inseparably attended. I am not called upon to question the wisdom or policy of preferring hereditary to elective monarchies among the great nations of Europe, where different orders and ranks of society are established and large masses of property accumulated in the hands of single individuals, and where ignorance and poverty are widely diffused, and standing armies are necessary to preserve the stability of the government. The state of society and of property in this country, and our moral and political habits, have enabled us to adopt the republican principle, and to maintain it hitherto with illustrious success. It remains to be seen, whether the checks which the Constitution has provided against the dangerous propensities of our system will ultimately prove effectual. The election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation, affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue and even hazardous to the public tranquillity. The Constitution, from an enlightened view of all the difficulties that attend the subject, has not thought it safe or prudent to refer the election of a President directly and immediately to the people; but it has confided the power to a small body of electors, appointed in each State, under the direction of the Legislature; and to close the opportunity as much as possible against negotiation, intrigue and corruption, it has declared that Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall vote, and that the day of election shall be the same in every State. This security has been still further extended, by the act of Congress directing the electors to be appointed in each State within thirty-four days of the day of election." Kent's Commentaries, vol. i., p. 273.

A great variety of opinions existed among the framers of the Constitution, and much discussion took place in the Convention, in relation to the Executive Department, how it was to be organized, and how, and in what manner, to be filled. By reference to the Madison Papers, containing the Debates of the Convention, it will be found, however, that the members unanimously agreed, without debate, to the provision requiring the President to be a natural born citizen, &c.; to be thirty-five years of age, and a resident for fourteen years. 5 Elliott's Debates, 521.

In agreeing to the mode of election great difficulty was experienced. In the programme submitted by Edmund Randolph, which was denomi. nated the Virginia plan, it was proposed that the Executive should be chosen by the National Legislature. James Wilson was in favor of an election by the people, but said he "was almost unwilling to declare the mode he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical." Yet he was in favor "to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures, but the Executive also, in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States." Roger Sherman thought "an independence of the Executive on the Supreme Legislature" was "the very essence of tyranny," and therefore favored the appointment of the Executive by the Legislature, and of making "him absolutely dependent on that body." John Rutledge suggested "an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the National

Legislature." Col. Mason favored Mr. Wilson's idea, but thought it impracticable. Elbridge Gerry "opposed the election by the National Legislature," because "there would be a constant intrigue" between the Legislature and the candidates, and "votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter." He liked Mr. Wilson's proposition, but "feared it would alarm and give a handle to the State partisans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities." He preferred "taking the suffrages of the States, instead of electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint;" but he "was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions." Mr. Wilson's proposition was voted for by but two States, Pennsylvania and Maryland, and the proposition of Mr. Randolph was agreed to by the following vote: Aye-Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; Nay-Pennsylvania and Maryland. Elliott's Debates, vol. v., pp. 142-3-4.

Some time afterwards Elbridge Gerry moved a reconsideration of the subject, and proposed "that the National Executive should be elected by the executives of the States, whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the States in the election of the Senate." Edmund Randolph strongly opposed this proposition, and it was negatived, nine States voting against it, and Delaware being divided. Ibid., 174. Alexander Hamilton was in favor, and read a proposition to that effect to the Convention, of the executive authority being "vested in a Governor, to be elected to serve during good behavior—the election to be made by electors chosen by the people in the election districts." Ibid., 205. When the subject again came in form before the Convention, Gouverneur Morris took strong ground against the election by the National Legislature, and moved to strike out National Legislature, and insert citizens of the United States; but his motion received but one vote, that of Pennsylvania; whereupon Luther Martin moved that the Executive be chosen by electors appointed by the several Legislatures of the States, which was also negatived, it receiving only the vote of Maryland and Delaware. Ibid., 323.

Subsequently a reconsideration was had, when Oliver Ellsworth moved that the Executive "be chosen by electors, appointed by the Legislatures of the States" in a certain ratio named, and the question being divided, both parts were adopted, the States of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia voting against the first, and Virginia and South Carolina against the second. Ibid., 338. William C. Houston subsequently again moved a reconsideration, and proposed that the Executive be elected by the National Legislature, and it prevailed by a vote of seven to four, Connec

ticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia being in the negative, but the Convention re-opened the discussion of the subject the same day, and again receded from its decision. Ibid., 358. Various propositions followed, but none were adopted. Ibid., 359 to 368. These and the difficulties which environed the subject are clearly stated in the following remarks of Mr. Mason:

