To entitle an applicant to a judgment admitting him to citizenship he must take the oath specified in Sub. 2, Sec. 2165 R. S. of U. S. and he must prove that he made the prior declaration required by Sub. 1 of the same section, and that he possesses the qualifications as to residence, character and attachment to the Constitution and Nation required by Sub. 3 of said section. The importance of these conditions demands their separate and detailed consideration.

(1.) Oath of applicant.

The applicant must declare on oath before the court that he will support the Constitution of the United States and that he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign. prince, potentate, state or sovereignty and particularly by name to the prince, potentate or sovereignty of which he was before a citizen or sub. ject. U. S. R. S. Sec. 2165, Sub. 2.

In respect to this declaration Judge Dallas, of the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, in a recent opinion says: "Of the fact of making the declaration to support the Constitution of the United States, no extrinsic evidence is necessary, for it is made in the presence of the judge, but it by no means follows that the court is charged with no duty in respect to this declaration. It may safely be assumed that Congress in requiring it to be made before the court meant to assure its being made with decent solemnity; but more than this it is expressly provided that it shall be made "on oath," and therefore, in my opinion, it should not be accepted in any case in which upon examination it appears that the applicant does not understand its significance, or is without such knowledge of the Constitution as is essential to the rational assumption of an undertaking vouched by oath to support. In many instances these declarations are made by men who have no counsel to inform or restrain them and who themselves have no adequate appreciation of their purport or of the sacredness of the accompanying oath, which in order to accomplish the object in view they are often quite willing to take as a matter of course. I cannot shut my eyes to the existence of this abuse, nor regard as sufficient, under the statute, any oath which relevant questioning results in showing is not intelligently and conscientiously tendered." I take it a court may safely assume in cases of intelligent applicants that the oath to support the Constitution is taken with proper sincerity and with the intent to faithfully carry out the obligations thereby imposed. If the court is in doubt of the applicant's sincerity, it is clearly its duty to make proper inquiry. If as a result of that inquiry it becomes apparent that the applicant does not take this oath with sincerity; does not intend to carry out the obligations which that oath imposes upon him, his application should be rejected. It it appears that the applicant has no conception of the obligations his oath impose upon him, then clearly this oath should not be administered, until he is made to understand, possibly

by instruction of the court, what those obligations are. The interests of the Nation and of the applicant are alike disregarded, if, when this solemn oath is taken, the latter is ignorant of the obligations he swears to perform.

(2.) Prior declaration.

Unless his is one of the cases in which a prior declaration is dispensed with, the applicant must prove to the court that at least two years prior thereto he declared on oath before a clerk of a court of Record his intention to become a citizen and to make the renunciation contained in his oath. This prior declaration may have been taken by the clerk outside of and away from his office. Andres v. Circuit Judge, 77 Mich. 89. In Re Langtry, 31 F. R. 879, decided by Mr. Justice Field, of the U. S. Supreme Court, is, however, an authority holding exactly the contrary.

(3.) The applicant must also prove that he has resided in the United States five years and in the State or Territory in which the court is held one year, "but the oath of the applicant shall in no case be allowed to prove his residence." R. S. Sec. 2165, Sub. 3. It has been decided that the applicant's oath is not merely insufficient to prove his residence, but it is so devoid of the character of testimony that even if false, perjury cannot be assigned upon it. U. S. v. Grottkau, 30 F. R. 674..

In the case of Cumming's Petition, 41 N. H., 270, it was held that the provision as to residence was complied with if the applicant had resided any one of the five years in the State. (In that case, however, the applicant resided in New Hampshire at the time of his application.) It would follow from this reasoning that if the applicant was at the time of his application a resident of Ohio, he would bring himself within the provisions of this statute, if he had lived any one of the last five years in Michigan. I will not presume to quarrel with so high a tribunal as the Supreme Court for the State of New Hampshire, but I do not think any court in this State should assume jurisdiction to pass upon the application for citizenship of a non-resident of this State. Assuming the correctness of the New Hampshire case, it would still not be obligatory on State courts to entertain jurisdiction. Kentucky v. Denison, 24 How. 66.

In any event only our own State authorities could compel us to entertain such jurisdiction, and no state authority is likely to contend or decide that the courts of this State should spend their time in making citizens of another State.

The provision under discussion does not require the applicant to reside within the jurisdiction of the court passing on his application. An article in the Philadelphia Press of Oct. 5, 1894, states that 2,000 alien residents of Philadelphia were naturalized by the court of an adjoining county and that a protest from the grand jury caused that court to make an order refusing naturalization to non-residents of the County.

(4.) The applicant must also prove: That during his five years' res

idence in the United States he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. R. S. 2165, Sub. 3. He has not behaved as a man of good moral character if he has been convicted of the crime of perjury, even though he was subsequently pardoned. In Re Spencer, 5 Sawyer 195. In general it may safely be said if the applicant has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or has behaved like one guilty of such a crime he is excluded under this clause.

After quoting the foregoing provision the Supreme Court of Utah (in the matter of Kanaka Nian, 21 P. R. 993) say: "The man intrusted with the high, difficult and sacred duties of an American citizen should be informed and enlightened; he should have sufficient intelligence to discriminate right from wrong in political matters, and should possess a feeling of moral obligation sufficient to cause him to adopt the right. In the law quoted, Congress exhibited an intention to admit to citizenship aliens of a good moral character, attached to the principles of liberty and justice contained in the Constitution, and desirous of the public good, and to exclude aliens who live immoral lives and disregard moral principles, who are in favor of despotism and are indifferent to or opposed to these institutions upon which the welfare of all depends. They intended to exclude the immoral; those who were opposed to the principles of liberty and justice and are in favor of anarchy and confusion. No one should be admitted who has not sufficient intelligence to understand the principles of government, which rest in part upon his will. It does not appear to the satisfaction of the court that the applicant understands the principles of the Constitution of the United States or its institutions sufficiently to become a citizen."

