Mr. SISSON. May I ask whether or not the bombing of the cities of France-Paris and other cities-so far as its effect was concerned, was minimized in the newspapers during the war? Gen. MITCHELL. Yes, sir: always, in order to keep up morale. The fact of the matter was this: The objects of the bombardment of Paris, especially the last one, was to congest the means of transportation arcund Paris so that the supplies could not be sent up from there to the front. Paris was at a great distance from the German lines in those days for effective bombardment. They tried it both with cannon and with bombardment airplanes. The result was that, between those two things, the railroads and every road around Paris were congested with people running out to such an extent that it interfered very materially with the shipment of munitions to the front and at a very important time. Then, too, it made the factory workers nervous and cut down their work 30 or 40 per cent. They kept everything dark at night, and the total effect, even of that very small bombardment, was very great. Mr. ANTHONY. Has not a board recently appointed for the purpose found that it was impracticable to prepare this country for war in time of peace, and that it was more practicable after the declaration of war to develop the air program? Gen. MITCHELL. There was a board which recommended an air program of 3,800 planes and 24 airships to be prepared in time of peace. Mr. ANTHONY. What board was it that made the finding I just mentioned? Mr. ANTHONY. Was the board you refer to a joint Army and Navy board? Gen. MITCHELL. No, sir. It was an Army board, of experienced Army officers, that recommended the organization of the Army. Mr. ANTHONY. Did it not decide that it was not practicable to prepare for war in the air in time of peace? Gen. MITCHELL. No, sir; that board did not do that. Quite the contrary-it decided that it was and should be done at once. Mr. ANTHONY. Did it not decide that it was not practicable to put the courtry on a war basis in time of peace, so far as the air was concerned? Gen. MITCHELL. No, sir. Mr. ANTHONY. There was such a board that made such a finding. Gen. MITCHELL. I have not seen that report; I do not know of it. But if such a report was made their conclusion is wrong, because it can be done in time of peace with a small expenditure of money. And if it is not done in time of peace it will be all over when war is declared, because the air force will be the first to attack. The great trouble now is that whenever an air question is up for discussion, mostly individuals who are not air officers are consulted. No one is capable of passing on air matters except an air officer trained in the work. COMMENT ON GEN. MITCHELL'S STATEMENT. NAVY DEPARTMENT, MY DEAR MR. HICKS: In reply to your inquiry in regard to certain statements recently made by Brig. Gen. Mitchell, Assistant Chief of Army Air Service, before the subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. I desire to submit the following comment: As these statements have been given wide publicity and have attracted a considerable interest which may react unfavorably to the Navy, it would seem that the facts with regard to the Indiana experiment, from which Ġen. Mitchell reported certain definite conclusions very prejudicial to the best interests of national defense, should be clearly understood. You will recall that the Indiana is one of our oldest battleships, built many years ago and before details of construction and of the subdivision of the underbody of naval craft was at all well understood in the light of present requirements, and before the development of armor had reached its present-day strength in composition and in distribution aboard ship. Before making explosive tests on the Indiana, numerous nonexplosive dummy bombs were dropped with the view of giving bombing practice to the pilots at Hampton Roads, who had prepared to conduct the exercise for several weeks. This was done to determine data regarding the percentage of hits to be expected upon a stationary area the size of the deck of this ship. It may be pointed out, however, that bombing a vessel under way at sea is an entirely different and a far more difficult Lask than dropping projectiles upon a stationary target about which there may be landmarks assisting the pilot in making his approach. The Navy carries on bomb-dropping exercises over water periodically, and has done so for several years. Frequently these exercises take place at moving targets. The general states that there is no trouble at all about dropping bombs, and that the Army has never dropped one on a ship from a plane in the air, but elsewhere he states, "To begin with, we can tell you definitely now that we can either destroy or sink any ship in existence to-day.' Also in another portion of his testimony, completely ignoring all of the offensive powers of a ship, he states, "We can hit very often, if we have to, because, if necessary, we will come down and lay the bomb on the deck." The purpose of the explosive experiment was to obtain comparative data as to the effects which might be produced by bombs and by high-explosive shell. The effect of shell fire had been studied frequently upon other structures, so it was not deemed necessary to fire with guns upon the Indiana on this occasion. It was also desired at this time to obtain certain data with regard to the distance from the skin of the ship at which the explosion of underwater bombs of various sizes might damage the outer shell. By following the reasoning of Gen. Mitchell one might equally well and clearly demonstrate the absolute supremacy of either the gun or of the torpedo against a modern battleship by firing them against an ancient hulk, such as the Indiana, when securely moored at anchor. Any large modern bomb, shell, or torpedo could not