to preferve to us. And according to their advice, pack up our hopes and fears into as narrow a room as we can possibly, by which we shall render the last more portable, and the first lefs tedious.

Ofborne. Advice to his Son. (e) Omnia nobis tenebras fecimus.] Nothing is more frequent than the ufe of this metaphor in Scripture, but full to our purpofe is, re were fome time darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord. All things that are reproved are made manifest by the light; for whatsoever doth make manifeft, is light. Wherefore he faith (If. 60. 1.) Awake thou that sleepeth, and arife from the dead, and Chrift shall give thee light. Ephef. v. 8. 14. I fend thee, (Paul) to the Gentiles, to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light. Act. 26. 18. Rom. 13. 12. i. Tim. 5. 5. i. John, 2. 8.

(f) Nec-circumfpectius pedem ponimus] but as wife, redeeming the time. Ephef. v. 15. deeming the time. Col. iv. 5,

(g) See Fitzofborne, Letter 48.

See then that ye walk more circumspectly, not as fools,
Walk in wisdom toward them that are without, re-

(b) So Mofes, in the name of the Lord, I have fet before thee this day life and good. It is not hidden from thee; neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldst say, who shall go up for us into heaven, and bring it us? Neither is it beyond the fea, that thou shouldst say, who shall go over the Jea, and bring it unto us? But the word is very nigh thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayeft do it. Deut. 30. 11---15. See alfo Rom. x. 6---8.

(i) See Ep. 18.

(4) Linguas phenicopterorum] Whatever bird it was, Muret. obferves, that Apicius (that master of gluttony and diffolutenefs) recommended the tongue of it as a moft dainty morfel. Sueton. in Kitell. c. 13.

Dat mihi penna rubens nomen: fed lingua gulofis

Noftra fapit, quid fi garrula lingua foret!
Gluttons have borrow'd this my name from Greek;

My tongue a dainty bit! oh, could I speak!

() It is obfervable that litters were not fed by way of state, before the time of Julius Cæfar, but only for travelling. Suetonius mentions it as a particular privilege granted to one Harpocras, the being carried about the city in a litter, in the time of Claudius Cæfar: he also observes that they were not allowed to ladies of an eafy fame, in the time of Domitian. See Lipf. Flect. i 19.

(m) This, with Attalus' leave, feems a very hard leffon, and fomewhat like what the old nurfe faid to her child: lie ftill, child, you will die presently. But his argument is, that we should not be over-anxious even for neceffaries; and much lefs purchase them at the expence of liberty.

() See Ep. xxv. (N. d. e.) Elian Var. Hift. iv. 13.

EPISTLE

EPISTLE CXI.

On idle Cavils.

YOU defire to know, Lucilius, by what word we express in Latin, what the Greeks called sopar, fophifms. I know of none who have expreffed it properly, though fome have attempted it; and the reason of this is, being averfe to, and not using the thing itself, we made no account of the name. Yet that seems to me the most expreffive which is made by Cicero (a). He calls them cavillationes, cavils; which whoever applies himself to, he forgeth indeed fubtle questions; but makes no advance in the better conduct of life: nor is made thereby more strong, more temperate, or more elate. Whereas he, who hath fought his remedy against the evils of life in philofophy, becomes magnanimous, full of confidence, infuperable; and feems the greater, the nearer you approach him like a mountain, the height whereof is not very apparent when viewed at a distance, but when you come near it feems to reach the skies.

Such, my Lucilius, is a philofopher, when a philofopher indeed; according to the truth of things, and not a counterfeit by art. He ftands on an eminence, is admirable, upright and truly great. He does not ftrut, and walk on tiptoe, like those who help their height by fome shift, and would fain feem taller than they are; but is contented with his natural ftature. And why fhould he not be content; fince he is too tall for Fortune to lay her hand upon him; and is therefore above all worldly affairs? In every ftate or condition he is confiftent with himfelf, and the fame man; whether his life runs fmoothly on with a profperous gale, or whether it be toffed by the boisterous waves of adverfity.

