CHAPTER 65 of the General Laws. The real property law. framers of that Revision bestowed great care upon, ions and subdivisions. The "Part " (II), itself, was The arrangement of the provisions relating to "real property" cannot be exhibited more briefly or satisfactorily than by setting forth the captions of the first three chapters of the "Part, " and of their subordinate divisions, in the Revision of 1830: CHAPTER 1. 2. Creation and division of estates. 3. Uses and trusts. 4. Powers. 5. Dower. 6. Landlord and tenant. 7. Conveyances and mortgages. 8. Recording instruments affecting real property. 9. Descent of real property. 10. Laws repealed; when to take effect. A comparison of these two methods of division will lead to conclusions as to the nature of the Of real property and of the nature, qualities and changes in arrangement, made in 1896, and as to alienation of estates therein. 2. Of uses and trusts. 3. Of powers. 4. Of alienation by deed. Title III. Of estates in dower. Title IV. Of estates for years and at will; and the rights and duties of landlords and tenants. the benefits to accrue from such changes. If this "real property law" were a portion of a scientific code," the opinion is ventured that it would be impossible to properly set forth its provisions under ten correlate articles. The thoughtful product of the revisers of 1830 has evidently fallen a victim to a rule of the commissioners of 1889, which may be inferred to exist, from a collation of their reported and enacted statutes, viz.: That the results of legislation are to be collected in groups, each of which is capable of being designated by some short English sounding title, such as the "State Law," the "Salt Springs Law," the "Canal Law,” etc., without any attempt at scientific classification; and then, that every such group (chapter) is to have one, and only one, set of subdivisions, namely, articles, which exhibit no co-ordination or equality of status or content. One of the results of the new method of arrange Title V. Miscellaneous provisions of a general ment is manifest, on consulting any of these recently nature. CHAPTER 2. Of title to real property by descent. CHAPTER 3. Of the proof and recording of conveyances of real estate, and the cancelling of mortgages. The foregoing division of the statutory provisions relating to real property, is, doubtless, not perfect, but it is evidence, on its face, of care and thought expended in an arrangement of those provisions. If this division were to be discarded, it ought to be for reasons in some manner rendered obvious, and a better should be substituted. The new revision gives us one, instead of three, chapter headings; and one, instead of two, series of successive subdivisions, as follows: CHAPTER 547. ter 46 of the General Laws. enacted statutes-there is no place for general defi- "miscellaneous provisions of a general nature." It may be of interest, to refer to another incident, though perhaps, not necessary result, of the new mode of division of subject, adopted in the "real property law " of 1896. The first title of the first chapter of Part II of the Revision of 1830 had a caption which consisted merely of a clubbing together of the captions of its subordinate divisions, namely, Title I (art. 1), of the tenure of real property, An Act relating to real property, constituting chap- and (art. 2) of the persons capable of holding and conveying lands." The revision of 1889-1896 wiped out the captions of title 1 and of article 2, leaving the caption of article 1 to stand-Tenure of real property." This might have been a judicious course to pursue, but it was accompanied with a feature which produces a result singular if not more remarkable. The revisers of 1830 embodied in the first article of the first title of the first chapter, four sections truly relating to the "chapter," are co-extensive in meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments,—without any qualification or exception. By § 240, the term "real property," as used in this article," includes lands, tenements and hereditaments and chattels real, except a lease for a term not exceeding three years (the article referred to is 8, on recording). By § 280 (under article 9, on descent), the term “real tenure by which lands | property," as used in this article, includes every estate, interest and right, legal and equitable in lands, tenements and hereditaments, except such as are determined or extinguished by the death of an intestate seized or possessed thereof, or in any manner entitled thereto; leases for years, estates for the life of another person; and real property held in trust, not devised by the beneficiary. in this State were to be holden (viz.: lands were declared alluvial, subject to escheat to the State in default of heirs), and three sections related to this same subject of tenure (viz., guardianship of lands, formerly held by socage tenure). In our modern revision all these seven sections are omitted as components of the "real property law." Three of the sections are in the Constitution; one is The punctuation of this last definition renders transferred to the "public lands law;" and three the meaning obscure. But the main suggestion are transferred to the "domestic relations law." is whether any complications will arise from the exThis obviously left the caption, "tenure of real prop-istence of a general definition, more comprehensive erty," without anything to operate on; but, instead of omitting that caption, it is transferred to a place over the sections