pel the observance of neutrality, under these circumstances, was no easy matter. Hitherto, Washington had the people with him; but in this case, a large proportion was on the other side. His resolution was nevertheless unshaken; and, at the risk of popularity, he persisted in promoting the real good of his fellow-citizens, in opposition to their own mistaken wishes and views.

The tide of popular opinion ran as strongly against Britain, as in favour of France. The former was accused of instigaiing the Indians to acts of hostility against the United States; of impressing their sailors; of illegally capturing their ships; and of stirring up the Algerines against them. The whole of this hostility was referred to a jealousy of the growing importance of the United States. Motions were made in congress, for sequestrating debts due to British subjects; for entering into commercial hostility with Great Britain, and even for interdieting all intercourse with her, till she pursued other measures with respect to the United States.-Every appearance portended immediate war between the two countries. The passionate admirers of France wished for it; while others, more attached to British systems, dreaded a war with Great Britain, as being likely to throw the United States into the arms of France. In this state of things, when war seemed inevitable, the president composed the troubled scene, by nominating John Jay, in April, 1794, envoy extraordinary to the court of London. By this measure, a truce was obtained; and that finally ended in an adjustment of the points in controversy between the two countries.-The exercise of the constitutional right of the president to negotiate, virtually suspended all hostile legislative measures; for these could not, with delicacy or propriety, be urged, while the executive was in the act of treating for an amicable adjustment of differences. A treaty between the United States and Great Britain, was the result of this mission. This was pronounced by Mr. Jay, “to be the best that was attainable, and which he believed it for the interest of the United States to accept." While the treaty was before the senate for consideration, a member, contrary to the rules of that body, furnished an editor of a newspaper with a copy.--This being published, operated like a spark of fire applied to combustible materials, The angry passions, which for some short time had been

smothered, broke out afresh. Some went so far as to pronounce the treaty a surrender of their power to their late enemy, Great Britain, and a dereliction of their tried friend and ally, France. The more moderate said, that too much was given, and too little received. Meetings of the people were held at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and several other places, in which the treaty was pronounced to be unworthy of acceptance, and petitions were agreed upon and forwarded to the president, urging him to refuse his signature to the obnoxious instrument.

These agitations furnished matter for serious reflexion to the president, but they did not affect his conduct, though they induced a reiterated examination of the subject. In a private letter to a friend, after reciting the importance of the crisis, he added, "There is but one straight course, and that is, to seek truth, and to pursue it steadily." It is probable, that he had early made up his mind to ratify the treaty, as better than none, and infinitely better than war; but regretted that it was so generally disliked, and considered by many as made with a design to oppress the French Republic. Under the weight of his high responsibility, he consoled himself, "that in time, when passion shall have yielded to reason, the current may possibly turn."-Peace with all the world, was his policy, where it could be preserved with honour. War he considered as an evil of such magnitude, as never to be entered upon without the most imperious necessity. The mission of Mr. Jay was his last effort for the preservation of peace with Great Britain. The rejection of the treaty which resulted from this mission, he considered as the harbinger of war; for negotiation having failed to redress grievances, no alternative but war was left. By this prudent conduct, the rising states were preserved in peace, but the bickerings of the citizens amongst themselves, and their animosities against Great Britain, still continued.-The popularity of General Washington, for the present was diminished; but this he had expected. In a letter to general Knox, he observes, "Next to a conscientious discharge of my public duties, to carry along with me the approbation of my constituents, would be the highest gratification of which my mind is susceptible. But the latter being secondary, I cannot make the former yield to it, unless some criterion more infallible than partia

if they are not party meetings, can be discovered as the touchstone of public sentiment. If any person on earth could, or the Great Power above would erect the standard of infallibility in political opinions, no being that inhabits this terrestrial globe, would resort to it with more eagerness than myself, so long as I remain a servant of the public. But as I have hitherto found no better guide than upright intentions, and close investigation, I shall adhere to them while I keep the watch."

sion.

After the treaty was duly ratified, an attempt was made to render it a dead letter, by refusing the appropriations of money necessary to carry it into effect. Preparatory to this, a motion was made for the adoption of a resolution to request the president to lay before the house of representatives a copy of his instructions to Mr. Jay, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to the treaty with Great Britain. This involved a new question, where the treaty-making power was constitutionally lodged? The debate was animated and vehement. Appeals were made both to reason and pasAfter a discussion of more than twenty days, the motion was carried in the affirmative, by a majority of twentyfive votes. When the resolution was presented to the president, he replied, "that he would take time to consider it." His situation was peculiarly delicate; the passions of the people were strongly excited against the treaty; the popu larity of the demand being solely for information; the large majority by which the vote was carried; the suspicions that would probably attach in case of refusal, that circumstances had occurred in the course of the negotiation which the president was afraid to publish, added to other weighty consid erations, would have induced minds of an ordinary texture, to yield to the request.-With Washington, popularity was only a secondary object. To follow the path of duty and the publie good, was a primary one. He had sworn to " preserve, protect, and defend the constitution." In his opinion, the treaty-making power was exclusively given by the people, in convention, to the executive, and the public good requir ed that it should be so exercised. Under the influence of these solemn obligations, he returned the following answer to the resolution which had been presented to him:

"Gentlemen of the House of Representatives, "With the utmost attention, I have considered your resolution of the 24th instant, requesting me to lay before your house a copy of the instructions to the minister of the United States, who negotiated the treaty with the king of Great Britain, together with the correspondence and other documents relative to that treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiations may render improper to be disclosed.

"In deliberating upon this subject, it was impossible for me to lose sight of the principle which some have avowed in its discussion, or to avoid extending my views to the consequences which must flow from the admission of that principle.

"I trust that no part of my conduct has ever indicated a disposition to withhold any information which the constitution has enjoined it upon the president as a duty to give, or which could be required of him by either house of congress as a right; and with truth I affirm, that it has been, as it will continue to be, while I have the honour to preside in the government, my constant endeavour to harmonize with the other branches thereof, so far as the trust delegated to me by the people of the United States, and my sense of the obliga tion it imposes, to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution, will permit.

"The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, to other persons. The necessity of such caution and secrecy, was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, the principle on which that body was formed, confining it to a small number of members.

"To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent.

"It does not occur, that the inspection of the papers asked for, can be relative to any purpose under the cognizance of the house of representatives, except that of an impeachment, which the resolution has not expressed. I repeat that I have no disposition to withhold any information which the duty of my station will permit, or the public good shall require to be disclosed; and in fact all the papers affecting the negotiation with Great Britain, were laid before the senate when the treaty itself was communicated for their consideration and advice.

"The course which the debate has taken on the resolution of the house, leads to some observations on the mode of making treaties under the constitution of the United States.

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Having been a member of the general convention, and knowing the principles on which the constitution was formed, I have ever entertained but one opinion upon this subject, and from the first establishment of the government to this moment, my conduct has exemplified that opinion, "That the power of making treaties is exclusively vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and that every treaty so made and promulgated, thenceforward becomes the law of the land."-It is thus, that the treatymaking power has been understood by foreign nations; and in all the treaties made with them, we have declared, and they have believed, that, when ratified by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate, they become obligatory. In this construction of the constitution, every house of representatives has heretofore acquiesced, and until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared to my knowledge that this construction was not the true one. Nay, they have more than acquiesced; for until now, without controverting the obligation of such treaties, they have made all the requisite provisions for carrying them into effect.

"There is also reason to believe, that this construction agrees with the opinions entertained by the state conventions, when they were deliberating on the constitution, especially by those who objected to it; because there was not required in commercial treaties the consent of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of the senate, instead of two-thirds