Now fuch conftancy can never be procured by the cavils beforementioned. The mind plays with thefe things, without receiving any

3

benefit

benefit from them. It is to dethrone philosophy, and reduce her to the common level. However you may fometimes amufe yourself with them, but it must be, when you intend to trifle and do nothing. But let me give you this caution; they have one bad quality attending them; they are too apt to allure the mind with a certain delight, and induce it, by a fpecious appearance of fubtlety, to fix itself upon them; when we have fo much bufinefs of the greatest importance upon our hands; when scarce our whole life is fufficient to learn this one thing, a contempt of life. But what of governing it, you say? This, Lucilius, is the fecond work we have to do; for no one can manage, or govern it well, who hath not first despised it.

ANNOTATIONS, &c.

(a) Cavillationes, the word indeed is ufed by Cicero, but not in this fenfe, rather fignifying quirps, witticifms, and the like.

Old Sinners very difficult to be reformed.

INDEED, Lucilius, I defire, as much as you, to instruct our old friend. But he is too tough and ftubborn for me, or rather, I should fay, what is more troublesome, he is too tender and delicate, his conftitution having been broke by a constant and evil habit. I will give you an example from my own experience. Every vine is not fit for grafting if it be old and worm-eaten; or if it be weak and slender, it will not receive the fcyon, or not nourish it; it will not take with it, and communicate its nature and quality. We are used therefore to cut it off just above ground, in order that if it fails, a fecond experiment

may

may be made by setting it again in the earth. The person you write about, and are concerned for, hath not ftrength; he hath so long indulged himself in vice, that at the fame time he both withers away, and hardens. He cannot close with reafon, nor indeed give it entertain

ment.

I will not fay that he He is at present sick of

He fays indeed he is of

But he is defirous, you fay. Do not think fo. tells you a lie ; he only thinks he is defirous. luxury; but he will foon return to it again. fended at his own life. I do not deny it; for who is not offended at it? There are men, who have both hated and loved their life at the fame time (a). We will therefore then give you our opinion, when he hath given us full affurance, that he really detefts luxury and all manner of excess; at present we are not clear in this point.

(a) Dr. Young hath beautifully expreffed this but on another occafion. "Life we think long and short; Death feek and shun;

Body and foul, like peevish man and wife,

United jar, and yet are loth to part." N. T. 11.

EPISTLE CXIII

A trifling Queftion, Whether Virtues and Vices are Animals *.

YOU defire me, Lucilius, to give you my opinion of that question, fo bandied about among the Stoics: whether juftice, fortiude, prudence, and other virtues, are animals. It is from fuch questions as these, my dear friend, that we are thought to exercife our wits to very little purpofe; and to wafte our time in idle and ufelefs difquifitions. However, I will endeavour to oblige you with an answer, and explain what some VOL. IL P P

among

among the Greeks (a) have understood of this affair; though I must own myself not of their opinion. The reafons that induced the antients to receive it, are the following:

It is manifeft, fay they, that (animus) the foul is an animal, seeing that it is the efficient caufe of life in us; and that animals borrow their name from it (6). And virtue is nothing elfe but the foul, under such a modification, and therefore it is an animal. Befides virtue acts, but nothing can act without impulfe or motion; and if it hath motion, which indeed properly belongs to animals, it is therefore an animal. If virtue, it is likewife faid, is an animal, it is an animal through virtue; for why? it contains itself. As a wife man does all things by, or thro' virtue; fo does virtue all things by itfelf: and therefore it is urged, that all arts are animals, all the objects of thought, and whatever is comprehended in the mind. From whence it follows, that millions of animals dwell in the narrow compafs of the human breaft; and all of us are so many animals, or contain fo many animals.

In answer to this, let me obferve, though every one of the things alledged be an animal, they are not many animals. And this I will explain to you, if you will hear me, with your usual attention and acuteness.

Every particular animal muft have a particular fubftance: but all thefe fuppofed animals have one foul, or are contained in one foul, therefore they can be but one; they cannot be many. I am an animal; I am also a man; yet you will not say that I am two. And why? because they must be feparable: the one, I fay, must be deducible from the other, or elfe they cannot be two. Every unit, however multiplied in itself, bath still but one nature, and is therefore one (c). My foul is an animal, and I am an animal; yet we are not two; because, my foul is a part of myself. A thing is to be numbered by itfelf, when it fubfifts by itself; but when it is part of another, it cannot leem a different. thing from that because a different, or another thing, must be what is, properly, wholly and abfolutely within itself.