tenements devisable in like case of devise, &c. causa qua supra.

$288. Also it is commonly said that every jointenant is seised of the land which hee holdeth joyntly per my et per tout; and this is as much to say, as he is seised by every parcell and by the whole, &c., and this is true, for in every parcell and by every parcell and by al the lands and tenements he is joyntly seised with his companion.

§ 290. Also, joyntenants (if they will) may make partition betweene them, and the partition is good enough; but they shall not bee compelled to doe this by the law; but if they will make partition of their own will and agreement, the partition shal stand in force.

Co. LIT., 187, a. This is true regularly; but by the custome of some cities and boroughs, one joyntenant or tenant in common may compell his companion, by writ of partition grounded upon the custome, to make partition. But since. Littleton wrote joyntenants and tenants in common generally are compellable to make partition by writ framed upon the statutes of 31 & 32 H. 8. And albeit they be now compellable to make partition, yet, seeing they are compellable by writ, they must pursue the statutes and cannot make partition by parol, for that remaines at the common law.

LIT., § 291. Also, if a joynt estate be made of land to a husband and wife and to a third person, in this case the husband and wife have in law in their right but a moity, and the third person shall have as much as the husband and wife, viz., the other moity, &c. And the cause is, for that the husband and wife are but one person in law, and are in like case as if an estate be made to two joyntenants, when the one hath by force of the joynture the one moity in law, and the other the other moity, &c. In the same manner it is where an estate is made to the husband and wife and to two other men, in this case the husband and wife have but the third part, and the other two men the other two parts, &c. causa qua supra.

2 BL. COM., 179-182. The properties of a joint-estate are derived from its unity, which is fourfold: the unity of interest, the unity of title, the unity of time and the unity of possession; or, in other words, joint-tenants have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same conveyance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the same undivided possession.

First, they must have one and the same interest. One joint-tenant cannot be entitled to one period of duration or quantity of interest in lands, and the other to a different; one cannot be tenant for life, and the other for years; one cannot be tenant in fee, and the other in tail. But if land be limited to A. and B. for their lives, this makes them jointtenants of the freehold; if to A. and B. and their heirs, it makes them joint-tenants of the inheritance. If land be granted to A. and B. for their lives, and to the heirs of A.; here A. and B. are joint-tenants of the freehold during their respective lives, and A. has the remainder of the fee in severalty or if land be given to A. and B. and the heirs of the body of A.; here both have a joint-estate for life, and A. hath a several remainder in tail. Secondly, joint-tenants must also have a unity of title; their estate must be created by one and the same act, whether legal or illegal; as by one and the same grant, or by one and the same disseisin. Joint-tenancy cannot arise by descent or act of law; but merely by purchase or acquisition by the act of the party; and, unless that act be one and the same, the two tenants would have different titles; and if they had different titles, one might prove good and the other bad, which would absolutely destroy the jointure. Thirdly, there must also be a unity of time; their estates must be vested at one and the same period, as well as by one and the same title. As in case of a present estate made to A. and B.; or a remainder in fee to A. and B. after a particular estate; in either case A. and B. are joint-tenants of this present estate, or this vested remainder. But if, after a lease for life, the remainder be limited to the heirs of A. and B.; and during the continuance of the particular estate

A. dies, which vests the remainder of one moiety in his heir; and then B. dies, whereby the other moiety becomes vested in the heir of B.; now A.'s heir and B.'s heir are not jointtenants of this remainder, but tenants in common; for one moiety vested at one time, and the other moiety vested at another. Yet where a feoffment was made to the use of a man, and such wife as he should afterwards marry, for term of their lives, and he afterwards married; in this case it seems to have been held that the husband and wife had a joint-estate, though vested at different times: because the use of the wife's estate was in abeyance and dormant till the intermarriage; and, being then awakened, had relation back, and took effect from the original time of creation. Lastly, in joint-tenancy there must be a unity of possession. Joint-tenants are said to be seised per my et per tout, by the half or moiety, and by all; that is, they each of them have the entire possession, as well of every parcel as of the whole. They have not, one of them a seisin of one half or moiety, and the other of the other moiety; neither can one be exclusively seised of one acre, and his companion of another; but each has an undivided moiety of the whole, and not the whole of an undivided moiety.

4 KENT COMM., 361. The common law favored title by joint-tenancy, by reason of this very right of survivorship. Its policy was averse to the division of tenures, because it tended to multiply the feudal services and weaken the efficacy of that connection. But in Hawes v. Hawes, 1 Wils. Rep. 165, Lord Hardwicke observed that the reason of that policy had ceased with the abolition of tenures; and he thought that even the courts of law were no longer inclined to favour them, and, at any rate, they were not favoured in equity, for they were a kind of estates that made no provision for posterity. As an instance of the equity view of the subject, we find that the rule of survivorship is not applied to the case of money loaned by two or more creditors on a joint mortgage. The right of survivorship is also re

jected in all cases of partnerships, for it would operate very unjustly in such cases. In this country the title by jointtenancy is very much reduced in extent, and the incident of survivorship is still more extensively destroyed, except where it is proper and necessary, as in the case of titles held by trustees.

In New York, as early as 1786, estates in joint-tenancy were abolished, except in executors, and other trustees, unless the estate was expressly declared, in the deed or will creating it, to pass in joint-tenancy. The New York Revised Statutes (1 R. S. 727, sec. 44) have re-enacted the provision, and with the further declaration, that every estate, vested in executors or trustees, as such, shall be held in joint-tenancy. The doctrine of survivorship incident to joint-tenancy (excepting, I presume, estates held in trust) is abolished in the States of Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, Missouri, Tennessee, North and South Carolina, and Alabama. In the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, and Delaware, joint-tenancy is placed under the same restrictions as in New York; and it cannot be created but by express words; and, when lawfully created, it is presumed that the common law incidents belonging to that tenancy follow. The English law of joint-tenancy does not exist at all in Ohio and Louisiana, and it exists in full force in Georgia, Mississippi, and Maryland.

N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW, § 56. Every estate granted or devised to two or more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be in jointtenancy; but every estate vested in executors or trustees as such shall be held by them in joint tenancy. This section shall apply as well to estates already created or vested as to estates hereafter granted or devised.

CHAPTER II.

TENANCY IN COMMON.

LIT., § 292. Tenants in common are they which have lands or tenements in fee-simple, fee-taile or for terme of life, &c., and they have such lands or tenements by severall titles, and not by a joynt title, and none of them know of this his severall, but they ought by the law to occupie these lands or tenements in common, and pro indiviso to take the profits in common. And because they come to such lands or tenements by severall titles and not by one joynt title, and their occupation and possession shall be by law betweene them in common, they are called tenants in common. As if a man infeoff two joyntenants in fee, and the one of them alien that which to him belongeth to another in fee, now the alienee and the other jointenant are tenants in common, because they are in such tenements by severall titles, for the alienee cometh to the moytie by the feoffement of one of the joyntenants, and the other joyntenant hath the other moitie by force of the first feoffement made to him and to his companion, &c. And so they are in by severall titles, that is to say, by severall feoffements, &c.

§ 294. Also, if three joyntenants bee, and one of them alien that which to him belongeth to another man in fee, in this case the alienee is tenant in common with the other two joyntenants; but yet the other two joyntenants are seised of the two parts which remain joyntly, and of these two parts the survivor between them two holdeth place, &c.

§ 298. Also, if lands bee given to two to have and to hold, scil. the one moity to the one and to his heires, and the other moity to the other and to his heires, they are tenants in common.