property, which, at all events, shows that they had never granted it to Joseph. Inasmuch, then, as Joseph entered and continued in possession, claiming title, which title was adverse to any claim in the heirs at law of William, to any claim of the fee in William; and as this possession continued for thirty years, uninterrupted and undisturbed, it gave to Joseph, and to those claiming under him, a full and complete right to retain the possession against all the world. We have, in this possession of Joseph, exclusively taken and held by him, and so long acquiesced in by others, not only evidence of the opinion of his guardian, founded doubtless upon a knowledge of the title at the time, and of his own opinion of the title, but we have, by their acquiescence, and by the ad mission of his co-heirs that they had no right, and the admission of the creditors, for the payment of whose debts these lands have now been sold to the demandants, evidence that William, their debtor, had no estate of inheritance in the premises which could descend to his heirs, or be liable for his debts. How else are we to account for their conduct in relation to these lands? That William possessed them was notorious. The demandants, upon the trial, proved that they had always been known by the name of the Dudley lands, which consisted of a large tract, situate in Connecticut and Massachusetts. If, then, the creditors of William Dudley had believed that he had been seised in fee of the lands, and that they were, therefore, liable for his debts, how is their conduct to be accounted for in suffering their lands to go into possession of Joseph, as his own, and continue there twenty-eight years before they took a single step to enforce the lien which they had upon the lands? When William died these creditors knew their rights, and no doubt knew his title papers might at that time have been produced to show what were the respective estates of William and Joseph in the premises. If, then, the creditors had not been conscious that William did not own the fee of the lands, they never would have remained so long quiet, seeing another enjoy the lands, and taking the rents and profits. 3. By the statute of Connecticut, no person has a right of entry into lands, but within fifteen years next after his right or title shall first descend or accrue, with the usual savings. It is contended, that 1822. Ricard V. Williams. |