relating to the subject of "persons capable of holding and conveying lands," and the proper caption (of Art. 2) for these sections is abolished! The only basis for this singular re-adjustment which suggests itself is, that regard was had to the etymological relations of tenure, teneo, and holding lands. Another circumstance attending the new revolution in arrangement which may prove a subject of even more embarrassment than either of those already mentioned is, the new definitions of certain foundation-terms. The revisers of 1830 defined certain of these terms separately in each of their three chapters on real property. In chapter 1, the general chapter, by section 10 of title 5, "real estate," and "lands," as used in that chapter, were to be construed as coextensive in meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments. In chapter 2, on descent, by section 27, the term "real estate, as used in that chapter, was to be construed to include every estate, interest and right, legal and equitable, in lands, tenements and hereditaments, except such as are determined or extinguished by the death of an intestate, seized or possessed thereof, or in any manner entitled thereto, and except leases for years, and estates for the life of another person." Finally, in chapter 3, on recording, by section 36. "real estate," as used in that chapter, was to be construed as co-extensive in meaning with lands, tenements and hereditaments, and as embracing all chattels real, except leases for a term not exceeding three years. Let us now see how the case will stand after October 1, 1896. There is only one Chapter (including all the ten articles); and, by § 1, the terms "real property" and "lands," as used "in this" (entire) than the later special ones. These dry speculations are interrupted by entertainment, as the eye casually glances at the running title of section 9 of the new Code, which is: "Heirs of patriotic Indian "; supplanting the former title: "Heirs of certain Indian patentees may convey in certain manuer.” The condensed humor contained in this suggestion of aboriginal fidelity, of members of the preceeding race, in scalping their brothers to help the white man get possession of their fatherland, raises a suspicion that we may have lost more than we know, in consequence of the grave decorum and invariable dignity of the revisers of three score years and ten ago. THEO. F. C. DEMAREST, 160 BROADWAY, NEW YORK CITY. New Books and New Editions. A MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY LAW. By Walter D. Smith, of the Law Department of the University of Michigan. This is the last volume of the Hornbook Series which has been published. The work is one which is peculiarly fitted for the publication of the Hornbook Series as it allows a division into many subdivisions and subheads in treating of the subject. It is a most difficult and almost a thankless task to attempt to write on a subject of such broad scope, and we therefore have examined with interest the arrangement and treatment of the subject matter of the author. The author attempts to define certain subjects. These definitions are carefully worded, but, as in any legal subject, the person writing the definition would be disagreed with by many who use his work. We consider the book will be useful to many who desire to obtain a smattering of some of the principles of law, and we can commend its general arrangement and method. Published by West Publishing Company, St. Paul, Minn. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, JULY 25, 1896. Current Topics. [All communications intended for the Editor should be addressed simply to the Editor of THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL. All letters relating to advertisements, subscriptions, or other business matters, should be addressed to THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL COMPANY.] there be a written verdict signed by jurors or by a foreman, and we have no doubt that, in cases where the court thinks it right to do so, it may announce its conclusion in the presence of the jury and of the parties or their representatives, and direct the entry of a verdict. without asking the formal assent of the jury. Until a case has been submitted to the jury for its decision upon disputed faets, the authority of the court for all the purposes of the trial is at every step necessarily absolute, and its ruling HE recent opinion of the United States Cir- upon every proposition, including the question v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., is only interesting because of the remarks of Judge Woods on the subject of the power and authority of a trial court to punish for contempt the refusal of a juror to find a verdict for one or the other of the parties when so directed by the court. At the trial of the action before the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, there was unusual excitement caused by the action of one of the jurors who refused to find a verdict for the defendant after the court had so directed. The unfortunate juror only escaped punishment through the action of the attorneys accepting a dismissal of the suit instead of a verdict. Naturally great interest existed on the subject of the power of the court to punish a juror for contempt under the circumstances, and Judge Woods dwells upon the subject in the following language: the jury, must be conclusive, until upon writ of error it shall be set side. That remedy is provided by law, and presumably will be effective and adequate, if there