fail to be very effective against a ship of the type and date of that vessel, which would be particularly impressive to one uninformed as to naval progress or of naval problems. The conclusions which the general reports with regard to the effectiveness of bombing modern battleships from the results of this experiment, as set forth in his statements, should not be accepted as correct. In a modest way, and in so far as it is practicable to do so, the Navy constantly is carrying on tests and experiments to assist in the solution of the difficult problems confronting it. It must seem unfortunate that the Navy should not have the privilege of presenting facts with regard to naval experience and needs to Congress, and that an officer of another branch of the Government should presume to present the methods for conducting and the results of a naval experiment, as has been done in this case, is to be deplored. Very truly, yours, Hon. F. C. HICKS, Naval Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. JOSEPHUS DANIELS. MEMORANDUM ON GERMAN PLANES. NAVY DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In reply to House resolution No. 648, dated January 27, 1921, I beg to submit the following: (a) Number of German airplanes purchased by this department in 1920: Three. (b) Fund out of which payment was made: Aviation, Navy, 1921." (c) Authority for this purchase: The appropriation act for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1921. (d) Agency through which such planes were purchased: The J. L. Aircraft Corporation, New York, N. Y. (e) Price paid per plane: $27,100, which included a third of $3,500. With the three planes was received a set of floats priced at $3,500: This sum was split between the three planes, so that without the floats each plane would have cost close to $26,000. (f) The use to which these planes have been put: Examination of details of construction. Tests in flight to determine the aerodynamic advantages of the novel arrangement of wings used on this plane. Tests in the air to develop the advantages of novel features of the engine. Tests in starting from land and, with pontoons, from water, to determine whether this type plane has advantages over American designs. Determination of the value of a metal plane as a counterpoise for an aircraft radio apparatus. Determination of resistance to deterioration of this construction. (g) Number of these planes destroyed by fire or otherwise: None due to flying; one plane lost while housed at Naval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C., due to destruction of a wooden hangar caused by a fire starting in the roof of the building. (h) Number of pilots killed as a result of the plane destroyed: None. (i) Number of planes of American make in the possession of the Navy: One thousand one hundred and eighty-five, of which 265 are in use. Sincerely, yours, The SPEAKER, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. JOSEPHUS DANIELS. MEMORANDUM ON GERMAN PLANES. NAVY DEPARTMENT, MY DEAR MR. KAHN: In transmitting herewith answers to the questions raised in House resolution 648, I submit below the following additional matter for your information: During 1920 there were purchased by the Navy Department three German airplanes of the Junkers all-metal type. Authorization for the purchase of same was made from my office, and payment was made from the appropriation "Aviation, Navy, 1921." The planes were purchased from the J. L. Aircraft Corporation, New York City, at a price of $27,100 each. With these three planes was received, in addition to spare parts, a set of floats, the price of which was $3,500. This $3,500 was split between the three planes, so that without the floats the price per plane would have been very close to $26,000. It was deemed necessary to order a set of spare parts. The cost of these added to that of the three planes made up the sum of $100,000. The letters "J. L." are the initials of one J. Larsen, an individual who has been identified with aeronautics in this country for several years. Mr. Larsen imported from Germany several all-metal airplanes of a new type, developed in Germany since the armistice by a Prof. Junkers. Larsen demonstrated the new Junkers planes to the Army, the Navy, and Post Office officials, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. These were the first all-metal planes ever flown successfully, and the first unbraced monoplanes successfully flown in the United States. Metal construction is of the greatest importance in the development of the airplane. The present wood and fabric construction, while light and strong, has proved shortlived, especially in the Tropics, and planes kept in storage too long may become unsafe from dry-rot, fungous attack, and general deterioration. For the Navy the development of metal construction is of particular importance. Attempts at metal construction in this country have not been successful in the past, due mainly to lack of a suitable high-strength metal and lack of knowledge of its fabrication. It seemed that the quickest and the best way to make progress in the matter would be through actual ownership of proved metal planes, and the Junkers airplanes, of the type purchased, had been proved in Germany. Also, the motive plant of that plane was deemed desirable for study and test in the air. Reports of its performance had been received, but it is not always that such reports can be believed. The engine of the Junkers all-metal airplane is of the BMW 180 H. P. type, built by the Bayrische Motor Works of Germany. It is an abnormally high compression motor, incorporating certain novel and interesting features which were not available in any developed engine of American manufacture. This engine, in the Junkers plane, offered a ready means to test under service conditions, an important line of advancement, namely, the