Judge Dallas, in the opinion heretofore cited, immediately following his discussion of the oath heretofore quoted, says: "Furthermore the law requires that it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the applicant has behaved as a man attached to the principles of the Constitution, and bearing this in mind with what has already been said, the conclusion would seem to be inevitable, that the court ought not to admit any alien to citizenship without being satisfied that he has at least some general comprehension of what the Constitution is and of the principles which it affirms." I do not cite these opinions as decisive. I am well aware that it can be contended that a man can behave as one attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States without any acquaintance with that instrument just as easily as one can behave morally without an acquaintance with the doctrines of moral philosophy. But these views, if they are extreme, serve to call our attention to language which I think has frequently passed unnoticed. If that language does not mean that the applicant should have a knowledge of the Consti

tution, it at least means that he should have behaved as if he loved its principles. One who has consorted and acted with the enemies of the United States; one who has supported anarchial or any other movement directed against Government; one who has in any way exhibited contempt for or hatred to the principles of our Constitution or to our Nation has not behaved as a man attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and as a man well disposed to the good order and haphiness of the same, and is not entitled to citizenship.

(5.)

Nearly all applicants seeking citizenship without having made a prior declaration base their claim on the ground that they came to the United States when they were under age. An applicant of this class must not only do all required of applicants who have made such prior declarations-excepting, of course, to prove the making of such prior declaration-but he must also prove that he is at least twenty-one years old; that he came to this country under eighteen years of age; that he has resided here continually since, that the entire period of such residence is five years, and that for the two years next preceding it has been his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the United States. R. S. U. S. Sec. 2167.

It appears therefore that the statute of naturalization requires that an applicant for its privileges should have behaved during his five years' residence in this country as a good man, and as a good citizen and that his fidelity in the future shall be assured by his oath to support the Constitution. To insure the admission of worthy and the rejection of unworthy applicants, the statute provides for a judicial investigation of each application by a court.

Unfortunately the statute marks out no method by which the court shall conduct this investigation. It remains for the courts therefore to discover and put in operation a proper method of proceedure. That method should be the one best calculated to bring before the court all the facts bearing upon the questions under investigation. Says Judge Dallas in the opinion heretofore cited: "An applicant for naturalization then is a suitor who by his petition institutes a proceeding in a court of justice for the determination of an asserted right. Every such petition must of course allege the existence of all facts and the fulfilment of all conditions upon the existence and fulfilment of which the statutes which confer the right asserted have made it dependent.

But the presentation of the petition merely brings the matter before the court and the burden rests upon the petitioner to establish its material allegations by such evidence as the law has made requisite, and which is needed to satisfy the judgment of the Court. Without this there can be no such judicial inquiry into the case as the act of Congress contemplates. In short the application must be supported by legal proofs of the facts on which it rests; the proceedings are strictly judicial. The alien who applies for admission asserts on his part a compliance with the conditions

and he must furnish the requisite proof of what he asserts, or he establishes no right." Says Chief Justice Marshall in Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters 407: "They (the courts) are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law and to judge as to both law and fact." The testimony required must be of a legal character. Ex parte affidavits are insufficient. It is scarcely necessary to quote a decision to the effect that a clerk cannot perform the judicial duty of passing upon these applications. Such a decision, however, exists. See in the matter of Clark, 18 Barbour 447. It follows from the decision just quoted, as well as from general considerations, that the witnesses in these matters should take the witness stand and testify to facts relevant to the question under investigation. The practice of permitting the witnesses to testify in the language of the statute is, in my judgment, a vicious one. To accept the general statement of a witness that the applicant is a man of good moral character attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same, is in effect to require no testimony whatever upon these material facts. At the most, such a witness can be held only to the good faith of his opinion. His acquaintance with the applicant may be so limited as to make that opinion, no matter with what faith it is held of no value whatever. In other words he may have no such knowledge of the applicant's behavior as to justify his expressing an opinion. It may happen that notwithstanding knowledge by the witness of very improper conduct of the applicant, motives of kindness induce favorable testimony. The applicant may, according to the witness's standard, have behaved as a man of good moral character, when according to the standard that the court would apply; he has not so behaved at all. In other words, under this system, the standard which each witness has in his own mind and not the standard which the law requires, determines the judgment of the court. The judicial function "to receive testimony, compare it with the law and judge, both as to the law and fact," is delegated to every witness who comes into court. There ought in these cases to be afforded an opportunity for the introduction of all material evidence, whether favororable or opposed to the claim made by the applicant. Testimony bearing on the questions involved, whether it comes from the mouths of witnesses selected by the applicant or from others having an acquaintance with the facts should be received. To afford this opportunity obviously demands a reformation as to the time and place of hearing such applications as well as in the method of conducting them. Those applications should be heard in the court within whose jurisdiction the applicant resides. They should be heard only on stated occasions, as on a stated day each week, each month, or each term, as the case may be. They should not be heard until that applicant's petition stating the facts upon which he bases his claim and specifying his residence with the utmost