it cannot be exercised without
a bona fide change of domicil,
and can never be asserted as a
cover for fraud, or to justify a
crime against the country, or
any violation of its laws. Id.
348
8. An augmentation of force or il-
legal outfit within the neutral
territory only affects captures
made during the cruize for which
such augmentation or outfit was
made. Id.
348
9. Captures by public ships, as
well as by privateers, if made
in violation of our neutrality,
are subject to restitution. Id.
350
10. Case of the Exchange, 7 Cranch,
116. distinguished from this
case. Id.
11. Quære, How far a condemnation
as prize in the Court of the cap-
tor's country will oust the ju-
risdiction of a neutral tribunal,
proceeding in rem against the
captured property for a viola-
tion of the neutral jurisdiction?
ld.
12, Such a condemnation will not
oust the jurisdiction of the neu-
tral tribunal, which has custody
of the res capta, before its con-
demnation in the Court of the
captor. Id.
355
13. Prizes made by armed vessels
which have violated the statutes
for preserving the neutrality of
the United States, will be re-
stored if brought into our ports.
The Gran Paru, 471, 486
14. But this Court has never deci-
ded that the offence adheres to
the vessel under whatever
change of circumstances that
may take place, nor that it cap-
not be deposited at the termina-
tion of the cruize, in preparing
for which it was committed; but
if this termination be merely
colourable, and the vessel was
originally equipped with the in-
tention of being employed on
the cruize, during which the
capture was made, the delictum
is not purged. Id.
487
A question of fact respecting the
proprietary interest in prize
goods, captured by an armed
vessel fitted out in violation of
the statutes of neutrality of the
United States. Restitution to
the original Spanish owners de-
creed. Id.
490
16. This Court will restore to the
former owners property captu-
red in violation of the neutrali-
ty of the United States, where
it is claimed by the original
wrong-doer, though it may have
come back to his possession after
a regular condemnation as prize.
The Arrogante Barcelones, 496.
Quære, How far a condemnation
would protect the title of a third
person, being a bona fide pur-
chaser, without notice, in such
a case? Id.
519
In cases where a condemnation
is relied on, the libel as well as
the sentence must be produced.
The Nereyda, Note a, 519
19. In such cases, the claimant must
show by competent evidence
that he was a bona fide pur-
chaser for a valuable considera-
tion. Id.
519
20. A question of fact upon the bona
fides of an alleged sale of Portu-
guese ships, and their cargoes,
which had been captured in
violation of our neutrality. Res-
titution to the original owners
fecreed. The Monte Allegre,
2. Commitment for contempt. Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, 3 Wils. 188. confirmed in Ex parte Kearney,
43 3. Lien of vendor for u paid purchase money, various cases on the subject of, commented on, distinguished, confirmed, overruled, in Bailey v. Greenleaf, 51. 57 4. Local Law Decision of this Court in Matthews v. Zane, 5 Cranch, 92. revised and confirmed in S. C.
208 5. Conclusiveness of decree. Brown v. Gilman ante, vol. IV. p. 255. reconciled with Brown v. Jack
commented on and confirmed in Macker's heirs v. Thomas, 531
1. The vendor of real property, who has not taken a separate security for the purchase money, has a lien for it, on the land, as against the vendee and his heirs. Bailey v. Greenleaf, 46, 50 2. This lien is defeated by an alienation to a bona fide purchaser without notice. Id. 50 3. Nor can it be asserted against creditors holding under a bona fide conveyance from the vendee. Id.
4. Quare, Whether the lien can be asserted against the assignees of a bankrupt, or other creditors coming in under the purchaser by act of law? Id. 50 5. The dictum of Sugden, in his Law of Vendors, 364. examined, and questioned. Id. 6. It is a rule, both of law and equity, that a party must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of his adversary's. Watts v. Lindsey's heirs, 158. 161 7. The decree must conform to the allegations in the pleadings, as well as the proofs in the cause. Crocket v. Lee, 522. 525
See LOCAL LAW, 3. 28, 29, 30.
PRACTICE, 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. This Court has authority to issue a habeas corpus, where a person is imprisoned under the warrant or order of any other Court of the United States. Kearney, 2. But this Court has no appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, confided to it by the laws of the United States, and cannot revise the judgments of the Circuit Courts, by writ of error, in any case where a party has been convicted of a public offence.
