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the statute." If there were in fact any grant from the brothers and sisters of William, it is more reasonable to suppose such grant made to Joseph. If we admit, then, that the same length of possession by a parcener, would bar one of his co-parceners as would bar others, still William, having entered in 1769, would not bar any of his co-heirs, by possession, until 1784; but in the latter year the greater number of his brothers and sisters were still either minors, or within the five years' saving of the statute in favour of minors, and to be allowed after they came of full age. So that there is no ground whatever, on which it is possible to presume a grant to William from his brothers and sisters.

There is then a double difficulty in supporting the instruction, which was given to the jury. 1st. Because they were told, that they might presume a grant to William in fee, when the whole possession, taken together, was shown to be incompatible with the existence of such a grant. And, 2dly. Because they were instructed they might presume a grant to William, from his brothers and sisters, in a case in which the statute of limitations would apply, if they had not been within its exception as minors. The jury were farther instructed, that William might have claimed an estate for life in the premises by mistake, and that such mistake ought not to defeat his title by possession. I agree, that if it appeared, that he had an estate in fee, his mistake ought not to prejudice him; but that not appearing, there is no evidence of

a Cowp. 114.

any mistake whatever.

All the evidence, which

shows that he had any title at all, shows such title to be only to an estate for life, and there is no ground to presume any mistake.

2. The remaining general question is, whether, supposing William D. to have died possessed of an estate in fee, the demandants are entitled to recover in the present action?

Here has existed a possession of 33 years in Joseph, and those claiming under him. The judge instructed the jury, that, as against the creditors of William, supposing him to have died possessed of the land in fee, neither Joseph, nor those claiming under him, had gained title by possession. There can be no doubt this ought to be considered an adverse possession. Every possession is adverse where there are circumstances to destroy a presumption, that the defendant is in under the plaintiff's title. There is no ground to presume that Joseph entered into possession, intending to hold subject to the incumbrance of William's debts: especially, as there were strong reasons to suppose he entered claiming a title in himself, not derived from his father. It seems clear, that this length of possession would have barred William Dudley himself, if he had lived. If he had conveyed on the day of his death, it would have barred his grantee. If he had devised the lands, it would have barred the devisee. If he had mortgaged, it would have barred the mortgagee. If he had mortgaged for the payment of this very debt, the creditor

a Jackson v. Todd, 2 Caines' Rep. 183.

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and mortgagee would have been long since barred by the adverse possession of Joseph, and those claiming under him. The doctrine contended for on the other side goes to give more permanency to a general unknown lien, than to a well known and specific lien. A mortgage deed is registered, and may be known but where are debts registered? How is a stranger to know any thing of them? In the present case, a creditor, twenty-eight years after the death of his debtor, causes letters of administration of his estate to be taken out, proves his debt, or gets it confessed, and attempts to enforce his general lien as creditor on the debtor's land, after this lapse of time, against bona fide purchasers buying without notice of the claim. To permit this would be opposed to justice and equity, and to the whole policy of the law. If twenty-eight years will not bar such a claim, what lapse of time will bar it? or is it to be perpetual? The general mischiefs of such a doctrine are obvious. It would disturb titles to a very great extent. No man could buy with any security. The defendant in this case has, of course, no means of contesting the existence or amount of the debt. That question is settled between other parties; and although from lapse of time, all debts would be presumed to be paid, yet, if the administrator, who in such cases is generally the agent of the creditor, desires to admit the debt, the tenant of the land cannot dispute it. This renders it absolutely indispensable, for the security and safety of purchasers, that liens of this nature should be enforced promptly, or in reasonable time after the debtor's decease. No system could answer the com

mon purposes of justice, which should allow a creditor to come on the land for his debt, at any time, and in whosoever hands he might find it. The courts of Massachusetts have expressed the opinion, that a creditor, by unreasonable neglect and delay, in pursuing his remedy, should be deemed to waive his lien on the land; and have very clearly intimated that in ascertaining what neglect ought to be considered as unreasonable, they should be governed by the analogy of the statute of limitations." They have also decided that the estate should not be sold, if the creditor's demand be barred by the act limiting actions against administrators and executors; and that if the administrator pay the debt himself, and then lie by till it would have been barred, he shall not indemnify himself by charging it on the land.‘

In this case there is great reason for following the analogy of the statute of limitations. The words of the Connecticut statute are the same as those of the English, except as to the number of years. "No person shall make entry into lands, &c., but within fifteen years next after his right or title shall descend or accrue." This is descriptive of the title under which he enters, and does not regard the time of his own accession to that title. In the case of Beach v. Catlin, it would seem to be intimated by one of the

a Gore v. Brazer, 3 Mass. Rep. 542. Wyman v. Brigden, 4 Mass. Rep. 150.

b Scott v. Hancock, 13 Mass. Rep. 162. Allen v. Strong, 15 Mass. Rep. 58.

© 4 Duys Rep. 284.

B

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learned judges, that a judgment creditor, coming into the land by extending his judgment on it, is in under a new title, and that, as to him, the statute runs only from the time of the execution of the writ. That case is understood to have been relied upon as applicable to this, in the Court below. It would be difficult, I think, to support it; for supposing that a judgment can be extended on lands, of which the judgment debtor is not in possession, but which are in possession of another holding adversely to him, it would seem that he could derive no higher right, or better title than his debtor had, and must hold under him. This would not be the accruing of a new title in the judgment creditor, but merely a transfer or devolution of an existing title. It is no more a new title than if he had acquired it by deed of conveyance. Perhaps it would not be going too far, in the case now before the Court, to hold the demandants within the words of the statute, on a liberal construction, as having a right to enter, being creditors, on the death of their debtor, insolvent; for although the right was not perfect, they could make it perfect whenever they pleased. They could as well have caused letters of administration to be taken out in 1784, as in 1814. But because this may be, I contend the present case is within the principle of the cases which have been decided by the analogy of the statute of limitations, and on grounds of public policy. It is well known that many cases which are not within the letter of the statute, are construed to be within it by analogy. The statute, for instance, does not apply, in terms, to proceedings in equity;