be just ground for invoking it. Certainly the obstinacy of a conceited juror is not likely to prove a wholesome substitute" One of the most significant planks in the Chicago convention is the one declaring against "life tenure in the public service." Considering the persons who recently controlled the convention it is not surprising to see that such an idea is prevalent against the present terms of the judges of the United States Supreme Court. If such an idea were carried out we would be deprived of one of the most beneficent features of our highest court. We have always considered that the greatest safeguard of the people of this country in preventing an unjust usurpation of power by Congress was the fact that the judges of the Supreme Court were appointed for life and were able to take part in any matter presented to them without considering the effect it would have upon one or more of the political parties of the country. Our own Court of Appeals, though it has a fourteen-year term of office, has, at times, been, to some extent, handicapped because of the fact that the judges have to be re-elected to the position which they hold. The usefulness of the court, it is declared, is sometimes impaired by reason of the fact that one or more of the judges of the Court of Appeals have to consider that their term of office is drawing to a close. If it were not for this, the Court of Appeals would, doubtless, be "The authority and duty of a judge to direct a verdict for one party or the other, when, in his opinion, the state of the evidence requires it, is beyond dispute, and it is not for jurors to disobey, nor for attorneys to object, except in the orderly way necessary to save the right to prosecute a writ of error. The conduct of the juror in this instance was in the highest degree reprehensible, and might well have subjected him and any who encouraged him to persist in his course to punishment for contempt. His conduct was in violation of law, subversive of authority, and obstructive of the orderly administration of justice. In fact by his course he put in jeopardy the interests which he assumed to protect, because it is only by treating the case as if the verdict directed had been returned that we have been able to review the judgment and to order a new trial. We deem it proper free from unjust and unwarranted criticism. to observe here that it is not essential that | The Supreme Court of the United States would be injured more, perhaps, by a change such as has been suggested than would any of the State courts, and it would certainly become, to some degree at least, subject to the will and caprice of the party in power, and be liable to be influenced by partisanship, demagogy and fanaticism. Such a change would be little short of revolutionary in its consequences. The judges, if so elected, would become mere party creatures, subject to party control. The correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Secretary Olney on the Venezuelan question, and in regard to a plan for international arbitration, has added considerable interest to a subject which has been widely discussed in various magazines, periodicals and in the press at large. Though Lord Salisbury and Secretary Olney have as yet been unable to agree upon any plan of international arbitration there is much for congratulation and encouragement in the correspondence just made public. This shows that both sides are in favor of international arbitration and have been striving in a most friendly spirit to bring it about. They agree as to the desirability of the end in view and differ only as to the way of reaching it. Finally, they are evidently confident of coming to an agreement in time, but have deemed it well to report progress to the people of both countries. It is, of course, to be regretted that the negotiations carried on have not been crowned with success, but success can hardly be far off when it is considered that popular sentiment on both sides is strongly for international arbitration and the two governments are trying in a friendly spirit to agree upon a mutually satisfactory plan. Surely this is a favorable outlook. At a recent meeting of the Illinois State Bar Association Hon. Thomas C. Windes, judge of the Circuit Court of Cook county, spoke on the delays in the administration of justice. As this is a subject which is at present creating widespread interest in this State and throughout the country, we give in substance the address, in which he spoke as follows: "That there are the most serious and many times exasperating and disastrous delays in the attainment of justice, we have, from almost every litigant who wants results, from every consciously innocent man charged with crime and from the great body of the public that clamors for the speedy punishment of the petty thief, the robber, the night-time burglar, the scheming bank president, embezzler of hard earned savings and the murderer. On the other hand, if you have the confidence of the swindler, the scoundrel or the shrewd, calculating manager of the great corporations that maim and kill people by the hundreds, he will tell you that costs are so small that he can well afford to pay interest and attorney's fees for the sake of the delay which he can make in the collection of a just money demand against him or his corporation, or he will tell you "the plaintiff's witnesses may die in the course of a few years delay that I can make, and I can defeat his claim altogether, although it is a just one." "Or in the case of a personal injury, he