Id. 3. Hence the Court will not grant a habeas corpus, where a party has been committed for a contempt adjudged by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Id. 41 4. In such a case, this Court will not inquire into the sufficiency of the cause of commitment. Id. 41 5. The case of Crosby, Lord Mayor of London, 3 Wils. 188. commented on, and its authority confirmed. Id. 6. A commitment for a contempt by a Court of competent jurisdiction, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, is conclusive, and canany other not be inquired into in tribunal. Id. 7. Where a party claiming title to lands under an act of Congress, brought a bill for a conveyance, and stated several equitable circumstances in aid of his title, and the State Court where the suit was brought having dismissed the bill, and the cause being brought to this Court by appeal, under the 25th sec. of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20., upon the ground of an alleged misconstruction of the act of Congress under which the title was claimed, by the State Court: Held, that this Court could not take into consideration any distinct equity arising out of the contracts or transactions of the parties, and creating a new and independent title, but was confined to an examination of the plaintiff's title as depending upon
the construction of the act of Congress. Matthews v. Lane, 164. 206 8. Note on the extent of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in cases arising in the State Courts under the constitution, treaties, and laws of the Union. Note a. 206
1. In general, a sum of money in
gross, to be paid for the non-
performance of an agreement,
is considered as a penalty, and
not as liquidated damages. Tay-
loe v. Sandiford,
2. A fortiori, when it is expressly
reserved as a penalty. Id. 17
3. Thus, where in a building con-
tract, the following covenant was
contained: "The said houses
to be completely finished on or
before the 24th of December
next, under a penalty of 1000
dollars, in case of failure ;" it
was held, that this was not in-
tended as liquidated damages for
the breach of that single cove-
nant only, but applied to all the
covenants made by the same
party in that agreement; that it
was in the nature of a penalty,
and could not be set off in an ac-
tion brought by the party to re-
17
cover the price of the work. Id.
4. An agreement to perform cer-
tain work within a limited time,
under a certain penalty, is not
to be construed as liquidating
the damages which the party is
17
to pay for the breach of his co-
Id.
venant.
5. The case of Fletcher v Dycke,
2 Term Rep. 32. commented on,
and distinguished from the pre-
sent. Id.
6. And it must also appear that the
party found in possession enter-
ed without right; for if his entry
were congeable, or his posses-
sion lawful, his entry and pos-
session will be considered as
limited by his right.
The doctrine of estoppel, or the
principle of legal policy, which
forbids a party from denying the
title under which he has re-
ceived a conveyance, does not
apply as between vendor and
vendee, especially where the See DEED.
latter has not received posses-
sion from the former.
See EJECTMENT, EVIDENCE, FRAUD.
1. Possession of land by a party,
claiming it as his own in fee, is
prima facie evidence of his
ownership and seisin of the
inheritance. Ricard v. Wil-
liams,
59. 105
2. But possession alone, unexplain-
ed by collateral circumstances,
which show the quality and ex-
tent of the interest claimed, evi-
dences no more than the mere
fact of present occupation by
right. Id.
105
3. But if the party be in under ti-
tle, and by mistake of law sup-
poses himself possessed of a less
estate than really belongs to
him, the law will remit him to
his full right and title. Id. 106
4. It is a general rule that a dis-
seisor cannot qualify his own
wrong, but must be considered
as a disseisor in fee. Id. 107
5. But this rule is introduced only
for the benefit of the disseisee,
for the sake of electing his re-
medy.
1. Presumptions of a grant, ari-
sing from the lapse of time, are
applied to corporeal, as well as
incorporeal hereditaments. Ri-
card v. Williams, 59. 109
2. They may be encountered and
rebutted by contrary presump-
tions, and can never arise where
all the circumstances are per-
fectly consistent with the non-
existence of a grant. Id. 109
3. A fortiori, they cannot arise
where the claim is of such a na-
ture as is at variance with the
supposition of a grant. Id. 110
4. In general, the presumption of
a grant is limited to periods ana-
logous to those of the statute of
limitations, in cases where the
statute does not apply. Id. 110
5. Where the statute applies, the
presumption is not generally re-
sorted to : but if the circum-
stances of the case are very co-
gent, and require it, a grant may
be presumed within a period
short of the statute.
Id. 110
6. Under the laws of Massachusetts
and Connecticut, the power of
an administrator to sell the real
estate of bis intestate, under an
order of the Court of Probates,
must be exercised within a rea-
sonable time after the death of
the intestate.
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