use of "doped" fuels and high compression ratio. To have gained the information desired by any means other than the purchase of apparatus already proved would have entailed the development of a new engine and power plant installation. Such special construction would have been extremely costly. The purchase of three sample planes of the type in question by the Army, and of three sample planes by the Navy, was recommended after an inspection by the technical committee of the Joint Army and Navy Aeronautical Board, which committee proposed certain tests to be carried out by the Army and certain tests to be carried out by the Navy. Sincerely, yours, Hon. JULIUS KAHN, M. C., House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. о JOSEPHUS DANIELS. [No. 7.] SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS. Deficiencies and Surpluses. General Account of Advances. Clothing and Small Stores Fund. Hearings before the COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Wednesday, January 19, 1921. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Thomas S. Butler (chairman) presiding. Statements of REAR ADMIRAL C. J. PEOPLES, assistant to the Paymaster General, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and Mr. CLYDE REED, special assistant. The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Peoples, we have nothing whatever to do with appropriations, but whatever requires legislation in order to improve the appropriations we will be very glad to consider. will be pleased to hear you concerning any of these items or paragraphs which affect your department, or any other statement you may desire to make. Admiral PEOPLES. In connection with the deficiencies which confronted the Navy Department for the fiscal years 1919 and 1920 we have proposed a clause which will avoid an appropriation. It necessitates legislation. We had a conference with the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. Good, and also the chairman of the subcommittee on appropriations, Gov. Kelley, day before yesterday, and they requested us to take this matter up with the Naval Committee as having jurisdiction, and the proposition is this: As the committee knows, all of the funds appropriated by the naval bill pass to the credit of the Navy on the books of the Treasury under what is known as "General account of advances." This account was established by Congress in 1878 in order to permit the Navy to function promptly and properly and pay its bills, due to the fact that vessels of the Navy are scattered at different stations and all over the world. That "General account of advances" opens an account on the books of the Treasury equal in amount to the total appropriated in the naval bill. The CHAIRMAN. As a lump sum? Admiral PEOPLES. As a lump sum. The CHAIRMAN. The whole appropriation, as a lump sum? Admiral PEOPLES. That is the total amount of the "General account of advances" credited for any one year. Mr. HICKS. That is, this account is credited on the books of the Treasury Department for the amount that has been appropriated by Congress for that purpose? Admiral PEOPLES. Yes, sir. That money is then drawn out of the Treasury, disbursed under "General account of advances" and immediately charged up against each of the appropriations contained in the naval bill. The matter of deficiencies is controlled by the special acts and statutes which pertain to authorized deficiencies; that is, with respect to deficiencies for subsistence, clothing, fuel, and transportation they are specifically authorized by another law (sec. 3722, R. S.). The General account of advances" is not the means of a deficiency for the reasons I have just explained, sir, that that matter is controlled entirely by the deficiency laws on that particular subject. Now, we have this situation confronting us. The deficiencies for 1919 and 1920 aggregate about $114,000,000. That money has been spent and it has all been spent out of money in the Treasury. It is necessary for an appropriation ordinarily amounting to that sum to carry as a credit under General account of advances." We have proposed here a plan by which we will take all unexpended balances under the various appropriations, pass them to the credit of those appropriations under which deficiencies have been authorized by law by taking out of "General account of advances" the naval supply account. In other words, to separate the naval supply account (which is the material account of the Navy and authorized by the act of 1910) and establish a naval supply account fund-the two coupled up together. I might read the proposed legislation Mr. PADGETT. If I may interrupt you just there. If I remember correctly, a good many years ago the naval supply account and the "General account of advances were separate accounts and were consolidated under the administration of Admiral Rogers, Paymaster General, were they not? Admiral PEOPLES. They were, yes, sir. Mr. PADGETT. And it was all brought into one? Admiral PEOPLES. All under General account of advances." Mr. PADGETT. Why do you want to separate them now and go back to the original plan?" Admiral PEOPLES. We wish to separate them for the reason that, as the Navy Department has increased, the present condition which confronts the service is entirely different than when the naval supply account itself was established under "General account of advances. The stores on hand now aggregate approximately $280,000,000, as compared with about $50,000,000 up to five years ago. The CHAIRMAN. What will this enable you to do that you can not now do? Admiral PEOPLES. This will enable us to avoid approximating for the deficiencies under the prior years and to maintain our drawing power under "General account of advances" with the Treasury. think if I might read the proposed clause, sir, it might be selfexplanatory. |