will confidingly whisper, "the poor devil, you know, has lost an arm and a leg, or has lost both legs, or his spine is injured so that he is partially paralyzed, or his nervous system has received such a shock that he is a physical wreck, or his skull is fractured and presses on his brain so that, my doctor tells me, it is only a question of time when he will either die or become insane (I wish he had been killed outright, for then our liability would be limited to $5,000. I'm told he earned $6,000 every year before he was injured). He must have surgical treatment, nurses and medicines. His wife, they say, is costs money, my friend. not very strong and will soon become a mother, there are three little children too, two, four and six years of age, the eldest of whom has a functional disease that renders it helpless. My dear sir, to keep this woman and children from actual suffering will require money these days That I hear that this fellow, before this accident lived up to his income practically, and what he has saved will certainly be expended in the course of a year. Don't you see that delay is what we want. This fellow can't pay lawyers— he can't get around to look up witnesses, and he can't keep them together even if he gets them, two or three years. I am told by our claim agent that there is only one witness who knows the principal facts necessary to establish his case, and his health When we get him that far along, if it seems that further delay is very uncertain, then I'll offer him a few hundred hundred dollars, certainly not more than one-fourth of what he would recover by a trial; most likely he will take it, feeling that he must, and that he can no longer bear the delay. This case of the man comparatively well to do might be much more fully elaborated to show the practical advantages of delay in the courts to the defendant, and the want, misery and suffering which come to the plaintiff and his family by this same delay. But far greater is the want and suffering caused where the injured one is dependent for himself and his family upon his daily wages, whether as laborer, clerk or artisan; or in the case of the breadwinner losing his life, the mother and children, almost helpless, must battle against these odds. In the case of the innocent man charged with crime, the delay in length of time which confronts him is not so great in our State, but no doubt to many a poor man, who is without friends to procure bail, days seem to be weeks and even months, and months almost a lifetime. The practice which holds a man in jail awaiting trial on a criminal charge for months, when he wishes a trial, is radically wrong. In years past that has often occurred in Chicago, but is of less frequency under the present administration of the State's attorney's office. During the month of June, the present year, every prisoner committed to the Cook county jail prior to April 1st of this year, had had a trial if he wished it, and very many were tried who were committed during the month of May. While this is a great improvement over past years, every prisoner committed during any one month should be tried the following month if he asked it, or the prosecuting attorney should be required to show some good reason for his failure in that regard. If a man is guilty, the swifter his trial and conviction the better the effect on him and other criminals. If he is innocent, the State does him a most grievous wrong in depriving him of his liberty and inflicts upon him the shame and disgrace almost inseparably connected with confinement within prison walls under a charge of crime. But far greater is the wrong which is constantly being done by other delays in the administration of criminal justice. There is real cause for the clamors which come from the public everywhere in this State and county that crime is not speedily punished. If crime is speedily punished, that means that there shall be speedy trials, and when they are had, the false accusation of crime falls when the testimony is adduced in court, and the innocent person accused is promptly liberated as he should be. These delays in criminal cases arise mainly from the cumbrous, effete grand jury system, the length of time consumed in the examination of petit jurors, the necessity of every case of felony being tried by a jury, and the scope of appellate jurisdiction. In civil cases delays come largely from the great mass of litigation which is caused principally by the lack of any substantial penalty to the defeated party by way of costs and attorney's fees. It causes to many speculation suits as well as defenses. A plaintiff or defendant, as the law now is on costs and attorney's fees, may well afford to bring a suit or make a defence, if he has one chance in two of success. I am confident many suits are brought and defenses are made not even on chances of meritorious success, but solely on the possibilities through the worry and expense to which the opposite party can be subjected, some sort of advantage may be gained in way of settlement before a trial can be reached. Much delay also comes from the generalities of our system of pleading. So far from giving the real cause of action or defense are the pleadings in many cases that the attorneys could not get the faintest idea from the pleadings alone as to the real matter in dispute. In fact it is too often the case that pleadings are drawn purposely to conceal the real matter in dispute. Another great cause of delay comes of the fact that so many cases are tried by juries, when |