In every stage of the question relative to the executive, the difficulty of the subject, and the diversity of the opinions concerning it, have appeared; nor have any of the modes of constituting that department been satisfactory. First, it has been proposed that the election should be made by the people at large; that is, that an act which ought to be performed by those who know most of eminent characters and qualifications should be performed by those who know least; secondly, that the election should be made by the Legislatures of the States; thirdly, by the executives of the States. Against these modes, also, strong objections have been urged. Fourthly, it has been proposed that the election should be made by electors chosen by the people for that purpose. This was at first agreed to; but on further consideration has been rejected. Fifthly, since which, the mode of Mr. Williamson, requiring each freeholder to vote for several candidates, has been proposed. This seemed, like many other propositions, to carry a plausible face, but on closer inspection is liable to fatal objections. A popular election in any form, as Mr. Gerry has observed, would throw the appointment into the hands of the Cincinnati, a society for the members of which he had a great respect, but which he never wished to have a preponderating influence in the government. Sixthly, another expedient was proposed by Mr. Dickinson, which is liable to so palpable and material an inconvenience, that he had little doubt of its being by this time rejected by himself. It would exclude every man who happened not to be popular within his own State; though the causes of his local unpopularity might be of such a nature as to recommend him to the States at large. Seventhly, among other expedients, a lottery has been introduced. But as the tickets do not appear to be in much demand, it will probably not be carried on, and nothing therefore need be said on that subject. After reviewing all these various modes, he was led to conclude, that an election by the National Legislature, as originally proposed, was the best; if it was liable to objections, it was liable to fewer than any other. He conceived, at the same time, that a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited. Having for his primary object—for the polar star of his political conduct-the preservation of the rights of the people, he held it as an essential point, as the very palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of state, and particularly the executive, should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were at first taken, in order that they may feel and respect those rights and interests which are again to be personally valuable to them. He concluded with moving, that the constitution of the executive, as reported by the Committee of the Whole, be reinstated, viz.: "that the executive be appointed for seven years, and be ineligible a second time."

Mr. Mason's motion was agreed to by a vote of seven to three, and on the question to agree to the whole resolution as amended, relating to the Executive, namely: "That a National Executive be instituted, to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of seven years, to be ineligible a second time, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise pro

vided for, to be removable on impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty, to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury;" the same passed by the following vote: New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia-aye, six; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland-no, three; Massachusetts, not on the floor; Virginia divided, (Mr. Blair and Col. Mason, aye; Gen. Washington and Mr. Madison, no; Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.) Ibid., 369.

The Committee, consisting of Messrs. Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham,. Ellsworth and Wilson, appointed to report a Constitution, conformable to the resolutions passed by the Convention, reported the article relating to the Executive, as instructed, but when it came up for adoption by the Convention it was again opposed. Daniel Carroll moved to strike out legislature and insert people, but only two States, Maryland and Pennsylvania, voted for it. Others followed, however, with like motions to amend, and there being much dissatisfaction on the subject, it was referred to another Committee, which reported the following:

"After the word' excellency,' in Sect. 1, Art. 10, to be inserted: He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner, viz.: Each State shall appoint, in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and members of the House of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Legislature. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; and they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each, which they shall sign, and certify, and transmit, sealed, to the seat of the General Government, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in that House, open all the certificates, and the votes shall be then and there counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of that of the electors; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Senate shall immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for President; but if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall choose, by ballot, the President; and in every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be Vice President; but if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them the Vice President. The Legislature may determine the time of choosing and assembling the electors, and the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes."" Deb., 507.

5 Elliott's

This presented a new mode, more acceptable in the main than any other that had yet been proposed, and was modified and amended to the form in which it was finally adopted, and made part of the Constitution, as agreed upon by the Convention.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE SENATE.

THE small number, and long duration of the Senate, were intended to render them a safeguard, says Chancellor Kent, against the influence of those paroxysms of heat and passion, which prevail occasionally in the most enlightened communities, and enter into the deliberation of popular assemblies. In this point of view, a firm and independent Senate is justly regarded as an anchor of safety amidst the storms of political faction; and, for want of such a stable body, the republics of Athens and Florence were overturned, by the fury of commotions, which the Senates of Sparta, Carthage and Rome might have been able to withstand. The characteristical qualities of the Senate, in the intendment of the Constitution, are wisdom and stability. The legal presumption is, that the Senate will entertain more enlarged views of public policy, will feel a higher and juster sense of national character, and a greater regard for stability in the administration of the government. These qualities, it is true, may, in most cases, be found in the other branch of the Legislature; but the constitutional structure of the House is not equally calculated to produce them; for, as the House of Representatives comes more immediately from the people, and the members hold their seats for a much shorter time, they are presumed to partake, with a quicker sensibility, of the prevailing temper and irritable disposition of the times, and to be in much more danger of adopting measures with precipitation, and of changing them with levity. A mutable legisla

tion is attended with a more formidable train of mischiefs to the community. It weakens the force, and increases the intricacy of the laws, hurts credit, lessens the value of property, and it is an infirmity very incident to republican establishments, and has been a constant source of anxiety and concern to their most enlightened admirers. A disposition to multiply and change laws, upon the spur of the occasion, and to be making constant and restless experiments with the statute code, seems to be the natural disease of popular assemblies. In order, therefore, to counteract such a dangerous propensity, and to maintain a due portion of confidence in the government, and to insure its safety and character at home and abroad, it is requisite that another body of men, coming likewise from the people, and equally responsible for their conduct, but resting on a more permanent basis, and constituted with stronger inducements to moderation in debate, and to tendency of purpose, should be placed as a check