practical, has undoubtedly come very largely from the crowding of the work into too short a period of time. With the lengthening of courses we may hope for a change. But this is a problem that the profession and the schools must solve, and let us hope that the solution will be such as to place the study of law in the United States upon a thoroughly scientific basis. If this and the other reforms suggested can be accomplished, much will have been done in the way of lifting the profession above the grade of a mere calling and fitting it for the grave public duties that it must, of necessity,

assume.

CAN THE PRESENT JURY SYSTEM BE IMPROVED.

PROF. B. M. THOMPSON.

There is unquestionably much dissatisfaction with the quality of the modern jury,and with the character of its work. Since juries are composed of men possessing finite intelligence, at best, we ought not to expect that their verdicts would show evidence of infinite wisdom. But the most charitable, who do not expect the impossible are often disappointed at the quality of the possible. All this goes without saying and consequently the question is often discussed, how can the system be improved?

We suggest the following changes. None of them are revolutionary, although a few may be regarded as somewhat radical.

First; Reduce the pay of jurors from two to one dollar per day. Two dollars is not sufficient to induce the best men to serve for the pay and is sufficient, especially in cities to be attractive to a certain class who are indesirable. One dollar per day will cover a juryman's actual expenses and no more and he will thus be giving his time to the public service. We shall at once by this change rid ourselves of the professional juryman and make the position more attractive to the men whose services we seek to obtain.

Second; Reduce the number of the jury in all civil suits from twelve to six. The unanimous verdict of six intelligent men of character and ability is all that parties litigant ought to demandand if jurymen are to serve, practically, without compensation such service should be made as light as practicable and subserve the ends of justice.

Third; No general verdict, except in actions founded upon tort, to be rendered. In all other cases the jury to render a special verdict in answer to interrogatories to be prepared and submitted to them by the litigants under the direction of the court, and upon the special verdict so found the court to render judgment. Under this system the jury would be exclusive judges of fact and questions of law would be left exclusively to the court.

Fourth; All suits involving less than two hundred dollars, over and above all set offs, to be tried by the court. At least one half of all the causes tried in the circuit courts belong to that class. At the

present time the cost of a jury to the taxpayers of each county is at least fifty-four dollars per day while the jury is in attendance, made up of forty-eight dollars pay of twenty-four jurymen and six dollars. pay of two officers in attendance. I think if we had access to the exact facts we should find that the actual cost to the taxpayer in furnishing a jury in this class of cases exceeds the amount involved. I do not question the right of litigants to play for small stakes, nor indeed their duty to do so in very many cases. But I submit that, so far as the public is concerned there is no principle involved, and when from a pecuniary standpoint, the game is not worth the candle the taxpayers should not be required to furnish any more light than is reasonably necessary.

I have not made any effort to elaborate the arguments in favor of these several changes nor indeed to so much as to enumerate them. Neither have I indicated at all in detail the proper practice and proceedings in case these changes were made, that being mere matter of detail.

The primary object of any change should be, of course, to better the situation, but it is not unworthy of mention that the changes suggested would save the taxpayers of the state over $100.000, per annum, a very pretty penny.

MICHIGAN STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.-The Board of Directors of the Michigan State Bar Association met at Lansing, on Tuesday April 30th, and arranged a program for the Annual Meeting to be held in Lansing on the 25th of June. There were present:-Hon. M. V. Montgomery, President; Eli. R. Sutton, Secretary; Alfred Russell, S. T. Durand, Geo. W. Weadock, Justice Brown, Dallas Boudeman, Judge Howard, Judge Cahill and O'Brien J. Atkinson.

The program for the annual convention as perfected, comprises papers by Alex. R. Avery of Port Huron, J. Newton Fiero of New York. J. A. Boyd, Chancellor of Ontario, and Benton Hanchett of Saginaw. Preparations will be made for entertaining the American Bar Association which is to meet in Detroit during the month of August. In the evening a banquet in honor of the Supreme Court Justices and guests of the Association will be served at the Downey House.

The JOURNAL takes this opportunity to urge upon the members of the Association and of the profession generally, the importance of attending this session. Assuredly the convenience of members composing our state bar is admirably suited in point of both time and place selected for the meeting. A majority of the states are fortunate in the possession of active and well supported bar associations, but Michigan, with a bar of admittedly superior standing, has shown amazing apathy relative to the maintenance and expansion of such an important organization. It is the most excellent means at the command of members of the profession throughout the state, for weaving a bond of fraternal communion that shall be valuable as a source of business profit, as well as a medium for the cultivation of social intercourse. Every lawyer in the state should not only become a member of the Association, but should manifest an active interest in its development and perpetuation.

THE NEGOTIABILITY OF PAPER PAYABLE WITH EXCHANGE. It is an unfortunate but a necessary consequence of our system of jurisprudence that different and conflicting rules become established in the

various state courts. It is especially to be regretted that commercial paper does not form an exception to this rule, because like money, which it is coming to represent more and more, it should everywhere have the same value and be governed by the same laws. The Iowa case of Culbertson v. Nelson, 61 N. W. Rep. 854, is an example of the conflicting views taken by the courts of the different states on this subject. It was there held that "a bill of exchange for the payment of a certain sum with exchange" was not negotiable. The authorities, which are well collected in the opinion, are in great conflict on this point. The view of the Court is sustained in the following cases: Lowe v. Bliss, 24 Ill. 168; Bank v. Strother, 28 S. C. 504; Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24; Fitzharris v. Leggatt, 10 Mo. App. 529; while the opposite conclusion has been reached in Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 242; Johnson v. Frisbie, 15 Mich. 286; Morgan v. Edwards, 53 Wis. 599; Hasting v. Thompson (Minn.) 55 N. W. Rep. 968; Bradley v. Lill, 4 Biss. 473; Price v. Teal, 4 McLean 201; etc.

The Court said "the agreement to pay a certain sum.... with exchange" introduces an uncertainity as to the amount to be paid, which destroys the character and negotiability of the instrument as a bill of exchange...... This certainty must appear on the face of the paper, and not from anything dehors the instrument. The maxim, "Id certum est quod certum reddi potest," does not apply except the certainty required may be ascertained from the face of the paper."

On strict principle this reasoning is undoubtedly correct, but the uncertainty is more apparent than real. The reason of the rule is that the instrument should contain on its face the means of ascertaining exactly the amount due, but as the amount of exchange can be readily calculated at any time and usually bears but a very small proportion to the principal sum, à liberal construction of the rule is to be preferred to a strict, technical observation of it. Since the whole law of commercial paper is founded upon usage and custom, and it is now customary to treat such instruments as negotiable, it seems but proper that the courts should favor a liberal rather than a strict application of the rule.

It is curious to note that while the Supreme Court of Iowa has held that the stipulation to pay an attorney's fee for collection does not alter the negotiable character of a bill or note, (Sperry v. Horr, 32 Iowa 184; First National Bank v. Dubuque S. W. Ry. Co., 52 Iowa 378), the Supreme Court of Michigan, which upholds the negotiability of paper payable with exchange, denies the negotiability of such an instrument.

THE VALIDITY OF AN ATTORNEY'S INTEREST IN A CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE RESULTANT JUDGMENT.-Modern decisions affecting the interest of an attorney, by contract, in a cause of action and in any judgment that may be entered thereupon, have become molded into a doctrine which recommends itself as a source of pro